A Vision of a New Combined Arms Philosophy & Doctrine

[Signalian]

wars have evolved.

now the realms are Social media, confusion, deployment of special forces masked with irregulars, snipers , EW systems, ELS systems, jamming of other drones and signals.

cost to produce one JF 17 = 15 mil USD

for the same 15mil USD, you can deploy spec forces , train irregulars and create mayhem via social media + numerous small surv drones . these irregular hybrid mix will do far more damage vs the single JF 17 that will be shot down in a full blown battle in a few minutes

far more cost effective

far more impactful

far more leverage to negotiate

------------------------

Two different roles for two different objectives. Both have own significance.
Money can't be a deciding factor.

 

[blueazure]

Two different roles for two different objectives. Both have own significance.
Money can't be a deciding factor.

if making enough cheap tanks is the idea of a new combined arms, i can only wish you good luck .,

no one had more heavy tanks than bashar al assad, yet his Jaish al arbi suri was beaten out of every town and hamlet in syria by lightly armed rebels with rusty ATGMs .

money isnt a factor? how come sir ? are you familiar with the price movement bill for an armored regiment ?
last time i checked, pakistan is cash strapped and economy is tumbling down like a kite . our very shrewd neighbor has figured this equation and has bled us dry with hybrid war sans firing a shot.

again, good luck with the light tank

 

[Signalian]

if making enough cheap tanks is the idea of a new combined arms, i can only wish you good luck .,

no one had more heavy tanks than bashar al assad, yet his Jaish al arbi suri was beaten out of every town and hamlet in syria by lightly armed rebels with rusty ATGMs .

money isnt a factor? how come sir ? are you familiar with the price movement bill for an armored regiment ?
last time i checked, pakistan is cash strapped and economy is tumbling down like a kite . our very shrewd neighbor has figured this equation and has bled us dry with hybrid war sans firing a shot.

again, good luck with the light tank

I'm having tea, would you like to have some?

JF-17 is an aircraft. Irregulars and other forces combined makes a hybrid force. JF-17 is an effective AD platform, which an irregular force can't provide. Regarding money, You can employ irregulars worth 30 million US$, but they wont provide effective AD neither reach anywhere within seconds as JF-17 would. Their roles are different.

I didn't reply any of your post mentioning tanks.

 

[blueazure]

I'm having tea, would you like to have some?

JF-17 is an aircraft. Irregulars and other forces combined makes a hybrid force. JF-17 is an effective AD platform, which an irregular force can't provide. Regarding money, You can employ irregulars worth 30 million US$, but they wont provide effective AD neither reach anywhere within seconds as JF-17 would. Their roles are different.

I didn't reply any of your post mentioning tanks.

the JF 17 is a good looking a/c , it has good weapon suite, granted. it makes for a very flashy ad promo

yet what is the return- on- equity for this 20mil USd a/c that will be shot down by area denial weapons ( s 300 / s 400 ) that our enemy has deployed ? dropping 3 bombs and getting shot down in a conflict?, not a very price effective option i take

as i said, there is empirical evidence to prove ( from syria to ukraine ) that irregulars blended with conventionals have caused way more mayham and achieved results vs regular forces.

 

[Armchair]

The compromise on tank type, APC vulnerability, low SPG numbers, only Short range AD and incomplete logistic system. Support and supply is not top notch. Lack of proper IFV. Not every Commander can pull of maneuvers like Lt Col Nisar of 25 Cavalry. Not committing Armor Divs in 1971. The T-59/69 replacement saga. Small Div formations. Lack of reserve MBT's.

Hi Signalian, I will try to break down bit by bit and discuss the issues you've underlined. Let me start with the first paragraph:

1. Need for IFV / APC vulnerability -
With the "Flex" tank that we have outlined the need for an IFV is significantly decreased. This is because each of the 4000 odd Flex tanks can carry 4 infantry. These infantry can be heavily armed, given that their mobility is significantly easier.
The basic strategy of using the APC as a battle taxi is sound, imho. Particularly in the age of ATGMs, area weapons and CAS.
The APC I have in mind for this role is a simple 8x8 APC that can carry 12 soldiers. 400hp engine (utilizing the same basic engine as the 500hp Flex tank, creating massive economies of scale for engine production, whose engine can also be used for large logistics trucks)

2. Compromise on tank type / T-59 /69 replacement saga
This is only a problem because there is a lack of vision, and because HIT is inefficiently organized. Turn it into a technocratic organization like the nuclear program and see the transformation. Unless there is a mechanical reason, Zarrars should not be prematurely retired. Tank battles defending Infantry divisions in defensive positions will not be fast moving battles, but a more static or slow paced defense. Zarrars are fine for this, unless we take into consideration reliability problems that inevitably come with age. When that becomes untenable, you retire them.
Remember, according to this plan, there will be 4000 new tanks that can easily give you the firepower and numbers to change the strategic landscape.

3. Wheeled SP guns needed
The South African model here may be best to replicate in scale. Using the same 400 / 500 hp engine as the core mobility platform and a local 155mm gun.
What I am saying is if you look at industrial production technical data, you will find that when you mass produce things, you get incredible economies of scale. You can drastically lower costs. That is the only way to solve the problem you are seeing in so many of your posts that you've expressed - insufficient and unreliable equipment.

4. Support and supply is not top notch
This needs to be, if not top notch, considerably better. The vision, the aim - is to decisively defeat India and liberate Kashmir. These will be massive maneuvers with constant flanking moves, at a scale never before seen - with 45 divisions in play just for the PA. How are you going to manage, control, coordinate, maneuver this large an army if you were the DGMO? Logistics would be king.

5. Every Commander cannot pull of maneuver warfare
They have to be taught. They have to practice. There has to be constant learning and constant focus on effectively practicing such maneuver warfare. And this has to be done from the level of the foot soldier to the sargent to the officers. From the level of a battalion to Corps and Army Groups. Perhaps you will need 4 commands - Kashmir, Lahore, Central, South. South of Lahore to the desert, there is a huge span of tank and maneuver country. Later in this thread we can try to put situation maps and show different deployment and engagement scenarios.

6. Lack of reserve MBTs
What specific kinds of reserve are you looking for? Organic reserve or strategic reserve? Division level or? Remember, we have the equipment in this scenario for 25 new divisions and (30-5) 25 old divisions, with equipment for 5 of the 25 new divisions being absorbed by the traditional divisions. Meaning you have 45 total divisions and 5 divisions worth of tanks, APCs and CAS aircraft organically in reserve (say at the division headquarters).

I will try to write more and deal with more of the questions you've raised later in'sha'Allah.

 

[Armchair]

Your thread starter is trying to replicate a template for war used by largest man army in world war two IE Russia thst was funded constantly by USA and Britain by air drops to defeat Germany in east .

He mentions modern European military tactics and doctrine.

Pakistan is poor developing country it can be Israel turkey or Germany or Russia I .tactics equipment or doctrine

South Asia is south Asia
All mouth no brains
Bravado and completely unorganised .

Typical south Asian traits

Hi -
Thesis: Blitzkreig
Anti-thesis: Deep Battle
Synthesis: What I'm proposing

It tends to combine characteristics from both and have certain new elements. For instance the base tank the "Flex tank" carries 4x infantry. This allows an even greater organic armor-infantry combination.
Some other key differences from Deep Battle:

1. The division is being seen as a maneuvering unit. Even the base unit is by default motorized.
2. Integration of CAS aircraft at the divisional / Corps level.
3. The concept of mobile artillery and mobile mortar.
4. "steady"-kreig rather than "blitz"-kreig or static defense.
5. Focus on ATGM and guided munition, precision strike rather than the Soviet doctrine of compensating with massive firepower.

So, I think its unfair to say that I'm regurgitating Soviet Deep Battle ala WW2.

The reason we are completely unorganized is because of the colonial legacy. We were not like this prior to that.

 

[Signalian]

Two components of war over looked are:

1. Deception
2. Reserves

1. A force in every sector filled with creativity of magic tricks related to camouflage, incorrect message transmissions, false buildings and depots, modifying cars and vans and tractors to look like proper tanks and APC's to give wrong location of armoured units or over strength of armoured forces etc

2. Reserve forces; a mixture of serving, retired, newly inducted and para military to handle old equipment in storage like 25 pounders, M-48, T-55 etc only for defensive purposes if the enemy makes a breakthrough towards cities of significance like Lahore, Sialkot, Hyderabad etc.

 

[Armchair]

Two components of war over looked are:

1. Deception
2. Reserves

1. A force in every sector filled with creativity of magic tricks related to camouflage, incorrect message transmissions, false buildings and depots, modifying cars and vans and tractors to look like proper tanks and APC's to give wrong location of armoured units or over strength of armoured forces etc

2. Reserve forces; a mixture of serving, retired, newly inducted and para military to handle old equipment in storage like 25 pounders, M-48, T-55 etc only for defensive purposes if the enemy makes a breakthrough towards cities of significance like Lahore, Sialkot, Hyderabad etc.

Interesting, yes, these would be great to incorporate into the doctrine as well.

You could also produce monkey versions of the tanks you are building, if you wanted to do it really properly. So, for instance, your mass production tank factory could churn out fake tanks, that can actually have some basic mobility and firepower, driven around by a single driver and a gunner, both with fast escape hatches. This would confuse the enemy as to your actual strength and posture.

About reserves - yes, a credible reserve strategy would be very important. Something on the lines of what you've propose has perhaps already been implemented by the PA. But one could actually utilize reserves better.

For instance, if you have the conscript supplement as I've proposed - 6 month service from random list of matriculation students and 6 month service from random list of graduating students, and you added semi-retired personnel in the mix, the combination would be excellent as the green horns would have the experience of the semi-retired personnel to learn from.

Lahore sector, Sialkot sector, and the "thin waistline" where India will supposedly attempt to cut Pakistan into half, would be excellent places to deploy at depth such reserves. Some could also be deployed on major train junctions for rapid axis maneuvers.

@denel I just found this, thought you may find it interesting or have something to add:

Ratels formed the mainstay of the SADF's ad hoc battle groups for most of the South African Border War. As the Ratel and most of the SADF's other combat vehicles were lightly armoured, South African mechanised doctrine came to revolve around such tactics as rapid movement, striking from the flank, and confusing the enemy with continuous manoeuvring.[22] In this regard the SADF differed greatly from Western IFV doctrine–which confined the IFV's role to assisting the forward momentum of tanks–as well as Soviet IFV doctrine, which dictated that IFVs must occupy and hold terrain as needed.[23] Although capable of operating independently, Ratel-based battle groups were not expected to occupy and hold static positions; their primary task was to outmanoeuvre an enemy unit[24] before destroying it with a concentrated fire and movement tactic known as a firebelt action.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ratel_IFV#Description

@Signalian was the Ratel ever tested in Pakistan? Seems very close to the concept I was talking about of a "Flex Tank" and a "mobile mortar" both carrying troops at the back!!!!

Would need to be heavier for the Indo-Pak scenario and perhaps a 105mm gun instead of the 90mm but the rifled gun has its advantages.

 

[Armchair]

In 1984, South Africa launched Operation Askari, which saw its mechanised and motorised infantry contingents threatened by large Angolan tank formations for the first time.[7]Both the Ratel-90 and Eland-90 were used as improvised tank destroyers but performed inadequately against T-54/55 tanks of the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA).[7] The armoured cars were decisively outranged by the Angolan tanks, and their inability to fire on the move resulted in a poor rate of engagement.[8]

Finally, after seeing the inadequacies, Denel found the solution to replace the Ratel and Aland with the Rooikat.

So perhaps, a good starting point would be to evaluate the Rooikat in Pakistani conditions.

 

[denel]

Interesting, yes, these would be great to incorporate into the doctrine as well.

You could also produce monkey versions of the tanks you are building, if you wanted to do it really properly. So, for instance, your mass production tank factory could churn out fake tanks, that can actually have some basic mobility and firepower, driven around by a single driver and a gunner, both with fast escape hatches. This would confuse the enemy as to your actual strength and posture.

About reserves - yes, a credible reserve strategy would be very important. Something on the lines of what you've propose has perhaps already been implemented by the PA. But one could actually utilize reserves better.

For instance, if you have the conscript supplement as I've proposed - 6 month service from random list of matriculation students and 6 month service from random list of graduating students, and you added semi-retired personnel in the mix, the combination would be excellent as the green horns would have the experience of the semi-retired personnel to learn from.

Lahore sector, Sialkot sector, and the "thin waistline" where India will supposedly attempt to cut Pakistan into half, would be excellent places to deploy at depth such reserves. Some could also be deployed on major train junctions for rapid axis maneuvers.

@denel I just found this, thought you may find it interesting or have something to add:



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ratel_IFV#Description

@Signalian was the Ratel ever tested in Pakistan? Seems very close to the concept I was talking about of a "Flex Tank" and a "mobile mortar" both carrying troops at the back!!!!

Would need to be heavier for the Indo-Pak scenario and perhaps a 105mm gun instead of the 90mm but the rifled gun has its advantages.

Ratel has too many many uses. Extremely long ranged and outperformed what it was built for. The article describes the flanking manvouering as correct however, Ratels were able to hit T-55/54 without issues and were able to get thru mines at the same time.

 

[Army research]

Two components of war over looked are:

1. Deception
2. Reserves

1. A force in every sector filled with creativity of magic tricks related to camouflage, incorrect message transmissions, false buildings and depots, modifying cars and vans and tractors to look like proper tanks and APC's to give wrong location of armoured units or over strength of armoured forces etc

2. Reserve forces; a mixture of serving, retired, newly inducted and para military to handle old equipment in storage like 25 pounders, M-48, T-55 etc only for defensive purposes if the enemy makes a breakthrough towards cities of significance like Lahore, Sialkot, Hyderabad etc.

Sir have you heard of the famous case of cricket diplomacy where we during the preceding tensions had fooled the Indians to believe that our armoured strike corps were in South sindh poised to attack gujrat where as he then at the match told something gandhi that they are infact in north Punjab to ready to cut across the chickens neck and reach delhi,
This needs to be replicated

 

[Signalian]

Interesting, yes, these would be great to incorporate into the doctrine as well.

You could also produce monkey versions of the tanks you are building, if you wanted to do it really properly. So, for instance, your mass production tank factory could churn out fake tanks, that can actually have some basic mobility and firepower, driven around by a single driver and a gunner, both with fast escape hatches. This would confuse the enemy as to your actual strength and posture.

About reserves - yes, a credible reserve strategy would be very important. Something on the lines of what you've propose has perhaps already been implemented by the PA. But one could actually utilize reserves better.

For instance, if you have the conscript supplement as I've proposed - 6 month service from random list of matriculation students and 6 month service from random list of graduating students, and you added semi-retired personnel in the mix, the combination would be excellent as the green horns would have the experience of the semi-retired personnel to learn from.

Lahore sector, Sialkot sector, and the "thin waistline" where India will supposedly attempt to cut Pakistan into half, would be excellent places to deploy at depth such reserves. Some could also be deployed on major train junctions for rapid axis maneuvers.

@denel I just found this, thought you may find it interesting or have something to add:



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ratel_IFV#Description

@Signalian was the Ratel ever tested in Pakistan? Seems very close to the concept I was talking about of a "Flex Tank" and a "mobile mortar" both carrying troops at the back!!!!

Would need to be heavier for the Indo-Pak scenario and perhaps a 105mm gun instead of the 90mm but the rifled gun has its advantages.

I dont think Ratel has been tested or any wheeled tank for that matter. The concept of light tanks or wheeled tanks in Sub-continent is not that significant, probably due to the nature of combat.

Firstly, heavier armor protection on MBT is criteria. There are no light tanks operating in Indian or Pakistan Armies which could be facing heavier MBT's. AMX-13, Staurt etc were phased out on first given opportunity. Over time, the new inducted MBT's in both armies had more armor which meant more weight, bigger cannon, bigger engine.
Putting more armor, bigger ammunition type for bigger gun means more weight. Wheeled AFV could be 30 Tons or 35 Tons max ? Tracked MBT can go 50 Tons+.

Second is terrain. Its not one type of terrain. There are plains, desert, mountains etc. In desert, more heavier types of MBT's (42+ Tons) with bigger engines are preferred. Tracks have an advantage in desert and won't get bogged down in thick mud and thick snow. Wheels have advantage in plains or mountains though can encounter mud and snow. Its easier to operate one type of machinery and use it all over the terrain.

Third, Anti-tank role is mainly given to ATGM's. There is much more required from MBT's than to primarily be engaged in a tank vs tank battle. 106mm is becoming obsolete yet operational to some extent, unlike before. Older MBT's (T-59,69) are used in infantry support roles.

Fourth, 125mm gun is the standard now for MBT's. Anything below, even 105mm equipped T-59 and T-69 are slated for quick replacement. 76mm, 90mm, 100mm might not be inducted.

If PA is considered; PA puts heavier AFV's in direct contact with the enemy and deploys best available MBT (AK,T-80) in desert and upgraded MBT (AZ) in plains. Consider M-113, its not supposed to be in direct contact with the enemy. Its very light, aluminium protection catches fire rapidly and its not adequately equipped with a main gun or a turret. Ratel is 20T, Rooikat is 30T. For direct contact with enemy, they would need more armor protection, ERA, caged armor maybe, increasing weight affecting mobility. Considering terrain; Sialkot, Narowal axis could be a terrain where wheeled AFV's could be deployed. Lahore and south of Lahore, lots of obstacles like canals, irrigated lands etc, then bunkers, mines, tank traps etc which will slow down the speed that is required from wheeled AFV's.

 

[Armchair]

I dont think Ratel has been tested or any wheeled tank for that matter. The concept of light tanks or wheeled tanks in Sub-continent is not that significant, probably due to the nature of combat.

Firstly, heavier armor protection on MBT is criteria. There are no light tanks operating in Indian or Pakistan Armies which could be facing heavier MBT's. AMX-13, Staurt etc were phased out on first given opportunity. Over time, the new inducted MBT's in both armies had more armor which meant more weight, bigger cannon, bigger engine.
Putting more armor, bigger ammunition type for bigger gun means more weight. Wheeled AFV could be 30 Tons or 35 Tons max ? Tracked MBT can go 50 Tons+.

Second is terrain. Its not one type of terrain. There are plains, desert, mountains etc. In desert, more heavier types of MBT's (42+ Tons) with bigger engines are preferred. Tracks have an advantage in desert and won't get bogged down in thick mud and thick snow. Wheels have advantage in plains or mountains though can encounter mud and snow. Its easier to operate one type of machinery and use it all over the terrain.

Third, Anti-tank role is mainly given to ATGM's. There is much more required from MBT's than to primarily be engaged in a tank vs tank battle. 106mm is becoming obsolete yet operational to some extent, unlike before. Older MBT's (T-59,69) are used in infantry support roles.

Fourth, 125mm gun is the standard now for MBT's. Anything below, even 105mm equipped T-59 and T-69 are slated for quick replacement. 76mm, 90mm, 100mm might not be inducted.

If PA is considered; PA puts heavier AFV's in direct contact with the enemy and deploys best available MBT (AK,T-80) in desert and upgraded MBT (AZ) in plains. Consider M-113, its not supposed to be in direct contact with the enemy. Its very light, aluminium protection catches fire rapidly and its not adequately equipped with a main gun or a turret. Ratel is 20T, Rooikat is 30T. For direct contact with enemy, they would need more armor protection, ERA, caged armor maybe, increasing weight affecting mobility. Considering terrain; Sialkot, Narowal axis could be a terrain where wheeled AFV's could be deployed. Lahore and south of Lahore, lots of obstacles like canals, irrigated lands etc, then bunkers, mines, tank traps etc which will slow down the speed that is required from wheeled AFV's.

Thanks @Signalian for that enlightening explanation. But that is how they have operated, perhaps it doesn't mean it is how they should operate.

Incidentally and @denel will testify to this I believe, the Ratel and Rooikat outperformed MBTs in South Africa, specially in sandy conditions. The fine-grained sand in South Africa is horrid for tracked vehicles. This is precisely the kind of sand PA struggles with.

Somebody set a doctrine that they must use heavy MBTs alone, and nothing else. But should we not question that assumption? Should we not try other things?

Do we really believe that an AK will survive a direct hit? How often? How many?

A Rooikat would cost a fraction to build, a small fraction of the price. It could be uprated with a better engine and spaced / reactive armor. It could be designed with the engine upfront and 4x troops at the back. It would cost a fraction to operate, and would be 10x times easier to deploy. It wouldnt even need the tank transporters that are a logistics headache.

Doctrine and strategy are developed with intellectual input, deep discourse. Each army builds its own based on its conditions. Just as we saw with the case of South Africa and Russia. But for some reason PA's doctrine seems to be a close replica of how things are done elsewhere. It just feels like there isn't even an ability to meaningfully discuss.

Lahore and south of Lahore, lots of obstacles like canals, irrigated lands etc, then bunkers, mines, tank traps etc which will slow down the speed that is required from wheeled AFV's

Interesting. Would love to learn more about this and how far south of Lahore, because after a point, between the desert and the northern plain, there is ideal tank country. Would really like to know why those obstacles would be a bigger problem for wheeled vehicles. PA M113s, although can ford a canal on paper, in reality they can't. Most tanks in PA are meant to cross canals via bridges not amphibiously except in exceptional and rare circumstances when that capability itself is doubtful in many circumstances.

If you hit a proper tank trap, - say like a hidden trench, if the tank trap was worth its salt, no tank can escape that. A wheeled tank was found by the South Africans to be easier to retrieve than a tracked tank, and that makes logical sense.

Mines are a serious concern but the added ground clearance of wheeled types may favor them. Most tanks can be taken out by an anti-tank mine and most tanks of the world have relatively thin armor underneath.

Imagine how many more tanks PA could have for its army of 800,000 men who are right now either going to get a gold-plated, extremely time consuming to produce tank, or nothing at all, not even proper IFVs or APCs whose numbers are wanting.

Who comes up with a strategy like that for a poor third world country with low capital and an abundant labor supply?

 

[LeGenD]

Stalin's strategy defeated Nazi Germany, accounting for 80% of German WW2 losses, defeating one of the greatest militaries history has ever seen. Conquering a huge chunk of Europe. Not that the above replicates Soviet strategies, it brings a new paradigm, a new synthesis of ideas given disruptive technologies today.

Disagree with your assessment! The Wehrmacht lost because it was not in the position to fight a two-front war for long. US-led advances in Africa and Europe led to diversion of important assets from the Eastern Front to counter them since 1942. Additional factors such as impact of bombing raids on industrial output and livelihood of people in Germany, decline in the quality of forces committed to the Eastern Front due to diversions and lack of capacity to replace losses, and Lend-Lease Program to address Soviet logistics related shortcomings - all took a toll on Operation Barbarossa and facilitated its failure. Statistics do not capture these qualitative factors.

Food for thought:

http://canadianmilitaryhistory.ca/s...opp-keynote-2010-military-history-colloquuim/

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/08/hitler-germany-campaign-collapsed

https://www.gazeta.ru/science/2016/03/11_a_8115965.shtml

 

[Armchair]

As appalling as it sounds, the main "doctrine" of Pakistan is that "if India has it, we will try to get it". Nihilism is celebrated in this culture. There is no depth in the intellectual process.