This thread is rather amusing due to the amateur assumptions of the OP.He has no understanding of the road-rail networks on both sides,without which you can't launch any mechanized offensive due to logistics.Total absence of understanding of logistics and terrain is shown by the talk of mechanized offensives accross marshy swamps of sindh-gujarat border.Nor does he seem to understand the significance of the canal and ditch cum bund defenses which can be flooded/act as barrier with layered defense as necessary on both sides.
His understanding of 'new' doctrine is also fantastical.Some basic mistakes are -
1.Calling for hundreds of piston engine CAS aircraft and assuming they will 'devastate' indian army by swamping them due to cheapness.It seems he has forgotten that a piston engine aircraft can be shot down by even the 12.7 mm Heavy machine gun on the tanks and 30 mm cannons on IFVs,forget the 200 odd upgraded zsu-23-4 and tunguska mobile gun-AA systems accompanying indian armour and static bofors L70 and zsu-57-2 systems.Cheap as piston engine aircraft are,you know what's cheaper ?-AA guns and MANPADS.A single soldier with even an obsolete MANPAD can 100% one shot a piston engine aircraft with a dirt cheap MANPAD.India has thousands of IGLAs deployed at platoon level.Piston engine aircraft are also defenceless against mistral/stinger armed helicopters like HAL Rudra/LCH(not yet deployed) and apaches.And all this without even getting into missile defences such as QRSAM/SPYDER, Akash, barak-8(not yet deployed).OP has also assumed that these CAS aircraft will operate will total impunity over indian airspace which means PAF has gained total air dominance over core indian territory,if you believe PAF can achieve that i commend you on your optimism.
2.OP also has developed unreal notions of breakthrough with cheap 'light' tank/car and obsolete 'upgraded' t-55 derivatives and also believes that putting ATGM on a platform makes it a breakthrough offensive weapon(in reality its a defensive weapon).Let me give you a reality check on 'light tanks'.A light tank-car can be easily defeated by even basic light infantry.Indian army platoon and some times squad level M3/M4 Carl gustav rocket launcher(which has far better accuracy at range over RPGs)/LAW are sufficient to destroy 'light' tanks and these are present in tens of thousands .Thats not even counting the 50,000 plus ATGM stock of the indian army's infantry battalions.The 4000 MILAN-2T,3000 kornet,300 NAG and 300 Spike-LR are generally kept for enemy's modern tanks but over 40,000 konkurs-m and milan 2 are available for general use which are more than enough for tin cans like the ones being proposed(infact enough for all PA armour with exception of maybe T-80UD with duplet ERA).Heavy tanks can survive MBRL barrages,soft skinned vehicles can't,as was found in ukraine where whole mechanized battalions were wiped out in seconds by MBRL attacks but heavy armour did rather well.
Hear this lecture if you want to understand modern warfare trends in maneuvre from an american veteran expert who was an on the ground observer in ukraine.
I pity the mind that thinks that these tank-car or t-55 upgrades can offensively punch through even a single regiment of dug in hull down modern tanks like a t-90.The frontal armour of the T-90 is on video in youtube shown to have survived direct hit from american TOW-2 in syria,survived 7 RPG hits in dagestan in chechen wars.The 1200 strong(400 more in production) T-90 fleet has a stock of 25,000 INVAR 4km range cannon launched ATGM also.
The real armour balance between IA and PA is ~770 modern tanks for PA-450 Al khalid + 320 T-80UD vs ~2300 modern tanks for IA- 1200 T-90 plus 1000 upgraded t-72 plus 124 arjuns.Add to this 1500 unupgraded T-72 for IA and thousands of t-55 derivatives and older chinese models for PA.
http://fofanov.armor.kiev.ua/Tanks/TRIALS/19991020.html
Russian source on T-80U vs T-90 protection levels.
3.Also the above ORBAT starting from post #124 on page 9 and plan of attack is messed up(even though commands and corps structure is due to be overhauled in next 3 years with IBG and theatre commands).He assumes that size of corps is uniform on both sides and uses the corps as a basic maneuvre unit creating fake material superiority where none exists.
Let me put into perspective -(infantry is lorry borne,mech either m-113 APC for PA or BMP-2 IFV for IA)
Southern command - Indian XII corps(1 rapid div+ 1 inf div+ 1 arm brigade+1 mech brigade) is seen being defeated and losing half of gujarat to an undisclosed airborne helicopter force and a random marine division ignoring the existence of indian air force and navy altogether or how they would be supplied over the marshes.Realistically speaking PN would be lucky to have its surface fleet survive the first 48 hours and not have karachi harbour in flames against the full might of indian navy,forget an amphibious assault with transports along the coast.The grand fantasy envisages these embarked 'marines' and light airborne forces will capture half of gujarat against a rapid division(which is 2-3 infantry/mech inf brigades plus an armoured brigade),another full infantry division quartered in ahmedabad,plus 2 more independent mechanized brigade and armoured brigade formations.Not sure if this is scenario meant to be serious or ganja humour.The air borne force penetration (if its gets through IAF) being proposed in gujarat can be crushed by just the sole infantry division,leaving all the mechanized formations to entreat the pak armour movements further north.The petty hovercraft penetrations proposed can be simply dealt with by the BSF and coast guard.The size of the BSF is 260,000 compared to 40,000 for pak rangers to put things in perspective.So the whole gujarat -bhuj front is a fantasy.
Now little to the north coming to southern rajasthan sector,what the fantasy in gujarat has allowed the OP is to artificially negate on paper 3 mechanized and 2 armoured brigades of indian southern command as if they didn't exist,and thus not allocate any pakistani forces in sindh to oppose them by imagining they are defeated by vague airborne troops and some imaginery marine division just so he can now focus 2 corps in this sector,creating a fake local superiority.Infact 12 RAPID division(2 mech brig+1 amd brig) of indian XII corps is not even in gujarat,and actually based at Jodhpur and will face action in rajasthan.
Here,Pakistan 12corps is brought in which in reality is in Quetta garrisoning balochistan against an uprising and manning the afghan border.Even allowing this its 2 infantry divisions,1 armd brigade and 1 inf brigade.Add 5th corps (freed up because of gujarat fantasy) with 2 infantry divisions and a mechanized inf div(25th,not sure composition) still total attacking force is 4 infantry divisions,1 inf brigade and,1 armd brigade and 1 mech div.Against this will be pitted XXI strike corps plus 12 RAPID at jodhpur (even if we magically ignore indp armd brigade and indp mech brigde of XII corps keeping in line with gujarat fantasy,when in reality they would crash into the open flank of pak 5th corps from the south in any attempted turning move).Even ignoring them you have 2 RAPID divisions,a full armoured division,an infantry division and an artillery division with its own smerch battalions and brahmos regiment(~100 missiles plus 100 reload) and field arty.Upto the observer to decide who has better chances in the open desert - total 13 inf brigades,2 amd brgde,1-2 mech brgde vs 4 amd brigades,3 inf brigades,4-6 inf/ mechanized brigades ,1 artillery division).I am not shifting any units from eastern command to counter 12 corps shift from quetta due to china threat.
In OP's scheme,moving further north around bikaner Indian I strike corps is attacked by Pak 2nd strike corps(1 amd div plus 1 mech inf div) and 31 corps(2 infantry divs +1 mech inf div) over the rajasthan canal.However here OP has made a mistake in his ORBAT.2 whole Rapid divisions under X corps have been placed much north ,whereas they are actually deployed in bikaner and kota in this axis.(24 RAPID at bikaner,18 RAPID reserve at kota).So in case of a attempted pincer attack on this front by pak 2nd and 31 corps it will face overwhelming forces.The balance of forces would be 2 pak infantry divs,2 mech inf divs and 1 armoured division against india's 3 full rapid divisions,1 armoured division,1 infantry division and 1 independent armoured brigade(iab),plus a full artillery division(with integral smerch and brahamos regiments).The result would be a decimation of the pakistani attack at worst,a huge battle of attrition at best.
By prematurely deploying the PA 2nd strike corps and its armoured division,OP also creates a crisis further up north.Pak XI corps(wrongly shown as IX corps probably typo) is seen as a defensive force(11 corps presumably redeployed from NWFP in peshawar) with 1 or 2 infantry divisions and one iab facing indian X corps with one infantry div and one iab in defense.(its two rapid divisions fighting in bikaner axis)
Now here the indian II strike corps -the kharga corps which is the elite tip of the spear formation(500 t-90 and 500 bmp-2 approx) of the indian army is free to make its move.The kharga corps has one armoured division,one rapid division,one iab( overstrength),one artillery division and one infantry division.The forward advance of the PA 2nd strike corps removes any obstacle from its path and essentially gives it a free run to do its traditional job.The kharga corps has an open field to race south-west towards rahim yar khan and then jacobabad blocking off N5 and n55 highway,cutting off punjab from sindh and splitting pakistan in two.This movement would also put it into the rear of pak attacking forces in bikaner axis(31st and 2nd) encircling them and annihilating them in a hammer anvil with II kharga corps as hammer and I strike corps plus elements of X corps as anvil.
So i consider the 2 prong attack plan on bikaner as suicidal,would certainly lead to destruction of the two attacking PA corps due to kharga corps attack and resulting sandwich between two strike corps of indian army.
Further north in the lahore-amritsar axis OP's scheme pits pakistan 4th corps(with 2 inf div,one inf brigde,one arty bgde,one iab) against IA XI corps with 3 infantry divisions,one arty bgde,one iab,one mech brigade).IA superiority is marginal and insufficient for major advance.XI corps if needed can however easily detatch a mechanized brigade north or south and still maintain slight numerical superiority.No hard progress on any side can be expected here.
Further north in sakargarh -pathankot -akhnoor area you have pakistan 1st strike corps and 30 corps vs IX corps and XVI corps of india.72 mountain strike corps(MSC) division based at pathankot(currently being reorganized into IBGs) is reserve which can go north towards china border or west towards pakistan.Combination of 30 corps (two infantry divs + iab +arty division+AT bgde) and 1st strike corps(two infantry divisions+iab +arty bgd+ one armoured division) for total of 4 infantry div,2iab,2artybgd,1 amd div,AT bgd is an impressive concentration. Combined indian formations would amount to 6 infantry divisions(incl MSC),4 iab,1artybgd.Battle here would be a ferocious .
Further north,due to difficult terrain no major advances in LOC except localized operations .India certain to make an attempt on haji pir which it foolishly gave back in 1965 after capture and the bulge is major source of infiltration.
5.Finally the role of raising hundreds of thousands of conscripts in this scheme is meaningless.Conscripts will have to be fed and supplied,have very limited military utility,and would get massacred if facing regular formations with armour and artillery(may hold back infantry for limited time).Also not explained why hundreds of thousands of conscripts are added to Pak ORBAT ,but 1 million strong active paramilitary forces of india not similarly accounted for ,or the territorial army or reserve manpower over 2 million .
