angeldemon_007
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It is a pity that External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna could not stop himself from welcoming the US suspension of military aid to Pakistan. It was just a matter of time before Defence Minister A.K. Antony joined the chorus.
India has consistently taken the view that it is not desirable that this region had to be heavily armed by the US which will upset the equilibrium in the region itself, to that extent India welcomes this step, Krishna reportedly said. Antony wanted to know if the suspension was just a temporary one.
The comments from the two senior ministers of the UPA government were both irrelevant and ill-considered. Irrelevant because what is at stake is not the supply of heavy weapons to Pakistan or the military balance between India and Pakistan.
Islamabad is nowhere near matching Indias own current purchases of advanced conventional weapons, including from the United States.
Their remarks were ill-considered because they suggested Indias glee at Pakistans adversity, and reinforced the image of Delhis unreconstructed hostility to Islamabad. They also come at a time when India is trying to revive a working relationship with Pakistan.
Krishna himself had worked hard over the last few months to renew the dialogue with Pakistan that was stalled after the terror attack on Mumbai in November 2008.
Delhi is set to host Pakistans foreign secretary and foreign minister later this month to review the progress in the first round of talks. This was not the moment for a perverse Indian welcome of US aid to Pakistan being suspended.
What is more troubling, however, is the lack of appreciation in our political class of the complex dynamic that has enveloped US-Pakistan relations since the killing of Osama bin Laden by American Special Forces deep inside Pakistan on May 2.
This is not just another familiar moment in what is widely seen as a transactional relationship between Pakistan and the US. Pakistan has been at once the most sought after and most sanctioned ally of the US for nearly six decades.
Washington has cut off aid to Islamabad before, but only to embrace the Pakistan army again and again. Washington and Islamabad find themselves in a very different situation now.
Unlike on the previous occasions, the US cant simply walk away from Pakistan today. Without changing Pakistans strategic behaviour, Washington knows, America wont be secure.
Take for example the turn of the 1990s. After the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Afghanistan at the end of the 1980s, Washington washed its hands of and started sanctioning Pakistan for its clandestine nuclear weapons programme.
This time, the US must get the Pakistan army to hunt down the residual leadership of al-Qaeda still hiding in the countrys western borderlands. It is pressing the Pakistan army chief, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, to go after the Haqqani network in North Waziristan that is responsible for most attacks on US forces in Afghanistan.
Washington wants Kayani to put pressure on the Afghan Taliban leadership to negotiate a political settlement with Kabul and the international community as the US withdraws its forces starting this month.
Despite the double embarrassment from the bin Laden episode that he was hiding right under the nose of the Pakistan army and was attacked by the US without Rawalpindis permission Kayani has been reluctant to oblige the Obama administration.
The news over the weekend that the US was suspending about $800 million of military aid to Pakistan followed an explicit warning by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton a couple of weeks ago that there will be consequences if the Pakistan army does not keep its promises on combating terror.
That warning was followed by a series of leaks in the New York Times that damned the ISI for promoting regional terror, its complicity in the killing of the Pakistani journalist Saleem Shahzad, and exposed the links between the Pakistan army and the global nuclear black-market.
As the Obama administration turns up the heat, the Pakistan armys reaction has been cool and composed. Rawalpindi has declared that it can do without American military aid. In fact, a few weeks ago, the armys corps commanders pompously called for the diversion of the US military aid to the civilian sector. Kayani is playing hard ball.
Traditionalists in Delhi would say Washington and Rawalpindi will sort things out, and kiss and make up sooner than later, because they need each other so much. Others might argue that Kayani will find it hard to comply with the American demands without undermining his position at home and abandoning the armys presumed interests in Afghanistan and India.
Some would point to the explicit debate in Pakistan on ending the historic strategic dependence on the US and looking for other options, including China and Saudi Arabia. There is no evidence so far in the public domain that either Beijing or Riyadh is eager to replace Washington.
Whichever way Pakistan moves, there is no denying the deepening contradiction between the interests of the US and the Pakistan army in Afghanistan. As Washington and Rawalpindi try to stare down each other, Delhi should closely watch the spectacle rather than sleepwalk into the theatre as Krishna and Antony have done.
For the first time since 1954, when the US and Pakistan launched security cooperation, it seems plausible that their partnership could spin out of control. The subcontinents geopolitics, then, might be on the cusp of a historic rupture.
Indias challenge at the moment is to reflect on Pakistans alternative futures and develop creative approaches to both Rawalpindi and Washington. Until then it is best for official Delhi to keep its lips sealed, eyes and ears open, and the brain ticking.
A very tangled web - Indian Express
India has consistently taken the view that it is not desirable that this region had to be heavily armed by the US which will upset the equilibrium in the region itself, to that extent India welcomes this step, Krishna reportedly said. Antony wanted to know if the suspension was just a temporary one.
The comments from the two senior ministers of the UPA government were both irrelevant and ill-considered. Irrelevant because what is at stake is not the supply of heavy weapons to Pakistan or the military balance between India and Pakistan.
Islamabad is nowhere near matching Indias own current purchases of advanced conventional weapons, including from the United States.
Their remarks were ill-considered because they suggested Indias glee at Pakistans adversity, and reinforced the image of Delhis unreconstructed hostility to Islamabad. They also come at a time when India is trying to revive a working relationship with Pakistan.
Krishna himself had worked hard over the last few months to renew the dialogue with Pakistan that was stalled after the terror attack on Mumbai in November 2008.
Delhi is set to host Pakistans foreign secretary and foreign minister later this month to review the progress in the first round of talks. This was not the moment for a perverse Indian welcome of US aid to Pakistan being suspended.
What is more troubling, however, is the lack of appreciation in our political class of the complex dynamic that has enveloped US-Pakistan relations since the killing of Osama bin Laden by American Special Forces deep inside Pakistan on May 2.
This is not just another familiar moment in what is widely seen as a transactional relationship between Pakistan and the US. Pakistan has been at once the most sought after and most sanctioned ally of the US for nearly six decades.
Washington has cut off aid to Islamabad before, but only to embrace the Pakistan army again and again. Washington and Islamabad find themselves in a very different situation now.
Unlike on the previous occasions, the US cant simply walk away from Pakistan today. Without changing Pakistans strategic behaviour, Washington knows, America wont be secure.
Take for example the turn of the 1990s. After the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Afghanistan at the end of the 1980s, Washington washed its hands of and started sanctioning Pakistan for its clandestine nuclear weapons programme.
This time, the US must get the Pakistan army to hunt down the residual leadership of al-Qaeda still hiding in the countrys western borderlands. It is pressing the Pakistan army chief, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, to go after the Haqqani network in North Waziristan that is responsible for most attacks on US forces in Afghanistan.
Washington wants Kayani to put pressure on the Afghan Taliban leadership to negotiate a political settlement with Kabul and the international community as the US withdraws its forces starting this month.
Despite the double embarrassment from the bin Laden episode that he was hiding right under the nose of the Pakistan army and was attacked by the US without Rawalpindis permission Kayani has been reluctant to oblige the Obama administration.
The news over the weekend that the US was suspending about $800 million of military aid to Pakistan followed an explicit warning by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton a couple of weeks ago that there will be consequences if the Pakistan army does not keep its promises on combating terror.
That warning was followed by a series of leaks in the New York Times that damned the ISI for promoting regional terror, its complicity in the killing of the Pakistani journalist Saleem Shahzad, and exposed the links between the Pakistan army and the global nuclear black-market.
As the Obama administration turns up the heat, the Pakistan armys reaction has been cool and composed. Rawalpindi has declared that it can do without American military aid. In fact, a few weeks ago, the armys corps commanders pompously called for the diversion of the US military aid to the civilian sector. Kayani is playing hard ball.
Traditionalists in Delhi would say Washington and Rawalpindi will sort things out, and kiss and make up sooner than later, because they need each other so much. Others might argue that Kayani will find it hard to comply with the American demands without undermining his position at home and abandoning the armys presumed interests in Afghanistan and India.
Some would point to the explicit debate in Pakistan on ending the historic strategic dependence on the US and looking for other options, including China and Saudi Arabia. There is no evidence so far in the public domain that either Beijing or Riyadh is eager to replace Washington.
Whichever way Pakistan moves, there is no denying the deepening contradiction between the interests of the US and the Pakistan army in Afghanistan. As Washington and Rawalpindi try to stare down each other, Delhi should closely watch the spectacle rather than sleepwalk into the theatre as Krishna and Antony have done.
For the first time since 1954, when the US and Pakistan launched security cooperation, it seems plausible that their partnership could spin out of control. The subcontinents geopolitics, then, might be on the cusp of a historic rupture.
Indias challenge at the moment is to reflect on Pakistans alternative futures and develop creative approaches to both Rawalpindi and Washington. Until then it is best for official Delhi to keep its lips sealed, eyes and ears open, and the brain ticking.
A very tangled web - Indian Express
