illusion8
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In today’s globally overheated and overloaded “security” dominated news, no international meeting seems to avoid being analyzed in terms of its significance for forging or strengthening “strategic alliances” and dealing with “threats.”
Today, Wednesday, September 3, India Prime Minister Narendra Modi wraps up a five day visit to Japan, during which much of the media buzz, both domestically and internationally, including in Forbes.com, has been about a new Japan-India strategic alliance aimed at containing Chinese “expansionism.”
Putting such a spin on Modi’s visit is necessary for the Abe government, and for Abe himself. Abe has been tireless in pursuing throughout the Asian region his “Proactive Contributor to Peace” anti-China coalition building strategy. Much more than the Philippines or Vietnam, recruiting India into a coalition would be strategically game-changing.
But this will not happen. As much as Modi offered lip service to Abe’s concerns about “expansionism,” and “those with 18th century ideas” who “engage in encroachments and enter the seas” of others, what Modi and India are prepared to do with Japan strategically is hardly apparent.
Importantly, Modi declined to reorient India-Japan relations toward security and military cooperation by acquiescing to Abe’s request to adopt the “2+2” format in relations management.
The “2+2” format, officially called the Security Consultative Committee, is the core of U.S.-Japan relations. “Two plus two” refers to the two chief representatives, one the top diplomat (the U.S. secretary of state and the Japanese minister of foreign affairs), one the defense chief (the U.S. secretary of defense and the Japanese minister of defense) on each side, who meet and set policy at least annually, and are supported by a permanent secretariat.
Under the “2+2” format, the annual agenda inevitably focuses on security and defense issues, with the agenda and policy proposals emanating almost entirely from defense and security agencies. Diplomacy and foreign affairs agencies are left playing largely public relations roles.
In the U.S.-Japan relationship, the “2+2” format has ensured that U.S. policy toward Japan reflects the Pentagon’s priorities and serves to protect the security alliance, forestalling any reconsideration of the presence or purpose of U.S. bases, and generally ensuring that Japanese policies conform to and support American interests, especially security interests.
Abe has paid the highest compliment possible to the effectiveness of the “2+2” format by seeking to emulate it as a key pillar with his expansive regional “Proactive Contributor to Peace” doctrine and coalition building strategy, promoting it not just with the Philippines, Vietnam and Australia, but also with Russia. The first Japan-Russia “2+2” meeting was held last November.
But if Abe feels that a Japan-India “2+2” format is in Japan’s interest, Modi clearly feels differently about India’s. While the two leaders agreed to regularize joint naval training activities, further expansion of security ties was relegated to “further study.”
Modi’s rebuff has historic, political, and economic explanations.
India was the first major country to proclaim “non-alignment” during the Cold War, becoming the leader of a “movement” of states that essentially saw no merit in involving themselves in that global power struggle. It is not so different today, from India’s perspective.
What Indian vital interests that might be advanced by allying with Japan against China with which it shares a 3000 kilometer border? Press reports refer to Indian concern about safe passage through Indian Ocean sea lanes. All countries in East Asia share this concern, as the Middle Eastern energy supplies vital to their economies transit these waters.
We should not think either that China is not extending a warm hand of friendship to Modi. The first telephone call Modi received following his May swearing in was from Chinese Premier Li Keqiang who for 40 minutes conveyed China’s desire to build “robust ties” with his new government.
What India wants and needs is economic and technological development.
Here there is certainly reason to aggressively pursue every form of cooperation with Japan. For Japan also, India presents probably the most hopeful opportunity for major projects and investments, as well as for trade. However, here Japan is playing catchup to China. India-China trade is currently almost four times that between India and Japan.
In a speech in Tokyo to Japanese business leaders, Modi promised them “a red carpet, not red tape” in India. This was an acknowledgement that bureaucracy and restrictive laws and regulations still characterize India’s market. How deft Japanese businesses will be in navigating these barriers, and effective Modi will be in reducing them, remain to be seen.
Japan’s globally oriented enterprises are desperately seeking large new markets. For the past 20 years, the market that offered the greatest opportunity was China’s. For political and economic reasons, Japanese companies are finding China an increasingly difficult place to grow.
According to JETRO, in 2012 and 2013, Japan-China trade measured in USD declined by 3.3% and 6.5% respectively. In 2013 Japanese direct investment in China totaled USD 9.1 billion, a decline of 32.5% from 2012, while investment in ASEAN countries increased 1.2 fold from USD 10.6 billion to USD 23.6 billion.
Can India become for Japan what China became: a new engine of economic growth, enhanced global competitiveness, and profitability? We can hope. What is unlikely, and would not in any case be constructive, is that India lines up with Japan against its neighbor and major current economic partner, China.
A Japan-India Anti-China Alliance? No. This Is About Economics - Forbes
Today, Wednesday, September 3, India Prime Minister Narendra Modi wraps up a five day visit to Japan, during which much of the media buzz, both domestically and internationally, including in Forbes.com, has been about a new Japan-India strategic alliance aimed at containing Chinese “expansionism.”
Putting such a spin on Modi’s visit is necessary for the Abe government, and for Abe himself. Abe has been tireless in pursuing throughout the Asian region his “Proactive Contributor to Peace” anti-China coalition building strategy. Much more than the Philippines or Vietnam, recruiting India into a coalition would be strategically game-changing.
But this will not happen. As much as Modi offered lip service to Abe’s concerns about “expansionism,” and “those with 18th century ideas” who “engage in encroachments and enter the seas” of others, what Modi and India are prepared to do with Japan strategically is hardly apparent.
Importantly, Modi declined to reorient India-Japan relations toward security and military cooperation by acquiescing to Abe’s request to adopt the “2+2” format in relations management.
The “2+2” format, officially called the Security Consultative Committee, is the core of U.S.-Japan relations. “Two plus two” refers to the two chief representatives, one the top diplomat (the U.S. secretary of state and the Japanese minister of foreign affairs), one the defense chief (the U.S. secretary of defense and the Japanese minister of defense) on each side, who meet and set policy at least annually, and are supported by a permanent secretariat.
Under the “2+2” format, the annual agenda inevitably focuses on security and defense issues, with the agenda and policy proposals emanating almost entirely from defense and security agencies. Diplomacy and foreign affairs agencies are left playing largely public relations roles.
In the U.S.-Japan relationship, the “2+2” format has ensured that U.S. policy toward Japan reflects the Pentagon’s priorities and serves to protect the security alliance, forestalling any reconsideration of the presence or purpose of U.S. bases, and generally ensuring that Japanese policies conform to and support American interests, especially security interests.
Abe has paid the highest compliment possible to the effectiveness of the “2+2” format by seeking to emulate it as a key pillar with his expansive regional “Proactive Contributor to Peace” doctrine and coalition building strategy, promoting it not just with the Philippines, Vietnam and Australia, but also with Russia. The first Japan-Russia “2+2” meeting was held last November.
But if Abe feels that a Japan-India “2+2” format is in Japan’s interest, Modi clearly feels differently about India’s. While the two leaders agreed to regularize joint naval training activities, further expansion of security ties was relegated to “further study.”
Modi’s rebuff has historic, political, and economic explanations.
India was the first major country to proclaim “non-alignment” during the Cold War, becoming the leader of a “movement” of states that essentially saw no merit in involving themselves in that global power struggle. It is not so different today, from India’s perspective.
What Indian vital interests that might be advanced by allying with Japan against China with which it shares a 3000 kilometer border? Press reports refer to Indian concern about safe passage through Indian Ocean sea lanes. All countries in East Asia share this concern, as the Middle Eastern energy supplies vital to their economies transit these waters.
We should not think either that China is not extending a warm hand of friendship to Modi. The first telephone call Modi received following his May swearing in was from Chinese Premier Li Keqiang who for 40 minutes conveyed China’s desire to build “robust ties” with his new government.
What India wants and needs is economic and technological development.
Here there is certainly reason to aggressively pursue every form of cooperation with Japan. For Japan also, India presents probably the most hopeful opportunity for major projects and investments, as well as for trade. However, here Japan is playing catchup to China. India-China trade is currently almost four times that between India and Japan.
In a speech in Tokyo to Japanese business leaders, Modi promised them “a red carpet, not red tape” in India. This was an acknowledgement that bureaucracy and restrictive laws and regulations still characterize India’s market. How deft Japanese businesses will be in navigating these barriers, and effective Modi will be in reducing them, remain to be seen.
Japan’s globally oriented enterprises are desperately seeking large new markets. For the past 20 years, the market that offered the greatest opportunity was China’s. For political and economic reasons, Japanese companies are finding China an increasingly difficult place to grow.
According to JETRO, in 2012 and 2013, Japan-China trade measured in USD declined by 3.3% and 6.5% respectively. In 2013 Japanese direct investment in China totaled USD 9.1 billion, a decline of 32.5% from 2012, while investment in ASEAN countries increased 1.2 fold from USD 10.6 billion to USD 23.6 billion.
Can India become for Japan what China became: a new engine of economic growth, enhanced global competitiveness, and profitability? We can hope. What is unlikely, and would not in any case be constructive, is that India lines up with Japan against its neighbor and major current economic partner, China.
A Japan-India Anti-China Alliance? No. This Is About Economics - Forbes
