4,000 extra US troops due near Pak-Afghan border

[Pk_Thunder]

4,000 extra US troops due near Pak-Afghan border​

KABUL (updated on: November 23, 2008, 19:04 PST): A brigade of 3,500-4,000 extra US troops due in Pak-Afghan border in January will be deployed to stop infiltration of militants, the US military said on Sunday.

The brigade has been approved as part of requested US troop reinforcements for Afghanistan's fight against extremists that could amount to about 20,000 personnel, US military spokesman Colonel Greg Julian told reporters in Kabul.

"The first brigade that is coming will go into the (Nato-led) RC-East (Regional Command East) and they are going to move into areas that are currently not covered," Julian said.

Guards along the porous border are being trained and 165 border posts are being built as part of a drive to stop militants entering Afghanistan, Julian said.

"We recognise that there are certain lines or avenues that the insurgents come through (from Pakistan) and we are focusing our efforts on those," he said.

International and Afghan troops along with counterparts in Pakistan this month launched "Operation Lionheart" along the border.

The Afghan government has long demanded more focus in the US-led "war on terror" on extremist bases in Pakistan, and there have been more than 20 apparent US air strikes in the area over the past few months.

There are already nearly 70,000 international soldiers in the country, but Afghan officials have called for extra troops on the border to fight a growing Taliban-led insurgency.

Julian said the top US commander in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, has asked for three combat brigades along with support elements such as intelligence and air power, which could altogether amount to 20,000 personnel.

"However they are dependent on the security situation in Iraq improving enough so those forces can be made available, and upon the agreement of the Afghan government," he said.

Taliban-led violence in Afghanistan has been on the increase every year since the 2001 US-led invasion forced the militants out of power.

 

[Munir]

The best option for both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The only way to eradicate all elements that are a danger to both nations.

 

[batmannow]

4,000 extra US troops due near Pak-Afghan border​

KABUL (updated on: November 23, 2008, 19:04 PST): A brigade of 3,500-4,000 extra US troops due in Pak-Afghan border in January will be deployed to stop infiltration of militants, the US military said on Sunday.

The brigade has been approved as part of requested US troop reinforcements for Afghanistan's fight against extremists that could amount to about 20,000 personnel, US military spokesman Colonel Greg Julian told reporters in Kabul.

"The first brigade that is coming will go into the (Nato-led) RC-East (Regional Command East) and they are going to move into areas that are currently not covered," Julian said.

Guards along the porous border are being trained and 165 border posts are being built as part of a drive to stop militants entering Afghanistan, Julian said.

"We recognise that there are certain lines or avenues that the insurgents come through (from Pakistan) and we are focusing our efforts on those," he said.

International and Afghan troops along with counterparts in Pakistan this month launched "Operation Lionheart" along the border.

The Afghan government has long demanded more focus in the US-led "war on terror" on extremist bases in Pakistan, and there have been more than 20 apparent US air strikes in the area over the past few months.

There are already nearly 70,000 international soldiers in the country, but Afghan officials have called for extra troops on the border to fight a growing Taliban-led insurgency.

Julian said the top US commander in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, has asked for three combat brigades along with support elements such as intelligence and air power, which could altogether amount to 20,000 personnel.

"However they are dependent on the security situation in Iraq improving enough so those forces can be made available, and upon the agreement of the Afghan government," he said.

Taliban-led violence in Afghanistan has been on the increase every year since the 2001 US-led invasion forced the militants out of power.

just another , desperate effort by lossing occupyants?

 

[S-2]

The only losers if we leave are the Afghani people.

Lets look at their leaders- Zahir Shah- deposed. Daoud- Murdered. Taraki- Murdered. Amin- Murdered. Karmal- exile in Moscow? Najibullah-Murdered. Rabbani?? Mullah Omar? Hamid Karzai?

See any names there that really please you? N.A. or pashtu, none have served their citizens well and all possess marginalizing agendas that pit one faction against others-too often in open combat.

Probably should have occupied the nation and made them wards of the world for about a half-century. Anybody but their own would be about right.

 

[dr.umer]

The ‘Good War’ Isn’t Worth Fighting ​

23 Nov 2008
The New York Times

AFGHANISTAN does not matter as much as Barack Obama thinks.

Terrorism is not the key strategic threat facing the United States. America, Britain and our allies have not created a positive stable environment in the Middle East. We have no clear strategy for dealing with China. The financial crisis is a more immediate threat to United States power and to other states; environmental catastrophe is more dangerous for the world. And even from the perspective of terrorism, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are more lethal.

President-elect Obama’s emphasis on Afghanistan and his desire to send more troops and money there is misguided. Overestimating its importance distracts us from higher priorities, creates an unhealthy dynamic with the government of Afghanistan and endangers the one thing it needs — the stability that might come from a patient, limited, long-term relationship with the international community.

We invaded intending to attack Al Qaeda and provide development assistance. We succeeded. By 2004, Afghanistan had a stable currency, millions more children in school, a better health system, an elected Parliament, no Al Qaeda and almost no Taliban. All this was achieved with only 20,000 troops and a relatively small international aid budget.

When the decision was made to increase troops in 2005, there was no insurgency. But as NATO became increasingly obsessed with transforming the country and brought in more money and troops to deal with corruption and the judiciary, warlords and criminals, insecurity in rural areas and narcotics, it failed. In fact, things got worse. These new NATO troops encountered a fresh problem — local Taliban resistance — which has drawn them into a counterinsurgency campaign.

More troops have brought military victories but they have not been able to eliminate the Taliban. They have also had a negative political impact in the conservative and nationalistic communities of the Pashtun south and allowed Taliban propaganda to portray us as a foreign military occupation. In Helmand Province, troop numbers have increased to nearly 10,000 today from just 2,000 in 2004. But no inhabitant of Helmand would say things have improved in the last four years. Mr. Obama believes that sending even more troops and money will now bring “victory” in Afghanistan. Some of this may be politically driven: a pretense of future benefits appears better than admitting a loss; and because lives are involved, no one wants to write off sunk costs.

Nevertheless, these increases are not just wasteful, they are counterproductive. The more costly we make this campaign, the more likely we are to withdraw when another crisis emerges or our attention wanders. Grand investment precipitating a sudden withdrawal repeats the “Charlie Wilson’s War” effect of 1990, when Afghanistan fell in a moment from spoiled godson to orphan, leaving bankruptcy and chaos behind.

Further, the more we give, the less influence we have over the Afghan government, which believes we need it more than it needs us. What incentive do Afghan leaders have to reform if their country is allowed to produce 92 percent of the world’s heroin and still receive $20 billion of international aid? Are they wrong to think that if they became more stable and law-abiding and wiped out the Taliban we would give them less support? That this is a protection racket where the amount of money one receives is directly proportional to one’s ability to threaten trouble?

This is certainly the experience of the more stable provinces in central Afghanistan, where leaders talk about the need to set off bombs to receive the assistance given to their wealthier but more dangerous neighbors. A more detached strategic perspective and less aid would give us more leverage.

A sudden surge of foreign troops and cash will be unhelpful and unsustainable. It would take 20 successful years to match Pakistan’s economy, educational levels, government or judiciary — and Pakistan is still not stable. Nor, for that matter, are northeastern or northwestern India, despite that nation’s great economic and political successes.

We will not be able to eliminate the Taliban from the rural areas of Afghanistan’s south, so we will have to work with Afghans to contain the insurgency instead. All this is unpleasant for Western politicians who dream of solving the fundamental problems and getting out. They will soon be tempted to give up.

It is in our interests for Afghanistan to be more stable in part because it contributes to the stability of the region, and in particular Pakistan. Well-focused, long-term assistance in which we appear a genuine partner, not a frustrated colonial master, could help Afghans achieve this goal. We will be able to create, afford and sustain such a relationship only if we put it in a broader strategic context and limit its scope.

Rory Stewart, a former British Foreign Service officer, is the author of “The Places in Between” and “The Prince of the Marshes.”

 

[Kharian_Beast]

The best option for both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The only way to eradicate all elements that are a danger to both nations.

Best option for both is if US forces piss off back to Burger King and we mine and fence the border and if need be conduct aggressive patrols well inside of Afghanistan without Uncle Sam to supervise anything. We should also mine the border with Iran and India and isolate ourselves till domestically things are back on track. Pakistan should trust no one who is bordering because they have proven themselves to be enemies and major liabilities to national security except our good friend China.

 

[dr.umer]

France airs doubt over increasing troops in Afghanistan ​

24 Nov 2008

PARIS :The French foreign minister says he has doubts about U.S. President-elect Barack Obama's plans to fight militants in Afghanistan.

Bernard Kouchner says plans that increase troop numbers would only work "in specific areas only with a precise task." Kouchner says France believes military power alone won't stabilize the situation in Afghanistan.

Kouchner told France's TV5 television Sunday that international troops should help the Afghan people "take matters into their own hands."

Obama wants to step up the U.S. fight against terrorism in Afghanistan.

The United States has some 32,000 soldiers in Afghanistan. Obama has said he plans to add about 7,000 or 8,000 troops to the Nato mission there next year.

 

[batmannow]

Best option for both is if US forces piss off back to Burger King and we mine and fence the border and if need be conduct aggressive patrols well inside of Afghanistan without Uncle Sam to supervise anything. We should also mine the border with Iran and India and isolate ourselves till domestically things are back on track. Pakistan should trust no one who is bordering because they have proven themselves to be enemies and major liabilities to national security except our good friend China.

Kharian_Beast;sir
good thoughts, if its paractical!
one thing everybody should understand , which is that "WAR OF TERROR" can only be fought , if all the concerning parties are united, nobody act by his own!
its a good effort infact, to united the troops on one front, each side of the border, but the problum is political, and afghan govt doesnt have any cure of that dangerous venom?

 

[Kharian_Beast]

Kharian_Beast;sir
good thoughts, if its paractical!
one thing everybody should understand , which is that "WAR OF TERROR" can only be fought , if all the concerning parties are united, nobody act by his own!
its a good effort infact, to united the troops on one front, each side of the border, but the problum is political, and afghan govt doesnt have any cure of that dangerous venom?

Good points batmannow it is indeed worthy for mankind to unite against extremism and chaos. It is indeed a political problem, since the Afghan government has exhibited itself of being a completely useless entity outside of Kabul that can only survive with US presence, and that the real people in charge are the same people that have always run the country (anyone with a gun). This is why I believe fencing and mining the border will be handy, Afghan and US forces will be helped out since all their problems will stay on their side while Pakistan can stick to providing intelligence and humanitarian aid like it has done in the past.

 

[ejaz007]

I think the best option still is the fencing one. Even with additional troops US/NATO won't have the strength to effectively control flow of terrorists from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Remember if we cant control the situation with 100,000 troops how do they plan to accomplish the task with 4,000 troops.
We have better knowledge of the area and people and they are generally considered an outsider and the cause of the problem not the solution.

 

[batmannow]

I think the best option still is the fencing one. Even with additional troops US/NATO won't have the strength to effectively control flow of terrorists from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Remember if we cant control the situation with 100,000 troops how do they plan to accomplish the task with 4,000 troops.
We have better knowledge of the area and people and they are generally considered an outsider and the cause of the problem not the solution.

ejaz007, sir
bang on target!
1000% , my vote goes to " fencing " the boders!

"if we cant control the situation with 100,000 troops how do they plan to accomplish the task with 4,000 troops."

actully , they know it , we know it, but again! some crazy (genious), genrls experamenting the things here, i guss they think , thier soliders are superhumans, thats what i call the stupidness.

 

[fatman17]

RUMSFELD: One surge does not fit all

By DONALD H. RUMSFELD Special to The New York Times

The surge in Iraq has been one of the most impressive military accomplishments in recent years. It has been so successful that the emerging consensus is that what may now be needed in Afghanistan is a similar surge of American forces. President-elect Barack Obama campaigned on his intention to do so, as did his former opponent, John McCain.

As one who is occasionally — and incorrectly — portrayed as an opponent of the surge in Iraq, I believe that while the surge has been effective in Iraq, we must also recognize the conditions that made it successful. President Bush’s bold decision to deploy additional troops to support a broader counterinsurgency strategy of securing and protecting the Iraqi people was clearly the right decision. More important, though, it was the right decision at the right time.

By early 2007, several years of struggle had created the new conditions for a tipping point:

Al Qaeda in Iraq’s campaign of terrorism and intimidation had turned its Sunni base of support against it. The result was the so-called Anbar Awakening in the late summer of 2006, followed by similar awakening movements across Iraq.

From 2003 through 2006, U.S. military forces, under the leadership of Gen. John Abizaid and Gen. George Casey, inflicted huge losses on the Baathist and al Qaeda leadership. Many thousands of insurgents, including the al Qaeda chief in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, were captured or killed and proved difficult to replace.

The Iraqi Security Forces had achieved cohesion, improved operational effectiveness and critical mass. By December 2006, some 320,000 Iraqis had been trained, equipped and deployed, producing the forces necessary to help hold difficult neighborhoods against the enemy. By 2007, the surge, for most Iraqis, could have an Iraqi face.

And the political scene in Iraq had shifted. Muqtada al-Sadr, the firebrand cleric, declared a cease-fire in February 2007. The government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, seated in May 2006, moved against militias and Iranian-backed militias and has imperfectly, but notably, rejected narrow sectarian policies.

The best indication that timing is everything may be that there had been earlier surges without the same effect as the 2007 surge.

The decision to conduct a surge came out of an interagency review in the fall of 2006. By mid-December, as I was leaving the Pentagon, there was a rough consensus in the Defense Department that deploying additional combat brigades to Iraq was the right step.

Some military leaders raised reasonable questions about the potential effectiveness of a surge, in part because of a correct concern that military power alone could not solve Iraq’s problems. I agreed, and emphasized that a military surge would need to be accompanied by effective diplomatic and economic "surges" from other departments and agencies of the American government, and by considerably greater progress from Iraq’s elected leaders.

During my last weeks in office, I recommended to Bush that he consider Gen. David Petraeus as commander of coalition forces in Iraq, as Casey’s tour was coming to an end. Petraeus and his deputy, Gen. Ray Odierno, had the experience and skill to recognize and exploit the seismic shifts that were taking place in Iraq’s political landscape.

At the critical moment — a moment when the Iraqis were able and willing to be part of the surge with the American forces — the United States surged into Iraq with the right commanders, additional forces and a fresh operational approach rooted in years of on-the-ground experience.

Americans can be proud of what has been accomplished in Iraq over the last five-plus years. They should also be impressed by the results of the surge, which, thus far, has outstripped expectations, including mine.

Bush’s decision to increase combat troop levels in Iraq in January 2007 sent a clear message that he was determined not to abandon a people to death squads and terrorists.

We will need the same commitment to helping the people of Afghanistan succeed, but that does not mean we will achieve it with the same tactics or strategies.

The way forward in Afghanistan will need to reflect the current circumstances there — not the circumstances in Iraq two years ago. Additional troops in Afghanistan may be necessary, but they will not, by themselves, be sufficient to lead to the results we saw in Iraq. A similar confluence of events that contributed to success in Iraq does not appear to exist in Afghanistan.

What’s needed in Afghanistan is an Afghan solution, just as Iraqi solutions have contributed so fundamentally to progress in Iraq. And a surge, if it is to be successful, will need to be an Afghan surge.

Left unanswered in the current debate is the critical question of how thousands of additional American troops might actually bring long-term stability to Afghanistan — a country 80,000 square miles larger than Iraq yet with security forces just one-fourth the size of Iraq’s.

Afghanistan also lacks Iraq’s oil and other economic advantages. It is plagued by the narcotics trade. Its borders are threatened by terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan. Fractured groups of Pashtun tribesmen on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border do not yet appear willing to unite and take on the insurgents in their midst, as Arab tribes did in Iraq.

Further, Afghanistan has a long history of defeating foreign armies that sought strength in numbers. More U.S. troops could raise tensions, particularly in Afghanistan’s Pashtun south, where the insurgency is strongest.

Only capable indigenous forces can ultimately win an insurgency. Afghan forces, backed by coalition troops, will need to move into the most violent areas to secure and protect the local population, enabling Afghans to cooperate with their government without losing their lives.

To do this, the size of the Afghan National Army will need to be increased well beyond its 70,000 or so troops and its training accelerated.

More American forces will need to undertake the unglamorous work of embedding with Afghan soldiers as advisers, living and fighting together.

Kingpins and senior facilitators in the thriving poppy industry that helps to fuel the insurgency will need to be treated as military targets, as al Qaeda and Taliban leaders are.

The current suggestion of "opening negotiations" with the Taliban may well win over some low- and mid-level supporters, but if history is any guide, offering the hand of peace to hardened fanatics is not likely to prove successful.

Aggressive action against Taliban and al Qaeda sanctuaries in Pakistan will need to continue. Pakistani officials will have to isolate any factions in their military and intelligence services that are sympathetic to the Taliban.

In a few weeks, the new commander in chief, Barack Obama, will assume the responsibility of leading a nation at a time of war. Time and flexibility are the two constants of military success. In a struggle with an adaptable, thinking enemy, there is no single template for success. More is not always better. One size does not fit all.

The singular trait of the American way of war is the remarkable ability of our military to advance, absorb setbacks, adapt and ultimately triumph based upon the unique circumstances of a given campaign.

Thus it has been throughout our history. And thus it will be in Iraq and Afghanistan, if we have the patience and wisdom to learn from our successes, and if our leaders have the wherewithal to persevere even when it is not popular to do so.

Donald H. Rumsfeld was the secretary of defense from 2001 to 2006.

 

[JK!]

If the borders are fenced they will just break through using bangalores like the Algerian fighters in the 1960s against the French.

Plus the UK has just announced recently to invest some £700 Million in new vehicles so I doubt they will want to leave after putting in that kind of money.

 

[Munir]

Irac is run by people that hate eachother as much as the USA. Afghanistan can and will not be conquered by more troops. Pashtuns area different breed and I do not think the US see the difference between Al Qaida, Taleban or orinary Afghan... The fact remains that the US should show more respect to the locals. They might look underdeveoped according to US standards but it is their nation...

But removing wrong elements (including warlords) is a blessing...

 

[Keysersoze]

If the borders are fenced they will just break through using bangalores like the Algerian fighters in the 1960s against the French.

Plus the UK has just announced recently to invest some £700 Million in new vehicles so I doubt they will want to leave after putting in that kind of money.

Actually dude you should look up the "Morice Line" that the French used. It was much more successful.