1965 War | An eye witness account.

[Kompromat]

Hilal Publication | September 2013.

 

[Kompromat]

 

[Chak Bamu]

I really like the picture of our jawans on the bank of BRB canal. Indians could never cross it. What really were they thinking when they planned the attack? Whoever had made the plan of attack on Lahore should have been court-marshalled. Was he?

 

[Joe Shearer]

I can't read Urdu, so can't comment on the main text.

However, it is incorrect that Indian troops did not cross the Ichhogil Canal. You might like to look up the Rlvant records, especially that of 3 Jat under Desmond Hayde:

India crossed the International Border on the Western front on 6 September, marking an official beginning of the war.[26] On 6 September, the 15th Infantry Division of the Indian Army, under World War II veteran Major General Prasad, battled a massive counterattack by Pakistan near the west bank of the Ichogil Canal (BRB Canal), which was a de facto border of India and Pakistan. The General's entourage itself was ambushed and he was forced to flee his vehicle. A second, this time successful, attempt to cross the Ichhogil Canal was made over the bridge in the village of Barki, just east of Lahore. These developments brought the Indian Army within the range of Lahore International Airport. As a result, the United States requested a temporary ceasefire to allow it to evacuate its citizens in Lahore. However, the Pakistani counterattack took Khem Karan from Indian forces which tried to divert the attention of Pakistanis from Khem Karan by an attack on Bedian and the adjacent villages.
The thrust against Lahore consisted of the 1st Infantry Division supported by the three tank regiments of the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade; they quickly advanced across the border, reaching the Ichhogil (BRB) Canal by 6 September. The Pakistani Army held the bridges over the canal or blew up those it could not hold, effectively stalling any further advance by the Indians on Lahore. One unit of the Indian Jat Regiment, 3 Jat, had also crossed the Ichogil canal and captured[27] the town of Batapore (Jallo Mur to Pakistan) on the west side of the canal. The same day, a counter offensive consisting of an armoured division and infantry division supported by Pakistan Air Force Sabres forced the Indian 15th Division to withdraw to its starting point. Although 3 Jat suffered minimal casualties, the bulk of the damage being taken by ammunition and stores vehicles, the higher commanders had no information of 3 Jat's capture of Batapore and misleading information led to the command to withdraw from Batapore and Dograi to Ghosal-Dial. This move brought extreme disappointment[28] to Lt-Col Desmond Hayde, CO of 3 Jat. Dograi was eventually recaptured by 3 Jat on 21 September, for the second time but after a much harder battle due to Pakistani reinforcements.

 

[Joe Shearer]

In answer to your question about the plan and the commander, you might like to look up the record of Major General Niranjan Parsad. Originally an aviator, he transferred to the Army and was involved in the fighting in 1962. Very clearly, from his actions on the battlefield in 1965, the defeat against the PLA affected him very deeply, and perhaps someone else should have been in command of 15 Div.

 

[DESERT FIGHTER]

Indian troops did cross the BRB canal and reached the outskirts of Lahore (Bata factory) in 1965.

They turned around routed the Pakistanis at Burki and Dograi.

Poor Pakistani generals always thought that BRB canal is not crossable but forgot that what is bad for India is bad for them. Their tanks could not retreat back. This infamous Canal crossing was impossible for them.

At Dograi, twelve tanks and Pakistani Commander Golewala was found hiding underneath a tank. They all surrendered to lt. Col Deshmond Hedge.

The ding - dong battle lasted 18 days. Each side crossed the BRB canal several times. Ceasefire for Pakistan came on a bad day. All Pakistani units surrendered. The east side of the canal was in Indian hand. Poor Pakistani troops began making preparations to dig fresh defences on the other side. Previously they were at Waghah border.

They erected a wooden palisade wall to mask their fresh preparations.

Melvin De Mello, the All India Radio broadcaster played the famous song from the Hindi film

"Aaj kiyon hum se Paedha hai.....

We all laughed. I was there as an NCC cadet delivering supplies after the ceasefire.

Yeah i laughed too...

Gen niranjan prasad ...15th Infantry Division in Lahore sector during the 1965 India Pakistan War. Was relieved of command after start of operations.

"...a major battle the west of the Beas would end in the destruction of the Indian Army and thereafter allow the enemy (Pakistani) forces to push to the gates of Delhi without much resistance." 1965 WAR-The Inside Story by R.D. Pradhan

In Chapter 8 titled "Of Cowardice and Panic" of his book "1965 War-The Inside Story", R.D. Pradhan describes the cowardice of Maj. Gen. Niranjan Prasad, the Indian general commanding officer in Lahore sector. When Pakistan Defense Forces counter-attacked the intruding Indian military and the general was fired upon on Sept 6, 1965, he "ran away". Here's an excerpt:

"On learning that, Lt. Gen. Harbakash Singh and the corps commander drove in a Jonga (Nissan P60 Jeep) to the battlefront. Army commander found that the enemy (PAF) air attack had created a havoc on G.T. Road. (Indian) Vehicles were burning and several vehicles of 15 Division abandoned on the road, the drivers having run away, leaving some of the engines still running. Maj. Gen. Niranjan Prasad was hiding in a recently irrigated sugar cane field. As described by Harabakash Singh: "He (Prasad) came out to receive us, with his boots covered with wet mud. He had no head cover, nor was he wearing any badges of his rank. He had stubble on his face, not having shaved." Seeing him in such a stage, Harbakhash Singh asked him: "Whether he was the General Officer commanding a division or a coolie? Why had he removed badges of rank and not shaved? Niranjan Prasad had no answer."

That Major Bhatti, whose myth was built by the Pakistani media at that time was in fact helping Pakistani troops to retreat and cross the Canal. What a joke. He was awarded highest national honor to help retreat. Other armis give awards for advance, here Pakistani army was handing out medals for retreat.

Listen flowlife trolling is one thing but insulting our martyrs not acceptable..

@WebMaster

In Line of Duty: A Soldier Remembers, according to Shekhar Gupta, the editor of Indian Express, Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh reveals that not only "did Gen Chowdhury play a very small role in the entire campaign, he was so nervous as to be on the verge of losing half of Punjab to Pakistan, including the city of Amritsar. Harbakhsh describes, in clinical detail, how our own offensive in the Lahore sector had come unhinged. The general commanding the division on Ichchogil canal fled in panic, leaving his jeep, its wireless running and the briefcase containing sensitive documents that were then routinely read on Radio Pakistan during the war. Singh wanted to court martial him, Chowdhury let him get away with resignation".

According to Shekhar Gupta, Harbkhash Singh recounts that a bigger disaster struck a bit to the south where the other division cracked up in assault, just as it encountered a bit of resistance. Several infantry battalions, short on battle inoculation, deserted and Singh gives a hair-raising account – and confirmation of a long-debated rumor – that Chowdhury panicked so badly he ordered him to withdraw to a new defensive line behind the Beas, thereby conceding half of Punjab to Pakistan. Singh describes the conversation with Chowdhury at Ambala where he refused to carry out the order, asking his chief to either put it down in writing or visit the front and take charge of the battle.

Foreign reporting:

The London Daily Mirror reported in 1965:

"There is a smell of death in the burning Pakistan sun. For it was here that India's attacking forces came to a dead stop.

"During the night they threw in every reinforcement they could find. But wave after wave of attacks were repulsed by the Pakistanis"

"India", said the London Daily Times, "is being soundly beaten by a nation

which is outnumbered by four and a half to one in population and three to one in size of armed forces."

In Times reporter Louis Karrar wrote:

"Who can defeat a nation which knows how to play hide and seek with death".

USA - Aviation week - December 1968 issue:

"For the PAF, the 1965 war was as climatic as the Israeli victory over the Arabs in 1967. A further similarity was that Indian air power had an approximately 5:1 numerical superiority at the start of the conflict. Unlike the Middle East conflict, the Pakistani air victory was achieved to a large degree by air-to-air combat rather than on ground. But it was as absolute as that attained by Israel.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Just as much, @DESERT FIGHTER, as you found the two posts above yours offensive, your own post was in large measure irrelevant. The issue on which I responded, and so too the other Indian poster, was of crossing the Ichhogil. There was also a question asked about the commander in charge of operations on the spot. As far as i am concerned, i believe that i answered both honestly, even to the extent where a general came out looking bad.

These apart, if you wish to add, tincture or embellish the actions of both armies, you are welcome to do so. However, that puts you on the same moral plane as the poster whom you reacted to with such violence.

If you want to exchange honest information, I am sure that you will find a ready and reciprocal response. If you wish to indulge in some chest-thumping, feel free; there will be those who will reciprocate to that as well, but they will not include me.

I really have no time for these spurious bellicosities.

 

[Joe Shearer]

For those who get unduly dyspeptic, this analysis from an impeccable source might serve as a useful carminative:

https://defence.pk/threads/1965-analysed.278349/

 

[Umair Nawaz]

Destroyed Pakistani Patton tanks at Patton Nagar (Khemkaran)


This is what Leo Heiman, the renowned Military Analyst wrote in American Military review of February 1966

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/utils/getfile/collection/p124201coll1/id/638/filename/639.pdf
Deployment of armor. In the battle of attrition which stemmed from sheer orthodox planning, India lost 114 tanks and 57 armored cars versus 471 Pakistani tanks and armored care destroyed, crippled, or captured. Pakistani loses were heavier .

He further writes:

In the zone of miiitary opera-tanks computere went wrong, ****-stani tanks were complicated to operate.
This may sound like a paradox but there is no doubt now that the sheer modernity of the Patton was its undoing vis-e-vis the older, slower, weaker, and simpler Centurion-s and Sherman used by the Indians.


The Patton weapon system, the tank crews fed misleading information into the electronic brains, the heavy guns had to be operated by hand, and the crews were so occupied with modern gadgetry that they had little time left for fighting. ‘To many armies, ultramodern hardware is not an asset.
Apart from having trouble with the Patton automated fire control equipment, the Pakistanis were handicapped by their battle deployment. Poor Planning.


When fuel and ammunition supplies were exhausted, the **** brigade ground to a halt. Lacking infantry protection, the Pakistani tanks became easy prey for Indian hunter-killer teams which stalked the Patton with jeep-mounted 106-millimeter recoilless rifles, bazookas, and flamethrowers.

About Pakistani Airforce he writes:

As ground attack aircraft, Pakistani F 104C and F-86 proved less effective than French Mystere jets, British hunter Hawks and Indian-made Gnats .

Star fighter was used for mainly A to A Combat. It was the first mach 2 fighter in South Asian history and we didnt had LGBs then like F16s to be used in Ground Attack. So with this high speed the Jet wasnt suitable for A to G missions and were not used for such purpose so this is enough to prove the analysis in post wrong!

Now abt tanks!

U just didnt had Shermans and Centurions but u also had AMX 13 tanks of France which were or advance then anything we had back then.But interestingly yr sources and Analysist never mention those tanks but only mention Second line Tanks.

 

[GR!FF!N]

Star fighter was used for mainly A to A Combat. It was the first mach 2 fighter in South Asian history and we didnt had LGBs then like F16s to be used in Ground Attack. So with this high speed the Jet wasnt suitable for A to G missions and were not used for such purpose so this is enough to prove the analysis in post wrong!

Now abt tanks!

U just didnt had Shermans and Centurions but u also had AMX 13 tanks of France which were or advance then anything we had back then.But interestingly yr sources and Analysist never mention those tanks but only mention Second line Tanks.

AMX 13 tanks were light tanks armed with 75 mm gun.in contrast,Pakistan had M-47 and M-48 Patton,best tank around that time.

Centurians,India's best MBT at that time was came atleast 8 years before production of first M-48 Patton.
don't post lies,please.

 

[Umair Nawaz]

AMX 13 tanks were light tanks armed with 75 mm gun.in contrast,Pakistan had M-47 and M-48 Patton,best tank around that time.

Centurians,India's best MBT at that time was came atleast 8 years before production of first M-48 Patton.
don't post lies,please.

Ah Stupid the light tanks r more effective in our scenario then those heavy tanks. Plus we also had just medium tanks we also nvr had Heavy tank.
The Best tank is that which comprises the first line of offence Not Second or third and by Far AMX-13 was yr best and to tellu truth AMX-13 saw its production after Pattons so in tech it was better or roughly Similar but advantage was with AMX in capabilities, do u even know AMX series r the best tank series that French had produced thats how they won its tenders in international markets where it competed with T-62A, Pattons etc etc Standard tanks, Thailand is an example.

There r two Variants of AMX-13 one is with 75mm main cannon and other is with 90mm Cannon. And u Had those ones as well as with 75mm guns. The Numbers of AMX 13 as a whole were more or less same as we had of M-48.

And we had 600-700 total tanks including Patton versions and also our Armour brigades besides these also had Centurion or atleast Sherman tanks as well so not every tank was Patton Standard. And the Tanks in total u had were roughly 1000-1200. That is how u were able to win this Battlle of Asl Uttar.

 

[GR!FF!N]

Ah Stupid the light tanks r more effective in our scenario then those heavy tanks. Plus we also had just medium tanks we also nvr had Heavy tank.
The Best tank is that which comprises the first line of offence Not Second or third and by Far AMX-13 was yr best and to tellu truth AMX-13 saw its production after Pattons so in tech it was better or roughly Similar but advantage was with AMX in capabilities, do u even know AMX series r the best tank series that French had produced thats how they won its tenders in international markets where it competed with T-62A, Pattons etc etc Standard tanks, Thailand is an example.

There r two Variants of AMX-13 one is with 75mm main cannon and other is with 90mm Cannon. And u Had those ones as well as with 75mm guns. The Numbers of AMX 13 as a whole were more or less same as we had of M-48.

And we had 600-700 total tanks including Patton versions and also our Armour brigades besides these also had Centurion or atleast Sherman tanks as well so not every tank was Patton Standard. And the Tanks in total u had were roughly 1000-1200. That is how u were able to win this Battlle of Asl Uttar.

AMX-13 came at the same time of Patton,in 1953.and they were not best tanks as India wasn't happy with AMX-13's performance.and it was our only modern tanks that time.and never AMX-13 was pitted against T-62 or Patton as both belongs to different category.while AMX-13 weighs around 14 Ton,Patton which is a MBT weighs over 45 ton.its like comparing a hand cart with heavy truck.do you even understand whats that mean???

hell,today,even MPV has more protection than those tanks.in front of any MBT,they got zilch chance.a single 75mm rounds couldn't do much harm against 120mm armor.2-3 shots needed.while Patton could blow these paper tanks with 90 mm gun.

and Battle of Asal Uttar was won using Horse Shoe formation and Stupid PA bogged down inside it.they got fire from 3 sides.it is well documented.

why bother to comment when you don't even know the basics???

 

[Umair Nawaz]

AMX-13 came at the same time of Patton,in 1953.and they were not best tanks as India wasn't happy with AMX-13's performance.and it was our only modern tanks that time.and never AMX-13 was pitted against T-62 or Patton as both belongs to different category.while AMX-13 weighs around 14 Ton,Patton which is a MBT weighs over 45 ton.its like comparing a hand cart with heavy truck.do you even understand whats that mean???

hell,today,even MPV has more protection than those tanks.in front of any MBT,they got zilch chance.a single 75mm rounds couldn't do much harm against 120mm armor.2-3 shots needed.while Patton could blow these paper tanks with 90 mm gun.

and Battle of Asal Uttar was won using Horse Shoe formation and Stupid PA bogged down inside it.they got fire from 3 sides.it is well documented.

why bother to comment when you don't even know the basics???

1) Patton production started in late 40s even wikipedia can tell this and AMX's started in early 50s both can be seen in wikipedia.

In Thailand's contender the AMx was selected over Pattons and T62 tank. And I did mentioned that Patton is a Medium tank anyways so no need to repeat it.

If yr armed forces were not too satisfied with AMX then so were our forces with Patton even in Wiki's 65 war page it is mentioned. Thats is one of the reason why we didnt after that opted for any western tank neither did u.
And Friend yes there is a weight difference b/w these two but it doesnt mean that this is the reason we call some thing inferior or superior ovr each other. In this case then Why is today AL Khalid is our MBT which will face face the likes of Arjun series tanks as one is medium and other is heavy tank? It has to do about capabilities then just weight. Rather in our South Asian scenario the light,Medium tanks r more effective because we live in fertile lands used for Agriculture and then we have sands like Deserts. Here the tanks who will be more agile will be more effective. So it doesnt matter if Patton weighted 38(its not 45 tons) tons or AMX 14 tons as u claim.

2) i think we r talking about 65 war not of today. As the time progresses the new tech comes and ammunition. So its better if we compare the amount of tech we had back then not today.

3) Only tactics dont make u win battles its about technology as well. And u had the matching technology.

4) Honestly u know the feeling is rather mutual.

 

[Joe Shearer]

@Umair Nawaz, why don't you stick to social and political matters? That will show up so much more gracefully, and would save embarrassment.

 

[Capt.Popeye]

@Umair Nawaz, why don't you stick to social and political matters? That will show up so much more gracefully, and would save embarrassment.

@Joe Shearer; your well-meaning counsel will just fall on 'deaf ears and dumbkopfs'

But just to re-inject any sense of perspective and most of all 'plain old sense' in to the discussion:
From the thread on PDF started by @Fatman 17 (and which you wisely redirected us towards), Joe.

1965 analysed
Columnist A H AMIN analyses the 1965 war dispassionately.


1965 was a watershed in Indo-Pak history! The war instead of being dispassionately analyzed became a ground to attack and condemn political opponents! Complete books were written out of sheer motivation based on pure and unadulterated venom! To date the trend continues at the cost of serious research and history writing! Most of these books were written by beneficiaries of the usurper Ayub or Bhutto haters! Men with a naive knowledge of military history made worse by a desire to settle personal scores! Jaundiced history of the worst kind!

This article is an overall analysis of the 1965 war based on military facts rather than any motivation to settle political scores based on matters of ego rather than any serious objective considerations! It is hoped that after 36 years readers would be more interested in hard facts rather than pure and unadulterated polemics by men who did not know the division of battle “more than a spinster”!

Timing of 1965 War
This has been the subject of many controversies and myths! In 1965 India was recovering from the effects of the China War. Indian Army was engaged in a process of massive expansion with units and divisions half trained half novice! Something like the Austrian Army of 1809! Outwardly expanding and larger but lacking the military virtue and military spirit identified by Carl Von Clausewitz as the key elements in a military machines effectiveness! There was no overwhelming Indian numerical superiority unlike 1971 and many parts of the Indo-Pak border like the vast bulk of Shakargarh bulge were unmanned on the Indian side! Qualitatively Pakistan had a tangible superiority by virtue of possession of relatively superior tanks and artillery! The Centurion tank which was the backbone of Indian army was concentrated in the Indian Armoured division while the vast bulk of Indian infantry divisions were equipped with the obsolete Shermans! Even in quality of command there were serious drawbacks! The Indian 1 Corps had been just raised and the GOC of the Indian 1st Armoured Division was about to retire! Indian Mountain Divisions brought into the plains lacked sufficient antitank resources and were not in the ideal fighting condition. Some 38 plus Indian Infantry Battalions were absorbed by the blotting paper of Indian Army i.e. a tract known as Kashmir! All these battalions were deployed north of Chenab River.
Indian Army was in the process of expansion and the Indian Army had no strategic reserves in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor against the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division.

Setting aside the ethical dilemma whether war is the best instrument of policy to settle political disputes militarily 1965 was the ideal time for Pakistan to settle its political problems with India. This point was realized by some mid- ranking senior officers in the Pakistan Army which included the Pakistani DMO Gul Hassan, Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik and by some civilians like Foreign Minister Z.A Bhutto and Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmad.

On the other hand Musa the Pakistani C-in-C was opposed to war! This was not because Musa was a pacifist but because Musa lacked military competence and was enjoying his second four-year-term as C-in-C of the Pakistan Army! Ayub the military ruler was initially against any military adventure but revised his ideas after Pakistani military successes in Rann of Katch.

In Clausewitzan terms 1965 was the ideal time for Pakistan to start a war. The following quotation illustrates the rationale; ‘Let us suppose a small state is involved in a contest with a very superior power, and foresees that with each year its position will become worse: should it not; if war is inevitable, make use of the time when its situation is furthest from worst? Then it must attack, not because the attack in itself ensures any advantages but it will rather increase the disparity of forces — but because this state is under the necessity of either bringing the matter completely to an issue before the worst time arrives or of gaining at least in the meantime some advantages which it may hereafter turn to account’.1

Comparative Level of Planning-Strategic
At the strategic level the Pakistani plan was superior. Its initial thrust launched with an infantry division-tank brigade size force against Akhnur was enough to cause a crisis of strategic level in the Indian Army. The situation with Akhnur in Pakistani hands would have been disastrous for India. All the Indian plans to launch the 1 Corps against the MRL would have been thrown to winds and Indians would have spent the entire war redressing the imbalance caused due to loss of Akhnur! On the other hand the Pakistani thrust in Khem Karan would have bottled up three Indian Infantry divisions in the Beas-Ravi corridor and three Indian divisions would have been forced to surrender. 1965 could have then been a Pakistani strategic success rather than a tactical draw as it turned out to be.

On the other hand the Pakistani 6 Armoured Division was well poised to deal with any Indian armoured thrust launched in the Ravi-Chenab corridor.

Pakistani failure lay in poor execution and understanding at the strategic level rather than planning
It was in implementation rather than planning that the Pakistani GHQ and Ayub failed miserably at the strategic level. The reason was simple. Both Ayub and Musa lacked strategic insight! They lacked the resolution and strategic coup d oeil to conduct decisive warfare. Both were extremely defensive in their approach and saw war as reacting to enemy countermoves rather than making the enemy react to their moves. Thus Musa as late as 1983 naively claimed in his book “My Version” that the aim of Grand Slam was not to capture Akhnur but to merely threaten it. In other words Musa saw a move which had the potential to cause a severe strategic imbalance in the Indian High Command as a tactical move to relieve pressure on Muzaffarabad! Allah is praised!

Even a foreigner saw the immense importance of capturing Akhnur. Thus the remarks of Marshall Chen Yi the Foreign Minister of China who was visiting Pakistan at the time of Grand Slam. Chen Yi thus “made a sharp cutting movement at the little finger; ‘knock them out at Akhnoor’.That will help the freedom fighters and also guarantee the security of East and West Pakistan. With the little finger gone, the whole hand becomes useless”!2 So thought a veteran of a many decade long civil war! This was Greek for a man who was elevated to the rank of Army Chief because of political considerations! This was Greek for a man accused of tactical timidity in Burma!
Inability to develop a doctrine of decisive warfare

The principal reason of failure of both the armies was “failure or inability to develop a doctrine of decisive warfare”. This was a colonial legacy. The Indian Army of pre-1947 was an internal security machine designed for defence while the main forces of the empires allies came into action on other decisive fronts. The concentration on both sides was to have tactical concepts while no doctrine integrating tactics with operational strategy and national strategy existed to give coherence to the whole business of warfare.

Lack of Resolution in the Ayub-Musa duo to energetically conduct the war
1965 was a failure in resolution at the highest level. Both the president and his handpicked chief lacked the resolution to provide strategic direction to a well-oiled machine which had the potential to inflict a severe strategic defeat on the enemy.

Failure of Pakistani GHQ to effectively supervise execution of plans or to create alternative organization or command arrangements to supervise the conduct of war

The job of an army HQ is not just to formulate plans but to effectively supervise the execution of plans. Ayub in words of a British contemporary was devoid of “operational experience” “organizational understanding” and “lacked tactical flair”.3 Thus Ayub and Musa saw no need to have intermediate corps headquarters to over insure the success of the army’s main attack involving a force of an infantry division and an armoured division. This was a case of extreme naiveté rather than a minor error of judgment. Probably the supreme commander was too busy with Five Year Plans and big business and had lost sight of the business of soldiering! His handpicked proxy chief wanted a peaceful tenure in which he would not be forced to exercise any strategic judgment!

The 12 Divisional organizational failures, one of the main reasons of Grand Slam’s failure, was another glaring case of lack of organizational insight on part of Ayub and Musa. While the Indians had bifurcated their forces in Kashmir based on north and south of Pir Panjal range right from 1948 and early 1950s Pakistan’s military supremo’s naively thought that one divisional headquarter was sufficient to manage a front of 400 miles in a mountainous territory spanning the Himalayas, Karakorams and the Pir Panjal!

Indian and Pakistani armour failures compared
At the strategic level both India and Pakistan got an opportunity to knock out the other side. Pakistan got it twice, first at Akhnur and then at Khem Karan. India got it once at Gadgor on 8th September. Both the sides failed. On the Pakistani side the failure had more to do with lack of strategic insight at Akhnur, ordering a change of horses in the middle of a crucial operation. Then at Khem Karan the Pakistani failure was at divisional level i.e failure to pump in all five armoured regiments on the 8th or 9th September thus achieving a decisive breakthrough. The situation was made worse by absence of Corps Headquarter. The Indian failure at Gadgor had more to do with failure at brigade and divisional level in actual execution despite the fact that the Indians had the mains “available” as well as “physically available” to achieve a breakthrough. The failure was Brigadier K.K Singh Commander Indian 1st Armoured Division who saw a threat to his flanks which in reality was a tank squadron of 62 Cavalry which had lost its way and blundered into the Indian artillery echelons opposite Rangre. The Indians had the means to achieve a breakthrough but failed primarily because lack of coup d oil and resolution at brigade level. This was a command and execution failure. In Khem Karan on the other hand Pakistan had the resources but failed to bring them into the battle area because of poor staff work and planning at divisional level. Thus on the decisive 8th September Pakistan did not have the means to achieve a breakthrough and this had more to do with poor initial planning and staff work at div and brigade level rather than at the command or execution level. Thus the Pakistani failure was a staff and planning failure in which all from brigade till GHQ were included while the Indian failure was a command failure in which the prime culprits were the armoured brigade and divisional commander.

On the Pakistani side the success at Gadgor had more to do with outstanding leadership at squadron and unit level rather than any operational brilliance at brigade or divisional level. In the Indian success at Khem Karan, however, an important role was played by Indian higher headquarters at divisional corps and army command level.

Triumph of Defence and Failure of Offence as a Form of War
1965 was a failure of offence and triumph of defence. Except in Grand Slam where initial overwhelming superiority enabled Pakistan to achieve a breakthrough, on both sides defence triumphed as a way of war. Both the armies were more used to defence because of British colonial military experience and comparative relative lack of difference in weaponry also ensured that defence triumphed over attack. Thus the attackers failed at Gadgor, Chawinda, Assal, Uttar and Valtoha regardless of religion of the defender! Both the armies lacked the dynamism to conduct attack a far more complicated form of war and totally outside the pre-1947 experience of fighting divisional and brigade level defensive battles till overwhelming superiority enabled the British to resume the offensive as at Al alamein and that too with non-Indian formations like the purely British armoured divisions or in Burma where the British-Indians had overwhelming superiority against the Japanese in tanks and air.

Ignored aspects of the war
There are certain points which are conveniently forgotten or not understood at all. Although the paratroopers failed in Pathankot area their dropping delayed the move forward of 14 Indian Infantry Division to support Indian 1st Armoured Division operations opposite Chawinda. The latter fact was acknowledged by a man no less eminent than the Indian GOC Western Command Harbaksh Singh.4

Conclusion
While Indian GOC Western Command Harbaksh Singh admitted that the Pakistani attack opposite Khem Karan could have been decisive we in Pakistan have twisted 1965 war into a case of blaming the civilians for intriguing against the army and leading it into an aimless military adventure. Even today India’s top military thinker Ravi Rikhye admits that Khem Karan had the potential to be India’s Fourth Battle of Panipat.

Pakistan failed because its military leaders lacked the strategic insight which was necessary to transform its tangible qualitative superiority in equipment and manpower at the tactical level into a victory! 1965 was an undoubted strategic failure on part of Pakistani higher command. Pakistan paid the price six years later. Success would have meant unity. Defeat led to civil war and secession. The fault lay in lack of strategic insight at the military level.

End Notes
1. Pages-397 and 398-On War-Edited by Anatol Rapport-Reprinted National Book Foundation-1976.
2. Page-93-Memoirs of a Bystander-A Life in Diplomacy-Iqbal Akhund-Oxford University Press-Karachi-1997.
3. Pages 428 & 429-Pakistan-Memories of Earlier Years-Lieut Gen Sir James Wilson-Army Quarterly and Defence Journal-Volume-120-No Four-October 1990.
4. Pages-61,129,135 and 136-War Despatches-Harbaksh Singh-Lancer-1991.
5. Ravi Rikhye’s article on Assal Uttar-ORBAT-19 August 2001.

DJ