KashifAsrar
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An article from ToI dated 24th April 2007.
Kashif
Manpreet Sethi
Why missile tests? The mere acquisition or demonstration of a nuclear weapons capability does not automatically translate into credible nuclear deterrence. For the weapons to be gainfully employed as a deterrent, a number of other steps are necessary. One of the most important of these is making the weapon deliverable on a reliable missile of requisite range and accuracy. This process calls for a regular and consistent programme of missile testing.
Pakistan conducted four missile tests in recent months. A two-stage, solid fuel, nuclear-capable ballistic missile, the Shaheen II, or Hatf VI, with a range of 2,000 km was test-fired on February 22. This was followed on March 3 with test-firing of a longerrange version of its nuclear-capable, radardodging cruise missile, the Hatf VII or Babur. The missileâs previous range of 500 km was enhanced to 700 km and this was tested as a terrain-hugging, highly manoeuvrable missile. The same was tested once again within less than 20 days of the first test. And most recently, on March 31, Pakistan test-fired yet another nuclear-capable surface-to-surface ballistic missile, the Hatf II or Abdali, with a range of 200 km.
Several Indian strategic analysts often tend to dismiss Pakistani missile test claims, or make light of them for invariably being âhighly successfulâ and ânuclear capableâ. One important thing, however, that should not be missed is the dead seriousness and focus of the Pakistani missile programme. For a country that perceives a security threat from India and seeks to neutralise its conventional superiority with a first use nuclear weapons doctrine, it is extremely logical that Islamabad should work in a focused and consistent manner to enhance its nuclear deterrence.
Pakistan has been following a multipronged approach. Its missile development, or acquisition, has included ballistic and cruise missiles of all ranges. It has also worked towards building a repertoire of short and medium-range missiles that have brought vast swathes of India within its reach.
India too carried out a successful test launch of Agni III. One hopes that these tests are not conducted as knee-jerk responses to tests across the border but are part of a more focused and planned programme of research and development of Indiaâs nuclear delivery systems.
Indian conceptualisation of nuclear deterrence has traditionally devoted greater attention to the number of nuclear weapons, their yield, need for more tests to enhance yield, and the countryâs fissile material stockpiling capabilities. The last two issues have particularly been in focus in the context of the ongoing negotiations on the Indo-US civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. The Indian establishment, as also the strategic community, has been pre-occupied with the possibility of the countryâs access to international nuclear commerce coming at the cost of depriving it of its right to conduct more nuclear tests in the future, or constraining its ability to produce and stockpile enough fissile material for credible nuclear deterrence.
While these concerns are valid, one must not forget that the demands of credible deterrence also rest on the ability to reliably and accurately deliver that warhead. Hence the need to develop, upgrade and enhance the range, accuracy and reliability of delivery systems through regular testing. Pakistan has displayed a remarkable focus on this parameter of deterrence. India should focus on survivability and reliability of its delivery mechanisms, given its no-firstuse nuclear doctrine. It has displayed a relaxed approach on this count.
Pakistanâs conduct of missile tests in rapid succession should, therefore, be taken by India as a wake-up call â not to conduct a series of tests in a tit-for-tat response but examine, analyse and imbibe larger prerequisites of credible deterrence. These should be based on four criteria: safety, survivability, reliability and penetration of its missiles. With these four factors, even a small nuclear force can assure effective deterrence.
The writer is with Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi.
Kashif
Missiles hold the key
Manpreet Sethi
Why missile tests? The mere acquisition or demonstration of a nuclear weapons capability does not automatically translate into credible nuclear deterrence. For the weapons to be gainfully employed as a deterrent, a number of other steps are necessary. One of the most important of these is making the weapon deliverable on a reliable missile of requisite range and accuracy. This process calls for a regular and consistent programme of missile testing.
Pakistan conducted four missile tests in recent months. A two-stage, solid fuel, nuclear-capable ballistic missile, the Shaheen II, or Hatf VI, with a range of 2,000 km was test-fired on February 22. This was followed on March 3 with test-firing of a longerrange version of its nuclear-capable, radardodging cruise missile, the Hatf VII or Babur. The missileâs previous range of 500 km was enhanced to 700 km and this was tested as a terrain-hugging, highly manoeuvrable missile. The same was tested once again within less than 20 days of the first test. And most recently, on March 31, Pakistan test-fired yet another nuclear-capable surface-to-surface ballistic missile, the Hatf II or Abdali, with a range of 200 km.
Several Indian strategic analysts often tend to dismiss Pakistani missile test claims, or make light of them for invariably being âhighly successfulâ and ânuclear capableâ. One important thing, however, that should not be missed is the dead seriousness and focus of the Pakistani missile programme. For a country that perceives a security threat from India and seeks to neutralise its conventional superiority with a first use nuclear weapons doctrine, it is extremely logical that Islamabad should work in a focused and consistent manner to enhance its nuclear deterrence.
Pakistan has been following a multipronged approach. Its missile development, or acquisition, has included ballistic and cruise missiles of all ranges. It has also worked towards building a repertoire of short and medium-range missiles that have brought vast swathes of India within its reach.
India too carried out a successful test launch of Agni III. One hopes that these tests are not conducted as knee-jerk responses to tests across the border but are part of a more focused and planned programme of research and development of Indiaâs nuclear delivery systems.
Indian conceptualisation of nuclear deterrence has traditionally devoted greater attention to the number of nuclear weapons, their yield, need for more tests to enhance yield, and the countryâs fissile material stockpiling capabilities. The last two issues have particularly been in focus in the context of the ongoing negotiations on the Indo-US civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. The Indian establishment, as also the strategic community, has been pre-occupied with the possibility of the countryâs access to international nuclear commerce coming at the cost of depriving it of its right to conduct more nuclear tests in the future, or constraining its ability to produce and stockpile enough fissile material for credible nuclear deterrence.
While these concerns are valid, one must not forget that the demands of credible deterrence also rest on the ability to reliably and accurately deliver that warhead. Hence the need to develop, upgrade and enhance the range, accuracy and reliability of delivery systems through regular testing. Pakistan has displayed a remarkable focus on this parameter of deterrence. India should focus on survivability and reliability of its delivery mechanisms, given its no-firstuse nuclear doctrine. It has displayed a relaxed approach on this count.
Pakistanâs conduct of missile tests in rapid succession should, therefore, be taken by India as a wake-up call â not to conduct a series of tests in a tit-for-tat response but examine, analyse and imbibe larger prerequisites of credible deterrence. These should be based on four criteria: safety, survivability, reliability and penetration of its missiles. With these four factors, even a small nuclear force can assure effective deterrence.
The writer is with Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi.
