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Why Pakistan won't sell Saudi the Bomb!

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Do you even bother to read the crap you are posting.

Or more relevant , do you even understand the Crap you are posting.

Just going to google to find some articles ad hoc does not show that you really understand the concept.

Realism in international relations supports my contention.

The idea behind Realism is that each country protects its own self interest.

That is precisely why I support a Strategic Relationship with countries like KSA, Turkey or China i.e. to protect Pakistan's National interest.

BTW , Machiavelli was an antecedent to Realism Philosophy and it is all about fulfilling Self Interest.

A broad principle of political realism is that the sum of all actions of a state are geared towards consolidating their own interests. By offering KSA a nuclear device at their disposal, we will only serve to create unnecessary animosity in the region, expedite another nuclear arms race and sour our relations with Iran, a neighbouring country which will further affect our relations with the Russians which have only recently started to thaw.
In this entire scenario, Pakistan stands to make nothing but two possible returns:

1) Cash
2) Oil

I doubt either are worth risking a nuclear arms race for.

I guess there are things you don't learn from Video Games, kid.

Yous should quit playing Mario and try something more recent gramps, you might just learn a thing or two, they've really improved the interactive component since the days of your grandchild's Attari.
 
This is not my style but I just gave him a taste of his own medicine.

Stay with the program genius, nobody said anything about handing over any nukes to anybody.

Providing a nuclear umbrella to KSA does not mean handing over the nukes to them.

Learn the difference.

Well, as a part of the same post, I can determine what your "Style" is.

We were discussing normally till he took this immature " condescending " tone with me in his post # 12.

What else can I call someone who uses that arrogant tone instead of making their point in an academic way.

Excuse me my friend, but I rather have few GOOD and RELIABLE Friends than a lot of $hitty ones.

Your academic choice of terms reflects fully in your first response to me, I had not been condescending here, had I?

And by the way, though I had no intention of coming off as "condescending" and was merely trying to offer an explanation, maybe you should shed some ego and try to do away with the illusion that everything being said has some sinister motive to demean. It's childish.

Please read his post number 12 and follow the discussion before Post #12 and you will know why you have to give people like that a taste of their own medicine.

Then he quickly googles to find a link that actually negates what he was saying an supported my contention.

I think in his rush to present something he did not even bother to read what he was posting.

Oh yes, taste of your own medicine, you went on a diatribe like some immature and emotionally unstable schoolgirl with weight issues. I doubt I was making that case if that was truly "My medicine".



Just thought I'd set the record straight seeing as I was busy and unable to reply.
Cheers,
 
Oh yes, taste of your own medicine, you went on a diatribe like some immature and emotionally unstable schoolgirl with weight issues. I doubt I was making that case if that was truly "My medicine".

Bulimia or Anorexia? With or without Dysmorphia? :D

Back to the topic, Pakistan must be very careful in favoring SA over Iran or vice versa, because it is itself one of the proxy battlegrounds for those two important States.
 
Bulimia or Anorexia? With or without Dysmorphia? :D

I think that is a question of the reader's perception.

Back to the topic, Pakistan must be very careful in favoring SA over Iran or vice versa, because it is itself one of the proxy battlegrounds for those two important States.

Exactly, with a largely sentimental population that wear their sects on their cuffs (which cover a wrist that grasps a rifle), even the slightest of indications that Pakistan is getting directly involved in the Shia-Sunni divide will have disastrous consequences, on the streets of Pakistan as well as the greater Middle East. With grave global concerns about our nuclear program, it is a matter of great importance that we keep ourselves secured and try to avoid becoming further embroiled in the global nuclear politics. Pakistan has neither the economic, nor the political standing to play the Nuclear Umbrella game, that is best left to the bigger players.
Then again, the whole issue is a non-starter from the beginning and can be dismissed as the whim of some writer who thought it could make a good future scenario, Kudos, mission accomplished.
Working to meet our nutritional and economic goals for 2015 is a much more pertinent issue that requires our attention and efforts.
 
Back to the topic, Pakistan must be very careful in favoring SA over Iran or vice versa, because it is itself one of the proxy battlegrounds for those two important States.
very true, selling bomb, offering umbrella or tent or even talking about it completely Haram and
I would go as far as saying that even saying Saudi Arabia and Pakistani Nuke in one sentence must be declared haram and against the constitution for the self preservation of Pakistan.because they will all have same impact.

Mushy (who sells "our innocent" people for Dollars) had a hard job of keeping Abdul Qadeer Khan in Pakistan although Uncle Sam demanded him many times... next time Uncle might "invite" the entire Nuclear Command of Pakistan for debrief if a hint of such haram is suggested.
 
KSA, UAE, Yemen, Oman and Jordan should work on N-Energy rather than looking for a Bomb.
 
Why Pakistan Won't Sell Saudi the Bomb

Zachary Keck
November 18, 2013
ivy_something_pd_111513.jpg
Much of the soul-searching since the Iraq War has focused on the intelligence failures that produced the faulty WMD assessment. Less attention has been paid to the more puzzling question of why so many people readily accepted the argument that Saddam would arm Al Qaeda with nuclear weapons, despite the obvious absurdity of the claim.
It is this latter question that also seems most relevant amidst new concerns about a Saudi nuclear weapon. Earlier this month, in the run-up to the Iran-P5+1 talks, the BBC’s Mark Urbanwrote a lengthy piece claiming that Pakistan has built nuclear weapons “on behalf of Saudi Arabia [that] are now sitting ready for delivery.”
The article attracted considerable attention and alarm, although it’s not clear why. Concerns about a secret Saudi-Pakistani nuclear pact date back to the 1970s and 1980s, and have become especially prevalent over the past decade.
Nonetheless, despite decades of suspicions, the existence of a Saudi-Pakistan nuclear pact is based almost entirely on speculation. Moreover, like the alleged Saddam-AQ nuclear nexus, the notion that Pakistan would supply Saudi Arabia with nuclear weapons defies common sense.
As noted above, concerns about a Saud-Pakistan nuclear pact emerged in the 1970s and 1980s as Saudi aid to Pakistan increased rapidly. Many in Western foreign-policy circles feared that some of the Kingdom’s aid was being used to fund Pakistan’s nuclear program, with Riyadh expecting some of the final products in return.
However, the increase in Saudi aid during the 1980s was due to other factors,such as Pakistan basing some fifteen thousand troops in the Kingdom, and the Saudi government financing of over half of the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union. If Saudi money directly funded Pakistan’s nuclear program, it was almost certainly because, as a Saudi advisor once explained, “We gave money and [the Pakistanis] dealt with it as they saw fit.”
SimilarWestern speculation centers on Saudi defense minister Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz’s trip to Pakistan in 1999. During the trip, Pakistani prime minister Sharif gave Sultan a tour of the Khan Research Laboratories, which produce highly enriched uranium, and an adjacent ballistic missile factory. He was believed to be the first foreign dignitary to view the highly secretive, military-run KRL, although he denied being given access to the secret parts of the complex.
It’s not exactly clear why giving the Saudi defense minister a tour of the facilities would be necessary for the two sides to forge a nuclear pact, or even how it would advance it. Furthermore, if the tour was part of a covert nuclear deal, it seems unlikely the two sides would have publicized it. Instead, the highly publicized nature of the tour suggests it was intended to symbolize the closeness of the Saudi-Pakistani relationship.
The timing of the trip supports this view. Specifically, after India’s nuclear tests the year before, Riyadh empowered PM Sharif to respond with his own nuclear tests by assuring him the Kingdom would help offset the international sanctions that were almost certain to follow.
Beyond pure speculation, suspicions of a Saudi-Pakistan nuclear pact also stem from the testimony of Mohammed Khilewi, the number two at the Saudi UN Mission until he defected in 1994. In seeking asylum in the U.S., Khilewi made a string of allegations to FBI agents, including that Saudi Arabia had a secret nuclear-weapons program and had helped fund Pakistan and Iraq’s nuclear programs. According to the UK Sunday Times, Khilewi claimed that in return for this funding, the two sides had signed a pact pledging that “if Saudi Arabia were attacked with nuclear weapons, Pakistan would respond against the aggressor with its own nuclear arsenal.”
The FBI agents who debriefed Khilewi did not put much stock into his claims. As his lawyer later complained, the two FBI agents “dismissed them as marginal and walked out of the meeting, refusing to take Khilewi into custody or give him protection.”
They were almost certainly right to do so. To begin with, Khilewi had a clear motivation for lying, given that his livelihood depended on being granted U.S. asylum. The U.S., however, had little reason to strain its alliance with Saudi Arabia on Khilewi’s account, unless of course he could be useful to U.S. interests.
His testimony all around appeared aimed at demonstrating his usefulness to the United States. Unfortunately, a central part of it would be proven unfounded a decade after he gave. Specifically, although Khilewi mentioned the Pakistani program, the overwhelming majority of his allegations were about the Kingdom’s alleged funding of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapons program in the 1980s. In Khilewi’s telling, Saudi Arabia gave Saddam at least $5 billion from 1985 through the Gulf War, in return for promises that it would receive nuclear weapons in return. Khilewi also claimed that Saudi nuclear scientists were regularly trained by their Iraqi counterparts in Baghdad. These allegations were seen as particularly damaging in the U.S. because of the still recent Gulf War.
After toppling Saddam Hussein in 2003, however, the U.S. gained extensive access to Iraqi documents and nuclear scientists, and conducted a large investigation into the history of Saddam’s nuclear-weapons program. None of what they found appears to have corroborated Khilewi’s claims about Saudi funding and scientific training. Nonetheless, he continues tobe cited byreports claiming that there is a secret Pakistani-Saudi nuclear pact.
Khilewi’s allegations are notable, however, in demonstrating that he understood how deeply the U.S. fears nuclear weapons spreading, particularly to the Middle East, and his willingness to use this to his advantage. Whatever other differences Khilewi may have with the Saudi family, they share this in common. Indeed, for years now Saudi rulers have repeatedly threatened to go nuclear if the U.S. doesn’t stop Iran from gaining nuclear weapons.
But for their threat to be effective, it has to be credible. And to be credible, Riyadh has to be capable of making good on it. This puts Saudi officials in a difficult bind as it would take decades for them to build a nuclear weapon from scratch, if they were ever able to do so at all.As Jacques Hymans has noted, of the ten states that have begun dedicated nuclear weapons programs since 1970, only three have been successful, with the jury still out on Iran. Of the three success stories, building the bomb took an average of 17 years. Not counting the Shah’s nuclear activities, the Iranian case has stretched 30 years and counting.
Saudi Arabia is far less capable of building a nuclear weapon than Pakistan or Iran. Furthermore, threatening to acquire nuclear bombs twenty five years from now is not likely to cause undue alarm among U.S. officials. Thus, Saudi leaders need a way to make their threats seem more urgent.
Enter the secret nuclear pact with Pakistan. For the past decade, periodic and often well-timed reports have surfaced claiming that if Iran goes nuclear, Pakistan has nuclear weapons waiting for Saudi Arabia to claim. Alternatively, others suggest that Pakistan might deploy nuclear weapons to the Kingdom under the guardianship of Pakistani troops, much like the U.S. bases nuclear weapons in NATO countries.
The first of these reportswas published by The Guardian in September 2003. The article’s two reporters—who were based out of Vienna (where the International Atomic Energy Agency’s headquarters is based)—said that they had “learned” of a recent strategic review Saudi Arabia had undertaken in which it considered building nuclear weapons or forming a new alliance with a nuclear armed power. The reporters speculated that Pakistan might be the potential new nuclear ally Saudi Arabia would seek out.
This report is one of the only ones that focuses on specific details rather than general speculation. Nonetheless, the authors provide little details about how they learned of the strategic review, though it doesn’t appear they saw the alleged document. It’s worth noting that Saudi Arabia isn’t a government that is particularly well known for (unplanned) leaks of high-level security documents, especially to a London newspaper.
The timing of the report is crucial here. Iran’s nuclear program had first been exposed publicly a year earlier. Then, in March 2003, the U.S. invaded Iraq despite Saudi reservations that it would create a vacuum that Iran would fill. The Bush administration is believed to have tried to assuage Saudi concerns by suggesting that Saddam Hussein would only be the first regime it would topple. As The Guardian report discusses in great detail, in the months after the invasion, the Saudis had become increasingly concerned about America’s commitment to them.
In this context, the leak about the strategic review was almost certainly intended to force the U.S. to renew its focus on Iran and its nuclear program. The timing of the report is also notable because the month after The Guardian article was published, Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz led a Saudi delegation on a trip to Pakistan.
Many are the numerous reports since then, including the one last week, have been based on even more shaky grounds. First, they all seem to surface during times when there is heightened concern about Iran’s nuclear program, and/or strains in the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Secondly, almost none add any new kind of evidence, usually just citing a couple unnamed officials. Interestingly, the reports often cite NATO or Western officials who appear to only to be voicing their suspicions about the existence of a pact. The rest of the space is usually filled by reciting the long history of speculation about a secret nuclear pact, conveniently papering over the lack of evidence supporting these fears.
Another flaw that almost all the news accounts share is that they analyze the pact solely from the perspective of Saudi Arabia, and ignore Pakistan’s interests almost entirely. They note, for example, that the Kingdom fears a nuclear-armed Iran and point out that Saudi officials have regularly threatened to go nuclear if Iran isn’t prevented from building the bomb. Although one can imagine some reasons the Saudis might not want Pakistani bombs, particularly if they were under the command of Pakistani soldiers, it’s not altogether difficult to believe Riyadh would accept a readymade nuclear deterrent.
But it’s downright preposterous to think that Pakistan would take the unprecedented step of selling Saudi Arabia nuclear weapons, given that it would have nothing to gain and everything to lose by doing so.
To begin with, Pakistani officials are exceptionally paranoid about the size of their nuclear arsenal, andtake extraordinary measures to reduce its vulnerability to an Indian or U.S. first strike. Providing the Saudis with their nuclear deterrent would significantly increase Islamabad’s vulnerability to such a first strike. It defies logic to think that Islamabad would accept this risk simply to uphold promises former Pakistani leaders might have made.
It is similarly hard to imagine that past Saudi economic assistance could purchase future nuclear weapons. After all, the U.S. has provided Pakistan with billions of dollars to fight terrorism since 9/11, and it found bin Laden living in an off-campus mansion outside Pakistan’s military academy. The Saudis have similarly struggled to use turn their financial assistance to Pakistan into influence. For example, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a time when international sanctions left Pakistan highly dependent on Saudi aid,Riyadh unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Pakistan to force the Taliban to hand over bin Laden.
If current aid in the 1990s couldn’t buy Saudi Arabia bin Laden, how can aid from the 1980s be expected to purchase a nuclear arsenal in the future? Unlike with bin Laden, Pakistan has compelling strategic incentives not to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear weapons. Such a move would, of course, result in immediate and severe backlash from the U.S. and the West, who would organize international sanctions against Islamabad. They would also use their influence in the International Monetary Fund to end its aid package to Islamabad, which currently serves as Pakistan’s lifeline. Pakistan’s nuclear sales would also force Washington to end any pretense of neutrality between Pakistan and India, and significantly strengthen ties with the latter.
Pakistan’s all weather friendship with China would also be jeopardized. In fact, it’s quite possible China would be more infuriated than the U.S. because the Kingdom suppliesabout 20 percent of China’s oil imports, and Beijing’s dependence on Persian Gulf oil is expected to grow in the coming years. By opening Saudi Arabia up to a conventional or nuclear attack, Pakistan would be threatening China’s oil supplies, and through them the stability of the Communist Party. This is a sin Beijing would not soon forgive.
No country would be more enraged by Pakistan’s intransigence than its western neighbor, Iran. It is this fear of alienating Tehran that would be the biggest deterrent to selling Saudi Arabia a nuclear bomb. To begin with, Tehran would immediately halt natural-gas sales to energy-starved Pakistan. More importantly, it would finally embrace India wholeheartedly, including a large Indian presence along its border with Pakistan.
Thus by selling Saudi nuclear weapons, Pakistan would have guaranteed it is surrounded by India on three sides, given that Delhi uses Iran as its main access point to Afghanistan. India’s presence in Iran would also be detrimental to Pakistan, because Iran borders on Pakistan’s already volatile Balochistan province. This would allow India and Iran to aid Baloch separatist movements, conjuring up memories of Bangladesh in the minds of Pakistani leaders. Finally, Iran could give the Indian Navy access to Chabahar port, which Delhi has invested millions in upgrading. Aside from being encircled on land, Pakistan’s navy would now be boxed in by the Indian and Iranian navies.
For a country as obsessed with strategic depth as Pakistan, this situation would be nothing short of a calamity. The notion that Pakistan would resign itself to this fate simply to honor a promise it made to Saudi Arabia is no less farfetched than believing Saddam would arm al-Qaeda with nuclear weapons. That may be why three decades of speculation has turned up no evidence of a Saudi-Pakistani nuclear pact.

Zachary Keck is associate editor of The Diplomat. Follow him on Twitter @ZacharyKeck.
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Zachary Keck
Reasons behind all such reports is a dream that one day Iran and KSA (in other words Sunni and Shia) will go to war. That will end any kind of threat muslims might pose to Israel. Everything in west is centered about the protection of Israel. Whatever happened in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Desert Storm 1 were all part of this large picture. How Saudi regime is made to believe that its existence is in danger and they need umbrella of mighty USA to protect them? Similarly on other side what Shia regime is doing by letting it act along the lines where USA and Israel want it to be.

How and when all these conspiracy theories will culminate to a point where the world (strongly backed by USA, India and Israel) demand an act and form "a coalition of willing" to destroy Pakistan nuclear weapons?

Its really not that simple game plan.
Nor Saudis and nor Iranis need a bomb. What we need are sane leaders who can analyze and lead 1.2 billion muslims to a path of peace and prosperity.
We talk of peace and mutual co-existence when talking about arabs and Israel, muslims and the west, India and Pakistan. Ever wonder why the same countries encourage us muslims to fight amongst us on shia-sunnis basis? They actually support one or another group. Example of Syria and Egypt is an eye-opener for us.
 
I seriously doubt KSA wants Pakistani Nukes. However, under a Strategic Treaty between the two Nations , KSA might permit Pakistan to provide a Nuclear Umbrella to KSA in case it is threatened with a Nuclear attack by another Middle Eastern neighbor.
Extremely far fetched! Strategic Treaty or not, you think Pakistan would risk nuking Iran in case of a Saudi-Iranian conflagration? That's a 0% probability.

Pakistan will never get involved in any conflict between third countries. All this talk of Pakistan providing a so called 'nuke umbrella' is pure speculation.
 
Because of economic isolation, a lifetime of sanctions, lack of trust from any country ever again, laws on nuclear proliferation and so on.
 
All the matrices, analyses and forecasts have failed to determine the story of Pakistan's nuclear capabilities. The textbook does not apply here. I would keep my mind open if the Saudis would want a war head for gold plating it. Nuclear war is not going to happen in Middle East or South East Asia or elsewhere. The game has changed but why do most of the people quickly make it their second option after conventional weapons?
 

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