Why India Uses Afghanistan as Pawn?

[r3alist]

Ya lets see and in the meantime get used to see the russians also.Might familiarize yourself in the changing scenario

pardon????

 

[Moorkh]

i feel like making a personal attack but will refrain

i was giving you 2 alternate mutually exclusive ways of thinking about the situation.

either we are selfless OR we are extremely logical in our strategic choices. not both at the same time. atleast not in this context

 

[manish123]

pardon????

Check out this website thoroughly.The Russians ur old friends are back.

 

[r3alist]

Check out this website thoroughly.The Russians ur old friends are back.

back where? to the future?

 

[pak-yes]

Largest aid doner in the world (including to Pakistan): USA
Country with highest debt: USA
Country with highest reserves in the world: China
Who received more aid than India and Pakistan in 2008: China


You need to learn a little more about how global economy and diplomacy works..

Woooo.How can you say that i mean any links or your own sources.

 

[manish123]

back where? to the future?

Too lazy to check?

 

[DESERT FIGHTER]

most of them will be recovered dead from pak-afghan border.And india will deny them as there people and declare them as mongoloid uzbeks.Shame

 

[manish123]

back where? to the future?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Russia Invades Afghanistan—Again

Moscow is lending a hand on the fight against the Afghan drug trade—but its cooperation comes with a price.

For Viktor Ivanov, the road back to Kabul has taken two decades. He first arrived in Afghanistan in 1987 as a young KGB officer, back when the country was the southernmost outpost of the Soviet empire. When he returned last month, Kabul was the outpost of a very different empire—one run by reluctant imperialists in Washington keen to get out as soon as possible. Though the official reason for Ivanov's return was to aid U.S. antinarcotics efforts—he's now Russia's drug czar—his real goal in Afghanistan was clear: to help recover some of Russia's lost influence there. As his Russian Air Force plane began its descent into the Kabul airport, Ivanov raised a glass of champagne with his aides and boasted, "Russia is back."

A lot of history stands in the way of Russia's new campaign. Local memories of the destruction wrought by the Soviets in their decade-long occupation remain fresh. But both the Afghans and the Americans have reasons to welcome Russia's reengagement. No one has a silver bullet for Afghanistan's rampaging drug trade, but with its vast intelligence assets across Central Asia and an operational group of Russian troops on the Afghan-Tajik border, Moscow could make a real difference. To win over the locals, the Russians have also offered to ramp up their involvement in the Afghan reconstruction, energy, and mineral sectors. Russian companies are currently negotiating to rebuild 142 Soviet-built installations across the country, including a $500 million deal to reconstruct hydroelectric plants in Naglu, Surobi, and Makhipar and a $500 million program to build wells and irrigation systems nationwide. Rosneft, the Russian state-owned oil and gas giant, has commissioned a study of gas fields in Djarkuduk and Shebarghan that could lead to contracts yielding $350 million a year. Russian air-transport contractors are already working for NATO and the Afghan government. But all this cooperation comes with a price: increased Russian influence in Kabul. Moscow makes no bones about this: it seeks nothing less than to "reclaim its geopolitical share of Afghanistan," says its ambassador, Andrey Avetisyan.

It might seem surprising, given Afghanistan's history as a Cold War battleground, that it's the Americans who invited the Russians back in. But sure enough, last year U.S. President Barack Obama and his Russian counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev, set up a series of contact groups on mutual security interests in the region. Ivanov and his U.S. counterpart, Gil Kerlikowske, have since sat down on many occasions to figure out ways Russia can help NATO choke off the Taliban's drug businesses.

The Russians have good reason to help. More than 130,000 Russians die each year of heroin addiction and its side effects, and about 120,000 more are jailed for drug-related crimes. Russia is the conduit for some $18 billion of heroin a year, making it both the biggest consumer and biggest transit country in the world. "It is useless to fight it inside our borders," says Ivanov. "We need to fight the problem at its root."

Unlike in 1979, that won't mean sending Russian troops to Afghanistan. But Moscow is working to provide something almost as potent: crucial intelligence on drug traffic throughout Central Asia, where Russia's Federal Security Service still maintains an excellent network of eyes and ears. Russia is also pushing Afghanistan's neighbors hard to pick up the pace on drug-enforcement efforts. Moscow, along with Beijing, leads the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a regional security bloc that includes all Central Asian states. Beefing up border security has been one of SCO's top priorities, with Russia contributing money, equipment, and training. The SCO won't be able to cut off the Taliban's drug routes via Iran and Pakistan. And Kabul will still have to tackle the problem of rampant corruption in its Interior Ministry and the police, who are responsible for more opium traffic than the Taliban. But Chris Chamber, a NATO spokesman, says that Russia's intelligence and regional influence will be crucial to the fight.

Still, Russia's ambitions in Afghanistan go far beyond the drug war, and include building a pro-Russian constituency among the country's elite, dominating Afghanistan's multibillion-dollar infrastructure-development industry, and exploiting its underground wealth. "It is not too late. We are determined to activate our business cooperation with Afghanistan. Russia is first of all interested in exploiting Afghan gas and mineral resources," says Avetisyan, the Russian ambassador.

To access these riches, Russia has been courting Afghan Vice President Karim Khalili—a leader of the country's persecuted Hazara community who Moscow hopes will act as Russia's chief lobbyist in Kabul. At a meeting with Khalili in March, Ivanov offered to aid Japanese efforts to restore the huge Buddha statues destroyed by the Taliban in 1999 in Banyan, Khalili's power base, and to develop tourism there, as well as to reconstruct a power station and a nearby tunnel that links north and south Afghanistan.

Russia also has a huge number of potential allies among Afghanistan's former communists, many of whom studied and lived in Russia in the 1980s. Some of these approximately 100,000 educated Afghans joined the mujahedin after the fall of Moscow's puppet Mohammad Najibullah in 1992 and are now powerful men in Afghan President Hamid Karzai's administration. Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, for example, a onetime officer in Najibullah's military, now rules a personal fiefdom in the north of the country and is an adviser to the chief of staff of the Afghan National Army.


Other communists who fled after Najibullah was toppled returned after the fall of the Taliban. Many found important jobs in the new resource-starved government, as they tended to be better trained and educated than the Islamist mujahedin. One former senior European diplomat in Kabul says that, though the communists were unwanted at first, they quickly became the building blocks of the Karzai regime. "Thank God at last we have some professionals, even if they were trained and educated in Moscow," the diplomat says. Statistics are hard to come by, but according to a top Afghan police officer and a former communist head of the Afghan Army, between 50 and 70 percent of all staff positions in the Ministries of Interior and Defense are now held by ex-communists. Russia plans to reach out to these people by sponsoring cultural programs in Kabul and by bringing in some of the 100,000 Afghan exiles living in Russia to help lobby them.

Russians in Kabul are eager to take advantage of such links—one Russian diplomat complained that he's fed up with watching foreigners line up "to get a bite of the Afghan pie when it could have been us." To help turn things around, 19 Russian business leaders will arrive in the capital in early May to talk about energy, rebuilding, transport, and logistics.

The Russians say their aim is simply to help make Afghanistan rich. "The Soviets did not just fight. Soviet scientists also made maps of all Afghanistan's resources," says Avetisyan. On his recent trip, Ivanov brought such maps with him and, during a meeting with Karzai, talked about gas, copper, and aluminum exploitation. Ivanov also made it clear to Khalili that Russia was ready to strike deals on "favorable terms." The Russians will face an uphill battle with the Chinese, who got into the country ahead of them—two years ago, the China Metallurgical Group bought one of the world's largest copper mines in Logar, south of Kabul, and it has promised to invest $3 billion in the project. But Moscow is reported to be eyeing the Hajigak iron mine, currently on sale for about $1.8 billion, and Russians say they may be ready to sign a deal during a Russian-Afghan forum in Kabul this July.

So far, such moves seem to elicit more relief than concern in Washington. The Obama administration has taken a big gamble with its surge, and everything is being done with an eye to July 2011, when the administration has promised to begin its withdrawal. For that to happen, Afghanistan's neighbors must shoulder more and more of the burden of helping fix its drug and infrastructure problems. If that means Afghanistan moving closer to Russia's orbit, then Washington, at least for now, seems to deem that a price worth paying. "The United States is not concerned about Russia coming back," says Anthony Cordesman, a respected analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. If history is any guide, having Afghanistan in Russia's sphere of influence would be far from ideal—but it would also be preferable to having it go it alone and spread violent mayhem across the region and the world.

With Ron Moreau and Sami Yousafzai in Kabul



It would be interesting how the whole thing plays out vis-a-vis Indian influence in Afghanistan along with that of a new entrant- albeit with old ties - Russia, compounded with the fact that both India and Russia were allies helping the NA, whose very officers are now a major part of Afghanistan's government machinery.

 

[manish123]

Guys study this carefully , this a huge game changer.

 

[vandemataram]

As usual an article bashful of India and Indians no matter what the truth is and whether or not other countries actually need to be so mindful of India's plans and programs.

Truthfully, we are in Afghanistan because of following reasons:

a) To facilitate the war devastated country in its quest to develop itself to its prewar days. The years of factionalism, the Soviet invasion and the Pakistan's notorious involvement of the mujahideen to fight the Russians, and the GWoT, nothing is left in that war ravaged country.

Owing to its deep cultural and strategic relationship with Afghanistan, India has no option to be a part of the consortium of the reconstruction efforts in that country. India has done well in the face of criticism back home and also the latest US pressure to tone down its operations in that region which plainly is to the detrimental of Indian interests. India has a very big stake in that country and it will be really foolish if India does get cowed down by repeated diplomatics overtures from the United States to keep away from Afghanistan.

b) Afghan relationship is the core to India's military, strategic and economic well being. A moderate government under Hamid Karzai is the best solution possible for India. Changes might come in, but India must make hay while the sun shines. Legitimate requirements of India to access the energy rich Central Asian republics are the basics of the reasons why India is needed to be there. India can help in a lot of ways and with its growing economic clout has more and more potential to bring about a sea change in Afghanistan and its polity and affairs. What India needs is an iron will to not buckle under pressure.

c) Through Afghanistan India gains strategic depth vis a vis Pakistan, the traditionally hostile nation. The need is probably more in view of this arrangement. A strong presence in Paksitan's western borders can be a nighmare for Pakistan and a great boon for India.

A country can meddle into affirs of another in various ways, but one needs to introspect to find out why should an external country be welcomed in Afghanistan. India must look to help Afghanistan economically, politically and militarily. A strong army and defense forces of a strong nation is in India's best interests.

d) India can build it to make it India strongest test-bed for humint and elint operations, the advantages of which are well known to be discussed. If not anything else can be used a strategic counter pressure point from India's PoV..

Jai Hind

All for India's strong presence in Afghanistan both in the economic and military spheres.

 

[Zebronic]

most of them will be recovered dead from pak-afghan border.And india will deny them as there people and declare them as mongoloid uzbeks.Shame

Just like Pervez Musharraf deny your army dead body during kargil.
Just to show international community.......

 

[CONNAN]

India, Pakistan and the Battle for Afghanistan

India, Pakistan and the Battle for Afghanistan - TIME

The road to success for President Obama's Afghanistan strategy runs through India, goes an increasingly familiar refrain. That's because reversing the Taliban's momentum requires getting rid of the movement's sanctuary in Pakistan, where the insurgent leadership is known to be based in and around the city of Quetta. But while Pakistan is aggressively tackling its domestic Taliban, it has consistently declined to act against Afghan Taliban groups based on its soil — because it sees the Afghan Taliban as a useful counterweight to what it believes is the dominant influence in today's Afghanistan of Pakistan's arch-enemy, India. Unless India can be persuaded to take steps to ease tensions with Pakistan, some suggest, Pakistan will not be willing to shut down the Afghan Taliban. (Read Joe Klein's take on Obama's speech on Afghanistan.)

Needless to say, that argument is not exactly conventional wisdom in New Delhi.

Indian influence has expanded after the U.S. invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and toppled the Taliban — it had been a longtime supporter of the Northern Alliance, the anti-Taliban coalition that dominated the Karzai government, and it poured hundreds of millions of dollars of aid into supporting the new regime. That's left many in Pakistan raising the specter of Indian encirclement — a concern noted by U.S. General Stanley McChrystal in September, when he said that "increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions." Some U.S. pundits have even called for India to scale back its operations in order to appease the Pakistanis.

Indian officials have little time for such reasoning. Events northwest of the Khyber Pass have had a central place in the strategic calculations of generations of rulers in Delhi, dating back to the imperial Mughals and the colonial British. India's ties with Kabul had lapsed during the bloody civil war that saw the Pakistani-backed Taliban rise to power in 1996, turning Afghanistan into a hotbed of extremism, some of it directed against India. In 1999, an Indian passenger airliner was hijacked by Pakistani nationals and flown to Afghanistan — negotiating for the release of the hostages, India was forced to free three Islamist militants, one of whom was later implicated in the killing of American journalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan. The Taliban also forged links with fundamentalist groups waging war on India in the disputed territory of Kashmir. "The consequences of that vacuum where Pakistan stepped in and meddled were horrendous for India," says Harsh Pant, professor of defence studies at King's College London. "It's a lesson no one in India is in the mood to learn again."

That's why India has pumped over $1.2 billion in development aid to the Karzai government, funding infrastructure projects ranging from highways to hydroelectric dams to a 5,000-ton cold storage facility for fruit merchants in Kandahar. India is building schools and hospitals, as well as flying hundreds of Afghan medical students to train in Indian colleges, because its own experience of the last period of Taliban rule has given it a vested interest in preventing a recurrence. (See pictures of the battle against the Taliban.)

The popularity of Bollywood music and Indian soap operas also hints at India's significant cultural influence in Afghanistan, which is buttressed by lasting bonds with Afghanistan's political elite. Afghan President Hamid Karzai went to university in India, while his electoral opponent, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, belongs to the old Indian-backed Northern Alliance. Kabul and New Delhi also share a common distrust of Islamabad, seeing the 1996 Taliban takeover as having been enabled by Pakistan's military intelligence wing.

But in the India-Pakistan relationship, each side often thinks itself the victim of the other's machinations, and Pakistan's generals view India's growing influence in Afghanistan as motivated by an intent to destabilize Pakistan. In recent months, officials in Islamabad have claimed that India's consulates in the Afghan cities of Kandahar and Jalalabad have been orchestrating terrorist activity in Pakistan, particularly in the vast, restive province of Baluchistan. India vehemently rejects such claims, for which no evidence has been offered in public. During her trip to Pakistan last month, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also dismissed the notion that India was trying to foment trouble in Pakistan. "The Pakistani fears are completely imaginary," says Bahukutumbi Raman, a former top-ranking Indian intelligence official and prominent strategic analyst.

The problem for Washington, at least according to Raman and other Indian analysts, is that regardless of their validity, Pakistan's fears translate into inaction when it comes to tackling the Afghan Taliban on its soil. "[The Afghan Taliban] are important to the Pakistanis. They give them a strategic depth," says Raman. Commodore Uday Bhaskar, director of the National Maritime Foundation, a think-tank attached to the Indian navy, says the Pakistani military is still struggling to accept a strategic universe in which India is no longer its most dangerous enemy. "You get the sense that if [India] does not loom large as a threat, then the Pakistani military loses much of its raison d'etre as an institution," says Bhaskar. (See pictures of Obama visiting Asia.)

Indian analysts fear tensions could be exacerbated by President Obama's declaration that the U.S. will begin to draw down 18 months after surging some 30,000 more American troops into Afghanistan. "It makes political sense for Obama, but the decision has really set the cat amongst the pigeons in the region," says Bhaskar. "Everyone is rattled." The prospect that the U.S. will soon depart Afghanistan makes it even less likely that Pakistan will want to crack down on a group that could still be a strategic asset in an uncertain situation.

India, for its part, is unlikely to change its own strategy in Afghanistan. It is developing a port at Chabahar in Iran, which could become a key point of entry for Indian goods and materiel into Afghanistan because Pakistan refuses India land transit rights to the Afghan border. India also runs an air base at Farkhor in Tajikistan on Afghanistan's northeastern border — a facility it secured with Russian support. Neither Moscow nor Tehran want to see the Taliban return to power, and a growing consensus between Russia, Iran and India — all traditional backers of the Northern Alliance — could work to prevent that in the months and years to come. "India may have to hedge its bets with these regional partners," says Harsh Pant. "When America leaves Afghanistan, they may be the ones left to deal with the mess."

 

[Zebronic]

Pakistan support Afghan Taliban and India support democracy in Afghanistan.
Lets see who win Afghan Taliban terrorist or people democracy of Afghanistan.

 

[Kinetic]

most of them will be recovered dead from pak-afghan border.And india will deny them as there people and declare them as mongoloid uzbeks.Shame

Do you have any evidence? While the Afghans themselves denying that who will believe you? India have done lot works in Afghanistan, resulting a good image of India in the hearts of Afghan people. Thats what India wanted, nothing more. A stable prosperous Afghanistan will only help India.

 

[manish123]

As usual an article bashful of India and Indians no matter what the truth is and whether or not other countries actually need to be so mindful of India's plans and programs.

Truthfully, we are in Afghanistan because of following reasons:

a) To facilitate the war devastated country in its quest to develop itself to its prewar days. The years of factionalism, the Soviet invasion and the Pakistan's notorious involvement of the mujahideen to fight the Russians, and the GWoT, nothing is left in that war ravaged country.

Owing to its deep cultural and strategic relationship with Afghanistan, India has no option to be a part of the consortium of the reconstruction efforts in that country. India has done well in the face of criticism back home and also the latest US pressure to tone down its operations in that region which plainly is to the detrimental of Indian interests. India has a very big stake in that country and it will be really foolish if India does get cowed down by repeated diplomatics overtures from the United States to keep away from Afghanistan.

b) Afghan relationship is the core to India's military, strategic and economic well being. A moderate government under Hamid Karzai is the best solution possible for India. Changes might come in, but India must make hay while the sun shines. Legitimate requirements of India to access the energy rich Central Asian republics are the basics of the reasons why India is needed to be there. India can help in a lot of ways and with its growing economic clout has more and more potential to bring about a sea change in Afghanistan and its polity and affairs. What India needs is an iron will to not buckle under pressure.

c) Through Afghanistan India gains strategic depth vis a vis Pakistan, the traditionally hostile nation. The need is probably more in view of this arrangement. A strong presence in Paksitan's western borders can be a nighmare for Pakistan and a great boon for India.

A country can meddle into affirs of another in various ways, but one needs to introspect to find out why should an external country be welcomed in Afghanistan. India must look to help Afghanistan economically, politically and militarily. A strong army and defense forces of a strong nation is in India's best interests.

d) India can build it to make it India strongest test-bed for humint and elint operations, the advantages of which are well known to be discussed. If not anything else can be used a strategic counter pressure point from India's PoV..

Jai Hind

All for India's strong presence in Afghanistan both in the economic and military spheres.

Pakistanis had written India off in afghanistan, in one of my previous posts, I had asked them to hold on to the bubbly a little bit.This article shows that India is no pushover.Hold ur horses my Pakistani friends and lets watch how this plays out.