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Why Arabs lost all its wars to Israel despite outnumbering Israel in weapons and manpower?

I am willing and able to discuss any military topic with you.. it is just that your type and thoughts do not fit my diplomacy..; we have said almost the same things about the 73 conflict and I have added some (very few details) and you found a way of talking about fanatism, just because I have quoted Sharon and Golda Mayer, and said some truth you were unaware of..!?

Maybe we will meet in another thread..till then take it easy..

the different between you and me is that, I do not factor in any national issue or characteristic issue when I was planning or try to detail someone else's plan, for me, if I were to plan an operation, I only look at the objective at hand and I would discard any personnel, national, sentiment issue. You can only plan a military operation that way.

I study war for war, I don't really care about Israel or Egypt won in 73, 67 or 48, for me, that mean nothing, I studied how command decision was made and how a particular battle was won.

Your so called "Truth" mean nothing to me, as they are not in my scope, that "truth" did nothing because it does not affect how that particular war ended up in the end, you may say Egypt want to give a breather to Israel, or whatever the hack you want to believe, Me? I studied almost all the battle happened in 1973, some of it when I was a Calvary Officer trainee in OCS, some of them just for fun. If the Egyptian were really fighting the way you describe, then they have a funny way on actually fighting the war.

Again, feel free to believe whatever you want to believe, but do not call me up to reply to these type of BS, this is not Military Science nor History, this is what a fan boy believe.
 
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Well; Arab commanders were just straight up horrible - they had little understanding of Modern Warfare and has no system of carrying and giving out complex orders. The Arab armies were also very disorganized and did not really believe in the cause they were fighting for.

Israel on the other hand had many officers that served in WW1/WW2 and the backbone of their military/officer corps were professionally trained by the British - their soldiers were also very dedicated.

Hahaha...
Many Egyptian top commanders like el-Shazly and el-Gamasy considered by western experts among The Top Military Leaders of the 20th Century . (But who you to know ?!)

The Israelis themselves said the opposite of your claiming during the war of attrition and post 73 war
Arab had the initiative to shot down F-4 phantom by lower aircrafts i.e Mig-19, Mig-21
The initiative to sink a destroyers by an anti-ship missile
The initiative to ....

You know what it's not even worth it educating people like you .. coz it's not about knowledge!
Just saying that the people who fought to liberate their lands "did not really believe in the cause they were fighting for" show the true color of yours!

Try to find other pilots who could do that with Mig-21
Without Israelis and Americans we would never hear this outstanding battle.
And they're so many yet untold.

Stick to your keyboard kid.. while Arab children (real men) facing tanks with stones because they truly believe in a cause.

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the different between you and me is that, I do not factor in any national issue or characteristic issue when I was planning or try to detail someone else's plan, for me, if I were to plan an operation, I only look at the objective at hand and I would discard any personnel, national, sentiment issue. You can only plan a military operation that way.

I study war for war, I don't really care about Israel or Egypt won in 73, 67 or 48, for me, that mean nothing, I studied how command decision was made and how a particular battle was won.

Your so called "Truth" mean nothing to me, as they are not in my scope, that "truth" did nothing because it does not affect how that particular war ended up in the end, you may say Egypt want to give a breather to Israel, or whatever the hack you want to believe, Me? I studied almost all the battle happened in 1973, some of it when I was a Calvary Officer trainee in OCS, some of them just for fun. If the Egyptian were really fighting the way you describe, then they have a funny way on actually fighting the war.

Again, feel free to believe whatever you want to believe, but do not call me up to reply to these type of BS, this is not Military Science nor History, this is what a fan boy believe.

You just forgot the context of war in all your thoughts, you are a tactical guy, and your BS does not apply everywhere, and is very far from strategy in a war..

Well; Arab commanders were just straight up horrible - they had little understanding of Modern Warfare and has no system of carrying and giving out complex orders. The Arab armies were also very disorganized and did not really believe in the cause they were fighting for.

Israel on the other hand had many officers that served in WW1/WW2 and the backbone of their military/officer corps were professionally trained by the British - their soldiers were also very dedicated.
You are talking about the 1948 war, that is true.. even the majority of the Arab world were still colonized by either the Brits or the French.
1967 war a preventive air strike on the Egyptian airforces on the ground, it was facilitated by satellite images of the Egyptian military airports, combined with ground intelligence operations from Usrael and its allies at that time and the infiltration of the Egyptian high command by highly trained women spies.
1973 war was totally different, due to extensive and comprehensive Arab reshuffeling of their armed forces, the results were clear and they won that war - at least in the case of Egypt,since the Syrian front went back to the pre1973 war statuquo-..
Cheers

@hellfire

" I gave you a crux of the overall war and not simply isolated battles. The US was the sole supplier of weapons to Israel, it forced Israel to a ceasefire and Egypt also had no option as its 3rd army was surrounded. Israelis were within 65 miles of cairo .... just how long do you think you would have lasted if US had not applied pressure on Israel to stop? Don't answer, its a rhetorical question!!!!!"

Do you know that Usrael did not abide by that ceasfire for more than 24 hours, to try encirling the Egyptian 3rd army and to claim that, which was a lie: General Sharon who was leading that operation said himself after the war:" I really do not know who was surrounding whom in that area", this should tell you a lot about the media lies..

The October War started October 6, and this document is from October 22.
U.S. support for Israel started to grow about 1970, and that is not news...
The document shows a couple of thing.

1. Israel is winning, at a cost.
2. Both Israel and the Arabs are beeing resupplied.
3. As a result of the failure, the Arabs are finally open to negotiations.

You are posting wrong information again:
The Arabs were open to negotiations much before the war, it is Usrael that refused, and then became "open to negotiations" when they were losing the war..you can not escape these facts...
Please refrain from answering , because it will be called trolling and no none wants that on this forum.

Israel returned the Sinai to Egypt because the Egyptians agreed to recognize Israel and maintain peace with Israel
Israel offered the Gaza Strip to Egypt, but the Egyptians refused.
Even with Jordan, Israel offered the West Bank to Jordan,
In return for recognition and peace, the Jordanians refused to take the West Bank.
Israel proposed to Syria the Golan in exchange for peace and recognition.
Arabs think that in war they'll get it, not realizing that if they want to return the territories that Israel occupied, they should make peace not war.

Egyptians are very smart people, Sadat himself said after the war that he can fight and defeat Usrael on its own - with proof; taking the Barlev line- but can not fight the US.. So what to do? Usrael had the totall full support of the US like if it was a US state, so better make peace, which was the aim from the beginning and without war if Sinai was given back..Then it took war, because the Usraelis were too arrogant and refused every peaceful attempt to let go of the Sinai, at the end of it Egypt gained much more than the Sinai Pininsula, it Got Billions of Dollars worth of aids and sophisticated American weapons and systems that were like some value plus for becoming American friends.

The other Arab states did not want to split Palestinian territories between them, it was a trap and they were aware of it.

Or - when Egypt found out they could not beat Israel, they decided to negotiate, instead of engaging in a new war.
The only thing the war changed, was the perception Egyptians had of themselves.

Talikng about self-perception:
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Israeli POWs all over the fronts, Egypt and Syria..

1. The 67 war was Israeli deception on stating that Arabs were going to take it out. Essentially they were the aggressors and knew certain victory because despite being outnumbered; they possessed both a qualitatively superior and much more trained force with years of combat experience.

2. The 73 war had the Americans jumping in to save Israel, without US intervention; Israel was going to resort to nuclear weapons.

Point 2. is very important: I saw picture during that war of American F-4 stationned at Usrael carrying 2/250 kt nuclear bombs under its wings, it came with the supplies the US was sending.. So I think usrael's nuclear weapons are a bluff, they have the assurance like NATO members to get covered with nukes if their survival is in question..
 
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Do you know that Usrael did not abide by that ceasfire for more than 24 hours, to try encirling the Egyptian 3rd army and to claim that, which was a lie: Genral Sharon who was leading that operation said himself after the war:" I really do not know who was surrounding whom in that area", this should tell you a lot about the media lies..

Yes, I know that Israel initiated a violation of ceasefire.

Now seriously, be a nice guy and read the whole exchange and not quote a sub text of the whole sequence. Like I said to the member, am not sitting to discuss the capture of every 15 or 20 R and its importance and the victory or lack there of.

The crux is - Egypt did not win(as claimed by the quoted personalities), and failed to achieve their military objectives in overall aims as elucidated at the start of hostilities.

Now go and waste your time on 15 or 45 Rs with someone else.
 
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It is because of excellent tactical planning by israel. In one war they bring in drone for first time and destroyed the enemy airforce by gathering information.

In another war, they bring in rective armour for the first time on the tank and enemy tanks were helpless.

In one war israeli spy made enemy soldiers drunk and destroyed its airforec completely.

Subsequently israely is innovating and has bring in many first in the world technologies such as iron dome, battlefield management system on tank etc. Israel builds their need specif weapons. They have second to the naone spy agency and they are highly motivated.

They are very good businessmen and they have a lots of money. US and israel are successful in deviding the Arabs. Saudi is Israel's friend. Now new Hizbullah chief has shown a clear sign of friend ship with israel.

Israle is afaraid of only one thing and that is russain weapons.
 
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Point 2. is very important: I saw picture during that war of American F-4 stationned at Usrael carrying 2/250 kt nuclear bombs under its wings, it came with the supplies the US was sending.. So I think usrael's nuclear weapons are a bluff, they have the assurance like NATO members to get covered with nukes if their survival is in question..

Pre-73 and in the war, YES.. after that.. no.
 
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You just forgot the context of war in all your thoughts, you are a tactical guy, and your BS does not apply everywhere, and is very far from strategy in a war..

I never said the context of war is never relevant. In fact, if you kindly try to remember the first post you quote me. I said to the OP on that post

"Do you want a tactical or political view on the subject", this is what I said.

You want a tactical analysis or a political analysis??
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In war studies, you can only discuss in one matter in one single term, you can either go tactically, strategically, or operationally.. That will give you a basis of comparison.

What you then reply to my post is try to use the ultimate strategic goal to justify what happened in the field, which is, in essence, useless. Let's put an example to use shall we? You said this.

In 1973 the arabs overwhelmed Usrael so much in the first stages of the war that they had to stop for a while because that is not what they have expected, for example, the Egyptians have thought of loosing up to 20 000 soldiers to get through the Barlev line - the stronget military line in the world at that time..they have lost 200..
The syrians took back the Golan Heights and the Mount Hermon in 48 hours , they marched toward Usrael..there was no opposition and they got orders to stop their advance.. Usrael (USA+Israel) took advantage of this..

Source: https://defence.pk/threads/why-arabs-lost-all-its-wars-to-israel-despite-outnumbering-israel-in-weapons-and-manpower.433156/page-7#ixzz4BExCDb2V

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Now operationally, this does not matter the Israeli, as stopping at that stage is a tactical error for the Egyptian, it matter not why Egyptian stopped, Even it's like you claim, the Egyptian does not understand how deep they fare in the opening engagement into the Sinai, FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE WITHIN THEIR UNIT is still a tactical error by Egyptian side.

You try to justified the tactical failure for the Egyptian by claiming they do not know how unopposed it is, it is a spinning of their mistake and trying to make an excuse for it.

Another issue for you is you then try to justify the whole war to put it in Egyptian don't want a total victories, they only want to get back what they lost in 67'. Point is, this is AT BEST ARGUABLE, and when we are talking about the Israel, this strategic goal does not applies as there are no way the Israeli will know whether or not the Egyptian start a war not to finish off the Israeli themselves or just to took back the Gaza Strip and Sinai. For them, Egyptian attacks them, they would have to be put into a mind that this is a fight to the finish.

What you claim Sharon or Golda said is also unnecessarily related, those are comment on the way by some key player, at no point they would represent the actual fighting on the ground. Eisenhower have already took the blame in case of D-day failure, and wrote a letter to the US public and took the blame for it before D-Day even started, does that mean D-Day will or had failed? Many commander, including me have opinion on or during any given battle. I have myself multiple time grunted on the fact that I was being dealt with a what I thought is undoable task. And at time I cursed at my commander, that does not mean anything.

Again, the different between me and you is, you start to look at a war or battle at the angle of a country perspective, trying to justify the action carried out, whether or not successful by the action appropriated to states., I am not saying what you did is wrong, I am simply saying I did not do that, I look at each conflict independently, I only look at the merit and fault of a battle. You want to justify any action is okay for me, just do not quote me and ask me about this type of "History"
 
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I never said the context of war is never relevant. In fact, if you kindly try to remember the first post you quote me. I said to the OP on that post

"Do you want a tactical or political view on the subject", this is what I said.



In war studies, you can only discuss in one matter in one single term, you can either go tactically, strategically, or operationally.. That will give you a basis of comparison.

What you then reply to my post is try to use the ultimate strategic goal to justify what happened in the field, which is, in essence, useless. Let's put an example to use shall we? You said this.



Now operationally, this does not matter the Israeli, as stopping at that stage is a tactical error for the Egyptian, it matter not why Egyptian stopped, Even it's like you claim, the Egyptian does not understand how deep they fare in the opening engagement into the Sinai, FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE WITHIN THEIR UNIT is still a tactical error by Egyptian side.

You try to justified the tactical failure for the Egyptian by claiming they do not know how unopposed it is, it is a spinning of their mistake and trying to make an excuse for it.

Another issue for you is you then try to justify the whole war to put it in Egyptian don't want a total victories, they only want to get back what they lost in 67'. Point is, this is AT BEST ARGUABLE, and when we are talking about the Israel, this strategic goal does not applies as there are no way the Israeli will know whether or not the Egyptian start a war not to finish off the Israeli themselves or just to took back the Gaza Strip and Sinai. For them, Egyptian attacks them, they would have to be put into a mind that this is a fight to the finish.

What you claim Sharon or Golda said is also unnecessarily related, those are comment on the way by some key player, at no point they would represent the actual fighting on the ground. Eisenhower have already took the blame in case of D-day failure, and wrote a letter to the US public and took the blame for it before D-Day even started, does that mean D-Day will or had failed? Many commander, including me have opinion on or during any given battle. I have myself multiple time grunted on the fact that I was being dealt with a what I thought is undoable task. And at time I cursed at my commander, that does not mean anything.

Again, the different between me and you is, you start to look at a war or battle at the angle of a country perspective, trying to justify the action carried out, whether or not successful by the action appropriated to states., I am not saying what you did is wrong, I am simply saying I did not do that, I look at each conflict independently, I only look at the merit and fault of a battle. You want to justify any action is okay for me, just do not quote me and ask me about this type of "History"

About your red text:
That never happened, they had very good communication from top to bottom. The error was tactical, but the orders were political from Sadat himself, as many generals and mostly the planner of the whole campaign General Chazly opposed it with all his power , but since war is an extention of politics and diplomacy, the latter prevailed, because Sadat was negotiating the terms of ending the war with Kissinger, so politics took over very quickly after the first week or so of fighting.. A whole Egyptian armourd brigade was sacrified (sent out of its air defense cover) so Usrael can have a point of crossing (saving face)..
In short, tactics or even strategies of modern warfare are subject to politics..

Pre-73 and in the war, YES.. after that.. no.
They -the US- did not leave them there, they can send them anytime they want in case of war, otherwise why a nation so spoiled by the West did not test its warheads if it had them in the first place? my answer is that they can tap into the american arsenal if need be..
 
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They -the US- did not leave them there, they can send them anytime they want in case of war, otherwise why a nation so spoiled by the West did not test its warheads if it had them in the first place? my answer is that they can tap into the american arsenal if need be..
No longer need to. The US supplied the nukes in the faith that they would have the authority over its release, but the Israelis saw their own interests and developed their own nukes using French and moles within the US nuclear program. There are many documented cases of the Israelis spying on the US for their own gains.
 
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About your red text:
That never happened, they had very good communication from top to bottom. The error was tactical, but the orders were political from Sadat himself, as many generals and mostly the planner of the whole campaign General Chazly opposed it with all his power , but since war is an extention of politics and diplomacy, the latter prevailed, because Sadat was negotiating the terms of ending the war with Kissinger, so politics took over very quickly after the first week or so of fighting.. A whole Egyptian armourd brigade was sacrified (sent out of its air defense cover) so Usrael can have a point of crossing (saving face)..
In short, tactics or even strategies of modern warfare are subject to politics..


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lol, they had very good communication from top to bottom, yet Sadat does not know his troop had penetrated that far and ordered a halt....Do you even realise how contradicted what you said to one thing and the other??

Again, I do not care your "Save Face" theory, you cannot look at history objectively and I will have nothing to talk to you about, you can think what you want regarding the Egyptian action and try to justify it with your own theory. as long as you keep it to yourself..

Please do not quote me again. I am of no interest to discuss your kind of "history", this would be the last post with you on this.
 
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Yes, I know that Israel initiated a violation of ceasefire.

Now seriously, be a nice guy and read the whole exchange and not quote a sub text of the whole sequence. Like I said to the member, am not sitting to discuss the capture of every 15 or 20 R and its importance and the victory or lack there of.

The crux is - Egypt did not win(as claimed by the quoted personalities), and failed to achieve their military objectives in overall aims as elucidated at the start of hostilities.

Now go and waste your time on 15 or 45 Rs with someone else.

I did read the whole exchange and found it of no value, the same as you answer here..If the ones who were directing that war on the Usreali side said they have lost it and you say otherwise, it means you are being emotional and extremist minded.. I am not surprized at all, most indians here are licking Usraeli A** for some innefective weapon systems, maybe India found out and now it turns to the US..

No longer need to. The US supplied the nukes in the faith that they would have the authority over its release, but the Israelis saw their own interests and developed their own nukes using French and moles within the US nuclear program. There are many documented cases of the Israelis spying on the US for their own gains.

Indeed even the theft of big quantities of weapon grade plutonium from US reseves!!! there is a bluff and then consolidating that bluff..

lol, they had very good communication from top to bottom, yet Sadat does not know his troop had penetrated that far and ordered a halt....Do you even realise how contradicted what you said to one thing and the other??

Again, I do not care your "Save Face" theory, you cannot look at history objectively and I will have nothing to talk to you about, you can think what you want regarding the Egyptian action and try to justify it with your own theory. as long as you keep it to yourself..

Please do not quote me again. I am of no interest to discuss your kind of "history", this would be the last post with you on this.
It is good for last post from me too because you seem a bit nervous, and extremist in your thoughts..
Egypt has planned a 15 km incursion into Sinai and all the troops stoped there, so communication was very good and those 15 kms were covered by SAM missiles, the rest I have told you in my previous post.
 
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I did read the whole exchange and found it of no value, the same as you answer here..

Then, why indeed, are you so keen in engaging me? Move along....!

If the ones who were directing that war on the Usreali side said they have lost it and you say otherwise,

Says a man who posted a statement with out the reference being posted........

Yes, the Egyptian military achieved it's objectives of crossing over to the East Bank and then they lost their plot. They lost the initiative, I have said it earlier. But the subsequent actions when Egyptian forces post re-org and consolidation moved East in order to relieve the pressure on Syrians, was still a continuation of war.

What is war?

For arm chair 'experts'/ignorant 'professionals' like you (who may have served but slept in their Junior Commander's courses and totally lost the plot in Military History & Tactics):

"We shall not enter into any of the abstruse definitions of war used by publicists. We shall keep to the element of the thing itself, to a duel. War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. If we would conceive as a unit the countless number of duels which make up a war, we shall do so best by supposing to ourselves two wrestlers. Each strives by physical force to compel the other to submit to his will: his first object is to throw his adversary, and thus to render him incapable of further resistance.

War therefore is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.

Violence arms itself with the inventions of Art and Science in order to contend against violence. Self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed usages of International Law, accompany it without essentially impairing its power. Violence, that is to say physical force (for there is no moral force without the conception of states and law), is therefore the means; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate object. In order to attain this object fully, the enemy must be disarmed; and this is, correctly speaking, the real aim of hostilities in theory. It takes the place of the final object, and puts it aside in a manner as something not properly belonging to war"


A revision for you!

While the Egyptians militarily lost the war as their aim was to wrest back control of the Sinai (as the breakthrough at the Great Bitter Lake was successfully exploited by Israel), in my first statement of this thread itself I had conceded that Sadat achieved his objective but paid dearly for it (in terms of his assassination). That is why when I said read everything and then speak, I meant for you to read it and see my response ALWAYS as an overall context.

Further revision for you:

"The result in war is never absolute"

'even the final decision of a whole war is not always to be regarded as absolute. The conquered/defeated state often sees in it only a passing or transitory stage, a situation which may be repaired in after times by means of political combinations and new alliances/allegiances. How much this also must modify the degree of tension and the vigour of the efforts made is evident in itself'

Hence, the state (the defeated/conquered state) may use this modified tension or invigorated efforts to either proceed on a path of alternate actions e.g. of improvement in bilateral relations and accumulation of diplomatic currency; or it may proceed along a route of renewed hostility/antagonism.

My first post in reply to GiannKall #50 for your reference

The bold part: Wasn't a stalemate ... Israel was born, don't distort history.

1956: The reversal of Suez blocking took place for commercial shipping as also Israel gained access to Tiran. The military victory was lost politically by Brits and French. Israelis got away with their objectives.

1973: It was Anwar al Saddat whose forces got stuck on the other side of the Suez inspite of being the one with initiative. And it was he, who took the initiative to bring peace to the Egypt Israeli equation ... a great but costly decision by him.

The aim of Egyptians in the war was to re-capture Sinai, and they failed.


Please first read Anwar Sadat's Biography .... to get your facts a bit in line


Now coming back to my statement here regarding 1973:

"The law of the extreme, the view to disarm the adversary, to overthrow him, has hitherto to a certain extent usurped the place of this end or object (the political objective) Just as this law loses its force, the political object must again come forward. If the whole consideration is a calculation of probability based on definite persons and relations, then the political object, being the original motive, must be an essential factor in the product. The smaller the sacrifice we demand from our opponent, the smaller it may be expected will be the means of resistance which he will employ; but the smaller his are, the smaller will ours require to be. Further, the smaller our political object, the less value shall we set upon it, and the more easily shall we be induced to give it up altogether."

Was the Egyptian effort a small political objective? (The recapture of Sinai to force Israel to negotiations?) One may argue on both sides of the point. However, the objective by itself is not small and was indeed, the principal aim of the whole exercise of war in 1973, the aim to ensure repossession of territories lost to Israel in 1967 war and also to achieve a political negotiation in order to bring about an end to hostilities between the two nations.




"Thus, therefore, the political object, as the original motive of the war, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force, and also the amount of effort to be made. This it cannot be in itself; but it is so in relation to both the belligerent states, because we are concerned with realities, not with mere abstractions. One and the same political object may produce totally different effects upon different people, or even upon the same people at different times; we can, therefore, only admit the political object as the measure, by considering it in its effects upon those masses which it is to move, and consequently the nature of those masses also comes into consideration. It is easy to see that thus the result may be very different according as these masses are animated with a spirit which will infuse vigour into the action or otherwise. It is quite possible for such a state of feeling to exist between two states that a very trifling political motive for war may produce an effect quite disproportionate, in fact, a perfect explosion."


The statement you have quoted of the Israeli 'commanders' is the result of this ambiguity of the situation. For the Israelis, the shock of loosing Bar-Lev line and the significant losses they incurred in the subsequent failed counter attack to stabilise their position, was an immense shock to the military and national psyche, who had believed in their own invincibility in the aftermath of 1967. The precision with which the Egyptian armies crossed the Suez and the ingenuity of the Engineering efforts in facilitating the same, was an eye opener for the complacent and confident Israeli commander.

"This applies to the efforts which the political object will call forth in the two states, and to the aim which the military action shall prescribe for itself. At times it may itself be that aim, as for example the conquest of a province. At other times, the political object itself is not suitable for the aim of military action; then such a one must be chosen as will be an equivalent for it, and stand in its place as regards the conclusion of peace. But, also, in this, due attention to the peculiar character of the states concerned is always supposed. There are circumstances in which the equivalent must be much greater than the political object in order to secure the latter. The political object will be so much the more the standard of aim and effort, and have more influence in itself, the more the masses are indifferent, the less that any mutual feeling of hostility prevails in the two states from other causes, and, therefore, there are cases where the political object almost alone will be decisive"

Here, the political objective was repossessing the lost territories. The military objective was formulated with the same being he principal objective. Hence, the immense pressure on Sadat to continue offensive operations against his better judgement. That the precarious situation on Syrian front demanded the action need not be underscored. However, the political action of only capturing the Suez was made redundant with the Israeli counter-attack and thence the military objectives converged as one with the overall political objective of repossessing the Sinai.

One can argue that the political aim of Sadat was limited to capture of Suez, but that in itself is a travesty as the political aim was always to repossess the Sinai.

"If the aim of the military action is an equivalent for the political object, that action will in general diminish as the political object diminishes, and that in a greater degree the more the political object dominates; and so is explained how, without any contradiction in itself, there may be wars of all degrees of importance and energy, from a war of extermination, down to the mere use of an army of observation."

There is your final explanation. I hope you can now co-relate.


Now coming to your specifics about the third army:

"AS THINGS FELL APART TO THE NORTH, SADAT felt compelled to order an offensive and press deeper into the Sinai. Shazly, his chief of staff, and other top generals fiercely opposed this move. They remembered how Israeli planes had devastated Arab ground forces in the 1967 war, and they did not want to move the army from under its missile shield. Yet on October 14, as many as 1,000 Egyptian tanks and several mechanized brigades rumbled forward. The targets were two gateways into Israel: the mountain passes at Mitla and Giddi, both at least 30 miles east of the Suez.

This thrust was met by air strikes as well as some 800 tanks led by heroes of Israel’s previous wars—General Avraham Adan and Major General Sharon. The two armored divisions outflanked the Egyptian units and ripped into them, destroying 265 tanks and at least 200 other vehicles. In contrast, only 40 Israeli tanks suffered damage, most of it minor. Worse for the Egyptians, the Israeli assault opened a chink in their lines along the Great Bitter Lake, which lay north of the Gulf of Suez. Adan and Sharon pounced and launched a counteroffensive to bridge the Suez Canal and divide the Egyptian Second and Third Armies on the west bank. Sharon was to boldly move his forces across the canal and push the Second Army north, establishing a corridor for Adan’s men to cross and wheel south, where they would destroy SAM missile launch sites and hit the Egyptian Third Army from the rear.

On October 15 and 16, Sharon’s 143rd Reserve Armored Division crossed the canal on pontoon bridges and established a bridgehead. The Israelis also raced southeast on the Sinai, slamming into the Egyptians concentrated in an area known as the Chinese Farm.


The fighting here was fierce. For four days the Egyptians fought the Israelis off from behind well-prepared defenses but Adan crushed their counterattacks. The Egyptian 25th Armored Brigade, for instance, lost its entire force of armored personnel carriers and 85 of its 96 T-62s while destroying only three IDF tanks.

On October 17 or 18, Soviet officials showed Sadat and General Ahmad Ismail Ali, his war minister, satellite pictures of the expanding bridgehead that Sharon had established on the west bank of the Suez. General Shazly recommended pulling back four armored units from the Sinai to counter the threat. But Sadat, calculating the political need to hang on to Egyptian gains, ruled against a withdrawal.

Three days later, with the Israeli threat deepening, Sadat finally pushed for an end to the war. “I knew my capabilities,” he said later, noting the American aid to Israel. “I did not intend to fight the entire United States of America.” Kissinger flew to Moscow, where he and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev drafted a U.N. Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire.

Although Egyptian and Israeli officials accepted the truce, fighting continued. The IDF sensed a crushing victory and marched on. Having crossed the Suez through the corridor that Sharon had established, General Adan and his 200 or so tanks raced south, destroying SAM sites and enveloping the 45,000-man Egyptian Third Army.

Some Israelis wanted to destroy the force, which was cut off from food and water supplies. Sadat requested U.S. and Soviet troops to enforce the cease-fire, shrewdly drawing the two superpowers into the fray. When the Americans hesitated, Brezhnev signaled that the Soviet Union was willing to act unilaterally—a message that the United States interpreted as major threat. Kissinger and a special crisis-management team within the White House held an emergency meeting and raised U.S. military forces from Defense Readiness Condition 4 to 3 for the first time since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Ultimately, diplomacy defused the situation, but it was one of the Cold War’s most dangerous moments.

On October 28, Israel, under pressure from the United States, agreed to allow the Egyptians to deliver food and medical supplies to the trapped Third Army. The next day, Syria stopped fighting. A couple of weeks later, on November 11, Egypt and Israel agreed to a cease-fire drafted by Sadat and Kissinger."

Some resources:

http://www.liquisearch.com/yom_kippur_war/combat_operations/in_the_sinai/egypts_trapped_third_army

Then you can have another view point like this; makes sense too:

http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/02/22/what-really-happened-in-the-yom-kippur-war/

I am sure you can find all sorts of views floating and indeed may be having the minimal faculties to make informed judgement.

But on PDF, I think that as a military professional/history buff, one has to analyse war for the facts as stated factually and and as available.

For example, despite the official line of India (which is parroted by 99% of Indian members here that 1962 war was thrust upon India by China, I love to take them to task over the incorrect information and indeed dissemination of falsehood. The conflict began with Indian troops moving across Macmahon line in Arunachal or NEFA of the time; something which our official narrative buries in a footnote).

So as a whole:

Aim of Sadat: To reclaim Sinai. Achieved

Aim of Sadat in 1973: To militarily force Israel to negotiate after wresting Sinai - not achieved. A military defeat as even the minimal aim of capture of Suez (not merely capture but you have to hold the territory too to qualify as a success in your war objectives) - not achieved. So Yom Kippur was a failure for them.

Aim of Israel: To legitimise itself as a state. Achieved. 1978 Camp David accord afforded this. So Israelis achieved their target to.

End result if only political objectives are looked at? A stalemate.

But if you look at the political objectives from the specific viewpoint of initiation of hostilities in 1973, failed; militarily lost the war.



it means you are being emotional and extremist minded.

No, it means you are sufficiently challenged to appreciate the information as

a. You are merely an enthusiast (or a fanboy; depending on how you look at it) having no clue about the art of war or indeed war fighting.

b. In case you are indeed a veteran, you have poor understanding of subjects as relevant to basic military instructorial course and may have fared poorly on them (am not presuming you are)

c. Or you may just be out to have some fun ....!


I am not surprized at all, most indians here are licking Usraeli A** for some innefective weapon systems, maybe India found out and now it turns to the US..

I am surprised that such a low level of comment is coming from you now .....

I am left with no words except that sometimes it is better to lick A$s than have someone shaft you for their benevolence (and get into the habit of getting shafted and enjoying it), which your original country seems to have developed!!!

You take care and note that not all people appreciate a crude sense of humour.

Thanks.



@Joe Shearer This is the gentleman who has started the thread about the Indian army conventional superiority over Pakistani army being exaggerated and has given outdated and lopsided view in them.
 
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Then, why indeed, are you so keen in engaging me? Move along....!



Says a man who posted a statement with out the reference being posted........

Yes, the Egyptian military achieved it's objectives of crossing over to the East Bank and then they lost their plot. They lost the initiative, I have said it earlier. But the subsequent actions when Egyptian forces post re-org and consolidation moved East in order to relieve the pressure on Syrians, was still a continuation of war.

What is war?

For arm chair 'experts'/ignorant 'professionals' like you (who may have served but slept in their Junior Commander's courses and totally lost the plot in Military History & Tactics):

"We shall not enter into any of the abstruse definitions of war used by publicists. We shall keep to the element of the thing itself, to a duel. War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. If we would conceive as a unit the countless number of duels which make up a war, we shall do so best by supposing to ourselves two wrestlers. Each strives by physical force to compel the other to submit to his will: his first object is to throw his adversary, and thus to render him incapable of further resistance.

War therefore is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.

Violence arms itself with the inventions of Art and Science in order to contend against violence. Self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed usages of International Law, accompany it without essentially impairing its power. Violence, that is to say physical force (for there is no moral force without the conception of states and law), is therefore the means; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate object. In order to attain this object fully, the enemy must be disarmed; and this is, correctly speaking, the real aim of hostilities in theory. It takes the place of the final object, and puts it aside in a manner as something not properly belonging to war"


A revision for you!

While the Egyptians militarily lost the war as their aim was to wrest back control of the Sinai (as the breakthrough at the Great Bitter Lake was successfully exploited by Israel), in my first statement of this thread itself I had conceded that Sadat achieved his objective but paid dearly for it (in terms of his assassination). That is why when I said read everything and then speak, I meant for you to read it and see my response ALWAYS as an overall context.

Further revision for you:

"The result in war is never absolute"

'even the final decision of a whole war is not always to be regarded as absolute. The conquered/defeated state often sees in it only a passing or transitory stage, a situation which may be repaired in after times by means of political combinations and new alliances/allegiances. How much this also must modify the degree of tension and the vigour of the efforts made is evident in itself'

Hence, the state (the defeated/conquered state) may use this modified tension or invigorated efforts to either proceed on a path of alternate actions e.g. of improvement in bilateral relations and accumulation of diplomatic currency; or it may proceed along a route of renewed hostility/antagonism.

My first post in reply to GiannKall #50 for your reference




Now coming back to my statement here regarding 1973:

"The law of the extreme, the view to disarm the adversary, to overthrow him, has hitherto to a certain extent usurped the place of this end or object (the political objective) Just as this law loses its force, the political object must again come forward. If the whole consideration is a calculation of probability based on definite persons and relations, then the political object, being the original motive, must be an essential factor in the product. The smaller the sacrifice we demand from our opponent, the smaller it may be expected will be the means of resistance which he will employ; but the smaller his are, the smaller will ours require to be. Further, the smaller our political object, the less value shall we set upon it, and the more easily shall we be induced to give it up altogether."

Was the Egyptian effort a small political objective? (The recapture of Sinai to force Israel to negotiations?) One may argue on both sides of the point. However, the objective by itself is not small and was indeed, the principal aim of the whole exercise of war in 1973, the aim to ensure repossession of territories lost to Israel in 1967 war and also to achieve a political negotiation in order to bring about an end to hostilities between the two nations.




"Thus, therefore, the political object, as the original motive of the war, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force, and also the amount of effort to be made. This it cannot be in itself; but it is so in relation to both the belligerent states, because we are concerned with realities, not with mere abstractions. One and the same political object may produce totally different effects upon different people, or even upon the same people at different times; we can, therefore, only admit the political object as the measure, by considering it in its effects upon those masses which it is to move, and consequently the nature of those masses also comes into consideration. It is easy to see that thus the result may be very different according as these masses are animated with a spirit which will infuse vigour into the action or otherwise. It is quite possible for such a state of feeling to exist between two states that a very trifling political motive for war may produce an effect quite disproportionate, in fact, a perfect explosion."


The statement you have quoted of the Israeli 'commanders' is the result of this ambiguity of the situation. For the Israelis, the shock of loosing Bar-Lev line and the significant losses they incurred in the subsequent failed counter attack to stabilise their position, was an immense shock to the military and national psyche, who had believed in their own invincibility in the aftermath of 1967. The precision with which the Egyptian armies crossed the Suez and the ingenuity of the Engineering efforts in facilitating the same, was an eye opener for the complacent and confident Israeli commander.

"This applies to the efforts which the political object will call forth in the two states, and to the aim which the military action shall prescribe for itself. At times it may itself be that aim, as for example the conquest of a province. At other times, the political object itself is not suitable for the aim of military action; then such a one must be chosen as will be an equivalent for it, and stand in its place as regards the conclusion of peace. But, also, in this, due attention to the peculiar character of the states concerned is always supposed. There are circumstances in which the equivalent must be much greater than the political object in order to secure the latter. The political object will be so much the more the standard of aim and effort, and have more influence in itself, the more the masses are indifferent, the less that any mutual feeling of hostility prevails in the two states from other causes, and, therefore, there are cases where the political object almost alone will be decisive"

Here, the political objective was repossessing the lost territories. The military objective was formulated with the same being he principal objective. Hence, the immense pressure on Sadat to continue offensive operations against his better judgement. That the precarious situation on Syrian front demanded the action need not be underscored. However, the political action of only capturing the Suez was made redundant with the Israeli counter-attack and thence the military objectives converged as one with the overall political objective of repossessing the Sinai.

One can argue that the political aim of Sadat was limited to capture of Suez, but that in itself is a travesty as the political aim was always to repossess the Sinai.

"If the aim of the military action is an equivalent for the political object, that action will in general diminish as the political object diminishes, and that in a greater degree the more the political object dominates; and so is explained how, without any contradiction in itself, there may be wars of all degrees of importance and energy, from a war of extermination, down to the mere use of an army of observation."

There is your final explanation. I hope you can now co-relate.


Now coming to your specifics about the third army:

"AS THINGS FELL APART TO THE NORTH, SADAT felt compelled to order an offensive and press deeper into the Sinai. Shazly, his chief of staff, and other top generals fiercely opposed this move. They remembered how Israeli planes had devastated Arab ground forces in the 1967 war, and they did not want to move the army from under its missile shield. Yet on October 14, as many as 1,000 Egyptian tanks and several mechanized brigades rumbled forward. The targets were two gateways into Israel: the mountain passes at Mitla and Giddi, both at least 30 miles east of the Suez.

This thrust was met by air strikes as well as some 800 tanks led by heroes of Israel’s previous wars—General Avraham Adan and Major General Sharon. The two armored divisions outflanked the Egyptian units and ripped into them, destroying 265 tanks and at least 200 other vehicles. In contrast, only 40 Israeli tanks suffered damage, most of it minor. Worse for the Egyptians, the Israeli assault opened a chink in their lines along the Great Bitter Lake, which lay north of the Gulf of Suez. Adan and Sharon pounced and launched a counteroffensive to bridge the Suez Canal and divide the Egyptian Second and Third Armies on the west bank. Sharon was to boldly move his forces across the canal and push the Second Army north, establishing a corridor for Adan’s men to cross and wheel south, where they would destroy SAM missile launch sites and hit the Egyptian Third Army from the rear.

On October 15 and 16, Sharon’s 143rd Reserve Armored Division crossed the canal on pontoon bridges and established a bridgehead. The Israelis also raced southeast on the Sinai, slamming into the Egyptians concentrated in an area known as the Chinese Farm.


The fighting here was fierce. For four days the Egyptians fought the Israelis off from behind well-prepared defenses but Adan crushed their counterattacks. The Egyptian 25th Armored Brigade, for instance, lost its entire force of armored personnel carriers and 85 of its 96 T-62s while destroying only three IDF tanks.

On October 17 or 18, Soviet officials showed Sadat and General Ahmad Ismail Ali, his war minister, satellite pictures of the expanding bridgehead that Sharon had established on the west bank of the Suez. General Shazly recommended pulling back four armored units from the Sinai to counter the threat. But Sadat, calculating the political need to hang on to Egyptian gains, ruled against a withdrawal.

Three days later, with the Israeli threat deepening, Sadat finally pushed for an end to the war. “I knew my capabilities,” he said later, noting the American aid to Israel. “I did not intend to fight the entire United States of America.” Kissinger flew to Moscow, where he and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev drafted a U.N. Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire.

Although Egyptian and Israeli officials accepted the truce, fighting continued. The IDF sensed a crushing victory and marched on. Having crossed the Suez through the corridor that Sharon had established, General Adan and his 200 or so tanks raced south, destroying SAM sites and enveloping the 45,000-man Egyptian Third Army.

Some Israelis wanted to destroy the force, which was cut off from food and water supplies. Sadat requested U.S. and Soviet troops to enforce the cease-fire, shrewdly drawing the two superpowers into the fray. When the Americans hesitated, Brezhnev signaled that the Soviet Union was willing to act unilaterally—a message that the United States interpreted as major threat. Kissinger and a special crisis-management team within the White House held an emergency meeting and raised U.S. military forces from Defense Readiness Condition 4 to 3 for the first time since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Ultimately, diplomacy defused the situation, but it was one of the Cold War’s most dangerous moments.

On October 28, Israel, under pressure from the United States, agreed to allow the Egyptians to deliver food and medical supplies to the trapped Third Army. The next day, Syria stopped fighting. A couple of weeks later, on November 11, Egypt and Israel agreed to a cease-fire drafted by Sadat and Kissinger."

Some resources:

http://www.liquisearch.com/yom_kippur_war/combat_operations/in_the_sinai/egypts_trapped_third_army

Then you can have another view point like this; makes sense too:

http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/02/22/what-really-happened-in-the-yom-kippur-war/

I am sure you can find all sorts of views floating and indeed may be having the minimal faculties to make informed judgement.

But on PDF, I think that as a military professional/history buff, one has to analyse war for the facts as stated factually and and as available.

For example, despite the official line of India (which is parroted by 99% of Indian members here that 1962 war was thrust upon India by China, I love to take them to task over the incorrect information and indeed dissemination of falsehood. The conflict began with Indian troops moving across Macmahon line in Arunachal or NEFA of the time; something which our official narrative buries in a footnote).

So as a whole:

Aim of Sadat: To reclaim Sinai. Achieved

Aim of Sadat in 1973: To militarily force Israel to negotiate after wresting Sinai - not achieved. A military defeat as even the minimal aim of capture of Suez (not merely capture but you have to hold the territory too to qualify as a success in your war objectives) - not achieved. So Yom Kippur was a failure for them.

Aim of Israel: To legitimise itself as a state. Achieved. 1978 Camp David accord afforded this. So Israelis achieved their target to.

End result if only political objectives are looked at? A stalemate.

But if you look at the political objectives from the specific viewpoint of initiation of hostilities in 1973, failed; militarily lost the war.





No, it means you are sufficiently challenged to appreciate the information as

a. You are merely an enthusiast (or a fanboy; depending on how you look at it) having no clue about the art of war or indeed war fighting.

b. In case you are indeed a veteran, you have poor understanding of subjects as relevant to basic military instructorial course and may have fared poorly on them (am not presuming you are)

c. Or you may just be out to have some fun ....!




I am surprised that such a low level of comment is coming from you now .....

I am left with no words except that sometimes it is better to lick A$s than have someone shaft you for their benevolence (and get into the habit of getting shafted and enjoying it), which your original country seems to have developed!!!

You take care and note that not all people appreciate a crude sense of humour.

Thanks.



@Joe Shearer This is the gentleman who has started the thread about the Indian army conventional superiority over Pakistani army being exaggerated and has given outdated and lopsided view in them.

If I were you, I would not engage with this gentlemen anymore,

He said some of the craziest stuff and then called me an extremist for simply looking up the event without impartial judgement. He is a defender of arab, hence all his view are biased, and if you keep arguing with him, it just went straight into a wall.

You can go with him about 100 post and not going anywhere, because for him, Egyptian did not lose that war, the Egyptian won and just let about 24,000 people die and capture just so Israel can save face lol:) is what he believe and nothing will change him from deviate from that.
 
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If I were you, I would not engage with this gentlemen anymore,

He said some of the craziest stuff and then called me an extremist for simply looking up the event without impartial judgement. He is a defender of arab, hence all his view are biased, and if you keep arguing with him, it just went straight into a wall.

You can go with him about 100 post and not going anywhere, because for him, Egyptian did not lose that war, the Egyptian won and just let about 24,000 people die and capture just so Israel can save face lol:) is what he believe and nothing will change him from deviate from that.

Absolutely, I saw his points against your post and understood ... had some spare time to chart out a long rebuttal to him, so I did .... for a few others

I was avoiding him. He has made a thread where he has actually posted nonsense and tried to justify it, but then the majority here is composed of those who keep publishing the nonsense and will argue over it. That is why you will see my posts are very few.

Unfortunately there are people supposedly professionals who have also got into it ...!! There is one particular member who is professing usage of Enhanced Radiation Weapons at the smallest point .....lol
 
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Enough with this thread!
Many of you still want to believe that Egypt was defeated back in 1973 as if Israel still occupying Sinai!
or that Israel left Sinai as a result of its desire to world peace!
Not iron and fire that compelled USA-Israel to go back pre 1967


The irony in pro-Israel posts here reminds me of what Israeli government had to say after withdrawing from Southern Lebanon back in 2000 and what Hezbollah said as a response to those lies .. I do remember the exact words from both sides though 16 years have passed since then!

Interesting is the way how rivals and different parts see things and facts!

Anyway, Just wanna share the image of the EAF 2016

13434832_1040508342681849_8824754553328150691_n.jpg


MIRAGE2000
F16 block52
RAFALE
MIG35
SU35 ...
......

A huge progress post 73 war and since ever actually

Can't wait to see what Egyptian falcons gonna do with the new Russian-origin Mig-35, Su-35
Just the previous video I posted here re. EAF Mig-21 vs IAF mirage-5 during 73 war give us a clear glimpse :victory1:

5EgQifK.gif
 
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