Why Arabs lost all its wars to Israel despite outnumbering Israel in weapons and manpower?

[Solomon2]

the most important thing to know is by the end and with the high isreali losses and limited manpower they could not afford more losses they were stretched from Sinai to the other side of the canal no one can know for sure what would happen if they attack -

Sure, the Egyptian Army performed better than in 1967 - at first, when it had the initiative on the offensive. While Israeli losses were great, in the last stages they were not, and by the time of the cease-fire Egypt's ground-to-air missile installations had been destroyed and there was no Egyptian ground force to block the Israelis had they wished to advance to Cairo and its airfields - and if the Israelis had, how long could the war have lasted? How long could the Egyptian Army maintain its strength without supplies or external support, since all war materiel was Soviet-built?

Why is this still being discussed? The facts to why Arabs lost all their wars are clearly written all over the Arab World. Just turn on the news.

Point!

 

[19887]

Do you know the next prophecy? 1,44000 Jews will be converted to Christianity and Jesus will return.(Reason why a majority of American Christians support Israel is to bring about the end of the world)....the rest of the Jews along with the Muslims and Pastafarians will burn...now god forbid one President gets to office who is nutty enough to think that he will bring the Messiah back!

I know this prophecy but...
Q:This prophecy belong to who??
A:To stup1d christians who believe in stup1d jew.

(Christians don't be offended)

 

[Ceylal]

Do you know the next prophecy?

None sense, all the three religions have their own prophecies..

 

[Solomon2]

If it wasn't for us Israel wouldn't exist. Period.

I really don't see the validity in that claim. U.S. did not supply Israel arms until the Kennedy Administration and reversed the results of the 1956 Sinai Campaign, was not a big arms supplier until after 1967, and if Golda Meir wasn't convinced of eventual U.S. support then Israel would likely have pre-emptively attacked in 1973,likely defeating both Egypt and Syria before the Soviets could send reinforcements or troops.

 

[Ceylal]

no Egyptian ground force to block the Israelis had they wished to advance to Cairo and its airfields - and if the Israelis had, how long could the war have lasted? How long could the Egyptian Army maintain its strength without supplies or external support, since all war materiel was Soviet-built?

Not really, If Israelis could, they will have had done it. After Ariel Sharon tank brigade was decimated, The IDF didn't venture any further, neither did the IAF for other reasons..
We thought after 43 years, both sides can spill their duffle bags, without any hung ups..

 

[19887]

If it wasn't for us Israel wouldn't exist. Period.

US helped us so much in 1948..not!
US helped us so much in 1956...not!
US helped us so much in 1967...not!
US was so good ally in 1973...not!
And we have to remember when the US invaded iraq and the iraqis launched scuds on us our best ally told us not to respond etc etc etc.....

 

[Solomon2]

Not really, If Israelis could, they will have had done it.

You really don't understand Jews that well, do you?

...After Ariel Sharon tank brigade was decimated,

Yes, the new anti-tank weapons. But by then the U.S. airlift also included M-60 tanks.

We thought after 43 years, both sides can spill their duffle bags, without any hung ups..

Ah, but then you have to be prepared to accept answers you don't like!

 

[Mahmoud_EGY]

Sure, the Egyptian Army performed better than in 1967 - at first, when it had the initiative on the offensive. While Israeli losses were great, in the last stages they were not, and by the time of the cease-fire Egypt's ground-to-air missile installations had been destroyed and there was no Egyptian ground force to block the Israelis had they wished to advance to Cairo and its airfields - and if the Israelis had, how long could the war have lasted? How long could the Egyptian Army maintain its strength without supplies or external support, since all war materiel was Soviet-built?!

they couldn't even enter suez a small city and nearly half of its population left because of the war no way even 1 isreali think about cairo
our airforce didn't lose much of its jets they could provide air cover

 

[The SC]

Please every one read the articles in post #200 and # 202 and stop this vicious cycle talk..

It is clear that Usrael had a near death experience..

 

[The SC]

@M.SAAD

1973 Arab-Israeli conflict: The Truth once and for all


They Said about the War


Introduction

The October 1973 War, a radical turning-point in the course of Arab-Israeli conflict, has evoked interest by military leaders, strategists, research and study centers and media around the world. This is due to the fact that this war had had far-reaching repercussions and impact on the Middle East region, not only on the military and strategic level but also on the overall political and economic life of the world as a whole. Statements by contemporary witnesses to the war are the most truthful historical accounts, documenting facts and impartially and objectively assessing results of the war. Such testimonies should be particularly true, when they are made by major strategists and military experts around the world let alone those witnesses from the other side. After the lapse of a quarter a century, it might be beneficial to review these testimonies in order to learn lessons from the October 1973 War.

Israeli Testimonies

Reporting Golda Meir, Israeli Prime Minister during October War:

The Egyptians crossed the canal and hit hard our forces in Sinai. The Syrians pushed deep into the Golan Heights. We incurred grave losses on both fronts. The agonizing question at that time was should we or should we not inform the nation of the truth about the bad situation?!.
In writing on the Yom Kippur War (October war) - not as a military report- but as a close-by disaster or a horrible nightmare that I myself have suffered from and will continue to haunt me throughout my life.

Reporting Moshe Dayan, Israeli Defense Minister during October War:

The war has shown that we were no stronger than the Egyptians. The halo of supremacy and the political and military premise that Israel is stronger than the Arabs; that they would be defeated should they dare to start war did not hold true. It was theory that it would take them the whole night to erect bridges, which we could prevent, using our armored vehicles. But it turned out that it was not easy to prevent them. Our exercise to send tanks to the battle front was very costly. We have never expected that.
(Press Conference, October 9, 1973)

The October War was an earthquake that hit Israel. What happened in this war has removed dust off our eyes, revealing to us what we could not see before. All this led to a change in the mentality of Israeli leaders.
(Statements by Dayan, December 1973)

Reporting Aba Eban, Israeli Foreign Minister during October War:

Many changes have taken place since October 6,1973. We should, therefore, not overestimate Israel military supremacy. On the contrary, there is now an overwhelming sense in Israel of the need to review national rhetoric. We have to keep away from hyperboles and be more realistic. (November 1973)

Reporting Aharon Yarev, Former Director of Israeli Intelligence:

Undoubtedly, the Arabs came out of the war victorious, while we, in terms of image and feeling, came out torn out and weak. When asked if he won the war, Sadat replied, "Look at what is going on in Israel after the war and you will know the answer to this question".
(Symposium on October War, Jerusalem,September 16, 1974)

Reporting Haim Hertzog, Former Head of the State of Israel:

The October war ended up in a major shock to all Israelis. Moshe Dayan is no longer the same man before. Since then he has been bent on himself. He has always had the conviction that he would not and could not afford to attack. Even amidst Egyptian infiltration, Dayan did not admit his miscalculations.
He turned into a sort of a Hamlet, torn out by suspicion, reluctance, and inability to take decision or impose his will. That was the beginning of fall for labour governments which has ruled Israel for 25 years until then. Similarly the war has caused conceptual changes in the mentality of Israeli leadership, who started looking for a new approach and a realistic policy of dealing with the problem through political solutions.
(From the Memoirs of Haim Hertzog)

Before October 6, we used to talk too much, this was one of our problems. While the Egyptians learned how to fight, we learned how to talk. They were patient and their statements were more realistic than ours. They were telling and announcing facts so fully that the external world seemed to trust their statements.
(Comments by Hertzog, November 1973)

Reporting Nahom Goldman , Former Head of Jewish Agency:

One of the most significant results of October 1973 War was that it put an end to the myth of an invincible Israel and its progressive supremacy over the Arabs.This also cost Israel a high price; about $ 5 billion. It caused a radical change to the economic position of the Jewish Agency, which dropped from a state of boom experienced a year earlier (albeit not firmly grounded as it seemed) to an extremely deep, and ever more intensive and serious crisis. The most serious result was that which affected the psychological side.
Gone was the Israelis' confidence in their sustained supremacy. Their internal morale was tremendously weakened, which is the most serious thing that can face a nation, particularly Israel. This weakness was embodied into two contradictory forms, which led to an extremely serious polarization of Israel. On the one hand, there were some people who began to question the future of Israel. On the other, increasing fanaticism and hard-line trends were visible, leading to what was called "Massada Complex".
The citadel, where the Jews took refuge during the Jewish rebellion movement against the Roman Empire, but never surrendered and all died).
Reporting "Whereto Israel"

Reporting Israeli General Ishio Javitch:
If we assess achievements against targets, we will find out that the Arabs' victory was more decisive. I should admit that the Arabs have achieved a very large part of their objectives. They proved capable of surmounting the fear barrier; got into war and fought efficiently. They also proved capable of forcing their way into the Suez Canal barrier. For Israel, the war ultimately ended without being able to break up Arab armies. We scored no victories. We could not back the Egyptian nor the Syrian army. Nor could we succeed in restoring the deterrent power to the Israeli army. To our great sorrow, they snatched the canal out of our grips with the force of arms.
(Symposium on October War, Jerusalem, September 16, 1974)

Reporting Amnon Kapelock, Israeli Military Commentator:

The English proverb says, "The higher the rise the more severe is the fall". On October 6, Israel fell off the top of the tower of peace and tranquility it had built up for itself.
The shock was as strong and impressive as prior illusions. It seemed as though the Israelis had waked up from a lengthy, sweet dream to see a long lists of self-evident truth, and indisputable principles, illusions and facts they had believed in for several years, shaken and sometimes shattered down by a new, unexpected fact, ununderstandable to most Israelis.
From the perspective of a plain Israeli, the October War can have more than one name such as; war of recovery from a hangover , collapse of legends , end of illusions , a death of sacred heifers .
Following prior wars, prestigious military parades were often conducted in the Independence Day, where the public viewed war booty captured from the enemy. On the contrary, this time a large exhibition was made in Cairo, two months after the war, where the public viewed tanks, guns, military vehicles and many Israeli weapons captured from the enemy during the war.
On prior occasions, soldiers returned home in a flurry of happiness and pride. However, this time, returning soldiers were gripped with sadness and consternation. Many had to frequent the psychiatric section of the Army's Medical Department, for treatment from "combat shock".

"Israel: End of a Myth"

Reporting Zaev Schev, Israeli Military Commentator:

This is the first war for the Israeli army, where many soldiers suffering combat shock and needing psychiatric treatment were treated. Some of them forgot their own names and had to refer to hospitals.
Israel was stunned by the Arabs' success in waging a surprise war on Yum Kippur and scoring military successes. This war has proved that Israel has to reassess the Arab warrior. This time, Israel has paid a very high price.
The October War has shaken Israel from top to bottom. Instead of overconfidence, suspicions emerged and questions surfaced to the top; should we live for ever on our own devastation? Could we possible stand any other wars?! "The October Earthquake: Yum Kippur War"

Reporting Israeli Professor Shimon Shamir:

I can list for the Arabs five important achievements:

First: They managed to affect a change in the US political strategy that was unfavour to Israel.

Second: They succeeded in making the military option happen, thus imposing such efforts on Israel that overburdened its resources and economy.

Third: They managed to achieve a high level of Arab cooperation in both the military and economic fields, particularly as they restored to the oil weapon in October.

Fourth: Egypt could regain the power of free maneuvering among major powers, which it lost ten years ago.

Fifth: The Arabs could change their own image; freeing themselves from the 1967 shock, and becoming more capable of hard work.
(Symposium on October War, Jerusalem, September 16,1974)

Reporting Yussi Belin, Member of the Knesset and Labour Party Leader:

The tension that prevailed in the Labor Party in 1973 had crippled the Party, making it unable to take a decision to enter into peace negotiations with the Arabs. This led to the failure of Junnar Jaring's mission of mediation between Egypt and Israel. The result was the outbreak of the Yum Kippur War (October) the end of tenure by the Lbour Party and consequently a Right-Left equivalence of power, which has until now characterized Israel's political system. Unless an independent leader will have emerged in Israel up to May 4, 1999 ( the date set for declaring a Palestinian State), it would be difficult to prevent the coming disaster from taking place ( following the October 1973 and Intifada 1987 disasters).

Testimonies by International Experts

Reporting American military historian Trevor Dubuoy, Chairman, Hero Foundation for Scientific Assessment of Historical Battles:

As a result of honorable fighting waged by both Egyptian and Syrian armies, the Arabs restored their own pride and self-confidence, which led to the reinforcement of Arab influence on the international arena in general. Strategically and politically speaking, there is no doubt that Egypt has won the war.
With the professional planning and performance whereby the crossing process was accomplished, no other army in the world could have done better. This precise work on the part of the general staff, particularly the element of surprise already achieved, resulted in remarkable success in crossing the Suez Canal on a wide front.
The Israel Intelligence categorically failed, as military intelligence activity concentrated on antagonist capabilities, being out of reckoning. Miscalculation of Arab capabilities gave rise to misconceptions of Arab intentions.
On the other hand, greater credit should be given to Arab security and confidentiality, whereby facts were adequately screened to re-affirm prior Israeli misconceptions.
While the Egyptians waged maritime war essentially through a strategic approach, the Israeli waged it through a tactical one. The Egyptian had imposed a successful siege on shipping traffic to Ilat sea-port by closing down Bab al-Mandab Strait. Their Mediterranean siege seemed to prevent neutral and Israeli ships from approaching the Israeli coast. On the southern front, Israeli attempts to destroy Egyptian air bases in the Nile Delta categorically failed thanks to the effective Egyptian air defense.
The Israeli also decided to attempt seizure of the city of Suez. Although their tanks infiltrated into the heart of the city, yet resistance was so severe that they had pull back after being inflicted with heavy losses.

(International Symposium on October War, Cairo, October 27-31, 1975)

Reporting British military historian Edger O'Balance:

For Israel, the October War has caused an "all-out" change in strategy. It was forcefully ejected from an offensive to a defensive position. Since its inception, Israel has adopted an offensive military position. The Israeli general staff have never cared to contemplate a defensive position.
The Israeli soldier has realized that defense is now vital for his own survival. Conventional defense, which Israel had, for long before the war, vaingloriously looked upon, became acceptable as a military necessity for the protection of Israeli borders.
After the marvelous military operations achieved by the old Islamic conquests and the Crusades, the prestige of the Arab soldier has continually diminished in western eyes, due to varying reasons beyond his control. In this context, Israel has intensified its publicity, until it was surprised in the October 1973 War with Arab soldiers shattering their fetters, defeating Israelis, capturing hundreds of them, downing hundreds of their craft, destroying hundreds of their tanks. In a nutshell, Arab soldiers shattered the myth of invincible Israeli supremacy. What holds true for the Arabs in Napoleon's saying, "The ratio of marble to military equipment is three to one"
(Ibid)

Reporting General Varar Huckly, Combat Development Director, British Army:

The lessons learned from October War relate to personnel and their capabilities more than the machinery they operate. The impressive achievement made by the Egyptians is the genius and skills of leaders and officers who were trained and waged such an offensive that came as a total surprise to the other party, albeit effected within its sight. As a complement, the soldiers demonstrated such high morale and audacity that would have been, in the past, impossible.
(Ibid)

Reporting French General Albert Merglain:

All military experts and political officials were confident that Arabs would never succeed in taking the Israeli army by surprise. Contrary to what happened in October War, justifying evidence were many and varied. First, there was extreme confidence in Israeli intelligence services, which were said to be some of the best in the world, particularly as it was known to all that the American special agencies were closely related to them.
US reconnaissance planes and satellites could shoot all the depth of Arab rear area. Such favourable conditions for monitoring antagonist fronts combined could hardly exist. Therefore, the element of surprise was excluded, particularly, as the man-made barrier of the Suez Canal protects the Israeli front line and allows easy and effective resistance. The Arab surprise came at 2 p.m. on October 6, 1973. Contrary to negative assertions by all politicians, military experts, pressmen and specialists everywhere, the unexpected took place.
(Ibid)

Reporting French writer Jean-Claud Jipoux:

Did Egyptian president Anwar el-Sadat conceive, as he sent out his tanks and soldiers to cross the Suez Canal on October 6, that he was releasing an overwhelming, horrible power that could change such world?! Nothing, from Europe to America, from Africa to Asia remained the same since the Yum kippur War. Something even deeper has turned upside down in the relationship that existed between the industrialized world and its old colonies. Painful Days in Israel


Reporting British Journalist David Hurst:

The October War was an earthquake. For the first time in the history of Zionism, the Arabs tried and succeeded in imposing by the force of arm a fait accompli.
The set-back was not merely military, but it also affected all psychological, diplomatic and economic elements making up the power and vitality of a nation. The Israelis paid a high price for merely maintaining a state of equivalence with their attackers. Within three weeks, they lost, according to official figures, 2,523 personnel; a loss, which, in proportionate terms is two and half times US loss in the Vietnam war over ten years. Following prior Israeli- Arab wars, a deluge of high-quality paper, pictorial books were published to commemorate victory. But this time, the first book published in Israel was entitled Al Mihdal (Negligence). In 1967, Israeli generals lectured their admiring audience on their various expeditions. However, as soon as the October War started they started exchanging accusations and the severest insults both on local and world media. Bereaved mothers and widows later accosted Moshe Dayan, the fallen deity with shouts branding him cut-throat. Prior wars were followed by impressive military parades marking the Independence Day, but this time, nothing of this sort was made. Conversely, the Israelis soon came to know that a large exhibition of booties was opened in Cairo. For the first time, the Israelis saw on Arab televisions the shameful sight of their prisons of war with their drooping heads.
The Gun and Olive Branch

World Media and Press Reports

As the Egyptian army crossed the Suez Canal, cutting through the Bar lev-line, the October war changed the course of history both for Egypt and the entire Middle East.
(Daily Telegraph October 7, 1973)

The image of the Arab fighter in the aftermath of 1967 War as presented by world press was totally negative, giving the impression that a successful military confrontation on the part of the Arab fighter was impossible due to Israel's military strength.
Accordingly, one can understand the extent of change occurring after the Arab fighter has proved his presence and capabilities and how the world press has conveyed such change to world public opinion.
(The Times, October 7, 1973)

The Egyptians and Syrians are demonstrating high efficiency, organization and courage. The Arabs have scored a psychological victory that will have its psychological impact. The retention by the Egyptian of the east bank of the canal is a tremendous, unprecedented victory, whereby Israeli illusions that the Arabs were unfit for war have been shattered.
( Washington Post, October 10, 1973 )

Last week was one of chastisement and torture for Israel. Obviously, Arab armies are fighting with strength, courage and determination.
The Israelis were grouped with sadness and depression as they found out that the war cost them heavily and that the Egyptians and Syrians were not, as they had been told, unable to fight.
(Financial Times, October 11, 1973)

Obviously, the Arabs are fighting with unparalleled valour. Definitely, their fierce fighting had a considerable role in their victories. At the same time, the Israelis were generally afflicted by a feeling of depression upon their agonizing discovery -which cost them a lot- that the Egyptians and Syrians were not, in reality, helpless soldiers. There were indications that the Israelis were retreating all through in front of the progressing Egyptian and Syrian faces.
( The Times, October 11, 1973)

It was quite clear that the Israelis had lost initiative in this war. This was admitted by their leaders, including General Shlomo Jonin, commander of southern front in Sinai, who said, this is the most difficult war fought by Israel since its inception in 1948"
(Sun, October 12, 1973)

The secure borders theory adopted for expansionist purposes by Israel since its inception up till now has been totally shattered. Israel military mentality must change in the light of October War. This time a psychological myth has been shattered. Israel should, from now on, give up the notion that its security can be realized by merely occupying land.
( Daily Telegraph, October 12, 1973)

This war has eliminated the feeling of humiliation for the Arab and injured Israel's pride
(Daily Mail, October 12, 1973)

The Egyptian and Syrian troops caught the Israeli leadership stark naked. It was only after three days that the Israeli leadership could mobilize adequate reserve troop to address the situation. The Israeli public opinion was sleeping on the conviction that its intelligence services were the most efficient, its army the strongest. Now the public opinion in Israel wants to know what happened and why. The question circulated by everybody in Tel-Aviv now is why the Israeli leadership had not been aware before hand of Egypt and Syria's plans?
(United Press Agency correspondent from Tel-Aviv, October 12, 1973)

The October War has shattered the security borders theory as understood by Tel-Aviv rulers. The war has proved that Israel's security cannot be guaranteed by tanks and missiles but rather by a peaceful, equitable settlement agreed by the Arab states.
(L'Humanite, October 17, 1973)

The Arabs are waging an equitable struggle. The Arabs are fighting in defense of their rights. If one fights in defense of his land against an aggressor, he is waging a war of liberation. But to fight in order to continue to occupy others' land is blatant aggression.
(Zeitung of German Democratic Republic, October 19, 1973)

Egypt has caught up with and even outstripped Israel in the field of missiles and electronics.
(The Observer, October 20, 1973)

The Israelis have faced a foe that was far ahead of it in everything, prepared for an extended war of attrition. Israel has at the same time faced a foe with better training and more skilled leadership.
(Associated Press, October 20, 1973)

Today, a feeling of sadness and depression prevails in Israel. The number of prisoners of war returning from Egypt was more than expected. This means that many lost their lives.
(Jewish Chronicle, Britain, November 23, 1973)

Israeli soldiers fled breathless from the Bar-lev line, with soiled bodies and pale faces. Flocks of them fled the hell opened against them by the sweeping Egyptian onslaught.
(Anna Bella (Italy) October 30,1973 )

Before the October War, the country was pervaded by wrong feelings; the feeling of our hawks of overwhelming military supremacy. Such conviction has led them into a military reassurance purporting that: "We'll cut them into pieces, should they dare to snap a finger at us.
(Al Hamishmar, Israeli Newspaper, October 29, 1973)

Al Ferdan east of the Suez Canal was the first site captured by the Egyptian troops. Then, the Egyptian scored their greatest victories, restoring their land since the first day. Their faces showed signs of pride and victory along the Bar-Lev line, which fell apart in front of them. Thus irreversibly gone was the Israeli Bar-Lev line.
(The Times, October 31, 1973)

The October War has brought about a concept, apparently unknown to us before; the war-stressed, i.e. those who suffer psychological shock, now dispersed at hospitals and convalescence houses, being treated from the impact of ferocious war. For the first time in their lifetime, Israeli soldier has known the experience of siege and isolation during the fight, the disgrace of capture and fear of ammunition running out.
(Haarts, November 2, 1973)

General Yshac Rabin announced that his country had military plans to face all probabilities, including the occupation of the North Pole. But it seems that the sweeping Egyptian onslaught at mid-day October 6, 1973, had not been among Israeli probabilities. They, therefore, paid heavily for it.
(Der Spiegel, (German Magazine), November 5, 1973)

Up to the date of cease-fire on the Sinai front we had not caused injury to the Egyptian army. Definitely, even failing the cease-fire, we would not be able to stop or destroy the Egyptian army. Thus, it can be said that during our fourth war with the Arab, we have realized nothing.
(Haarts, November 18, 1973)

The Egyptian navy during the October War outstripped the Israeli navy, particularly in the field of missiles.
(Defense Nationale (French Magazine), November 8, 1973)

The negligence committed in the Yum Kippur War led to the rise of a protest movement led by an Ishiknazi citizen, calling for investigating causes of the defeat of Israeli army in the war. These investigations led to the fall of officials responsible for such negligence. Following the assassination of former premier Yshaac Rabin, a new movement called Peace Generation emerged. This new movement led by Tal Zilberstein calls for the continuation of the peace process with Palestinians.
Both movements are in agreement on the prediction that a revolution, which will erupt from the heart of Israel street, is in the way.
(Maaref, Israeli Newspaper, September 20, 1998)

The alarm risen sounded at 1.50 p.m. October 6, 1973, in its own connotation, was more than a mere alarm cautioning Israeli citizens to come down to underground shelters. It was rather the outcry reiterated upon burial of the dead. At that time the deceased was the first Israeli republic. When the war was over, the count was restarted and a new history began. After a quarter century from the rise of the State of Israel the pillars and underpinnings of old Israel were turned into a wreckage stranded on road side.

http://www.sis.gov.eg/newvr/october/english/4.htm

 

[Mahmoud_EGY]

Please every one read the articles in post #200 and # 202 and stop this vicious cycle talk..

It is clear that Usrael had a near death experience..

they think they are so smart trying to pick which part of the war to talk about if you look back at this thread and every other talking about the 73 war you will find 99 percent talking about when they crossed the canal as if the war started that time but I let them . I am proud of my army and the results from this war from start to finish they leave a great battle like destroying the barliv line the isreali counter attack 2 days after we crossed the canal the mansora air battle the battle for ismalia and the battle for suez and many more the raids carried out by our thunderbolt commandos were hard to believe before and during the war
I can keep talking about this war for years to come

 

[Beny Karachun]

would we have Sinai back if not for victory in the war?

there are many battles if you want to mention 1 by 1 we should talk about destroying the barliv line the isreali counter attack the battle for suez and ismalia the mansora air battle
I said the plan was to advance within the cover of our SAMs
if you think that using nuclear weapons is that simple you are wrong

Of course you destroyed the Bar Lev, it was in a holiday when most of the army was at home and you attacked

You didn't manage to advance with your SAM because the Israelis destroyed them, like in the 16 October 1973 raid on Egyptian missile bases.

And I am pretty sure you missed like 60 other lines that I wrote.

 

[Anubis]

I know this prophecy but...
Q:This prophecy belong to who??
A:To stup1d christians who believe in stup1d jew.

(Christians don't be offended)

Say what you will about them...but hey are one of the key reasons of strong American support for Israel...they raised a lot of money for Israel too...but Israel did the smart thing...let the idiots live in their own hallucination and took the money...any other country would have done the same.

 

[Ceylal]

You really don't understand Jews that well, do you?

..
Please, most the IDF that was on the Suez canal were from North African origin. For a fact I know them better than you do, since they lived among us..

Yes, the new anti-tank weapons. But by then the U.S. airlift also included M-60 tanks.

The M-60 didn't change the course of the battle..Against the Sagger and the T55, they showed their limitations and Ariel Sharon Tank brigade died upset for not having a rematch with the Algerian tank brigade that laminated him

Ah, but then you have to be prepared to accept answers you don't like!

Shouldn't you ask yourself that? I have no qualm to recognize a fait d'armes wether it was Israeli or Egyptian.

 

[Mahmoud_EGY]

Of course you destroyed the Bar Lev, it was in a holiday when most of the army was at home and you attacked

You didn't manage to advance with your SAM because the Israelis destroyed them, like in the 16 October 1973 raid on Egyptian missile bases.

And I am pretty sure you missed like 60 other lines that I wrote.

our SAMs were not mobile it couldn't be moved and I did not miss anything I try not to repeat my self