When people say PTI is supported by army, this is what they really mean
An Indian perspective:
It's a close call
M K Bhadrakumar, May 11, 2013, DHNS :
As Pakistan heads for election on Saturday, it is making history. For a poignant moment, all that matters is that an elected government completed its term in office and the people will choose the next government. This is no small achievement in Pakistan’s tortured history.
For the people, however, memory mixes with desire. Their best hope is that Pakistan conclusively breaks with the past and marches forward as a democratic country. But in actuality, matters are rather delicately poised. The heart of the matter is that the two curses in Pakistan’s history continue to lurk in the shade – the dominating military and the predatory foreign power. What makes the present situation precarious is that these two seasoned players also mutually reinforce at present.
The outcome of Saturday’s election holds profound significance for regional and international security. The public opinion in Pakistan strongly militates against the country’s collaboration with the United States’ regional strategies. If this translates as national policies under the new government, it becomes problematic for Washington to advance its regional strategies in Central Asia and South Asia and in the Persian Gulf region.
There is a near-certainty that Pakistan will have yet another coalition government. The emergent possibilities are a coalition government led by either Nawaz Sharif or Imran Khan (or one that includes the latter). In the first eventuality, the US’s strategic partnership with Pakistan could come under strain.
A civilian government under Sharif can be expected to be assertive in spelling out policy orientations with regard to core issues such as the reconciliation of the Taliban. The Pakistani preference is to engage the Taliban politically, but on Pakistan’s terms. Again, the US’s drone attacks will become increasingly untenable, but what alternative would president Barack Obama have except to rely on the predators? Most important, the US is on the verge of establishing nine military bases in Afghanistan. A substantial long-term US military presence in the region is on the cards. The Pentagon counts on the Pakistani transit routes for supplying the troops in Afghanistan.
Suffice to say the US will watch the outcome of the election in Pakistan with great unease. Washington would have preferred to deal with the Pakistani military instead of negotiating with an assertive civilian government. To be sure, the Pakistani economy’s critical need to depend on IMF aid helps Washington to influence the new leadership, but only up to a point.
Ironically, Pakistani military has common interests with the US. Both find it disagreeable that the election could throw up a nasty surprise by mandating a strong government led by Nawaz Sharif. Sharif has barely hidden his agenda to establish civilian supremacy. He also wants Pakistan to snap its strategic alliance with the US. Sharif counts on the prevailing mood in Pakistan, which is against military rule. The recent years’ experience amply bears out that the political class is holding together when it comes to keeping the military out of political power.
Highly vulnerable
Equally, Sharif has made it clear that he intends to deny the military the scope to exploit tensions in Pakistan’s relations with India as an alibi to keep its grip over key areas of foreign and security policies. Thus, Sharif made normalisation with India a major plank of his manifesto. Indeed, much would depend on the Indian response to his overtures. Smart thinking is needed in Delhi but then, alas, Indian public opinion is highly vulnerable to rabble rousing nationalistic rhetoric.
The Pakistani military and the Americans would pin hopes on Plan B. Enter Imran Khan. In any whichever way one looks, Khan remains an enigma but having said that, he is also the familiar phenomenon of demagoguery hiding true intentions. He espouses virulent ‘anti-Americanism’ but then, isn’t he also the darling of the western opinion makers? In many ways, he reminds one of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in his class interests, social background, ‘charisma’ and his populism masquerading as radical ideology. Could he also be sharing Bhutto’s famous ambivalence vis-à-vis the military?
This is where Plan B comes into play. A ‘settlement’ between Khan and Asif Zardari is not only within the realms of possibility but would be welcomed as a desirable power-sharing arrangement in both Rawalpindi and Washington. Principally, such a power-brokering deal would keep Nawaz Sharif out of power, and it would also be built on the tacit understanding that the overall equilibrium of political power is not to be disturbed. From the US viewpoint, a grand bargain between Zardari and Khan will be a ‘win-win’ situation.
In sum, Pakistani politics is at a crossroads. The democratisation process cannot easily be reversed without an outright military coup, but, paradoxically, the more things seem to change in favour of representative rule, the more they remain the same. This is where a cardinal difference between Pakistan and Turkey needs to be noted.
Turkey’s Recep Erdogan could bank on strong western support when he asserted civilian supremacy, whereas Sharif doesn’t enjoy this advantage. The point is, the robust Kemalism of the Turkish Pashas often created problems for the western strategists, whereas, the Pakistani generals have been a compliant lot by and large and are willing to subserve the US regional strategies to an extraordinary degree as their doublespeak over the US drone attacks amply bears out.
The generals in Rawalpindi apprehend that Sharif has a long memory and may curb their role in the Pakistani political arena. The Americans are nervous that the homespun agenda of this ‘desi’ leader may disrupt US strategies at a crucial juncture in the geopolitics of the region. With Pervez Musharraf back in the pavilion hit wicket without opening an account, Washington now has no option but to counts on the GHQ in Rawalpindi to pitchfork the Third Front comprising Imran Khan and his motley crowd of Islamic parties, as the ‘swing factor’ in Saturday’s election, which would keep Sharif at bay and set the ball rolling for Plan B. It is a close call.
(The writer is a former ambassador)
It's a close call
(no homo)
