Who created Taliban in 1996 ?

[mr42O]

Benazir created Taliban in 1996 with help of CIA and saudies

 

[shuntmaster]

Taliban Take Toll on Pakistan's Biggest City
Militants Claim Responsibility for Deadly Karachi Blast, Extending Hold Despite Government Crackdown
By
SAEED SHAH and SYED SHOAIB HASAN, Updated Feb. 13, 2014 8:29 p.m. ET

A security official stands guard at the site of Thursday's deadly bombing of a vehicle carrying police officers in a Karachi neighborhood controlled by the Pakistani Taliban. The attack killed at least 12 officers. Reuters



KARACHI, Pakistan—The Pakistani Taliban have tightened their grip over the country's commercial hub, officials and residents said, despite a five-month government crackdown here.

On Thursday, tentative peace talks with the government were thrown into disarray when the militants claimed responsibility for a roadside bombing that killed at least 12 police officers when the bus taking them to duty was destroyed near the city's southeastern Landhi neighborhood, an area the Taliban dominate.

Karachi is likely to pay a steeper price if efforts by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's government to forge a peace deal with the al Qaeda affiliate's leadership in tribal areas collapse and a military operation is launched there.

"If the peace talks fail, we fear that a big terrorism wave will hit Karachi," said Raja Umar Khattab, a senior officer in the counterterrorism Crime Investigation Department of the Karachi police.

The Pakistani Taliban are a national threat, with Karachi providing the group a vital financial lifeline. Money raised in Karachi from extortion, land-grabbing, kidnapping and robberies is sent to the group's leadership in the tribal areas along the Afghan border, security officials said.

The January assassination of Karachi's most prominent counterterrorism police officer, Chaudhry Aslam, showcased the militants' reach and had a chilling effect on the police force, officers said.

"Everyone now is at a loss about who will step into Chaudhry Aslam's shoes," said Omar Shahid Hamid, a senior counterterrorism officer now on leave. "He had become a symbol, someone who is standing up to [Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan]

In January, the militant group attacked police officers, shot and killed three journalists, repeatedly bombed paramilitary Rangers who are helping carry out the crackdown, gunned down three polio-vaccination workers, and slit the throats of six devotees visiting a shrine. Karachi police said 27 officers were killed in January, after 168 were killed last year.

Mr. Sharif, concerned that his economic-revival plans would be undermined by spreading mayhem, initiated the security operation in September. Karachi, a fast-growing city of at least 20 million, has a huge industrial base, the country's only major port and is the nation's center of banking and finance.

Some officers said they fear local political support is fading for the Karachi operation, which they view as a last chance to regain control of the city from TTP and other militias. The operation's implementation depends largely on the Sindh provincial government, which is run by the opposition Pakistan Peoples Party, and which controls Karachi's police. There are signs of tension between the Rangers, who answer to Islamabad, and the provincial government, which is based in Karachi, security officials and politicians said.

"This is a difficult path," said Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, visiting Karachi on Thursday. "But, God willing, we will bring peace back to Karachi."

Ahmed Chinoy, head of the Citizens Police Liaison Committee, a statutory body that works with the police to reduce crime, said parts of Karachi were still too dangerous for regular patrols, while the crackdown targeted regular crime. "While the focus of the operation was on other crimes, the militants got breathing space and took advantage."

Last year, five different police chiefs served Karachi, disrupting the battle against crime. The current chief, Shahid Hayat, said that at any given time, he had about 7,000 officers available to be deployed on the streets, out of a total force strength of 27,000—9,000 officers are kept on personal security duty for politicians and other officials.

It is only in recent weeks, he added, that the operation has shifted focus to jihadi groups such as TTP.

"I'm being asked to control Karachi with such small numbers of police," said Mr. Hayat. "Policemen are being killed day in, day out. But we're still fighting."

More than 13,000 people have been arrested in the sweep since September, in more than 10,000 raids by police and the paramilitary Rangers force, the provincial Sindh government said. But officials and residents said it has left largely untouched the poor outlying neighborhoods that remain under TTP control, encircling the city, including one adjacent to the new U.S. Consulate compound.

TTP is the most aggressive armed group operating in multiethnic Karachi, alongside the ethnic Baluch gangs in Lyari, and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement, a party that represents the descendants of Muslim migrants from current India, and that has traditionally dominated Karachi politics.

The Karachi security operation led to the arrest of just 63 TTP members through the end of January, police said. That compared with the arrest of 296 people affiliated with the MQM, 101 with links to the Awami National Party—a secular Pashtun political party—and 171 members of Lyari gangs.

Sharfuddin Memon, the adviser to the Sindh provincial chief minister on security issues, said the operation had led to a 50% drop in assassinations and kidnapping for ransom in the city. He said police "morale is high" but the conviction rate for serious crimes is just 5%.

"There has been an impact from the operation, but if we don't sustain it, we are in trouble," said Mr. Memon.

Research by The Wall Street Journal, based on conversations with security officials and urban planners, shows TTP still control or dominate about 470 square miles of Karachi, or nearly a third of its area, where at least 2.5 million people live.

TTP's sway in Karachi extends right up to Saddar—the city center—and into areas such as Sultanabad, a ramshackle community next to the new U.S. Consulate compound.

These are districts with a majority population of Pashtuns, the same ethnic group as TTP's leadership. These areas that encircle the city include Baldia and the Sindh Industrial Trading Estate to the west and Gadap in the north. Residents in these areas said TTP's hold had gotten stronger over the past year.

 

[shuntmaster]

History of the Taliban
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Taliban emerged as a resistance movement aiming to eject the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. With the United States and Pakistan providing considerable financial and military support, the Afghan Mujahideen were able to inflict heavy losses on the Soviet troops. According to The New York Times, the Soviet Union lost about 15,000 soldiers in Afghanistan. In 1989, the Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan, and the Afghan Mujahideen, under the leadership of Ahmed Shah Massoud, surrounded the Afghan capital, Kabul, and took over the rule three years after the departure of the Soviets. The Afghan government that was backed by the Soviet Union and led by President Sayid Mohammed Najibullah was subsequently overthrown. The Mujahideen alliance forming the new Afghan government, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani as interim president, failed to reach political unity and ended up fighting one another.
The Taliban was one of the Mujahideen factions that formed during the Soviet occupation and the internal fighting in Afghanistan. The Taliban emerged as a powerful movement in late 1994 when Pakistan chose the Taliban to guard a convoy trying to open a trade route from Pakistan to Central Asia. With Pakistan providing weapons, military training, and financial support, the Taliban gained control over several Afghan cities and successfully captured Kabul in September 1996. The Taliban continued to control most of Afghan territories with intermittent fighting with Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance, led by Ahmed Shah Massoud, the former defense minister under the coalition government led by President Burhanuddin Rabbani. Pakistani support for the Taliban is based on strong religious and ethnic bonds between the Taliban and Pakistan, especially with the tribal areas on the North-West borders of Pakistan. Most of the Taliban’s leaders were educated in refugee camps in Pakistan where they had escaped the Soviet invasion. Taliban militants are Sunni Muslim Pashtuns, and Pashtuns constitute thirteen percent of the total population of Pakistan. Pashtuns dominate the Pakistani military and are concentrated in the North-West Frontier province, which was the command center for the Mujahedeen groups fighting the Soviet troops and a major destination for the Afghan refugees.
Following a public condemnation of the Saudi monarchy for allowing U.S. troops to enter and operate in Saudi Arabia, Osama Bin Laden moved to Sudan and eventually, in 1996, to Afghanistan, where he had fought against the Soviet troops and where he was warmly welcomed by the Taliban and its top leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar. As the Afghan Taliban had allowed Bin Laden to recruit militants and run training camps, the United Nations Security Council passed two resolutions UNSCR 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000), asking the Taliban to cease its support for terrorism and hand over Bin Laden. The Taliban took no action to end Bin Laden’s training activities and recruitment of militants and displayed no positive response to the Security Council resolutions. After the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001, the United States asked the Taliban to turn over Bin Laden. The Taliban refused to hand over Bin Laden and ignored the U.S. demands, and the United States, in response, bombed Taliban’s strategic military sites in Afghanistan. Consequently, the Taliban lost control over the Afghan Capital, Kabul, and was completely routed in December 9, 2001. Five days after September 11, 2001, Pakistan's president, General Pervez Musharraf,

pledged support for The U.S. efforts to capture Bin Laden and fight militant groups and all the Taliban members associated with Al Qaeda, a pledge that was followed by immediate demonstrations and protests by the pro-Taliban groups in Pakistan, where Taliban’s leaders were educated and where they fled the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan. Despite the pledge to fight Taliban and Al Qaeda, having such religious, ethnic, and political ties with Taliban, and being uncertain about an immediate severing of the momentum in the multifaceted and historical ties with the Taliban have pushed the Pakistani military and Musharraf's regime to avoid provocation of the Taliban fighters. Thus, the Taliban leaders, who survived the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan and the combat against the NATO troops in 2001, went back to Pakistan, precisely to the tribal areas where their Pashtun brothers reside, and namely to the North- West borders of Pakistan.
The United States moved to Iraq in 2003 and directed its military force on Iraq, and the Taliban, operating from southern Afghanistan and North-West Pakistan, namely Waziristan, started to regroup and carry out several deadly attacks against the U.S. led coalition in Afghanistan. The attacks against the U.S. troops continued to increase and the year 2006 was the deadliest year of fighting between the NATO troops and the Taliban since the 2001 war. Noticing the increasing attacks by the Taliban, NATO deployed about 40,000 troops in southern Afghanistan and launched a large operation against the Taliban militants operating in southern Afghanistan and along the borders with North-West Pakistan. Following the NATO operation, the Taliban lost its last stronghold on Afghan soil, and most of the Taliban fighters in Afghanistan were killed. Recognizing NATO strength and losing a large number of its fighters and more importantly its strategic base of command in southern Afghanistan, Taliban moved to Pakistan, specifically to Waziristan, where they were welcomed by their Pashtun brothers .
In 2003, the Pakistani government had intervened to contain and counter the Taliban’s expansion and influence and deployed a total of 80,000 troops in South and North Waziristan. After several confrontations with the Taliban militants and the loss of eight hundred Pakistani soldiers in combat, the Pakistani government and President Pervez Mushrraf realized that military confrontation of Taliban could further destabilize the country. Accordingly, in September 2006, Musharraf signed a peace agreement with seven militant groups in Waziristan, who call themselves Pakistan Taliban or Tehrik-i-Taliban. Under the terms of the agreement, Pakistan's army agreed to withdraw from the areas controlled by the Taliban in Waziristan, and the Taliban promised to stop launching attacks against NATO and Afghan troops in Afghanistan and against Pakistani army and government. Please, click to watch the about the peace deals with the militants.
The peace agreement with the Taliban fell apart when the Pakistani army intervened and laid siege to the Islamabad Red Mosque whose students and religious leaders had launched a campaign, accompanied by kidnappings and violence, to establish and impose Shariah Law in Islamabad. When negotiations between government officials and Mosque leaders failed, the Pakistani army attacked the mosque, leaving about one hundred people dead. The raid of the Red Mosque triggered a series of violent attacks against the Pakistani government because the Mosque and its leader, Maulana Abdul Aziz, have close religious ties with the Taliban. Both Maulana Abdul Aziz and Taliban want to establish Shariah Law in Pakistan. The Taliban cancelled its cease-fire agreement with Musharraf government in September 2006 and carried out several suicide bombings against government officials and security offices. The suicide attack against the regional office of the Pakistani Federal Investigation Agency in Lahore and the assassination attempt carried out against the former Interior Minister, Aftab Khan Sherpao, are the two major attacks that came after the Red Mosque incidence.
While the Taliban has rescinded the cease-fire agreement with Musharraf and carried out several deadly attacks against civilians and government officials, the power conflict between Mushrraf and opposition leaders, especially the former Pakistani Prime Ministers, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, has intensified. In September 2007, Musharraf and his government deported Sharif hours after his arrival in Islamabad although Pakistan’s Supreme Court ruled that Nawaz Sharif could return to Pakistan, Sharif was allowed to return to Pakistan until November 23, 2007. In March 2007, President Musharraf suspended Chief Justice Iftakar Mohammed Chaudhry, which led to demonstrations by supporters of Chaudhry and violent clashes with the Pakistani police. In May 2007, thirty nine people were killed in Karachi as a result of bloody clashes between supporters of Chaudhry and those supporting the government. In November 2007, Musharraf declared a state of emergency and suspended Pakistan's constitution, and at least five hundred opposition members were arrested. Consequently, thousands of lawyers led demonstrations to protest the emergency rule, and about seven hundred lawyers were arrested by the police. Musharraf did not lift the state of emergency and restore the Constitution until December 14, 2007. Musharraf stepped down as army chief in November 28, 2007 and announced that the parliamentary elections would take place in January 2008. As the country seemed to be healing, Benazir Bhutto was killed in a suicide attack in December 2007 at a campaign rally in Rawalpindi. The killing of Benazir Bhutto triggered violent riots by her supporters, who accused the government of being involved in Benazir’s death..

Strategic Depth – Pakistan’s Defense Doctrine



Amber Aziz

Pakistan in order to gain strategic depth helped America during Afghan war but as this war ended Pakistan remained all alone to bear its consequences. After Afghan war Pakistan was left with more than 3 million refugees to care for, thousands of madrassas funded by foreign money (Saudi Arabia) where youth was recruited to get training for militant activities, a Kalashnikov culture and the drug trade especially in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) which also became heaven for the militant outfits. This was due to the flawed strategic depth doctrine, which was adopted without realizing the long term effects that it would have on Pakistan’s society, culture and survival as a nation state. After 9/11 the situation has further complicated, now Pakistan is fighting against the same militants who were once trained by her incorporation with CIA. Moreover, increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is creating even more security concerns for Pakistan.

The way Pakistan’s defense policy evolved was thoroughly circumstantial. Before independence Pakistan armed forces were an integrated part of the Indian defense establishment. The style with which Britishers raised armed forces was imperial in nature as they were not accountable to the people of united India but to the foreigners and this imperial nature of armed forces remain intact even after independence. Likewise Sub continent’s defense always remained as an indivisible whole for the strategic planners even after independence defense remained top priority. After partition Pakistan remained in the perpetual state of insecurity obviously because of the hegemonic pressures from neighbors like India.That is why immediately after independence armed forces got heavy favour form Pakistan’s polity, thus making civilian contribution in policy making a farfetched idea.Therefore in Pakistan’s geostrategic realities, neighboring countries like India it was natural that no re-evaluation of the defense policy may take place and the internal balance of Pakistan drifted towards the armed forces.

In May 1976 first white paper was published explaining the higher defense organization (HDO). The main tasks of HDO are: Bringing the policy making process under the political direction, ensuring the development and growth of defense institutions, harmonizing the coordination between various agencies and groups to ensure smooth functioning of the entire setup. HDO actually consists of three major sections namely Defense Committee of Cabinet (DCC), Defense Council (DC) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC). DCC is actually the empowered and responsible body when it comes to the policy framing rather than the two other institutions which are advisory in nature. DCC is headed by the prime minister and its permanent members are Defense, Foreign, Interior and Finance Ministers. Originally DCC should have the final word but with the creation of National Security Council through an act of Parliament the authority of DCC have been bypassed. As in NSC services chiefs sits as a permanent stakeholder along with the premier who actually should be considered commander in chief. Today the need of time is that DCC should also be strengthened as a policymaking body and should be freed of powerful shadow of NSC.

While DC is being chaired by the Defense Minister, JCSC comprises of three services chiefs and a chairman of the committee. JCSC is a very important platform but the unfortunate fact is that its chairman has no executive authority over the services, now keeping in view the present condition of the country and India’s Cold Start Doctrine as well it is very much necessary that there should be greater integration and coordination between all the three services and JCSC should be empowered with some decisive capacities. Therefore it is very much important that the true spirit of HOD should be restored as it is very important for the strategic development and growth of the country’s defense and a lasting policy making system.

In Pakistan’s National security policy Nuclear weapons have played a very important role in defense and deterrence strategy. As mentioned above like Pakistan’s defense doctrine, Pakistan’s nuclear program-its strategic doctrine, is also outcome of a reaction to India’s nuclear program. India is secure in its own strength and they are fully conscious of it, they are in stronger position than Pakistan materially, economically and diplomatically therefore it is necessary for Pakistan not to lower its defensive measures. Two confrontations with the Indians at Kargil and heavy deployment of Indian troops at our borders have reinforced belief in our deterrence capacity.

Pakistan’s military have always focused on the creation of strategic depth against India and have looked towards Afghanistan and Central Asian Republics for this reason. This was one of the reasons for Pakistan to assist Afghanistan during the Russian invasion and maintain cordial relations with the Taliban regime. Pakistan adopted this doctrine of strategic depth during Zia-ul-Haq’s regime. Afterwards Nawaz Sharif extended the same policy by recognizing Taliban regime in May 1997 in return of which Taliban gave all possible security considerations to Pakistan that is why during 1990’s Pakistan made effective use of Militants, terrorists and other non-state actors especially in Kashmir against India. This was actually the golden period in application of the strategic depth doctrine but alas as Hassan Abbas writes:

“No one could have guessed it then, but the onset of the Afghan war was the most fateful dagger driven into the heart of Pakistan”

Pakistan in order to gain strategic depth helped America during Afghan war but as this war ended Pakistan remained all alone to bear its consequences. After Afghan war Pakistan was left with more than 3 million refugees to care for, thousands of madrassas funded by foreign money (Saudi Arabia) where youth was recruited to get training for militant activities, a Kalashnikov culture and the drug trade especially in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) which also became heaven for the militant outfits. This was due to the flawed strategic depth doctrine, which was adopted without realizing the long term effects that it would have on Pakistan’s society, culture and survival as a nation state. After 9/11 the situation has further complicated, now Pakistan is fighting against the same militants who were once trained by her incorporation with CIA. Moreover, increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is creating even more security concerns for Pakistan. As Dr A.Z Hilali writes:

“According to Michael Scheuer (former chief of CIA) , policy makers of Pakistan believe that India’s expensive, extensive and growing Afghan presence is a direct and even existential threat to Pakistan and after the incident of 9/11 this area of strategic depth has been transformed into a second military frontier with India”

India is effectively pursuing its long term policy of ‘strategic encirclement’ of Pakistan but unfortunately in response to it Pakistan does not have effective counter diplomatic and security policy towards Afghanistan. Therefore it is very much evident that Pakistan’s security policy towards Afghanistan needs to be reviewed as this idea of strategic depth have failed badly andnow ultimately the policy makers should realize that no strategic arrangement can be fruitful if it is based on country’s compromise of sovereignty.

1. Majority of Pakistanis want Sharia. Only problem is, they are not in agreement in what kind of Sharia they want. Taliban is clear on their interpretation of Sharia and claim that it is the purest and most Islamic as it can be.

2. Originally, Taliban were indeed from the Afghan Pashtuns, but their origins were in the Madrasas in Pakistani side of the border. Pakistan's ISI was very active in formation of Taliban from the Pashtun remnants of the Anti-soviet Mujaheddin. Ex-DG of ISI, Rtd. Gen. Hamid Gul is called the 'Father of Taliban' for some reason. Taliban was formed during Gen. Gul's tenure in ISI.

3. Originally the Afghans were not hostile to Pakistan. The non-Taliban/non-Pashtun Afghans only became hostile after Pakistan imposed the Taliban in their country and actively aided the Taliban regime in Kabul. The Pakistani establishment foisted the Taliban regime in Afghanistan for their own selfish goal of strengthening their doctrine of 'Strategic Depth' and not with the intention of doing good for Afghanistan/Afghans. Pakistan didn't care regarding what the ordinary Afghans wanted or felt, especially that of non-Pashtun ethnicity's in Afghanistan.

What Pakistan started as an instrument of Strategic depth in Afghanistan, has now morphed into Pashtun Pan-nationalism and has come to bite Pakistan in the back...

 

[shuntmaster]

Nobody had even heard of Taliban during the Regan era. There were the pan-Afghan mujahedeen coming from all ethnicity's of Afghanistan and few Jihadis from the Muslim ummah. The Taliban were created by the ISI much after the end of the soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The people who formed the taliban were predominantly from the Pastun tribes and many of them were mujahedeen veterans from the war against the soviets, who fought against the former mujahedeen to seize control of Afghanistan in order to give Pakistan the strategic depth is wanted in Afghanistan.

The Mujahedeen that CIA was instrumental in creation, were a Afghan nationalist freedom fighting militia, consisting of all ethnicities. The Taliban that ISI created was an radicalised Islamist militia consisting mostly of Pastun tribesmen, some veterans of anti-soviet mujahedeen force. There is a big difference between the two.

 

[batmannow]

Nobody had even heard of Taliban during the Regan era. There were the pan-Afghan mujahedeen coming from all ethnicity's of Afghanistan and few Jihadis from the Muslim ummah. The Taliban were created by the ISI much after the end of the soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The people who formed the taliban were predominantly from the Pastun tribes and many of them were mujahedeen veterans from the war against the soviets, who fought against the former mujahedeen to seize control of Afghanistan in order to give Pakistan the strategic depth is wanted in Afghanistan.

The Mujahedeen that CIA was instrumental in creation, were a Afghan nationalist freedom fighting militia, consisting of all ethnicities. The Taliban that ISI created was an radicalised Islamist militia consisting mostly of Pastun tribesmen, some veterans of anti-soviet mujahedeen force. There is a big difference between the two.

prove it, genious TALIBANS created by ISI?
lets see what you got, special doccuments from GOP? no?ohh its just your own twisted brians?lolzz

 

[shuntmaster]

prove it, genious TALIBANS created by ISI?
lets see what you got, special doccuments from GOP? no?ohh its just your own twisted brians?lolzz

Hamid Gul
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Lieutenant-General Hamid Gul (Urdū:حمید گل; born 20 November 1936) HI(M), SBt, is a retired high-ranking general officer in the Pakistan Army, and a former spymaster famous for serving as the Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan's premier intelligenceagency, between 1987 and 1989 during the late stages of and post-stages of the Soviet war in Afghanistan.
Gul is widely known and credited for pressing the hard-line policies on India after starting the insurgency in Kashmir against India in 1989 by diverting the Mujahideen who participated in the Soviet war to Indian-held Kashmir. Gul was also instrumental in the establishment of theTaliban and was once known as the "father of the Taliban". Apart from the Kashmir militancy in India and the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, Gul is also accused by the United States of having ties to Islamic terrorist organisations such as the Al Qaeda.
Gul's tenure as the director of the ISI coincided with Benazir Bhutto's term as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Later, Gul established the Islamic

 

[batmannow]

Hamid Gul
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
View attachment 17749
Lieutenant-General Hamid Gul (Urdū:حمید گل; born 20 November 1936) HI(M), SBt, is a retired high-ranking general officer in the Pakistan Army, and a former spymaster famous for serving as the Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan's premier intelligenceagency, between 1987 and 1989 during the late stages of and post-stages of the Soviet war in Afghanistan.
Gul is widely known and credited for pressing the hard-line policies on India after starting the insurgency in Kashmir against India in 1989 by diverting the Mujahideen who participated in the Soviet war to Indian-held Kashmir. Gul was also instrumental in the establishment of theTaliban and was once known as the "father of the Taliban". Apart from the Kashmir militancy in India and the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, Gul is also accused by the United States of having ties to Islamic terrorist organisations such as the Al Qaeda.
Gul's tenure as the director of the ISI coincided with Benazir Bhutto's term as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Later, Gul established the Islamic

call the mods, as them,this wikkipedia is not acceptable on PDF, now bring the official proves or shut up?

 

[Cyberian]

No one created Taliban.

Taliban was a phenomenon that came into existence in response to the 50,000 deaths and countless rapes that occurred in Afghanistan at the hand of Northern Alliance.

While the people of Afghanistan endured this suffering, the world was too distracted with events in Iraq and Bosnia and did not care. However, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, under severe economic and military sanctions at that time, was still there with the Afghan people. The same is true today and it'll be the same tomorrow Insha'Allah.

 

[batmannow]

No one created Taliban.

Taliban was a phenomenon that came into existence in response to the 50,000 deaths and countless rapes that occurred in Afghanistan at the hand of Northern Alliance.

While the people of Afghanistan endured this suffering, the world was too distracted with events in Iraq and Bosnia and did not care. However, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, under severe economic and military sanctions at that time, was still there with the Afghan people. The same is true today and it'll be the same tomorrow Insha'Allah.

northern alliance was not before TALIBANs , it was after when talaibans had thier control on most of afghanistan? idiot?lolzzz

 

[darkinsky]

Benazir created Taliban in 1996 with help of CIA and saudies

benazir era you may say, it was created in benazir era after many years of planning and resources, its like saying that nawaz shareef tested pakistani nukes, where as the founder of nuke program was some one else

 

[shuntmaster]

call the mods, as them,this wikkipedia is not acceptable on PDF, now bring the official proves or shut up?

The Pakistani Godfather: The Inter-Services Intelligence and the Afghan Taliban 1994-2010
by Adrian Hänni and Lukas Hegi

Abstract

Alongside the Americans, Pakistan plays a key role in the "war against terrorism" and against the insurgents in Afghanistan. The country receives huge financial and military aid. Nevertheless, this support could not improve the situation in Afghanistan. Quite to the contrary. nine years after the American invasion, the Taliban are stronger than ever. At any time, they can strike almost anywhere in Afghanistan. Therefore, the question is whether the money just evaporates ineffectively in a mire of corruption and inefficient administration, or whether Pakistan is playing a double game with its allies, thereby systematically aggravating the instability in its neighbouring state in order to protect its own interests.

The aim of the present study is to gather facts and disclose links that demonstrate the kind of game the Pakistani government is playing with the West, with its intelligence service supporting the Taliban on a grand scale. It also demonstrates the naivety of a superpower that allows an alleged ally to receive billions of dollars, with which Pakistan amongst other things financed groups that kill American soldiers almost on a daily basis. It also uses the money to expand its control over the insurgents in Afghanistan and undermines initiatives for a peaceful solution to the conflict.

After a historical summary highlighting the close connection between the Pakistani intelligence agency ISI with the Taliban since their emergence in the mid-90s, the arrest of an influential Taliban leader is used as an example to demonstrate the effrontery with which the Pakistanis are playing their game. The rivalry with its neighbour, India, and the consequent desire for strategic depth as well as the absolute will to control the Pashtun tribal areas emerge as constant strategic guidelines.

The Taliban: From Their Emergence to Their Coming Into Power In Kabul (1994-1996)

When the Taliban first arrived to Southern Afghanistan in November 1994, their ideology fell on fertile soil. More than 15 years of war had left their mark on the country. The constant interference of foreign powers proved to be particularly fatal. Specifically, the unequal treatment during the resistance against the Soviet occupation (1979-1989) had increased the mistrust among the tribes and ethnic groups. The United States and Saudi Arabia, amongst others, had given around ten billion dollars of subsidies to the mujahedeen in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. These funds were distributed with the help of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The ISI preferred the Pashtun tribes around Peshawar. They were therefore systematically given preferential treatment in the distribution of weapons and money by the Americans. Conversely, Pakistan regarded the south of Afghanistan around Kandahar as backward and the Durrani Pashtuns dominating the area at the time as untrustworthy.
The clashes between various factions and warlords in late 1994 had led to the disappearance of the old and more moderate leadership, and thus left room for the Taliban extremists. The whole country was divided among various warlords, forming and dissolving alliances as they pleased. In order to finance their war, the warlords exploited the population, cut down almost all forests and sold anything that wasn't nailed down. The on-going insecurity in turn called the truck mafia into action, which was operating from the Pakistani city of Quetta and from Kandahar. The fragmentation of the southern Afghan territory by many local warlords led to a serious restriction of their activities.
Although the exact origin of the Taliban movement is controversial and shrouded in myth, we can be certain that the above-mentioned situation - lawlessness and lack of leadership - has paved the way for this radical movement. The Taliban still had to manage without the support of the ISI, which at that time was backing Hekmatyar's Hizb-i Islami. However, in 1994, the defeat and the loss of prestige of Hekmatyar was becoming apparent, and Pakistan began to look for a new deputy. Then there was the desire of the new Pakistani Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, to open a trade route to Central Asia as quickly as possible. Because of the fighting around the capital, the northern route via Kabul to Mazar-i-Sharif and on to Uzbekistan was impassable. Therefore, the idea to open the route via the southern part of the ring road from Quetta via Kandahar to Herat and on to Ashgabat established itself. The plan aroused the suspicions of the local princes, who feared Pakistan might be preparing a military invasion of the eastern neighbours.
The first battle between Taliban and Hekmatyar fighters began in mid-October 1994. At Spin Baldak on the Afghan-Pakistani border, the Taliban overran a garrison of Hekmatyar. With the consent of Pakistan they then conquered a vast weapons and ammunition depot, built by the ISI. Consequently, the Taliban were able to continue fighting for quite some time. In addition, the Pakistanis had the opportunity to hide their support for the Taliban. This action can still be viewed as tolerated by Pakistan, but anything that happened after November 3rd must be considered active help. On this day, Taliban marched out at the request of the Pakistani to free a convoy detained by southern Afghan warlords. Shortly thereafter, they went on to take Kandahar. Already at that time, foreign diplomats were speculating that the Taliban were operating with the covert support of Pakistan. At the same time, the Pakistani Interior Minister Babar boasted the success of "his boys". However, the Taliban continued to try to demonstrate their independence and to resist the Pakistani influence.
While to many the origins of the Taliban still appeared mysterious, by the end of year, some sources were "concerned that the GOP [Government of Pakistan] (ISI) is deeply involved in the Taliban takeover in Kandahar and Qalat." The same source also expressed concern that the influence of the unpopular Pakistanis in the south could further destabilise the country and sooner or later lead to an Afghan-Pakistani conflict. Meanwhile, the Taliban continued their conquest of Afghanistan and marched north.
Pakistan was still putting its eggs into two baskets: On the one hand there were the Taliban, who had contributed to the opening of smuggling routes in the south, and on the other hand there was Hekmatyar and his Hizb-i Islami, who were exerting pressure on the government in Kabul. Whether it was a double game of the ISI, or whether the simultaneous support of both Afghan factions rather represents a power struggle between the civilian government of Benazir Bhutto and the ISI is unclear. In the second case, the support for the Taliban came firstly from the Home Office and its director Nasrullah Babar, while the ISI and the army still supported Hekmatyr, who was, however, involved in a gruelling two-front war. In mid-February the religious students coming from the south had taken over his headquarters. They opened the roads to Kabul and made possible the supply of the city after the long siege. Thus, the Taliban gained great sympathy among the population, but also satisfied a key demand of the transport mafia.
After Hekmatyar and his Hizb-i-Islami had been the Crown Prince of the ISI for a long time and had enjoyed generous support, the relationship between Pakistan and the Taliban in early 1995 changed radically: "at around this time the weight of opinion within the upper echelons of the ISI – (…) – now began to swing towards the Taliban. While in late 1994 Babar appears to have been the leading voice in the Islamabad establishment propounding the student's cause, by January the ISI was taking a growing interest." During that time, Taliban warfare also changed dramatically. This may reflect the fact that the former Afghan Defence Minister Tanai was reactivating his still existing network of connections to other officers of the communist regime. "None of this could have been done without permission, if not active encouragement, from the ISI itself."
After their rapid initial successes, in the first half of 1995 the Taliban suffered some heavy defeats. Ahmed Shah Massoud and his fighters drove them from the area in front of Kabul, and in the West, they had to desist from their attacks on Herat, after Ismael Khan had received support from Massoud, who had had the Taliban bombarded for several days. However, a poorly planned offensive of Khan against the weakened Taliban ended in a disastrous defeat and the final loss of Herat. The defeat, however, seems not only to have been due to poor planning. Western intelligence services suspected "infusions of well-trained re-inforcement and new weapons - now supported by a functioning logistics machine". Following this, riots broke out in Kabul. A mob attacked the Pakistani embassy and killed an employee. Thus the relations between the two countries hit rock bottom. Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani accused Pakistan openly of trying to oust him with help of the Taliban.The Pakistanis were not very cautious and openly admitted to supporting the Taliban in front of the Americans. The Pakistani ambassador defended himself saying "that in the wake of last months’ sacking of the Pak embassy in Kabul, GOP Afghan policy has been increasingly driven by intense domestic opposition towards Afghanistan."
In March 1996, Pashtun scholars came together for a large gathering. The discussions on the future of Afghanistan "were conducted in strictest secrecy, and all foreigners were expelled from Kandahar for this time. Pakistani officials, however, were present to monitor the Shura, including Qazi Humayun, Pakistan's ambassador in Kabul, and several ISI officials, including Colonel Imam, Pakistan's consul general in Herat." The meeting had been convened as a result of the stalemate between the Afghan factions. Rabbani's position had been consolidated and his prestige abroad increased. Consequently, Pakistan tried to forge an alliance against Rabbani with Hekmatyar, the warlord Rashid Dostum and the leaders of the Jalalabad Shura, but this was categorically rejected by the Taliban.The regional powers feared the consequences of Afghanistan dominated by the Islamist Taliban and gave massive support to Rabbani and Massoud. In return, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia increased their support for the Taliban.
True to the motto "the enemy of my enemy is my friend", Bhutto even tried to convince the U.S., which had an interest in curbing Iran, to support the Taliban. The United States declined, but also the Taliban refused to continue cooperating with other warlords. Yet the Taliban managed to convince Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to support them again. Riyadh and Islamabad had reached an agreement with them. In late September, the Taliban led a surprise attack on Jalalabad and overran it. At the same time, Pakistan let hundreds of gunmen enter unmolested across the borders into Afghanistan. The Taliban lost no time and continued their advance towards the capital from an easterly direction. A month after the attack on Jalalabad the first pickups with Taliban had already reached the streets of Kabul. The pro-government troops fled and Massoud also ordered a retreat for his troops. One of the first acts of the Taliban in Kabul was the execution of former President Najibullah, whose battered body they then put on display in the streets of Kabul.
Taking Kabul didn't mean the end of the war. The formerly warring warlords pulled together to form a new Alliance to defend Afghanistan against the Taliban. Massoud decided to make a full-scale attack on the scattered Taliban forces and advanced as far as Bagram. The success of the Taliban seemed seriously threatened. As a consequence, Pakistan again let thousands of 'volunteers' cross the border area of Pakistan into Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban. This enabled the militia of Mullah Omar to launch a new offensive and recover the lost territories.
The way was paved for the Taliban, and the prevailing lawlessness and lack of leadership since the departure of the Soviets have certainly increased their acceptance in parts of the population. However, their success is down to more than just this. In addition to these pull factors a number of push factors have played their part. This includes logistics, enabling the Taliban to carry out their operations equipped with enough weapons and ammunition. They also had enough fighters as new religious students from the Pakistani madrassas could enter the country unimpeded at all times. Furthermore, indoctrination and training played a crucial role. The Taliban broke up the deadlock with mobile warfare and relatively quickly caused large shifts in territorial ownership. Mobile warfare was made possible because the Taliban had large numbers of vehicles (mainly white Toyota pick-ups) and sufficient communication infrastructure available. This included a mobile communications network and a wireless network for the Taliban leaders, both of which had been set up by Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan had roads, the Kandahar Airfield and fighter jets for the Taliban repaired. They could also benefit from the experience of former officers of the communist army. These had been reactivated through the network of former Defence Minister Tanai, who had found refuge in Pakistan after a failed coup against Najibullah, which had most likely been supported by Pakistan in the first place. But corruption and the effects of money are also not to be underestimated. Many field commanders quite simply let themselves be bought. In any case, the substantial backing from Pakistan has significantly promoted the rapid advance and the takeover of Kabul by the Taliban.

The Taliban in Power in Kabul (1996-2001)
The support of the Taliban by the Pakistani government and the ISI continued after the gang around Mullah Omar took Kabul in September 1996 and overthrew the Tajik-dominated government of Rabbani and Massoud. Abdul Salam Saif, the Taliban ambassador in Pakistan, wrote what previously was the only detailed inside account of the movement, in which he describes in detail how he was inundated with offers from the Pakistani intelligence officials.The ISI continued pumping money, weapons and advisers into Afghanistan to help the Taliban win against the Northern Alliance. In addition, Pakistan provided diplomatic support, organised training for Taliban fighters, some of whom it had itself recruited, planned and commanded offensives, delivered ammunition and fuel and on several occasions apparently got directly involved in combat support. Undoubtedly, the Pakistani army and intelligence agencies, with the ISI at the forefront, made a vital contribution to the Taliban becoming a highly effective military force. The covert support of the Taliban by the ISI came from the corps headquarters in Peshawar. To give an example: a contact person deemed trustworthy by the U.S. consulate in Peshawar in October 1996 reported the border crossing from Pakistan into Afghanistan of an ISI convoy, consisting of 30-35 ISI trucks and 15-20 fuel trucks, at Torkham.The ISI itself in late 1996 estimated the total Pakistani aid to the Taliban to be as high as 20 million rupees.A number that may well be set too low. Two years later, a Pakistani source of the U.S. State Department put the support of the Pakistani government for the Taliban at "about a million dollars every few months".
According to a 2001 report by Human Rights Watch, the first direct military contacts between the Afghanistan office of the ISI and the Taliban after they seized power was established by sending a small team of Pakistani military advisers to the former stronghold of the Afghan army in Rishikor. The base in Rishikor, southwest of Kabul, was subsequently used as the main training centre for Pakistani volunteers, who had been carted off to fight for the Taliban in Afghanistan. No later than 1999, the accommodation of the Pakistani military and intelligence personnel were in a guarded area within the camp. According to a DIA-report, Pakistani religious students also received military training at Kandahar and Herat. There, a combination of members of Pakistan's Frontier Corps (FC), staff of the Najibullah era, as well as former supporters of the Wahhabi warlord, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, and the long-standing ISI protégé Hekmatyar provided training. This use of Pakistan's Frontier Corps was apparently not an isolated case. In addition to the training of fighters, company-size FC elements in Afghanistan were also used for command and control tasks and, if necessary, for fighting action itself. The reason for the use of the FC was that its units, as opposed to those of the Punjabi-dominated army, were completely or at least predominantly composed of Pashtuns. This represents the Taliban and the people in the South of Afghanistan.
Also by supplying fuel and ammunition, the ISI was trying to consolidate its influence on the Taliban operations.Here, the intelligence service based its actions on the system which it had set up during the Soviet occupation to control the military operations of its Afghan deputies. According to this system, large amounts of ammunition and fuel were made available to the Taliban commanders only when an operation has been approved by the ISI and the Pakistani military. The fact that the Taliban weren't happy with this system meant that they began looking for alternative arms suppliers, which is why soon private actors began to be involved in arms trade with the Taliban, too. A private offer was available particularly because the Bhutto government in 1994 had fired dozens of ISI officers, some of which with ties to the Taliban. Some of these officers had then founded their own import-export firms or participated in existing companies that were organising large private security and import-export-led operations. Thanks to these new business relations as well as their old Taliban connections, the ex-ISI officers now acted as weapons suppliers to Afghanistan.
After General Pervez Musharraf had come to power by an army coup in 1999, he increased the Pakistani support for the Taliban. Musharraf publicly declared that Pakistan's strategic interests lie in supporting the Afghan Pashtuns, whom he associated solely with the Taliban. The new ruler then went on to say that: "This is our national interest […] the Taliban can not be alienated by Pakistan. We have a national security interest here […]”. Apart from army chief Musharraf, the power within the military junta lay in particular with three hard-line generals who had made the decisive coup of 1999: Mahmoud Ahmad, Mohammed Aziz and Muzaffar Usmani. All three were passionate supporters of Islamic fundamentalist parties and the Taliban. Aziz, Director of Covert Operations in the ISI in the late 1990s served as the main organiser behind the military victories of the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. Ahmad - nota bene one of the most vocal supporters of the Taliban within the regime - in his function as ISI chief practically made the foreign policy of Pakistan. Thus, the U.S. State Department concluded in September 2000: "While Pakistani support for the Taliban has been long-standing, the magnitude of recent support is unprecedented.” The Clinton Administration at that time also appeared increasingly concerned that the direct participation of Pakistan in Taliban military operations had become more and more frequent in recent months, and that Pakistani military personnel had taken a more active role in the fighting. Towards the end of the year 2000, Pakistani aircraft helped Taliban forces with troop rotations during combat operations & staff of the ISI as well as of the army were involved directly in the planning of major military operations of the Taliban. In November 2000, UN General Secretary Kofi Annan Pakistan accused them at least implicitly of providing such support. Thus, the UN Security Council in January 2001 finally imposed sanctions against the regime in Kabul, which were aimed directly at getting it to stop the Pakistani weapons deliveries to the Taliban. But apparently, the sanctions missed their effect, for an intelligence dossier stating that Pakistan was circumventing the UN sanctions by continuing to deliver fuel and other goods to the Taliban was presented to the Security Council by both Russia and France. In April and May 2001, a few months before September the 11th, 30 ISI trucks were still crossing the Pakistani border into Afghanistan every day - the same number that the U.S. consulate in Peshawar in October 1996 had reported immediately after the coming into power of the Taliban. Some of these convoys were equipped with artillery shells, tank ammunition and anti-tank missiles.
The intentions and actions of Pakistan regarding the Taliban immediately after the terrorist attacks of September the 11th 2001 can not yet be conclusively assessed due to the few and contradictory sources. What is certain, however, is that the Pakistani military regime in accordance with its longstanding Taliban policy tried to persuade the U.S. to refrain from a military campaign against the Taliban, or at least limit it to air strikes, and to negotiate with the government in Kabul to find a solution. ISI director and de facto Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ahmad tried to convince U.S. Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin that the aim of the United States of eliminating Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda could best be achieved by forcing the Taliban to do it themselves: "[…] it is better for the Afghans to do it. We could avoid the fallout. If the Taliban are eliminated […] Afghanistan will revert to warlordism.” In September 2001, Ahmad not only met with many members of the Bush administration, but also twice with Mullah Omar in Kandahar. The question of whether or not at that time he made a last-minute attempt to get the Taliban to extradite Osama bin Laden after all, whether, as the U.S. State Department believed, this was merely a delay tactic, as claimed by Ahmed Rashid, or whether, quite to the contrary, Ahmad Mullah Omar encouraged them to brave an American attack rather than turn in Bin Laden, as is claimed by leaks to the CIA, must be left unanswered due to contradictory source material. In any case, during the ensuing Operation Enduring Freedom, the attack by the US-led coalition on the Taliban government, the ISI played a great double game. On the one hand, Pakistan officially made a U-turn, presenting itself as a close U.S. ally in the "war against terrorism" and accepting the "seven points" of the U.S. government, pledging to stop supporting the Taliban and, explicitly, promising to stop all supplies of fuel as well as any other goods and to cancel the transport of weapons and fighters into Afghanistan. On the other hand, and with the consent of Musharraf the ISI continued providing the Taliban with weapons, ammunition and fuel. As before, ISI trucks were rolling into Afghanistan on a daily basis. In addition, dozens of members of the Frontier Corps and ISI officers remained in Afghanistan to assist the Taliban in their defence. CIA agent Gary Berntsen realised "from the beginning of the conflict that ISI advisers were supporting the Taliban with expertise and material [...]".This double game was to shape and Pakistan's Taliban policy after the expulsion of Mullah Omar's gang from Afghanistan and continues to do so to this day.

 

[batmannow]

The Pakistani Godfather: The Inter-Services Intelligence and the Afghan Taliban 1994-2010
by Adrian Hänni and Lukas Hegi
Abstract

Alongside the Americans, Pakistan plays a key role in the "war against terrorism" and against the insurgents in Afghanistan. The country receives huge financial and military aid. Nevertheless, this support could not improve the situation in Afghanistan. Quite to the contrary. nine years after the American invasion, the Taliban are stronger than ever. At any time, they can strike almost anywhere in Afghanistan. Therefore, the question is whether the money just evaporates ineffectively in a mire of corruption and inefficient administration, or whether Pakistan is playing a double game with its allies, thereby systematically aggravating the instability in its neighbouring state in order to protect its own interests.

The aim of the present study is to gather facts and disclose links that demonstrate the kind of game the Pakistani government is playing with the West, with its intelligence service supporting the Taliban on a grand scale. It also demonstrates the naivety of a superpower that allows an alleged ally to receive billions of dollars, with which Pakistan amongst other things financed groups that kill American soldiers almost on a daily basis. It also uses the money to expand its control over the insurgents in Afghanistan and undermines initiatives for a peaceful solution to the conflict.

After a historical summary highlighting the close connection between the Pakistani intelligence agency ISI with the Taliban since their emergence in the mid-90s, the arrest of an influential Taliban leader is used as an example to demonstrate the effrontery with which the Pakistanis are playing their game. The rivalry with its neighbour, India, and the consequent desire for strategic depth as well as the absolute will to control the Pashtun tribal areas emerge as constant strategic guidelines.

The Taliban: From Their Emergence to Their Coming Into Power In Kabul (1994-1996)

When the Taliban first arrived to Southern Afghanistan in November 1994, their ideology fell on fertile soil. More than 15 years of war had left their mark on the country. The constant interference of foreign powers proved to be particularly fatal. Specifically, the unequal treatment during the resistance against the Soviet occupation (1979-1989) had increased the mistrust among the tribes and ethnic groups. The United States and Saudi Arabia, amongst others, had given around ten billion dollars of subsidies to the mujahedeen in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. These funds were distributed with the help of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The ISI preferred the Pashtun tribes around Peshawar. They were therefore systematically given preferential treatment in the distribution of weapons and money by the Americans. Conversely, Pakistan regarded the south of Afghanistan around Kandahar as backward and the Durrani Pashtuns dominating the area at the time as untrustworthy.
The clashes between various factions and warlords in late 1994 had led to the disappearance of the old and more moderate leadership, and thus left room for the Taliban extremists. The whole country was divided among various warlords, forming and dissolving alliances as they pleased. In order to finance their war, the warlords exploited the population, cut down almost all forests and sold anything that wasn't nailed down. The on-going insecurity in turn called the truck mafia into action, which was operating from the Pakistani city of Quetta and from Kandahar. The fragmentation of the southern Afghan territory by many local warlords led to a serious restriction of their activities.
Although the exact origin of the Taliban movement is controversial and shrouded in myth, we can be certain that the above-mentioned situation - lawlessness and lack of leadership - has paved the way for this radical movement. The Taliban still had to manage without the support of the ISI, which at that time was backing Hekmatyar's Hizb-i Islami. However, in 1994, the defeat and the loss of prestige of Hekmatyar was becoming apparent, and Pakistan began to look for a new deputy. Then there was the desire of the new Pakistani Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, to open a trade route to Central Asia as quickly as possible. Because of the fighting around the capital, the northern route via Kabul to Mazar-i-Sharif and on to Uzbekistan was impassable. Therefore, the idea to open the route via the southern part of the ring road from Quetta via Kandahar to Herat and on to Ashgabat established itself. The plan aroused the suspicions of the local princes, who feared Pakistan might be preparing a military invasion of the eastern neighbours.
The first battle between Taliban and Hekmatyar fighters began in mid-October 1994. At Spin Baldak on the Afghan-Pakistani border, the Taliban overran a garrison of Hekmatyar. With the consent of Pakistan they then conquered a vast weapons and ammunition depot, built by the ISI. Consequently, the Taliban were able to continue fighting for quite some time. In addition, the Pakistanis had the opportunity to hide their support for the Taliban. This action can still be viewed as tolerated by Pakistan, but anything that happened after November 3rd must be considered active help. On this day, Taliban marched out at the request of the Pakistani to free a convoy detained by southern Afghan warlords. Shortly thereafter, they went on to take Kandahar. Already at that time, foreign diplomats were speculating that the Taliban were operating with the covert support of Pakistan. At the same time, the Pakistani Interior Minister Babar boasted the success of "his boys". However, the Taliban continued to try to demonstrate their independence and to resist the Pakistani influence.
While to many the origins of the Taliban still appeared mysterious, by the end of year, some sources were "concerned that the GOP [Government of Pakistan] (ISI) is deeply involved in the Taliban takeover in Kandahar and Qalat." The same source also expressed concern that the influence of the unpopular Pakistanis in the south could further destabilise the country and sooner or later lead to an Afghan-Pakistani conflict. Meanwhile, the Taliban continued their conquest of Afghanistan and marched north.
Pakistan was still putting its eggs into two baskets: On the one hand there were the Taliban, who had contributed to the opening of smuggling routes in the south, and on the other hand there was Hekmatyar and his Hizb-i Islami, who were exerting pressure on the government in Kabul. Whether it was a double game of the ISI, or whether the simultaneous support of both Afghan factions rather represents a power struggle between the civilian government of Benazir Bhutto and the ISI is unclear. In the second case, the support for the Taliban came firstly from the Home Office and its director Nasrullah Babar, while the ISI and the army still supported Hekmatyr, who was, however, involved in a gruelling two-front war. In mid-February the religious students coming from the south had taken over his headquarters. They opened the roads to Kabul and made possible the supply of the city after the long siege. Thus, the Taliban gained great sympathy among the population, but also satisfied a key demand of the transport mafia.
After Hekmatyar and his Hizb-i-Islami had been the Crown Prince of the ISI for a long time and had enjoyed generous support, the relationship between Pakistan and the Taliban in early 1995 changed radically: "at around this time the weight of opinion within the upper echelons of the ISI – (…) – now began to swing towards the Taliban. While in late 1994 Babar appears to have been the leading voice in the Islamabad establishment propounding the student's cause, by January the ISI was taking a growing interest." During that time, Taliban warfare also changed dramatically. This may reflect the fact that the former Afghan Defence Minister Tanai was reactivating his still existing network of connections to other officers of the communist regime. "None of this could have been done without permission, if not active encouragement, from the ISI itself."
After their rapid initial successes, in the first half of 1995 the Taliban suffered some heavy defeats. Ahmed Shah Massoud and his fighters drove them from the area in front of Kabul, and in the West, they had to desist from their attacks on Herat, after Ismael Khan had received support from Massoud, who had had the Taliban bombarded for several days. However, a poorly planned offensive of Khan against the weakened Taliban ended in a disastrous defeat and the final loss of Herat. The defeat, however, seems not only to have been due to poor planning. Western intelligence services suspected "infusions of well-trained re-inforcement and new weapons - now supported by a functioning logistics machine". Following this, riots broke out in Kabul. A mob attacked the Pakistani embassy and killed an employee. Thus the relations between the two countries hit rock bottom. Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani accused Pakistan openly of trying to oust him with help of the Taliban.The Pakistanis were not very cautious and openly admitted to supporting the Taliban in front of the Americans. The Pakistani ambassador defended himself saying "that in the wake of last months’ sacking of the Pak embassy in Kabul, GOP Afghan policy has been increasingly driven by intense domestic opposition towards Afghanistan."
In March 1996, Pashtun scholars came together for a large gathering. The discussions on the future of Afghanistan "were conducted in strictest secrecy, and all foreigners were expelled from Kandahar for this time. Pakistani officials, however, were present to monitor the Shura, including Qazi Humayun, Pakistan's ambassador in Kabul, and several ISI officials, including Colonel Imam, Pakistan's consul general in Herat." The meeting had been convened as a result of the stalemate between the Afghan factions. Rabbani's position had been consolidated and his prestige abroad increased. Consequently, Pakistan tried to forge an alliance against Rabbani with Hekmatyar, the warlord Rashid Dostum and the leaders of the Jalalabad Shura, but this was categorically rejected by the Taliban.The regional powers feared the consequences of Afghanistan dominated by the Islamist Taliban and gave massive support to Rabbani and Massoud. In return, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia increased their support for the Taliban.
True to the motto "the enemy of my enemy is my friend", Bhutto even tried to convince the U.S., which had an interest in curbing Iran, to support the Taliban. The United States declined, but also the Taliban refused to continue cooperating with other warlords. Yet the Taliban managed to convince Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to support them again. Riyadh and Islamabad had reached an agreement with them. In late September, the Taliban led a surprise attack on Jalalabad and overran it. At the same time, Pakistan let hundreds of gunmen enter unmolested across the borders into Afghanistan. The Taliban lost no time and continued their advance towards the capital from an easterly direction. A month after the attack on Jalalabad the first pickups with Taliban had already reached the streets of Kabul. The pro-government troops fled and Massoud also ordered a retreat for his troops. One of the first acts of the Taliban in Kabul was the execution of former President Najibullah, whose battered body they then put on display in the streets of Kabul.
Taking Kabul didn't mean the end of the war. The formerly warring warlords pulled together to form a new Alliance to defend Afghanistan against the Taliban. Massoud decided to make a full-scale attack on the scattered Taliban forces and advanced as far as Bagram. The success of the Taliban seemed seriously threatened. As a consequence, Pakistan again let thousands of 'volunteers' cross the border area of Pakistan into Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban. This enabled the militia of Mullah Omar to launch a new offensive and recover the lost territories.
The way was paved for the Taliban, and the prevailing lawlessness and lack of leadership since the departure of the Soviets have certainly increased their acceptance in parts of the population. However, their success is down to more than just this. In addition to these pull factors a number of push factors have played their part. This includes logistics, enabling the Taliban to carry out their operations equipped with enough weapons and ammunition. They also had enough fighters as new religious students from the Pakistani madrassas could enter the country unimpeded at all times. Furthermore, indoctrination and training played a crucial role. The Taliban broke up the deadlock with mobile warfare and relatively quickly caused large shifts in territorial ownership. Mobile warfare was made possible because the Taliban had large numbers of vehicles (mainly white Toyota pick-ups) and sufficient communication infrastructure available. This included a mobile communications network and a wireless network for the Taliban leaders, both of which had been set up by Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan had roads, the Kandahar Airfield and fighter jets for the Taliban repaired. They could also benefit from the experience of former officers of the communist army. These had been reactivated through the network of former Defence Minister Tanai, who had found refuge in Pakistan after a failed coup against Najibullah, which had most likely been supported by Pakistan in the first place. But corruption and the effects of money are also not to be underestimated. Many field commanders quite simply let themselves be bought. In any case, the substantial backing from Pakistan has significantly promoted the rapid advance and the takeover of Kabul by the Taliban.

The Taliban in Power in Kabul (1996-2001)
The support of the Taliban by the Pakistani government and the ISI continued after the gang around Mullah Omar took Kabul in September 1996 and overthrew the Tajik-dominated government of Rabbani and Massoud. Abdul Salam Saif, the Taliban ambassador in Pakistan, wrote what previously was the only detailed inside account of the movement, in which he describes in detail how he was inundated with offers from the Pakistani intelligence officials.The ISI continued pumping money, weapons and advisers into Afghanistan to help the Taliban win against the Northern Alliance. In addition, Pakistan provided diplomatic support, organised training for Taliban fighters, some of whom it had itself recruited, planned and commanded offensives, delivered ammunition and fuel and on several occasions apparently got directly involved in combat support. Undoubtedly, the Pakistani army and intelligence agencies, with the ISI at the forefront, made a vital contribution to the Taliban becoming a highly effective military force. The covert support of the Taliban by the ISI came from the corps headquarters in Peshawar. To give an example: a contact person deemed trustworthy by the U.S. consulate in Peshawar in October 1996 reported the border crossing from Pakistan into Afghanistan of an ISI convoy, consisting of 30-35 ISI trucks and 15-20 fuel trucks, at Torkham.The ISI itself in late 1996 estimated the total Pakistani aid to the Taliban to be as high as 20 million rupees.A number that may well be set too low. Two years later, a Pakistani source of the U.S. State Department put the support of the Pakistani government for the Taliban at "about a million dollars every few months".
According to a 2001 report by Human Rights Watch, the first direct military contacts between the Afghanistan office of the ISI and the Taliban after they seized power was established by sending a small team of Pakistani military advisers to the former stronghold of the Afghan army in Rishikor. The base in Rishikor, southwest of Kabul, was subsequently used as the main training centre for Pakistani volunteers, who had been carted off to fight for the Taliban in Afghanistan. No later than 1999, the accommodation of the Pakistani military and intelligence personnel were in a guarded area within the camp. According to a DIA-report, Pakistani religious students also received military training at Kandahar and Herat. There, a combination of members of Pakistan's Frontier Corps (FC), staff of the Najibullah era, as well as former supporters of the Wahhabi warlord, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, and the long-standing ISI protégé Hekmatyar provided training. This use of Pakistan's Frontier Corps was apparently not an isolated case. In addition to the training of fighters, company-size FC elements in Afghanistan were also used for command and control tasks and, if necessary, for fighting action itself. The reason for the use of the FC was that its units, as opposed to those of the Punjabi-dominated army, were completely or at least predominantly composed of Pashtuns. This represents the Taliban and the people in the South of Afghanistan.
Also by supplying fuel and ammunition, the ISI was trying to consolidate its influence on the Taliban operations.Here, the intelligence service based its actions on the system which it had set up during the Soviet occupation to control the military operations of its Afghan deputies. According to this system, large amounts of ammunition and fuel were made available to the Taliban commanders only when an operation has been approved by the ISI and the Pakistani military. The fact that the Taliban weren't happy with this system meant that they began looking for alternative arms suppliers, which is why soon private actors began to be involved in arms trade with the Taliban, too. A private offer was available particularly because the Bhutto government in 1994 had fired dozens of ISI officers, some of which with ties to the Taliban. Some of these officers had then founded their own import-export firms or participated in existing companies that were organising large private security and import-export-led operations. Thanks to these new business relations as well as their old Taliban connections, the ex-ISI officers now acted as weapons suppliers to Afghanistan.
After General Pervez Musharraf had come to power by an army coup in 1999, he increased the Pakistani support for the Taliban. Musharraf publicly declared that Pakistan's strategic interests lie in supporting the Afghan Pashtuns, whom he associated solely with the Taliban. The new ruler then went on to say that: "This is our national interest […] the Taliban can not be alienated by Pakistan. We have a national security interest here […]”. Apart from army chief Musharraf, the power within the military junta lay in particular with three hard-line generals who had made the decisive coup of 1999: Mahmoud Ahmad, Mohammed Aziz and Muzaffar Usmani. All three were passionate supporters of Islamic fundamentalist parties and the Taliban. Aziz, Director of Covert Operations in the ISI in the late 1990s served as the main organiser behind the military victories of the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. Ahmad - nota bene one of the most vocal supporters of the Taliban within the regime - in his function as ISI chief practically made the foreign policy of Pakistan. Thus, the U.S. State Department concluded in September 2000: "While Pakistani support for the Taliban has been long-standing, the magnitude of recent support is unprecedented.” The Clinton Administration at that time also appeared increasingly concerned that the direct participation of Pakistan in Taliban military operations had become more and more frequent in recent months, and that Pakistani military personnel had taken a more active role in the fighting. Towards the end of the year 2000, Pakistani aircraft helped Taliban forces with troop rotations during combat operations & staff of the ISI as well as of the army were involved directly in the planning of major military operations of the Taliban. In November 2000, UN General Secretary Kofi Annan Pakistan accused them at least implicitly of providing such support. Thus, the UN Security Council in January 2001 finally imposed sanctions against the regime in Kabul, which were aimed directly at getting it to stop the Pakistani weapons deliveries to the Taliban. But apparently, the sanctions missed their effect, for an intelligence dossier stating that Pakistan was circumventing the UN sanctions by continuing to deliver fuel and other goods to the Taliban was presented to the Security Council by both Russia and France. In April and May 2001, a few months before September the 11th, 30 ISI trucks were still crossing the Pakistani border into Afghanistan every day - the same number that the U.S. consulate in Peshawar in October 1996 had reported immediately after the coming into power of the Taliban. Some of these convoys were equipped with artillery shells, tank ammunition and anti-tank missiles.
The intentions and actions of Pakistan regarding the Taliban immediately after the terrorist attacks of September the 11th 2001 can not yet be conclusively assessed due to the few and contradictory sources. What is certain, however, is that the Pakistani military regime in accordance with its longstanding Taliban policy tried to persuade the U.S. to refrain from a military campaign against the Taliban, or at least limit it to air strikes, and to negotiate with the government in Kabul to find a solution. ISI director and de facto Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ahmad tried to convince U.S. Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin that the aim of the United States of eliminating Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda could best be achieved by forcing the Taliban to do it themselves: "[…] it is better for the Afghans to do it. We could avoid the fallout. If the Taliban are eliminated […] Afghanistan will revert to warlordism.” In September 2001, Ahmad not only met with many members of the Bush administration, but also twice with Mullah Omar in Kandahar. The question of whether or not at that time he made a last-minute attempt to get the Taliban to extradite Osama bin Laden after all, whether, as the U.S. State Department believed, this was merely a delay tactic, as claimed by Ahmed Rashid, or whether, quite to the contrary, Ahmad Mullah Omar encouraged them to brave an American attack rather than turn in Bin Laden, as is claimed by leaks to the CIA, must be left unanswered due to contradictory source material. In any case, during the ensuing Operation Enduring Freedom, the attack by the US-led coalition on the Taliban government, the ISI played a great double game. On the one hand, Pakistan officially made a U-turn, presenting itself as a close U.S. ally in the "war against terrorism" and accepting the "seven points" of the U.S. government, pledging to stop supporting the Taliban and, explicitly, promising to stop all supplies of fuel as well as any other goods and to cancel the transport of weapons and fighters into Afghanistan. On the other hand, and with the consent of Musharraf the ISI continued providing the Taliban with weapons, ammunition and fuel. As before, ISI trucks were rolling into Afghanistan on a daily basis. In addition, dozens of members of the Frontier Corps and ISI officers remained in Afghanistan to assist the Taliban in their defence. CIA agent Gary Berntsen realised "from the beginning of the conflict that ISI advisers were supporting the Taliban with expertise and material [...]".This double game was to shape and Pakistan's Taliban policy after the expulsion of Mullah Omar's gang from Afghanistan and continues to do so to this day.

worse pakistani enemy prapoganda?lolzzzx

 

[shuntmaster]

worse pakistani enemy prapoganda?lolzzzx

First you ask for evidence of ISI involvement with Taliban creation. When I provide you with Wikipedia evidence you reject it saying Wikipedia is not reliable. Next when I provide an independent source evidence, you claim it as anti-Pakistan propaganda. This is height of state of denial. But you would blindly accept any conspiracy theories which support your beliefs.
Admit it, there is absolutely no way to win this argument with you, right?

 

[Sedqal]

PPP created TTP and PTI is protecting TTP - Only PMLN is the right choice

 

[shuntmaster]

PPP created TTP and PTI is protecting TTP - Only PMLN is the right choice

PTI & PMLN were the only 2 parties that were not targeted by the Taliban during the 2013 general elections and indirectly helped these parties. MQM and ANP are the only parties which are not tainted by Taliban association.