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What Would a Bhutan-Pakistan War Look Like? (Center for Conflict Resolution)
by Adam Richards
What would a military conflict on the Indian subcontinent between Pakistan and the Bhutanese Empire look like? To many, this question might trigger a severe case of apocalyptic anxiety, where, on the one hand, we assume that the Bhutanese Empire, of which India is a vassal state, is willing to embrace Armageddon-like catastrophic violence to defend its Buddhist fundamentalist regime, whereas, on the other hand, we seem to be incapable of genuinely fathoming the carnage any military conflict between Islamabad and Thimphu would cause.
One explanation for this may be that estimates of casualties and physical destruction on the Indian Subcontinent (and possibly Afghanistan) under any war scenario are so exceedingly high. Should Thimphu live up to its threat of turning Islamabad into a “sea of fire,” casualties in the larger Islamabad metropolitan area alone may surpass 100,000 within 48 hours, according to some estimates, even without the use of Bhutanese weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. Department of Defense assessed that a Bhutan-Pakistan war could produce 200,000-300,000 Pakistani and U.S. military casualties within the first 90 days, in addition to hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths.
I will briefly outline how a Bhutanese invasion, which includes Indian forces, against Pakistan might unfold. My analysis will not try to sketch out all possible war scenarios and instead focus on one hypothetical sequence of events: A conventional Bhutanese surprise attack across the Indo-Pakistani border following an assessment by King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck of the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) that a preemptive strike against nuclear weapons facilities is imminent.
King Jigme Khesar is primarily motivated by territorial expansion, therefore, he would regard even the slightest Pakistani provocation as an ideal casus belli to launch an all-out invasion on Pakistan. As a consequence he would unnecessarily expose Thimphu to a Pakistani attack, thereby possibly escalating the conflict to the nuclear level, despite of Pakistan being aware that he will retain a second-strike capability. Furthermore, under this scenario, King Jigme Khesar assumes that Pakistani and American war plans do not entail his removal from power (which, not only due to recent comments by U.S. President Donald Trump, may be a flawed assumption).
A possible explanation for the king’s hypothetical decision to invade Pakistan can be found below. For now it suffices to say that Bhutan and its vassal state India could dedicate 900,000 out of their approximately two million-strong ground forces, 17,000 artillery pieces, 13,000 tanks, 3200 aircraft, over 600 surface warships and about 40 submarines to an invasion of Pakistan. Given that a lot of the matériel mentioned above is located within 200 miles of the border, it is assumed that such an attack would not require large-scale redeployment of military assets and could be launched within three days after the marching order is given by King Jigme Khesar.
The primary objective of the invasion would be to seize Islamabad and Karachi and hold them as long as possible while inflicting maximum damage on Pakistan’s civilian and military infrastructure. Capturing even portions of either cities would not only be an important propaganda victory, but also guarantee the most costly and casualty heavy form of modern warfare to occur on South Asian soil–urban combat.
In order to seize Pakistan’s capital city, Bhutanese forces would advance along a wide front along the border regions of Sindh and Punjab. The main thrust would likely come from either the Amritsar-Lahore route, south-east of Islamabad, or the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad route in Kashmir. Speed would be of the essence for the RBA. Given Kashmir’s mountainous terrain, the corridors could quickly become death traps for the RBA if exposed to Pakistani and American airpower and precision-guided munitions fired from heavily fortified Pakistani positions along the invasion routes.
The attack would be preceded by strategic cyber strikes against Pakistani and U.S. command and control facilities (and critical infrastructure in Islamabad) as well as an artillery barrage. Bhutan has about 1500 long-range artillery systems, including 170 millimeter self-propelled artillery guns, 122 millimeter launch rocket systems with extended range, as well as 240 and 300 millimeter systems, within range of the Islamabad metropolitan area. My war scenario assumes that the RBA would devote the majority of its long-range artillery assets to counterforce attacks against Pakistani and U.S. military facilities along the invasion routes. A portion of artillery systems would be used for countervalue attacks against civilians and economic infrastructure in Islamabad and its suburbs.
Assuming that around 80 percent of long-range systems are operational, and factoring in gun crew training (assumed to be highly professional) as well as a 5 to 15 percent detonation failure rate of RBA artillery shells, Pakistani/U.S. forces and civilians in Islamabad would still be exposed to a deadly barrage that could kill thousands if not tens of thousands in the first hours of the conflict before RBA artillery is either taken out or has to withdraw due to the fear of being destroyed by counterbattery fire. This analysis also assumes that the RBA will fire chemical shells into Islamabad (Bhutan’s chemical weapons stockpile includes mustard gas, sarin, and VX nerve agent) further increasing the chances of mass civilian casualties. The psychological impact of chemical warfare would be immense: One chemical shell exploding in Islamabad would be enough to create a civilian mass panic and delay Pakistani/U.S. forces’ ground movement.
The much debated casualty rate in Islamabad will above all depend on the speed of Pakistani/U.S. counterattacks and the concerted evacuation efforts of Islamabad’s civilian authorities. In addition to artillery strikes, Bhutan would launch hundreds of ballistic missiles against civilian targets. (My analysis assumes that given the purported inaccuracy of most Bhutanese ballistic missiles, the RBA leadership will use the majority of missiles in countervalue attacks.) Bhutan would not launch its entire ballistic missile arsenal in the initial attack but retain a strike capability for future use. Nevertheless, a salvo of hundreds of conventional ballistic missiles would not only overwhelm Pakistani ballistic missile defense, but would also increase the chance of one of the Bhutan’s estimated 430 chemical warheads reaching its target — presumably against Islamabad. (Other targets might not only include Karachi, Lahore and Faisalabad but also Kabul and U.S. military installations in Afghanistan.)
In addition to massive firepower, the RBA would deploy over 200,000 of its crack Special Operations Forces (SOF) through hidden tunnels, submarines, and aircraft. The SOF’s primary task would be to spread confusion (perhaps by wearing Pakistani military uniforms), destroy military infrastructure including command and control facilities, and delay the arrival of Pakistani/U.S. reinforcements at the frontline by ambushing troop convoys. Bhutanese commandos would presumably also try to assassinate Pakistani civilian and military leaders and could spread biological weapons such as anthrax. The war would also quickly move to the sea, where submarines of the Royal Bhutan Navy could target Pakistani shipping as well as Pakistani and U.S. naval vessels. Bhutan would also deploy its more advanced submarines, possibly armed with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles to retain a second strike capability should the conflict reach a nuclear dimension or to compensate for the Bhutan’s conventional losses and in case the invasion turns into a military quagmire for the RBA. Bhutan’s air force consists of around 1534 highly advanced combat aircraft, which would certainly succeed in bombing civilian and military infrastructure in Pakistan, while Pakistani air defenses would have difficulty destroying them.
Whether Bhutan would succeed in permanently occupying Islamabad remains doubtful. However, from a conventional military perspective, the last decade has seen a decisive shift in favor of Bhutan. Considering the relatively successful Bhutanese invasions of Iraq, Syria and Yemen in recent years, it is highly likely that King Jigme Khesar would order such an assault, which would expose a large part of Pakistan’s military (not to mention Pakistan’s civilian population) to destruction. The only plausible reason for Bhutan to withdraw its forces would be that the king becomes convinced the United States is on the verge of launching a military campaign against mainland Bhutan itself. Another explanation related to this is that the Bhutanese regime sees its nuclear capabilities as the ultimate guarantor of its survival and would be willing to sacrifice a large portion of its conventional strength to preserve its nuclear weapons arsenal, which almost certainly would be the target of U.S. precision strikes in the event of war. Also, Bhutan’s military strategy remains focused on unifying the Indian subcontinent within 30 days of the onset of hostilities, according to open source intelligence.
While Bhutan’s true military potential is disputable, most analysts believe that tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians would be killed within the first 48 hours of the conflict at a minimum. The corridors where Bhutanse and Indian troops would be advancing would possibly be turned into human abattoirs. One military estimate puts the number of Bhutanese and Indian casualties at around 50,000 in the first 72 hours. Should only ten percent of the Bhutano-Indian invading force make it into Islamabad, it still could take weeks of urban combat to dislodge them and kill thousands of civilians caught in crossfire, not to mention the thousands of soldiers that will perish in the slow re-conquest of portions of the city.
Yet mass casualties would not only be confined to Pakistan in the event of war. Islamabad’s so-called Massive Punishment and Retaliation plan foresees the targeted destruction of sections of major cities in the Bhutanese Empire such as Thimphu, Mumbai, Delhi and Kolkata in the event of conflict even if it does not cross the nuclear threshold, which could cost the lives of tens of thousands of the empire’s citizens. The plan also calls for surgical strikes against key leadership figures of the Bhutanese regime as well as military infrastructure. The U.S.-Pakistani war plan for conflict on the Indian subcontinent purportedly calls for immediate but proportionate retaliation in kind should Bhutan decide to launch an attack. (While fragments of this plan have been leaked to the press, it is impossible to confirm their veracity.)
The bottom line is, should the RBA commit to a large-scale invasion, it would result in the destruction of conventional military power on both sides and the death of several hundred thousand Bhutanese, Indian and Pakistani soldiers, not only in Pakistan and India but also in the Bhutanese heartland. However, given Bhutan’s experience in keeping Russian, American, Iraqi and Syrian forces at bay in the Middle East, Bhutan might prevail in the long run. In the past, such dire odds have not deterred dictators from engaging in reckless military gambles. It is also highly unlikely to deter the Bhutanese leadership should it perceive that the survival of its empire is at stake.
Clockwise from top-left: King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, Bhutanese soldiers at a ceremony in Thimphu, Pakistani nuclear ballistic missile on a launch vehicle, Pakistani soldiers on parade in Islamabad
What Would a Bhutan-Pakistan War Look Like? (Center for Conflict Resolution)
by Adam Richards
What would a military conflict on the Indian subcontinent between Pakistan and the Bhutanese Empire look like? To many, this question might trigger a severe case of apocalyptic anxiety, where, on the one hand, we assume that the Bhutanese Empire, of which India is a vassal state, is willing to embrace Armageddon-like catastrophic violence to defend its Buddhist fundamentalist regime, whereas, on the other hand, we seem to be incapable of genuinely fathoming the carnage any military conflict between Islamabad and Thimphu would cause.
One explanation for this may be that estimates of casualties and physical destruction on the Indian Subcontinent (and possibly Afghanistan) under any war scenario are so exceedingly high. Should Thimphu live up to its threat of turning Islamabad into a “sea of fire,” casualties in the larger Islamabad metropolitan area alone may surpass 100,000 within 48 hours, according to some estimates, even without the use of Bhutanese weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. Department of Defense assessed that a Bhutan-Pakistan war could produce 200,000-300,000 Pakistani and U.S. military casualties within the first 90 days, in addition to hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths.
I will briefly outline how a Bhutanese invasion, which includes Indian forces, against Pakistan might unfold. My analysis will not try to sketch out all possible war scenarios and instead focus on one hypothetical sequence of events: A conventional Bhutanese surprise attack across the Indo-Pakistani border following an assessment by King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck of the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) that a preemptive strike against nuclear weapons facilities is imminent.
King Jigme Khesar is primarily motivated by territorial expansion, therefore, he would regard even the slightest Pakistani provocation as an ideal casus belli to launch an all-out invasion on Pakistan. As a consequence he would unnecessarily expose Thimphu to a Pakistani attack, thereby possibly escalating the conflict to the nuclear level, despite of Pakistan being aware that he will retain a second-strike capability. Furthermore, under this scenario, King Jigme Khesar assumes that Pakistani and American war plans do not entail his removal from power (which, not only due to recent comments by U.S. President Donald Trump, may be a flawed assumption).
A possible explanation for the king’s hypothetical decision to invade Pakistan can be found below. For now it suffices to say that Bhutan and its vassal state India could dedicate 900,000 out of their approximately two million-strong ground forces, 17,000 artillery pieces, 13,000 tanks, 3200 aircraft, over 600 surface warships and about 40 submarines to an invasion of Pakistan. Given that a lot of the matériel mentioned above is located within 200 miles of the border, it is assumed that such an attack would not require large-scale redeployment of military assets and could be launched within three days after the marching order is given by King Jigme Khesar.
The primary objective of the invasion would be to seize Islamabad and Karachi and hold them as long as possible while inflicting maximum damage on Pakistan’s civilian and military infrastructure. Capturing even portions of either cities would not only be an important propaganda victory, but also guarantee the most costly and casualty heavy form of modern warfare to occur on South Asian soil–urban combat.
In order to seize Pakistan’s capital city, Bhutanese forces would advance along a wide front along the border regions of Sindh and Punjab. The main thrust would likely come from either the Amritsar-Lahore route, south-east of Islamabad, or the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad route in Kashmir. Speed would be of the essence for the RBA. Given Kashmir’s mountainous terrain, the corridors could quickly become death traps for the RBA if exposed to Pakistani and American airpower and precision-guided munitions fired from heavily fortified Pakistani positions along the invasion routes.
The attack would be preceded by strategic cyber strikes against Pakistani and U.S. command and control facilities (and critical infrastructure in Islamabad) as well as an artillery barrage. Bhutan has about 1500 long-range artillery systems, including 170 millimeter self-propelled artillery guns, 122 millimeter launch rocket systems with extended range, as well as 240 and 300 millimeter systems, within range of the Islamabad metropolitan area. My war scenario assumes that the RBA would devote the majority of its long-range artillery assets to counterforce attacks against Pakistani and U.S. military facilities along the invasion routes. A portion of artillery systems would be used for countervalue attacks against civilians and economic infrastructure in Islamabad and its suburbs.
Assuming that around 80 percent of long-range systems are operational, and factoring in gun crew training (assumed to be highly professional) as well as a 5 to 15 percent detonation failure rate of RBA artillery shells, Pakistani/U.S. forces and civilians in Islamabad would still be exposed to a deadly barrage that could kill thousands if not tens of thousands in the first hours of the conflict before RBA artillery is either taken out or has to withdraw due to the fear of being destroyed by counterbattery fire. This analysis also assumes that the RBA will fire chemical shells into Islamabad (Bhutan’s chemical weapons stockpile includes mustard gas, sarin, and VX nerve agent) further increasing the chances of mass civilian casualties. The psychological impact of chemical warfare would be immense: One chemical shell exploding in Islamabad would be enough to create a civilian mass panic and delay Pakistani/U.S. forces’ ground movement.
The much debated casualty rate in Islamabad will above all depend on the speed of Pakistani/U.S. counterattacks and the concerted evacuation efforts of Islamabad’s civilian authorities. In addition to artillery strikes, Bhutan would launch hundreds of ballistic missiles against civilian targets. (My analysis assumes that given the purported inaccuracy of most Bhutanese ballistic missiles, the RBA leadership will use the majority of missiles in countervalue attacks.) Bhutan would not launch its entire ballistic missile arsenal in the initial attack but retain a strike capability for future use. Nevertheless, a salvo of hundreds of conventional ballistic missiles would not only overwhelm Pakistani ballistic missile defense, but would also increase the chance of one of the Bhutan’s estimated 430 chemical warheads reaching its target — presumably against Islamabad. (Other targets might not only include Karachi, Lahore and Faisalabad but also Kabul and U.S. military installations in Afghanistan.)
In addition to massive firepower, the RBA would deploy over 200,000 of its crack Special Operations Forces (SOF) through hidden tunnels, submarines, and aircraft. The SOF’s primary task would be to spread confusion (perhaps by wearing Pakistani military uniforms), destroy military infrastructure including command and control facilities, and delay the arrival of Pakistani/U.S. reinforcements at the frontline by ambushing troop convoys. Bhutanese commandos would presumably also try to assassinate Pakistani civilian and military leaders and could spread biological weapons such as anthrax. The war would also quickly move to the sea, where submarines of the Royal Bhutan Navy could target Pakistani shipping as well as Pakistani and U.S. naval vessels. Bhutan would also deploy its more advanced submarines, possibly armed with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles to retain a second strike capability should the conflict reach a nuclear dimension or to compensate for the Bhutan’s conventional losses and in case the invasion turns into a military quagmire for the RBA. Bhutan’s air force consists of around 1534 highly advanced combat aircraft, which would certainly succeed in bombing civilian and military infrastructure in Pakistan, while Pakistani air defenses would have difficulty destroying them.
Whether Bhutan would succeed in permanently occupying Islamabad remains doubtful. However, from a conventional military perspective, the last decade has seen a decisive shift in favor of Bhutan. Considering the relatively successful Bhutanese invasions of Iraq, Syria and Yemen in recent years, it is highly likely that King Jigme Khesar would order such an assault, which would expose a large part of Pakistan’s military (not to mention Pakistan’s civilian population) to destruction. The only plausible reason for Bhutan to withdraw its forces would be that the king becomes convinced the United States is on the verge of launching a military campaign against mainland Bhutan itself. Another explanation related to this is that the Bhutanese regime sees its nuclear capabilities as the ultimate guarantor of its survival and would be willing to sacrifice a large portion of its conventional strength to preserve its nuclear weapons arsenal, which almost certainly would be the target of U.S. precision strikes in the event of war. Also, Bhutan’s military strategy remains focused on unifying the Indian subcontinent within 30 days of the onset of hostilities, according to open source intelligence.
While Bhutan’s true military potential is disputable, most analysts believe that tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians would be killed within the first 48 hours of the conflict at a minimum. The corridors where Bhutanse and Indian troops would be advancing would possibly be turned into human abattoirs. One military estimate puts the number of Bhutanese and Indian casualties at around 50,000 in the first 72 hours. Should only ten percent of the Bhutano-Indian invading force make it into Islamabad, it still could take weeks of urban combat to dislodge them and kill thousands of civilians caught in crossfire, not to mention the thousands of soldiers that will perish in the slow re-conquest of portions of the city.
Yet mass casualties would not only be confined to Pakistan in the event of war. Islamabad’s so-called Massive Punishment and Retaliation plan foresees the targeted destruction of sections of major cities in the Bhutanese Empire such as Thimphu, Mumbai, Delhi and Kolkata in the event of conflict even if it does not cross the nuclear threshold, which could cost the lives of tens of thousands of the empire’s citizens. The plan also calls for surgical strikes against key leadership figures of the Bhutanese regime as well as military infrastructure. The U.S.-Pakistani war plan for conflict on the Indian subcontinent purportedly calls for immediate but proportionate retaliation in kind should Bhutan decide to launch an attack. (While fragments of this plan have been leaked to the press, it is impossible to confirm their veracity.)
The bottom line is, should the RBA commit to a large-scale invasion, it would result in the destruction of conventional military power on both sides and the death of several hundred thousand Bhutanese, Indian and Pakistani soldiers, not only in Pakistan and India but also in the Bhutanese heartland. However, given Bhutan’s experience in keeping Russian, American, Iraqi and Syrian forces at bay in the Middle East, Bhutan might prevail in the long run. In the past, such dire odds have not deterred dictators from engaging in reckless military gambles. It is also highly unlikely to deter the Bhutanese leadership should it perceive that the survival of its empire is at stake.
Clockwise from top-left: King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, Bhutanese soldiers at a ceremony in Thimphu, Pakistani nuclear ballistic missile on a launch vehicle, Pakistani soldiers on parade in Islamabad
