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What can India Do About Pakistan?

It would bear reminding to those who believe that Rajiv Gandhi's assassination was an example of a Hindu suicide bomber that Thenmozhi Rajratnam (Dhanu), like her LTTE supreme commander Prabhakaran, was a Tamil Methodist Christian.

For that matter, a large part of the LTTE cadre were Christians, many of them recent converts. And as has been seen in the recent past in terrorist incidents across the world, oftentimes its the recent converts of evangelical faiths who are most virulently radicalized.
 
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This is how most Indians think of Pakistan...

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very accurate actually.
 
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lol. Nahi yaar.

Its so refreshingly nice to see another 2009 PDF batchmate with less than 4000 posts.

What's with the humungous post counts with the newbies here bro? A sudden spurt of interesting stuff to talk about? Or simply cryostorage?
 
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As I said before talks should be done only through back channel, no media no hype no rhetoric. I would as a Pakistani not mind if India would want to engage Pakistani army as well through back door channels.

But is there any possibility that Pakistan would remotely consider anything similar to converting LoC to IB? Even that would be politically very very difficult for us, but that is still a possibility, leaving what we already have is not.
 
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But is there any possibility that Pakistan would remotely consider anything similar to converting LoC to IB? Even that would be politically very very difficult for us, but that is still a possibility, leaving what we already have is not.
might be possible after 2047, I think hitting the psychologically important hundred years of fighting for a piece of land might trigger some common sense.
 
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might be possible after 2047, I think hitting the psychologically important hundred years of fighting for a piece of land might trigger some common sense.

I have similar thoughts on this 100 year timeline actually. A permanent shedding of our colonial past. Don't know about how Pakistanis view it, but I would like to think that we have a living heritage and history of blood, faith and soil, of a single civilization of thousands of years. An unbroken living legacy unparalleled in the world today, with the remnants of now-dead civilizations morphing into completely unrecognizable entities.

With this as a backdrop, what is 200 years? Or 500? A blip. The blink of an eye.

Why then do we need to keep celebrating the 15th of August as the apex national holiday? And what makes independence from British rule more important for us as a nation than independence of the rule of other foreign rule before that?

See my point?

26th January? Sure. But I have my increasing reservations about the 15th of August. Both the name and the continuing significance when seen against the bigger picture.

I realize this has probably got little to do with the topic being discussed, but it was just a thought triggered by your post.
 
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But is there any possibility that Pakistan would remotely consider anything similar to converting LoC to IB? Even that would be politically very very difficult for us, but that is still a possibility, leaving what we already have is not.

I cannot predict the outcome of any such but one thing is for sure both sides will to have budge from their positions if peace is to be achieved. I think some sort of understanding was reached during Musharraf and Vajpayee time.
 
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By Shyam Saran on 25/08/2015


Delhi must look at talks as a means of enabling sustained diplomacy, rather than as a bargaining chip or form of penalty — whose denial will somehow become a pressure-point on Islamabad

File photo of Pakistan’s Prime Miniser, Nawaz Sharif, with Army Chief General Raheel Sharif. Credit: ISPR

The India-Pakistan talks have been called off and the sense of relief in Islamabad and, one suspects, New Delhi, must be palpable. Within days of the joint statement at Ufa last month, it became clear that the calculations on which the resumption of a dialogue process may have been envisaged had come undone. Stung by the widespread political as well as public criticism of having omitted any reference to Kashmir from the joint statement, the Nawaz Sharif government went into overdrive to insist there could be no talks without J&K being part of the agenda. On the India-Pakistan border and Line of Control, ceasefire violations mounted and two major cross-border terrorist incidents followed, one in Gurdaspur, Punjab and the other in Udhampur, Jammu & Kashmir. A “living dossier” in the form of the Pakistani national, Naved, was captured during the latter incident. He cheerfully admitted to being a Lashkar-e-Tayyaba jihadist and expressed delight at having been given the opportunity to kill Hindus.

Nawaz Sharif has clearly been unwilling or unable to rein in the military leadership or the terrorist group, the LeT. If the Indian strategy is to engage the Pakistani civilian leadership, while retaliating robustly to cross-border provocations by its military—hoping thereby to strengthen a pro-peace constituency in Pakistan—this has proved to be a non-starter. The Pakistan Army has demonstrated time and again that it exercises a virtual veto over the country’s policies towards India, Afghanistan, the United States and China. Except for India, these countries maintain parallel and probably deeper relations with the Pakistan military, acknowledging the reality of its over-riding authority.

Once the Pakistani military had made its opposition apparent and escalated violence on and across the border with India, the proposed meeting between the two National Security Advisers was doomed.


The assumption that the civilian, democratically elected government in Islamabad, is in favour of better relations with India is only partially true. It is a complex but interpenetrated political, bureaucratic and military elite which rules Pakistan. There may be nuanced differences among its constituents, but they share a deeply adversarial perception of India. Furthermore, it is presumptuous to believe that India can significantly influence the domestic political dynamic in Pakistan. Change in Pakistan will come from how internal forces play themselves out. This is not to suggest that India should not play different constituencies in Pakistan differently. It should, but with only modest expectations.

Pakistani calculations

India-Pakistan relations are, by their very nature, adversarial. This is rooted in widely divergent but deeply entrenched historical and national narratives. Each side has a different view of why partition took place, how the Kashmir dispute erupted, or why the wars of 1965 and 1971 were fought. Even liberal Pakistanis believe that cross-border terrorism is explicable, if not justifiable, because of an asymmetric threat from India. Such competing narratives can be reconciled only over a long period of patient engagement in which historical fact is separated from its politically generated distortions.

The expectation of a spectacular and emotional grand reconciliation, as between long estranged brothers, is a seductive myth which a succession of Indian leaders and civil society advocates have fallen prey to. Reconciliation and expanded cooperation will be the cumulative culmination of a series of continuous, modest, but nevertheless, practical steps to improve relations. Conversely—and as we have seen repeatedly in the recent past—any suggestion of a more than modest initiative promising a transformed relationship has inevitably led to a backlash from elements deeply invested in hostility.

Whatever be the official rhetoric in Islamabad, there is a broad elite consensus that the use of cross-border terrorism has proved to be remarkably effective in advancing Pakistan’s aims vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan. The possession of a nuclear deterrent, it is believed, shields Pakistan from serious military retaliation. The military establishment also believes that Pakistan’s adversaries, either by choice or by compulsion, are unable to play the same covert game of tit-for-tat. In the case of India, Islamabad has escaped retribution despite Pakistan-based terrorists launching progressively more serious terrorist attacks against Indian targets, including the horrific assault on Mumbai in 2008. In Afghanistan, its use of cross-border terrorism is seen validated by the US withdrawal from the country and its acquiescence in a Pakistani lead role in any political settlement of the long-drawn out civil war. Unless this strategic calculus in Islamabad undergoes a change, it is unlikely that we shall see anything more than a tactical adjustment in response to immediate pressures.

Changing the Pakistani strategic calculus requires measures on multiple fronts. There is no silver bullet. What are the levers which, taken together, could raise the cost to Pakistan, of continuing with its current posture?

Inhibitions to be overcome

India must dispense with the implicit anxiety that the disintegration of Pakistan or its descent into chaos,will confront India with an existential crisis. Whether Pakistan descends into chaos or disintegrates will depend upon what its people want and how the domestic political dynamic plays itself out in the country. India is mostly irrelevant in this regard. To refrain from imposing penalties on Pakistan’s rulers for fear of stoking chaos, is a flawed proposition. Is it not strange that Pakistan’s fragility is advertised as a mitigating circumstance even while its resilience and survivability is lauded by one analyst after another? Pakistan is often said to be suicidal but it has always shown a remarkable willingness to cut deals which ensure its survival and maintain the privileges of its self-entitled elite. We should be clear that we are dealing with a state that is coldly calculating in its pursuit of its declared interests.

Pakistan also uses the linguistic and cultural affinities between the peoples of the two countries to arouse sentimentality, which it then uses to obscure its fully unsentimental aims as a state with hostile intent. The Indian side, particularly political leaders, often fall prey to such tactics, sometimes quite unconsciously.The affinity is a reality to be acknowledged and used to advance relations if possible, but it should never be allowed to influence the calculus of inter-state relations.

Once these unspoken but severely limiting inhibitions are abandoned, then one can begin to look at what one would normally do faced with an adversarial state.

We have several pressure points which we have been loathe to use despite there being no corresponding Pakistani restraint. We have a formal claim on Gilgit Baltistan but since the Simla Agreement we have rarely articulated it, let alone pressed it determinedly. We have been reluctant to receive people from Gilgit Baltistan or raise our voice when their rights are violated. Our silence on the horrific human rights violations in Balochistan is misplaced. Thanks to its harbouring of Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Omar, Pakistan has earned its reputation of being an “epicentre of terror”. We could be much more active internationally to exploit that negative image. This should go hand in hand with the strengthening of our own security capabilities in preventing cross-border terrorism and retaliating against military provocations.

Denying dialogue does not help

At the same time, there are positive elements to be pursued through parallel, sustained and patient engagement. This means that talks should be pursued enabling sustained diplomacy, and not used as a bargaining chip or as a weak form of penalty. Doing so is acknowledgement that India has no effective levers to influence behaviour on the other side. In the past few years our response pattern has convinced Pakistan that after every crisis it is India which feels compelled to return to the table without a Pakistani quid pro quo. Therefore, any notion that holding back on dialogue is a pressure point on Pakistan, is no longer valid.

Other positive actions include promotion of people-to-people contact at all levels through a more liberal visa policy, unilateral if necessary. Even the limited visa liberalisation since 2004 has significantly increased the traffic between the two countries and there is a huge pent up demand in Pakistan for travel to India. There are close cultural affinities between the two countries and Bollywood is an indispensable part of the fabric of Pakistani life. These are underused assets.

The positive impact of increased exposure of Pakistani citizens to India will chip away at the contrived hostility that is encouraged by the Pakistani ruling elite, but this is a long-term endeavour requiring perseverance and patience. It should be our effort to promote exchanges among civil society, media and even the armed forces, such as NDC to NDC or Defence Staff College interactions. The promotion of bilateral trade and commercial exchanges should be a priority, opening up the Indian market to Pakistan’s key export commodities. The objective of these and other initiatives should be to foster, over a period of time, a more balanced and varied relationship between the two countries.

Managing Pakistan is a challenge but approaching it as a state with rational calculations which can be influenced through a varied set of political, economic, military and cultural instruments will do much to remove the self-imposed inhibitions on the conduct of our policy. The shift in mindset is fundamental. The rollout and use of the levers outlined here will need to be graduated and incremental, with careful regard to timing and opportunity. This is what we do with other states. This is what we need to do with Pakistan.

Shyam Saran is a former Foreign Secretary. He is currently Chairman,RIS and Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research

What can India Do About Pakistan? | The Wire

Friends all these people who keep giving some hard turn and twist about Indo Pak talks. But they dont want to talk about simple and clear stands . As follows:
First of all there wont be any good relationship between India and pakistan ever . Ee have to adk ourself Why could a country with terrible economy willing to go for war with larger and more stronger counter weight ? There are two reasons for this 1) Pakistan will crumble if it get isolated by wotld community or its ally . Because only when Pakistan is India's enemy or threat the Anti India block or peace keeper blocks countries will keep aiding Pakistan . Its as simple as that . Thats why once India stops all the contacts with pakistan which it should there will be no need for anti india block to keep aiding Pakistan . Thats why Pakistan puts pressure on India and world by keep propping the NUCLEAR card every now and then . Its the way the seek attention and keep their life earning money flowing in . But these talks neger meet any conclusions as pakistan will pill some trick with proxies which will make india to back track anc cancel the process .

2) India always said it before off the record . Let Pakistan to get destroyed by itself . We just have to wait and watch it scramble. And pakistan people wont be happy with tge establishment whileIndia reaching new heights and pakistan keep going down economically. This will leads to many factions within Pakistan to wage war against the state . For this tge Pakistan establishment want to create anger and madness hate against india so the people will stand as one against their so called enemy . This is why we see tit for tat response from pakistan when even india launches missiles or war words .

Now tell me will india pakistan can become peaceful neighbours ? And the path Pakistan has taken will keep hurting its internal structures and economy . Two basic needs to have proper peaceful nation .
 
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This is not specific to Pakistan, but any nation that is at war with itself will find it difficult to initiate or sustain a war with someone else.

The spillover effect will be there, lone wolf attacks even, but a sustained military engagement would be weakened at its core and untenable strategically.

Once India realized that it could not realistically take Pakistani or Pakistani held territory, the game changed forever.

I am sure the Pakistanis are as intelligent as we are, and realize the same.
 
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This is not specific to Pakistan, but any nation that is at war with itself will find it difficult to initiate or sustain a war with someone else.

The spillover effect will be there, lone wolf attacks even, but a sustained military engagement would be weakened at its core and untenable strategically.

Once India realized that it could not realistically take Pakistani or Pakistani held territory, the game changed forever.

I am sure the Pakistanis are as intelligent as we are, and realize the same.
agreed with every part but not the last part pakistan or pakistanies for that matter will never have peace with india till they get kashmir and under no circumsatnces india will ever give them kashmir and they know it .... all these peace talks or "geedar bahbkiyaa" as some call are nothing but ways to keep the pot boiling

now what can india do about pakistan to have peace on indian terms ..... simple ignoare them all together and concentrate on all other issues regarding owr own growth in time they will yield or at least soften there stand and that too when they come to terms with changed postions and geopolitics till then stataus que and the so called Namo-AD doctroine for pakistan :coffee:
 
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agreed with every part but not the last part pakistan or pakistanies for that matter will never have peace with india till they get kashmir and under no circumsatnces india will ever give them kashmir and they know it .... all these peace talks or "geedar bahbkiyaa" as some call are nothing but ways to keep the pot boiling

now what can india do about pakistan to have peace on indian terms ..... simple ignoare them all together and concentrate on all other issues regarding owr own growth in time they will yield or at least soften there stand and that too when they come to terms with changed postions and geopolitics till then stataus que and the so called Namo-AD doctroine for pakistan :coffee:

Guru, India does not have a problem. The problem is Pakistan's. This is with reference to Kashmir.

But I disagree with your notion that Kashmir is the golden sparrow to never ending peace with Pakistan.

The golden sparrow is a red herring.

Pakistan will always be a threat as long as it is a militarized and weaponized society.

But Pakistan will be a much smaller and ultimately insignificant threat were those two elements pointed inwardly at each other.
 
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Guru, India does not have a problem. The problem is Pakistan's. This is with reference to Kashmir.

But I disagree with your notion that Kashmir is the golden sparrow to never ending peace with Pakistan.

The golden sparrow is a red herring.
you are right bro but the thing is kashmir is the onli thing that genrates support for pakistani establishment from pakistani nation and to extend from other parties but then again kya faraq parta hai :D
 
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