What an Indian saw inside the Pakistan Army headquarters

[HAIDER]

One would expect a liberal dose of subservience and docility when army soldiers meet their senior officers. But the interaction between the lowly soldier and the colonel sitting by my side in the army vehicle left me both puzzled and amazed.

The tall, bearded, well-built Pathan guard, wearing a bulletproof vest, with what looked like an AK-47 slung across his broad chest looked unfriendly and cold when he stiffly saluted the colonel.

The Pathan guard looked unfriendly and cold when he stiffly saluted the colonel.
“Assalamualaikum,” he said in a coarse, surly voice. The colonel was in his khaki uniform, with the insignia on it stating loud and clear that he was a mid-level officer of the Pakistan Army. The guard couldn’t have missed that, but the presence of a colonel made no difference to the man guarding gate number 1 of the Pakistan Army’s GHQ in Rawalpindi.

…

The Pathan guard went up to a cabin to make a call from the landline. I could see him through the cabin glass—not once did he relax as he made the phone call. Tall, well-built guards stood facing the street, observing the passing vehicles. They were as still as statues, and the only sign of movement could be found in their eyes, which surveyed the street surrounding the GHQ.

…

They had to be on the watch and be ruthlessly professional, not only because they were guarding the sanctum sanctorum of Pakistan’s most revered institution, but also because of the threat perception. In October 2009, ten Tehrik-i-Taliban gunmen dressed in military uniform attacked the GHQ, killing nine soldiers and two civilians, and infiltrated the complex, holding many more hostage.

…

The Pakistan Army’s logo shone bright and proud right in the middle of the gate, displaying two crossed swords, the crescent and star, in bottle green. The entrance, the guards, the buildings inside, and the general feel of the place conveyed a sense of imperiousness, professionalism, and power, perhaps indicating the place GHQ enjoyed in the Pakistani sociopolitical imagination. The Pakistan Army has always enjoyed pride of place in the minds of the Pakistani civilians.

…

Inside the GHQ
The GHQ is within the Rawalpindi garrison complex. There is nothing extraordinary about Rawalpindi, an old run-down city adjacent to the rather new and modern city of Islamabad, Pakistan’s flashy capital.

…

We had passed through the giant gate, but the well-secured GHQ complex had several more layers of security, with automatic roadblocks and spike barriers.

…

I always imagined the top generals of the Pakistan Army as belonging to some kind of exclusive society—bound by oath, blood, and honour, and mired in secrecy. The power they wield is legendary.

…

“That’s not quite right,” Tariq Ghazi once told me, “it’s like any other organisation with its own differences, internal politics, people trying to get ahead of each other. But once a decision is taken, we carry out those decisions in a professional manner.”

…

I took a deep breath as I walked into the office of general Akbar. Known to be a no-nonsense officer, his reputation preceded him.

…

The Pakistan Army chief commands the army, but the CGS runs it.
The CGS (chief of general staff) is uniquely placed in the Pakistan Army, and wields a great deal of power. The Pakistan Army chief commands the army, but the CGS runs it—so they say in the army circles. While the chief is selected by the prime minister, the selection of the CGS is entirely the chief’s prerogative, which he does also on the basis of who among the lieutenant generals of the army he has an excellent chemistry with.

…

The chief General Bajwa’s office is hardly 25 metres from the office of the CGS. Put differently, power in Pakistan flowed from 25 metres from where I was standing.

…

We entered the CGS’s office through the main door, which led to a room with a huge table. On one side was a seating area and on the other side was the dining area. There were several doors which housed the offices of his deputies and officers. It looked like a living apartment—but it was not.

In the main hall, to the left, there was a large table which looked like the CGS’s workstation. There were crossed swords on the wall and miniature weapon systems placed on the table. The office looked magisterial, imperial, and awe-inspiring. On the right-hand side of the room, there was a small table which could be used as a meeting table or a dining table.

There were a few waiters standing around with trays of coloured drinks. There were a few adjacent rooms from where the uniformed waiters emerged with their trays and headgear.

…

General Akbar looked at me intently for a few seconds before uttering, “Welcome to Pakistan, and the GHQ.” He bears a strong-willed handshake and a miserly smile, and speaks thoughtfully. “Hope you had a good trip to the LoC (Line of Control).”

The awkwardness in the air was still refusing to go away.

“I must confess,” he said after a few more awkward seconds, “I was expecting to meet an older professor from India.”

“I will come again after a few years when I am older, general saab,” I responded with a smile.

He laughed loudly, as did his deputy and the young major, though not the waiters. Some of the awkwardness helpfully vanished. We got down to business.

“I have read your work, but you don’t seem to give much importance to the political factors behind ceasefire violations (CFVs). Since the arrival of the Modi government in new Delhi, CFVs are mostly caused by political triggers. Modi wants to show that he is a strong prime minister and hence the violence on the LoC. Rest assured, we will retaliate as and when we are fired at,” he said, beginning the conversation on an accusatory note.

I wasn’t too keen on getting into an argument with him.

…

I wasn’t there for a scoop. It was more of an intellectual pilgrimage.
“What about the question of terror? Is that not the most significant issue between India and Pakistan, including causing CFVs?” I asked him. He stressed two aspects relating to terrorism: one, how the Pakistan Army has been able to defeat terrorism in FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) and two, how what happens in Kashmir is spontaneous and locally driven.

“We only give diplomatic support,” he told me, sticking to the Pakistan Army’s official line on the matter. I didn’t want to be pushing my line beyond a point…I wasn’t there for a scoop. It was more of an intellectual pilgrimage.

…

“I will take your leave now,” Akbar said as he shook my hand. “I hope to see you again, here in Pakistan. Good luck with your work.” Mehmood saw me off at the door. “If you need anything while you are still here, please call me. Take my number from the major.”

I had learnt to recognise the significance of pleasantries and not to push their symbolic limits. I neither asked for the number nor was it given to me. The guards were once again still, the major saluted the general and took charge of me from him.

While we walked towards the major’s office, General Akbar’s cavalcade went past us. Everything had gone as per the major’s plans. In another 10 minutes, our car drove past the gate. I looked back for one last glimpse of the Pathan guard who stood still and tall at the gate, uninterested.

Excerpted with the permission of Penguin Random House India from The Line of Control by Happymon Jacob. We welcome your comments at ideas.india@qz.com.

 

[Path-Finder]

One would expect a liberal dose of subservience and docility when army soldiers meet their senior officers. But the interaction between the lowly soldier and the colonel sitting by my side in the army vehicle left me both puzzled and amazed.

The tall, bearded, well-built Pathan guard, wearing a bulletproof vest, with what looked like an AK-47 slung across his broad chest looked unfriendly and cold when he stiffly saluted the colonel.

The Pathan guard looked unfriendly and cold when he stiffly saluted the colonel.
“Assalamualaikum,” he said in a coarse, surly voice. The colonel was in his khaki uniform, with the insignia on it stating loud and clear that he was a mid-level officer of the Pakistan Army. The guard couldn’t have missed that, but the presence of a colonel made no difference to the man guarding gate number 1 of the Pakistan Army’s GHQ in Rawalpindi.

…

The Pathan guard went up to a cabin to make a call from the landline. I could see him through the cabin glass—not once did he relax as he made the phone call. Tall, well-built guards stood facing the street, observing the passing vehicles. They were as still as statues, and the only sign of movement could be found in their eyes, which surveyed the street surrounding the GHQ.

…

They had to be on the watch and be ruthlessly professional, not only because they were guarding the sanctum sanctorum of Pakistan’s most revered institution, but also because of the threat perception. In October 2009, ten Tehrik-i-Taliban gunmen dressed in military uniform attacked the GHQ, killing nine soldiers and two civilians, and infiltrated the complex, holding many more hostage.

…

The Pakistan Army’s logo shone bright and proud right in the middle of the gate, displaying two crossed swords, the crescent and star, in bottle green. The entrance, the guards, the buildings inside, and the general feel of the place conveyed a sense of imperiousness, professionalism, and power, perhaps indicating the place GHQ enjoyed in the Pakistani sociopolitical imagination. The Pakistan Army has always enjoyed pride of place in the minds of the Pakistani civilians.

…

Inside the GHQ
The GHQ is within the Rawalpindi garrison complex. There is nothing extraordinary about Rawalpindi, an old run-down city adjacent to the rather new and modern city of Islamabad, Pakistan’s flashy capital.

…

We had passed through the giant gate, but the well-secured GHQ complex had several more layers of security, with automatic roadblocks and spike barriers.

…

I always imagined the top generals of the Pakistan Army as belonging to some kind of exclusive society—bound by oath, blood, and honour, and mired in secrecy. The power they wield is legendary.

…

“That’s not quite right,” Tariq Ghazi once told me, “it’s like any other organisation with its own differences, internal politics, people trying to get ahead of each other. But once a decision is taken, we carry out those decisions in a professional manner.”

…

I took a deep breath as I walked into the office of general Akbar. Known to be a no-nonsense officer, his reputation preceded him.

…

The Pakistan Army chief commands the army, but the CGS runs it.
The CGS (chief of general staff) is uniquely placed in the Pakistan Army, and wields a great deal of power. The Pakistan Army chief commands the army, but the CGS runs it—so they say in the army circles. While the chief is selected by the prime minister, the selection of the CGS is entirely the chief’s prerogative, which he does also on the basis of who among the lieutenant generals of the army he has an excellent chemistry with.

…

The chief General Bajwa’s office is hardly 25 metres from the office of the CGS. Put differently, power in Pakistan flowed from 25 metres from where I was standing.

…

We entered the CGS’s office through the main door, which led to a room with a huge table. On one side was a seating area and on the other side was the dining area. There were several doors which housed the offices of his deputies and officers. It looked like a living apartment—but it was not.

In the main hall, to the left, there was a large table which looked like the CGS’s workstation. There were crossed swords on the wall and miniature weapon systems placed on the table. The office looked magisterial, imperial, and awe-inspiring. On the right-hand side of the room, there was a small table which could be used as a meeting table or a dining table.

There were a few waiters standing around with trays of coloured drinks. There were a few adjacent rooms from where the uniformed waiters emerged with their trays and headgear.

…

General Akbar looked at me intently for a few seconds before uttering, “Welcome to Pakistan, and the GHQ.” He bears a strong-willed handshake and a miserly smile, and speaks thoughtfully. “Hope you had a good trip to the LoC (Line of Control).”

The awkwardness in the air was still refusing to go away.

“I must confess,” he said after a few more awkward seconds, “I was expecting to meet an older professor from India.”

“I will come again after a few years when I am older, general saab,” I responded with a smile.

He laughed loudly, as did his deputy and the young major, though not the waiters. Some of the awkwardness helpfully vanished. We got down to business.

“I have read your work, but you don’t seem to give much importance to the political factors behind ceasefire violations (CFVs). Since the arrival of the Modi government in new Delhi, CFVs are mostly caused by political triggers. Modi wants to show that he is a strong prime minister and hence the violence on the LoC. Rest assured, we will retaliate as and when we are fired at,” he said, beginning the conversation on an accusatory note.

I wasn’t too keen on getting into an argument with him.

…

I wasn’t there for a scoop. It was more of an intellectual pilgrimage.
“What about the question of terror? Is that not the most significant issue between India and Pakistan, including causing CFVs?” I asked him. He stressed two aspects relating to terrorism: one, how the Pakistan Army has been able to defeat terrorism in FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) and two, how what happens in Kashmir is spontaneous and locally driven.

“We only give diplomatic support,” he told me, sticking to the Pakistan Army’s official line on the matter. I didn’t want to be pushing my line beyond a point…I wasn’t there for a scoop. It was more of an intellectual pilgrimage.

…

“I will take your leave now,” Akbar said as he shook my hand. “I hope to see you again, here in Pakistan. Good luck with your work.” Mehmood saw me off at the door. “If you need anything while you are still here, please call me. Take my number from the major.”

I had learnt to recognise the significance of pleasantries and not to push their symbolic limits. I neither asked for the number nor was it given to me. The guards were once again still, the major saluted the general and took charge of me from him.

While we walked towards the major’s office, General Akbar’s cavalcade went past us. Everything had gone as per the major’s plans. In another 10 minutes, our car drove past the gate. I looked back for one last glimpse of the Pathan guard who stood still and tall at the gate, uninterested.

Excerpted with the permission of Penguin Random House India from The Line of Control by Happymon Jacob. We welcome your comments at ideas.india@qz.com.

Should I waste my time reading this??

 

[HAIDER]

Should I waste my time reading this??

Should read Indian perspective ...even they trash about Pak army....

Its saying of Hazrat Ali , " stay close to your friends , but stay very close to your enemy" .

 

[Imad.Khan]

Should I waste my time reading this??

I read it, there isn't anything bad in it, but there isn't anything interesting either.

 

[Rank]

General Headquarters

 

[MastanKhan]

Should read Indian perspective ...even they trash about Pak army....

Its saying of Hazrat Ali , " stay close to your friends , but stay very close to your enemy" .

Hi,

Thank you---and that is what the young pakistanis don't understand---they want to show their arrogance and non-chalance---.

Just like what the indian air force general stated about pakistan air force being weak and getting weaker---and the pakistani kids act careless and carefree about it as if it means nothing---.

What a despicable character these pakistani kids and adults have been towards the welfare of their nation---.

They are so blind and so ignorant in their belief and the BULL SH-IT that the PAF has fed them---that the enemy which is 3 three times the numbers with 3 times the advanced weaponry---when its leading general states something---the sons of the soil don't even acknowledge how potent the threat is---.

 

[war&peace]

Hi,

Thank you---and that is what the young pakistanis don't understand---they want to show their arrogance and non-chalance---.

Just like what the indian air force general stated about pakistan air force being weak and getting weaker---and the pakistani kids act careless and carefree about it as if it means nothing---.

What a despicable character these pakistani kids and adults have been towards the welfare of their nation---.

They are so blind and so ignorant in their belief and the BULL SH-IT that the PAF has fed them---that the enemy which is 3 three times the numbers with 3 times the advanced weaponry---when its leading general states something---the sons of the soil don't even acknowledge how potent the threat is---.

Never underestimate your adversary.

 

[FuturePAF]

We need a Op-Force "Safron Corp" in the Pakistan Army. Not of the actual troops on a day to day basis, but the officers. From lowest commissioned officers and NCOs, all the way up to generals and even a mock Indian Army Chief, played by one of our corp commanders. They would eat, sleep, live as the Indians do. The goal would be to understand how the enemy thinks. As a rotating position (for at least 1-1.5 years) in an Army officers career, into and out of this flag officer force, it would be the best way to get into the mind set of the enemy. Going through this kind of training would also teach junior officers the differences between the enemy's bark and its actual bite. This would also be great for Psychological and Intelligence forces.

When exercises have to be done against Other Pakistani corps, the equipment, tactics, and general mindset can be taught to an elite corp of 20,000 troops. (training with elements of the Air Force and Navy would be integrated as well to mimic Col-Start Strike Corps as best possible) They would operate against regular Pakistani corps with the latest enemy strategies.

To fund the extra costs; Pakistan can offer the services of this Op-Force to our mid-east allies for long term exercises. This training will help keep Pakistani allies sharp as well. Pakistan can learn to simulate any number of enemies of our allies, through educating our officer corp as well as integrating modern information warfare, space warfare, EW, Cyber, Psych, Special Forces, and Intelligence operations.

Pakistan sits at the crossroads of Southern Eurasia, it needs to leverage its experience to redouble its defenses.

 

[Joe Shearer]

We need a Op-Force "Safron Corp" in the Pakistan Army. Not of the actual troops on a day to day basis, but the officers. From lowest commissioned officers and NCOs, all the way up to generals and even a mock Indian Army Chief, played by one of our corp commanders. They would eat, sleep, live as the Indians do. The goal would be to understand how the enemy thinks. As a rotating position (for at least 1-1.5 years) in an Army officers career, into and out of this flag officer force, it would be the best way to get into the mind set of the enemy. Going through this kind of training would also teach junior officers the differences between the enemy's bark and its actual bite. This would also be great for Psychological and Intelligence forces.

When exercises have to be done against Other Pakistani corps, the equipment, tactics, and general mindset can be taught to an elite corp of 20,000 troops. (training with elements of the Air Force and Navy would be integrated as well to mimic Col-Start Strike Corps as best possible) They would operate against regular Pakistani corps with the latest enemy strategies.

To fund the extra costs; Pakistan can offer the services of this Op-Force to our mid-east allies for long term exercises. This training will help keep Pakistani allies sharp as well. Pakistan can learn to simulate any number of enemies of our allies, through educating our officer corp as well as integrating modern information warfare, space warfare, EW, Cyber, Psych, Special Forces, and Intelligence operations.

Pakistan sits at the crossroads of Southern Eurasia, it needs to leverage its experience to redouble its defenses.

An impossible idea.

 

[FuturePAF]

An impossible idea.

Why So?

 

[MastanKhan]

We need a Op-Force "Safron Corp" in the Pakistan Army. Not of the actual troops on a day to day basis, but the officers. From lowest commissioned officers and NCOs, all the way up to generals and even a mock Indian Army Chief, played by one of our corp commanders. They would eat, sleep, live as the Indians do. The goal would be to understand how the enemy thinks. As a rotating position (for at least 1-1.5 years) in an Army officers career, into and out of this flag officer force, it would be the best way to get into the mind set of the enemy. Going through this kind of training would also teach junior officers the differences between the enemy's bark and its actual bite. This would also be great for Psychological and Intelligence forces.

When exercises have to be done against Other Pakistani corps, the equipment, tactics, and general mindset can be taught to an elite corp of 20,000 troops. (training with elements of the Air Force and Navy would be integrated as well to mimic Col-Start Strike Corps as best possible) They would operate against regular Pakistani corps with the latest enemy strategies.

To fund the extra costs; Pakistan can offer the services of this Op-Force to our mid-east allies for long term exercises. This training will help keep Pakistani allies sharp as well. Pakistan can learn to simulate any number of enemies of our allies, through educating our officer corp as well as integrating modern information warfare, space warfare, EW, Cyber, Psych, Special Forces, and Intelligence operations.

Pakistan sits at the crossroads of Southern Eurasia, it needs to leverage its experience to redouble its defenses.

Hi,

Why do you think I pushed for pak military to go to Yemen---. It could have created 8-10 divisions of battle groups---comprising of ground---air and naval units---

 

[FuturePAF]

Hi,

Why do you think I pushed for pak military to go to Yemen---. It could have created 8-10 divisions of battle groups---comprising of ground---air and naval units---

I disagree. Yemen is a political war where actually "winning" by Saudis would be to manage the Shia Yemenis like Shia Saudis. Getting involved in that political mess is a can of worms that would have caused blow back in Pakistan.

I don't advocate a mercenary force to prolong failed wars, but joint training for "active-defensive" wars. If the Saudis or the Emiratis could have repulsed Iraq in 1990, they would not have needed foreign troops to protect them. While these Gulf nations have the technology (maybe not the manpower), they don't have the kind of existential threat Pakistan faces, and one that requires it to constantly maintain capability parity with its adversaries. Should the Saudis need a defensive force from Pakistan that could be 8-10 battle group divisions or 100,000-150,000 soldiers then that is fine too. We just need to keep out of ventures like Yemen, where capturing the enemies capital doesn't end the war. A Pakistan peacekeeping force in Yemen would be fine after a political settlement. A Pakistan peacekeeping force in Syria with Turkish and Saudi Backing is also fine. Pakistan doesn't need to jump into the political squabble.

Pakistan's decades of peacekeeping experience should be the basis for Pakistan (with Saudi Financial and material support) under the OIC mandates to police the ends of wars. Pakistan and Saudi would cement their leadership and gain military experience. Pakistan can cements its military and political alliances this way, and the mutual defense treaties would maintain the peace among the Muslim countries. Arbitration under OIC guidance rather than going to the UN.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Why So?

A longish answer. Are you up for it? It's about diversity, and about how imitating such a situation is almost impossible for a Pakistani. If you know any Pakistani who has stayed in India for more than a week, ask him - or her.

 

[FuturePAF]

A longish answer. Are you up for it? It's about diversity, and about how imitating such a situation is almost impossible for a Pakistani. If you know any Pakistani who has stayed in India for more than a week, ask him - or her.

I understand that India is a diverse nation, and that "replicating" it in the form of an Op-Force is a tough task, but building a great understanding of your adversary may open not just military solutions, but diplomatic ones. Understanding why an Indian commander will choose to make one decision over the other may allow the Pakistani commander to choose a course of action that achieves an objective with less bloodshed on both sides.

In the end, If we can resolve the Kashmir issue, and keep water flowing in accordance with the Indus water treaty, slowly both sides can focus on economic development and trade. At which point this Saffron corp would be a better teaching tool to expedite collaborating rather then fight each other.

This can become an encompassing task for a section of the Pakistani military but it can pay off diplomatically, politically, an if necessary militarily. Its a long term strategic plan, but its not like we are going to change neighbors anytime soon. better to get to know them, then let the fog of war cause miscalculation.

Therefore, Pakistan needs this now more than ever.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I understand that India is a diverse nation, and that "replicating" it in the form of an Op-Force is a tough task, but building a great understanding of your adversary may open not just military solutions, but diplomatic ones. Understanding why an Indian commander will choose to make one decision over the other may allow the Pakistani commander to choose a course of action that achieves an objective with less bloodshed on both sides.

In the end, If we can resolve the Kashmir issue, and keep water flowing in accordance with the Indus water treaty, slowly both sides can focus on economic development and trade. At which point this Saffron corp would be a better teaching tool to expedite collaborating rather then fight each other.

This can become an encompassing task for a section of the Pakistani military but it can pay off diplomatically, politically, an if necessary militarily. Its a long term strategic plan, but its not like we are going to change neighbors anytime soon. better to get to know them, then let the fog of war cause miscalculation.

Therefore, Pakistan needs this now more than ever.

Out of a clear blue sky, a note like this one! I am gobsmacked.

Salut, Sir.

PS: About ten minutes later - still feeling concussed.
@Nilgiri @hellfire @Kaniska @Tom M

Look at these notes above (#8 and #12). I'm not saying they can achieve even a close degree of similarity (how would they get simply the variations within Tamil Nadu?) but the insight is hugely positive and encouraging. And so, so different from the usual crap.