only equal share is acceptable. nobody in our country with the right mind would go lower than this. the demarcation agreements of land and sea border between VN and CN are based on this principle. besides, we don´t want to become enemy of US/JP. our trust to China is low.
unrealistic scenario. a CH/PN alliance against VN/US/JP? I need a lot of imagination to see that happens.
It IS our rightful claim. There is no grey area. Just a simple matter of Chinese sneaking in when nobody was looking and then claiming it on the basis of............nothing. Just plain bullshit.
This is hugely off topic.Law, and Chinese maps which showed Kunlun range which was the Johnson Line/India's claim line.
(not said map).
To answer this question (of Aksai Chin) - we need to visit the exchange between Nehru and Enlai in the meeting in 1960, when the impasse really and fully came to the fore.
The root of the problem (and the answer) is that both countries use different claim systems to define its borders:
- India used legal treaties - and the last written one was the 1842 Chushul treaty.
- P.R China used de facto control - especially because unequal treaties were a reminder of European Imperialism deciding its borders, and it did not accept everything the ROC accepted (like McMahon line) although I don't think they took control from them legally..
The point is that the negotiations from the Indian side revolved entirely on the letter of the law - so all the details mentioned in the question were never utilized until the impasse was realized in the 1960 Nehru-Enlai meeting.
India had released 2whitepaperson its exchange with China between 1954-1959 (http://web.stanford.edu/group/to... and Historical Documents), but here is the relevant bit.
While British-India proposed several lines in Aksai Chin - China never acknowledged any of them in writing. But they did implicitly acknowledge the Macartney-Macdonald line till 1959. This made the Chushul treaty the last written treaty which meant that the Sikhs had retained Ladakh.
While the treaty itself basically codified maintaining status quo, instead of defining the border, Sino-Tibetan Ladakh usually includes some of Aksai Chin.Strangely, Chinese maps till 1920 didn't even show Aksai in China, while India never even had de facto control there.
It has been [wrongly] argued that Nehru performed a little bit ofskullduggery, in having India's maps unilaterally drawn in 1954 without communicating with PRC, when ALL previous Indian maps had shown Aksai as undemarcated - and that he should have pressed for the more feasibleMacartney-Macdonald line, which China had implicitly accepted till 1959 (before Dalai Lama fled). See THE TRUTH ABOUT 1962
WRONG - India was actually the first to publish correct and updated maps in 1954 which showed the full extent of India's claimed borders - China till 1959 continued to publish maps which showed arbitrary regions from Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Burma and Upper Assam (besides Arunachal) as its own, which made Nehru lose faith in the value of their promises. In fact it would go on to use these maps (while lying to Nehru these were "old ROC" maps which were pending revision) till 1961-1963 when they settled their borders with several countries like Burma, Pakistan and Nepal (leaving India and perhaps Bhutan pending). Page on sdstate.edu
The Macartney-Macdonald line using the Karakoram was neveractually acknowledged by the Chinese in 1899 in writing; they were weak at that time and eventually in 1912 (after Xinhai Revolution) the Qing was entirely expelled from the region. This essentially meant that the last written treaty was the Chushul of 1842.
Now here is where things get interesting - China herself admitted that India's legal position was stronger in Aksai Chin - a fact lost on those quoting Neville Maxwell.
A contemporary commentary on this mountain of evidence remarks that ‘it is quite evident that as far as consistency is concerned – and the length of time the claims have been advanced – the advantage lies with the Government of India’. No official Chinese maps showed Aksai Chin as part of China before the 1920s, and a Sinkiang map of the 1930s showed theKunlun rather than the Karakoram to have been the customary boundary – which had been the Indian claim all along. At least in the western sector (where the Chinese transgressions had taken place) India seemed to have the stronger case. ‘The Indian Government was both thorough and careful in presenting its case’, whereas the Chinese presentation was marked by a ‘maze of internal inconsistencies, quotations out of context, and even blatant and easily discernible falsehoods’.
Even if the Indians had the better of this argument overall, there remained a basic incompatibility of positions. Any evidence emanating from Western sources – even from unaffiliated travellers and itinerant Jesuit priests – was dismissed as tainted by ‘imperialism’. The Chinese would, up to a point, present counter-evidence, but in the end they would back off, saying that the border had not been delimited between the two countries as sovereign nations, that India could not claim the (ill-gotten) legacy of British India and that communist China did not stand by any treaties negotiated by anyone presuming to represent Tibet or China before the year of the revolution, 1949.
- India After Gandhi by Ramachandra Guha. Pg 234/235http://www.simplydecoded.com/wp-...
Now what happened was that between 1954-1957, Enlai coolly lied to Nehru, until a Tibetan MP in India visited Ladakh and found China had secretly built a road there, as did a publication from there.
India published two whitepapers which showed that the negotiations between 1954-1959 showed the boundary was uncontested, yet when the road was discovered, the pressure fell on Nehru.
It has often wrongly been said that he persisted out of stubbornness. False - he was famous for saying that not a single blade of grass grows there. No - his hand was forced by his the political Opposition (Jana Sanghis and Praja Parishad Mandals) as well internal Congressmen looking to upstage him. Everyone in Parliament was criticizing him and the press was calling for the use of force to remove China in Longju and clashes in Aksai Chin where 9 Indian casualties had occurred.
Throughout the second half of 1961 the Indian Parliament witnessed a series of bitter debates about the dispute with China. The prime minister himself was harried and hurt by a group of terriers at his heels. Three in particular nipped hard: Atal Behari Vajpayee of the Jana Sangh, Hem Barua of the Praja Socialist Party and N. G. Ranga of the Swatantra Party. Nehru was accused of turning a blind eye to Chinese ‘occupation’ of Indian territory and of placing himself magisterially above the fray.- Page 240 http://www.simplydecoded.com/wp-...
With this in mind, note how the 1960 meeting between Nehru and Enlai proceeded.
Both were exceptionally brilliant, educated and foreign trained statesmen with deep knowledge. Both argued with specific locations, villages, ridges and marker points - like described in the question. After trading charges for 2 days -
Enlai suggested an East-West swap as below:
the Chinese Government has not up to now made any demand in regard to the area south of the so-called McMahon line as a precondition or interim measure, and what I find difficult to understand is why the Indian Government should demand that the Chinese side withdraw one-sidedly from its western frontier area
The idea was that India's position was legally stronger in Aksai, butChina had reached its claim line (PARTLY) before India there. Similarly, India had occupied Arunachal (Tawang tract) in 1944(before PRC was founded) and NEFT in 1951 fully, even though China had the traditional claim there through Tibet. The suggestion was that each country could retain what it had perhaps illegitimately acquired.
Why did Nehru not play ball?
Its been said that if the whitepapers hadn't been published and India's position hadn't been public, we would have settled for the swap. Yet the public encroachment of GH219 in land claimed PUBLICLY by India, made Nehru's position untenable.
So the impasse continued.
- India kept claiming the legal position.
- China instead claimed de facto boundaries.
We all know the story from there.
But back to the original question -
- Chinese maps themselves showed the Johnson line along the Kunlun ranges which was basically India's claim line!
- India's legal position was equally strong in Arunachal Pradesh - it was a region ceded before PRC was founded. Thus Nehru refused to honor a status quo as it was all temporary - we see this throughout in his letters asking them to withdraw before negotiations. China repeatedly offered AP in 1914, 1960, 1961, 1962 (LAC), 1979 (Deng-Vajpayee). It was the first to propose it as the LAC and gave it legal sanction in 1993. But the point is that if a self-respecting nations "offers" you territory for swap - it means they don't realistically control it in the first place. Basically, you can't offer something if its not even yours nor do you de facto control it.
Today, its true that there will be a package solution - but its only because there is no other choice. Law or De Facto control ? You decide.
Geography?
Look at these two maps below which show the problem - China actually wants/needs areas South of the Karakoram - they built a second road near Kongka Pass in 1959 other than their highway - India claimed Lanak La was the boundary but 9 Indian policemen were killed in that confrontation.
As this map below shows, they reached most of their claim line by 1962 before the war (yellow) and India only lost the regions in red in the war. But should we claim the Karakoram based Macartney-Macdonald line when one/more of their new roads goes through the region (they built it in 1959 and its not the main GH219 highway) ?
So as such - bulk of the area was under de-facto Sinic control well before the war - but if India's interest is in claiming the region till the mountains of the Karakoram, we will claim the Macartney-Macdonald line (green)
A. G. Noorani has written on this extensively at Facts of history and Facing the truth.
Hmm... I think I now know what I wanted to know. Thank you for for reply.
It is estimated to rise about 20%-50% hence I used the word “up to” ，due to the so called “high standard” comes with TPP，but I forgot where I read it.
Still I would say that's a quite conservative estimation considering the strict labor/intellectual property/environmental laws and regulations TPP impose to the membersOf course theres no problems with signing up multiple FTAs，and long as they are pure FTAs dealing with only tariffs. But TPP is quite a different beast，as I said the rising production cost means a lot of Vietnam product only export to USJP，China and other countries won’t buy them since we have cheeper alternatives . The dependency of a single market is never a good thing，VN is going to be like another Mexico，praying to god everyday the US won’t get hit by another economic crisis...so joining the TPP is just like “choosing sides” and a big commitment to make
Yea tell that to the Russians who can‘t even find apples and tomatoes to buy when the sanctions hit
I´m afraid we are 1,000 miles off-topic now.It is estimated to rise about 20%-50% hence I used the word “up to” ，due to the so called “high standard” comes with TPP，but I forgot where I read it.
Of course theres no problems with signing up multiple FTAs，and long as they are pure FTAs dealing with only tariffs. But TPP is quite a different beast，as I said the rising production cost means a lot of Vietnam product only export to USJP，China and other countries won’t buy them since we have cheeper alternatives . The dependency of a single market is never a good thing，VN is going to be like another Mexico，praying to god everyday the US won’t get hit by another economic crisis...so joining the TPP is just like “choosing sides” and a big commitment to make
Yea tell that to the Russians who can‘t even find apples and tomatoes to buy when the sanctions hit
How dare you！I thought you were our friend and a Chindian
The way I see it，best case scenario for Vietnam is China recognize their mainland EEZ and That’s It. Never expect China to give up any island in Spratly，let alone recognize Vietnam occupation
Right now China stills somehow sees Vietnam as a little commie brother and would not like to resort to force over spratly，but if VN decides to join the US camp，China will not hesitate to take back spratly by force as a way of “cutting loss”，just like Putin did with Crimea.
If VN stays in China/Russia camp，they might hold on to these islands a little bit longer，but eventually I expect them to come to negotiation table to cede the spratly，in exchange for something else.
