Vietnam Defence Forum

[xiao qi]

But I will tell you something, Japan is one the favorite countries that chinese tourists travel to and when they go there, they see a different type of country and different type of people that what the chinese regime tells them.

Just 2 months ago when in China, I was talking to a girl that is a close friend of mine, she had just come back from a 1 week free trip to Japan that her company gave to their best marketing people as a reward. She was shocked about the differences between Japan and China, she kept saying: people are very nice and polite, they go out of their way to help us, everything is safe, don't have to worry about toxic / fake foods, don't have to check anything, you can trust things, everything is so clean, I wish China would be like Japan.

Propaganda and brainwashing only go so far, eventually the pendulum turns and when that happens, the chinese regime will be in trouble and they know it which is a reason why they push so hard right now.

Yes, you are right, Even some Chinese in PDF already asked us Why we worship Japanese, they are evil.. But Likely Japanese is upper class in Asia. The hatred from WW2 is not easy to forget with Chinese.

 

[Carlosa]

Yes, you are right, Even some Chinese in PDF already asked us Why we worship Japanese, they are evil.. But Likely Japanese is upper class in Asia. The hatred from WW2 is not easy to forget with Chinese.

Step by step my friend, people come back from their travel and they talk to their family and all their friends, the word spreads fast. Its not just upper class anymore, there is a large middle class of easy 200 million in China and growing fast. They love to travel, usually to Thailand and Japan.

 

[Carlosa]

For starter, anyone who believes in the line "China's peaceful rise" is an idiot, and I say that kindly. Diplomats would use a different word but the intention to designate such a believer would be the same.

Am NOT saying China does not have the right to improve her lot. As a capitalist, I say 'Show Me The Money'. So to China, by all means, rise all you want.

But there are two major factors hard at work in the Chinese leadership's thinking.

One -- It is about security for the Chinese people as they lift themselves and their country out of that horrible experiment with communism.

Two -- That 'century of humiliation' is a constant emotional weight upon that leadership.

For item one, nothing wrong with that. But for item two, according to the Chinese leadership, since it is not possible to erase what happened, the only possible thing to do is to create a counterweight. Humiliation is a traumatic emotional event. To recover requires the typical 'eye for an eye' response. By that, I do not mean that China must seek vengeance against those who humiliated her, ie the Europeans. But what I mean is that the appropriate response for being poor is to be wealthy, for ignorance it is education, for weakness it is strength, for loneliness it is companionship, and so on. Since China was once a victim, the matching response is to make someone a victim of China's strength and power. That is the emotional counterweight China want to create.

For China, a peaceful rise is possible only if others do not resist what China want to take from them or deny them access to. It was a shrew rhetorical move to use precisely those words as they create an initial condition in the receiver's mind. Those words were not meant for those who have a history with China, such as our Viet Nam, for example, and that history have not been so peaceful. Rather, those words were meant for observers who have no such history and willing, in their own minds, to create a blank slate for China. China lose nothing if those words do not work for everyone, but for the few that worked, the gains will be enormous in terms of long term diplomatic and economic benefits.

China's bullying of her immediate neighbors is an inevitability as believed by observers, and the demand to recognize China's claim to the entirety of the South China Sea confirmed that inevitability. Obviously, China cannot do to Viet Nam what the Europeans did to her, but China must do something -- anything -- to start creating that emotional counterweight. That land grab of the sea surface was the perfect tactic that put all her immediate neighbors on notice of their vulnerabilities and possibly weakness to resist.

Viet Nam must resist China's claim to the entirety of the South China Sea. Resist in every avenue, from military to diplomacy to rhetoric. Viet Nam WILL be the first target of China's intention to humiliate someone -- anyone. Lose this fight and it will be worse for Viet Nam than how it was for the country when it was partitioned during the Vietnam War.

Excellent analysis and very correct in all points.

Every analysis that TRULY understand how chinese people think, hits the right point by always mentioning the century of humiliation, the opium wars and the Japanese invasion. Those are the key points that shape the thinking and actions of the ruling class and the nationalists in China.

That's why the chinese have utmost contempt for the rule of international law or by any agreement they sign as they just demonstrated when they said that they were not bound by the agreement with the British about Hong Kong and that it was just a historical document. They feel they are justified to do as they please and take as much as they can take. They hate the west (Russians included, they simple been left for later, the Russians know it very well). They will ruthlessly say and promise whatever they need to do in order to achieve their objectives as we can easily see.

At this point, I feel that there is a fork in the road for Vietnam since now the chinese had not hesitated to threaten and there is only one way out, back down and kowtow or resit and fight.

The situation at Vanguard Bank was clear enough, Vietnam backed down and that can be ok in the short term, retreat, plan your options, talk to your friends and possible allies and decide what the final course of action will be and that's where the fork in the road will be. There is no middle road, backing down again means backing down every time and accept to be subservient to China and the chinese will keep locking VN further and further into their box. The chinese understand the Vietnamese leadership very well, they are very similar, they know how to blackmail them and how to bribe them. Once the process start, they will lock them in. Only the will of the Vietnamese people can prevent that and the regime knows that if they are seen as backing down and kowtowing to China, they lose their legitimacy to govern and that's what scare them the most. Retention of power is their number one priority.

So the stage is set, we'll see what the Vietnamese leadership decides to do, confronting China requires powerful friends and it will include massive economic pain. The Vietnamese regime allowed Vietnam to be much more economically dependent to China than what it needed to be and that gives China a powerful blackmail option. They use that option all the time with countries that don't follow their demands. Interesting times ahead.

 

[gambit]

Vietnam on the other hand, needs to be humiliated and put in its place (as the chinese would say), purely for tactical reasons. Its the case of "kill the chicken to scare the monkey".

Correct.

It is one thing to say 'Do not f*ck with me.' It is another to back it up. You have a new kid in the playground. Total unknown. If he says 'Do not f*ck with me.' and looks like he can back up what he said, most will leave him alone. A few may test the boundaries but if the new kid resists, the testers will retreat.

But China is not that new kid. She has been around for a few thousand yrs. Her presence and power rose and waned as conditions compelled. Then all of a sudden, it was the new kids who bullied and subdued China. Then even worse, it was not of her own efforts that she was liberated but that of another bunch of new kids.

Today, it is not enough for China to say 'Do not f*ck with me.' She has to back up those words. Just as China was once unjustly a victim, there has to be a target for China's rage, unfairly or not.

Saddam Hussein wanted Kuwaiti oil. But even dictators needs justifications, no matter how specious, for their actions. So Saddam Hussein invented the justification that Kuwait was stealing Iraqi oil underground. Then came the invasion. Same with Hitler and Germany. Other countries were constraining Germans and Germany. The Versailles Treaty was unjust. Germans in other countries were being oppressed. And so on.

China invented the 'fact' that the South China Sea 'rightfully' belongs to China. The material for this is so diaphanous that Victoria's Secret could use it for a new line of lingerie. Viet Nam's resistance serves dual purposes. To cast China as a victim and once again unjustly. And due to China's new prowess, Viet Nam will be the example of that 'Do not f*ck with me.' declaration. China may not want a war, but she NEED a defeated foe.

If Viet Nam is defeated, whether militarily or diplomatically, JPN and SKR will submit to China so some degrees. While they have the vast Pacific Ocean to ship their goods to the US, Asia is still their breadbasket and they need the SCS, not just to survive but also to grow.

 

[Carlosa]

Correct.

It is one thing to say 'Do not f*ck with me.' It is another to back it up. You have a new kid in the playground. Total unknown. If he says 'Do not f*ck with me.' and looks like he can back up what he said, most will leave him alone. A few may test the boundaries but if the new kid resists, the testers will retreat.

But China is not that new kid. She has been around for a few thousand yrs. Her presence and power rose and waned as conditions compelled. Then all of a sudden, it was the new kids who bullied and subdued China. Then even worse, it was not of her own efforts that she was liberated but that of another bunch of new kids.

Today, it is not enough for China to say 'Do not f*ck with me.' She has to back up those words. Just as China was once unjustly a victim, there has to be a target for China's rage, unfairly or not.

Saddam Hussein wanted Kuwaiti oil. But even dictators needs justifications, no matter how specious, for their actions. So Saddam Hussein invented the justification that Kuwait was stealing Iraqi oil underground. Then came the invasion. Same with Hitler and Germany. Other countries were constraining Germans and Germany. The Versailles Treaty was unjust. Germans in other countries were being oppressed. And so on.

China invented the 'fact' that the South China Sea 'rightfully' belongs to China. The material for this is so diaphanous that Victoria's Secret could use it for a new line of lingerie. Viet Nam's resistance serves dual purposes. To cast China as a victim and once again unjustly. And due to China's new prowess, Viet Nam will be the example of that 'Do not f*ck with me.' declaration. China may not want a war, but she NEED a defeated foe.

If Viet Nam is defeated, whether militarily or diplomatically, JPN and SKR will submit to China so some degrees. While they have the vast Pacific Ocean to ship their goods to the US, Asia is still their breadbasket and they need the SCS, not just to survive but also to grow.

That's right, we have a new situation now, the bully said: "stop the drilling or we attack your islands", that's the new chinese way of behaving in this region, they already feel that is almost theirs. Bad situation and there hasn't even been a comment or condemnation from USA, Trump is busy dealing with a lot of internal issues there and they'll have to deal with North Korea soon, so they don't need to open up new fronts right now and of course, the chinese understand that very well.

Bad situation all around.

 

[Carlosa]

China's Window of Opportunity in the South China Sea
Domestic and international stars have aligned to give China a chance to put forward a solution.

By Xue Li and Cheng Zhangxi
July 26, 2017

http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/chinas-window-of-opportunity-in-the-south-china-sea/

The South China Sea (SCS) issue has now arrived at a critical point. China should take the advantages of this opportunity to adjust its South China Sea approach – to steer from a “unilateral win” formula to “multilateral win” formula, so as to take lead in the problem-solving process. This new approach should drive the South China Sea problem-solving process to a faster track, in the process clearing out major obstacles to building a Southeast Asian hub for the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR).

Based on different opinions regarding sovereignty over islands and reefs and maritime interests and rights, the claimant parties in the South China Sea can be divided into two groups: mainland China and Taiwan, and the four ASEAN claimants (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei). The majority of the ASEAN non-claimants, along with some outsiders — led by European countries, the United States, Japan and Australia — tend to support the claims made by the ASEAN claimants, whereas a minority of the ASEAN non-claimants, Russia, South Korea, and some other outsiders stand neutral. Although there also are some disputes between the ASEAN claimants themselves, for the moment these disputes are considered “minor” in the face of their mutual confrontation with China.

At the moment, the South China Sea is in a relatively peaceful period, but over years of development, it has already been shaped into a trifold game between China and the United States; China and the ASEAN claimants; and China and the ASEAN as a whole. The game between China and the United States is the major conflict, but the game that sees the ASEAN claimants using ASEAN against China is increasingly tense. Because the South China Sea issue is already a flashpoint in China-ASEAN relations, it is considered an indicator for China’s overall foreign policy, as well a major tool to the United States’ Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy. The South China Sea issue is also a key security question for ASEAN countries and seen as a touchstone for the ASEAN security cooperation. China, meanwhile, has called for downplaying the South China Sea issue whilst strengthening political, economic, and cultural cooperation with ASEAN countries, but the outcomes so far are barely visible.

The ASEAN countries believe that China has become increasingly assertive regarding the South China Sea issue over the past few years. Along with China’s rise, this puts them in an even more disadvantageous position. As a response, the ASEAN claimants propelled the internationalization of the South China Sea issue and became more reliant on the United States and other foreign countries to deal with their security concerns. Only when China and the ASEAN agree on a binding working framework for handling the disputes will the ASEAN claimants then begin economic and cultural cooperation with China, and maybe venture attempts to strengthen security cooperation as well.

It is highly unlikely to see the South China Sea issue resolved in the short term. However, the South China Sea issue may not necessarily get in the way of promoting cooperation between China and the ASEAN claimants. Of course, this outcome requires a relatively more relaxed external environment and a smoother internal environment. The external environment mainly concerns the degree of intervention made by outside countries (i.e. major powers). The internal environment on the other hand, mainly refers to the domestic political stance of the ASEAN claimants and the resulting political relationships between these countries. On both fronts, China currently has a unique window of opportunity to improve its relationships with ASEAN claimants.

External Environment

Considering that populism and the anti-globalization trend have made developed countries less concerned about issues abroad, there is currently a relatively relaxed external environment for resolving the South China Sea issue. For the purpose of this analysis, Japan, the European Union, India, and Russia form the major external powers, with the United States taking the lead.

The Asia-Pacific region is in no doubt one of the United States’ most concerned areas. As an experienced hegemon, the United States is well aware that it has to give way to China’s rise, but in the meantime, it is hoping to slow down this process, as well as to increase the cost of the rise of China’s maritime power. In order to achieve this, the Obama administration shifted its military deployments to the Second Island Chain, strengthened the mobility of the First Island Chain, and urged its allies and partners to make further input so as to form an arc (from northern Japan to Darwin, Australia) to counterbalance China. However, the new Trump administration, whilst promising to “make America great again” and emphasizing “America first,” is likely to place more stress on domestic development and demand other countries assume more responsibilities.

Nevertheless, the Trump administration will continue to counterbalance China, but in practice, it might adopt a more tiered approach (e.g. prioritizing the North Korean nuclear issue first, and then the East China Sea and Taiwan, then the South China Sea, and so on) rather than carry on the arc strategy employed by the Obama administration.

If “core interest” is considered as vital to a nation as the brain is to the human body, freedom of navigation, though critical for the U.S. Navy, is not one of the United States’ core interests. The key to the U.S. Navy’s definition of freedom of navigation is the right to conduct military activities (including intelligence gathering) within other countries’ exclusive economic zones. To this end, the United States defined freedom of navigation in its own favor after World War II and promoted its stand with its much superior naval power. The reason behind the establishment of the Freedom of Navigation Program in 1979 is to continuously promote the United States’ maritime claims using its own domestic laws and regulations, even after the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) took effect, and to challenge what the United States regards as “excessive maritime claims.”

The Freedom of Navigation Program in practice carries out out Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) to challenge maritime claims by both allies and opponents. The South China Sea is a major area for carrying out FONOPs, but it is not the only one. In this context, FONOPs in the South China Sea are more of a bargaining chip, just like FONOPs in the Black Sea during the Cold War. Furthermore, after the United States lost its “Filipino arm” when President Rodrigo Duterte scaled back military cooperation with the United States, the significance of FONOPs is also greatly reduced. All told, then, the external environment is more conducive than anytime in recent memory for China to pursue peace in the South China Sea.

Internal Environment

The South China Sea issue involves mainland China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. The six other ASEAN countries are non-claimants; of these, Indonesia and Singapore are more influential on the South China Sea issue.

ASEAN Non-Claimants

Even though Indonesia is not one of the parties claiming disputed islands and reefs, there are about 50,000 square kilometers of exclusive economic zone north of its Natuna Islands situated within China’s nine-dash line. In order to strengthen its claim, not only has Indonesia been sending immigrants to the Natuna Islands for the past 20 years or so, in recent times, it also boosted military deployments to the area. Overall, though, Indonesia seems to be more discrete and realistic about the South China Sea issue.

When Joko “Jokowi” Widodo assumed the presidency in 2014, he put forward a vision for Indonesia to become a “global maritime fulcrum.” With a willingness to promote economic development, he pledged his support to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. China regards Indonesia as one of the key players in building the Belt and Road. At this stage, China-Indonesia cooperation has been continuously deepening. More to the point, Jokowi announced publicly during his 2014 election campaign that the South China Sea issue is so complicated that he would not to pay much attention to it unless a good potential solution emerges. That indicates Jokowi will probably keep a sound relationship with China — although during his re-election campaign in 2019, Jokowi might try taking a stronger hand toward the issue in view to fend off his conservative rival, General Prabowo Subianto.

Singapore, as the only developed country of the ASEAN members, with a high dependency on sea trade, is committed to promote ASEAN integration and play a “chief of staff” role. When it comes to the South China Sea issue, Singapore is keen on acting strongly against China. This, in the past few years, has inevitably led to turbulence in the China-Singapore relationship. However, given that Singapore’s economy is highly compatible with China’s, it has neither the ability nor the intention to openly confront China. Vietnam and the Philippines’ preferences to not publicly confront China are also holding back Singapore’s ambitions. These together indicate that Singapore will not pursue a radical SCS policy in the near future.

ASEAN Claimants

Of the four ASEAN claimants, Vietnam and the Philippines clearly have more disagreements with China, and they advocate using a multilateral framework to solve the issue. The Philippines in the past even attempted to pursue its interests through third-party arbitration by filing a case with the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Malaysia and Brunei, in contrast, are more settled about the South China Sea issue. Politically, they are more prone to using a bilateral framework to solve the issue, while managing differences and promoting cooperation.

There are two groups of political elites within the Vietnamese government – the Southern Clique and the Northern Clique. The new Vietnamese government is mainly formed by the Northern Clique, which is by and large China-friendly. Thus China and Vietnam are likely to maintain a relatively friendly relationship until 2021. As history suggests, the delimitation of land borders and the maritime boundary in the Beibu Gulf (Gulf of Tonkin) were all achieved under friendly circumstances. In this sense, Vietnam and China stand a good chance of coming to some common understanding over the South China Sea issue under the current Vietnamese government.

Likewise, there is a window of opportunity with the Philippines. The South China Sea policy adopted by former Philippine President Benigno Aquino III drove China-Philippines relationship to a nadir, and directly caused the “globalization” of the SCS disputes. After Duterte’s inauguration in 2016, the Philippines’ revised SCS policy has made great improvements to the China-Philippines relationship. At present, the prospects for China-Philippines ties are no less optimistic than they were during the Arroyo period, and the impact of SCS issue is kept to a minimum. Until the next presidential election, due in 2022, Duterte is very likely to continue this friendly approach, and limit the impact of SCS issue on bilateral relations.

As for Malaysia, since Prime Minister Najib Razak came to power in 2009, China-Malaysia relations has seen their best era in history. Najib insists on dealing with the SCS issue through a bilateral framework, and quietly resolved the recent Luconia Breakers dispute. Compare that to the previous prime ministers who set foot on Swallow Reef to claim ownership. At the moment, Najib is most likely to continue his premiership for another four years after the next election.

Finally, there has been an obvious increase in economic cooperation between China and Brunei in recent years. When it comes to jointly developing offshore oil and gas resources, Brunei holds a positive attitude and co-signed a joint declaration with China on the subject in 2013. Given that this joint development was hugely delayed due to Malaysia’s objection, a commonly understood solution to the South China Sea issue is in no doubt in Brunei’s favor.

Taiwan

Taiwan’s South China Sea stand mainly comes from the South China Sea Policy Guidelines established in 1993, which clearly stated that the waters within the nine-dash line are its “historic waters.” Although Taiwan is very unlikely to have a seat at the negotiation table over the South China Sea issue, there is still the possibility that it could carry out cooperation with the ASEAN countries. However, given her leanings toward “Taiwan independence” it’s likely that Tsai Ing-wen will be less concerned about the South China Sea issue than Ma Ying-jeou was.

Mainland China

In China, Xi Jinping might be the most powerful leader since Mao Zedong. While he is fully capable of making and implementing major foreign policies (e.g. the Belt and Road Initiative), including pursuing a resolution to the South China Sea disputes. The key lies in making the case that such foreign policy initiatives are necessary.

The Belt and Road Initiative is a top-level blueprint for foreign relations determined by the new Chinese government under Xi. Centering on economic development, it emphasizes promoting infrastructure and manufacturing throughout the Asia-Pacific, Eurasia, and even parts of Africa. In the promotion of the BRI, China has shown the leadership and responsibility of a great power to some extent, but at the same time, it also should realize that there still are political, security, and cultural differences slowing down the process. One of those is the South China Sea issue.

As the biggest coastal country of the South China Sea, it falls to China to come up with a “win-win” plan to sort out the SCS issue and take the lead in the process. Other claimants do not have the capacity to do so. At present, China is swinging between “protecting rights first” and “keeping SCS stability first.” The former focuses on China’s own national interests rather than those of the other claimants; the latter focuses on controlling differences, so as to keep the impact of the South China Sea issue to a minimum and carry on cooperation in other aspects. Given that both of these ideas center on China’s unilateral interests, they neither facilitate avoiding tensions nor help resolve the fundamental issue.

In addition to promoting economic cooperation with its neighboring countries, China, as a rising great power, should also take into consideration their security concerns and gain their trust in cooperation with China. Otherwise, China will see its neighboring countries turn to other partners. China must remember that the SCS dispute is the most important regional security issue for ASEAN countries.

As it stands, the SCS disputes have already gotten in the way of building the Southeast Asian hub of the Maritime Silk Road (MSR). Not only did the disputes sabotage the enthusiasm of the ASEAN claimants, but also wounded the participation of non-claimants. This is the main reason why Vietnam continuously replies that it “has to further observe” the Belt and Road Initiative before making a decision. The South China Sea issue is now like an infection in the China-ASEAN relationship; the treatment is a binding multilateral working framework.

Based on the above discussion, both the external environment and internal environment for resolving the South China Sea issue are in China’s favor at the moment. Should China miss this time window, there is a good chance that this “infection” will flare up once again at the slightest touch.

The next few years provide a window of opportunity for the claimants to work together to push forward a solution to the South China Sea issue. Rather than settling in to this seemingly peaceful but temporary situation, China should take this opportunity to initiate a new approach to the South China Sea issue so as to take the lead in the problem-solving process and fundamentally end this passive situation. The key to this new approach should be the idea of a win-win, comprehensive plan to resolve the South China Sea issue. Not only is this China’s obligation as a rising great power, but it is also the solution to the security concerns of the Southeast Asian countries, as well as the key the building the Southeast Asian hub of the MSR.

Xue Li is a Professor at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Cheng Zhangxi has a Ph.D. from the University of St. Andrews.

 

[Viet]

There are other news around the world

Cambodia

The communist chief Nguyen Phu Trong on a visit to Cambodia. He shows generousity by donating $25 million, 50 computers and 2 ambulance cars for the Khmer. But as everyone knows it, nothing is free in this world, Vietnam expects economic and strategic benefits in return.

Russia

Reporter: It is reported that Vietnam has expressed interest in ordering the third pair of Russian Gepard-3.9 Frigates, can you tell us about the actual status?

Mr. Mikheev: Both sides have discussed the project, we hope to make the decision soon.

Ông Mikheev - Tổng giám đốc Rosoboronexport (người ngồi giữa) trả lời các phóng viên quốc tế tại Triển lãm MAKS 2017. Ảnh: Bình Nguyên

Besides the first batch of T90S tanks to be delivered this year, Russia will transfer specially made armor verhicles for Vietnam infantry and equipment for Vietnamese Navy. So Mikheev, General Director of Rosoboronexport.

 

[xiao qi]

Vietnamese and Lao armies to boost technical cooperation
PANO – Senior Lieutenant General Be Xuan Truong, member of the Party Central Committee and Deputy Minister of National Defense hosted a reception for his Lao counterpart Lieutenant General Esamay Luangvanxay, who is also Director of the General Department of Techniques of the Lao People’s Army (LPA) on July 25 at the defense ministry’s headquarters.

Senior Lieutenant General Be Xuan Truong receiving his Lao counterpart Lieutenant General Esamay Luangvanxay on July 25
At the reception, the two senior officers held that bilateral defense ties have been enhanced practically and effectively over the past time.


The guest briefed the host on the outcomes of his previous meeting with commanders of the General Department of Techniques of the Vietnam People’s Army (VPA). The two sides reached consensus on technical cooperation in the time to come, with a focus on building long-term training programs and providing technical supply for strategic units of the Lao Defense Ministry and the LPA’s General Department of Techniques.

For his part, the host affirmed that the Vietnamese defense leaders would always create favorable conditions for the two armies’ technical sectors to boost cooperation, contributing to serving each country’s national defense and security.

 

[Viet]

SOUTHEAST ASIA POLITICS
South Vietnam flag still flies high
Vietnam's bid to pressure Australia into banning the flag shows how sensitive the symbol remains more than 40 years after the fall of Saigon

By HELEN CLARK
PERTH, JULY 23, 2017 1:33 PM

Ethnic Vietnamese fly the flag of former South Vietnam in Orange Country, California. Photo: Wikimedia Commons

Buried at the bottom of a detailed account of Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull’s trip to the G-20 Summit were a few lines on his meeting with Vietnam’s Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc. Though Vietnam is not a part of the G-20, a grouping of the top 20 economies in the world, Phuc and other leaders travelled to the event for meetings on the sidelines.

“In his discussion with Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc, the Vietnamese leader raised concerns about five local councils in Australia that reportedly support the flying of the ‘yellow’ flag, which was the flag of the former government of South Vietnam,” reported Fairfax media. “Mr Nguyen asked Mr Turnbull to exert his influence and stop the practice.”

How Turnbull responded to this request in their private bilateral is not known. Like the United States, Australia has been asked to repress the flag before but it still flies freely in many areas of the country where Vietnamese diaspora have settled, many of them refugees from the country previously known as the Republic of Vietnam.

Though an evergreen issue with Hanoi’s communist-led government, not much has been said about it in recent years, especially as new generations of young overseas Vietnamese return to start businesses and repair ties.

Vietnam’s government has long tried to quash the old flag flown by its diaspora in remembrance of the country’s previous division between capitalism and communism, so far to little avail. US freedom of speech laws mean it cannot be banned there.

In 2015, the issue arose uncomfortably in the US at an event marking the 40-year anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War.

A parade marking the 40th anniversary of the fall of Saigon in Ho Chi Minh City on April 30, 2015. Photo: AFP/Hoang Dinh Nam


The US government would not allow the South Vietnamese flag to be flown at its Camp Pendleton base, which received around 50,000 of the refugees who fled the fall of Saigon immediately after the war, as bases may not fly the flag of nations the government does not recognize.

It is, however, recognized as a symbol of the Vietnamese community in a dozen or so US states, including in California’s Orange County and other areas of the state with large ethnic Vietnamese populations. The Garden Grove City Council in California earlier this year moved to reaffirm a previous 2003 resolution that the South Vietnam yellow and red horizontal striped flag is the only recognized flag of Vietnam.

The well-organized and politically vocal community in California, whose older generation leans strongly Republican, flies the flag at various community events. Banned inside Vietnam, pro-democracy groups like Viet Tan also hoist the flag at their overseas events calling for political change. Vietnam War veterans also display it during commemorative events.

Vietnam War Vets take part in a July 4th parade in Santa Barbara, California on June 23, 2017. Photo: iStock/Getty Images


In Australia, the Maribyrnong Council in Melbourne, home to suburbs like Footscray with large Vietnamese populations, recognizes and flies the flag.

Viv Nguyen, then the vice-president of the Vietnamese Community of Australia (VCA), told the neighborhood newspaper Star Weekly in 2015, “If people feel strongly about the red flag, good for them, but the [South Vietnam] flag is not representative of another sovereignty,” she said.

“It represents a journey this community started from a very tough beginning.” The “yellow flag” will fly on special days, like Australia’s ANZAC Day, which commemorates the war dead each year with a dawn service.

While allowed at the small council level, Canberra firmly forbids the VCA from bringing the flag to official events in the capital. The Hanoi government regards the flag as illegal and it is strictly banned within Vietnam.

Vietnam’s attempt at political inference might seem unusual for Australia, which more often worries about Chinese political influence or meddling in its domestic affairs.

These have been many, from attempts to influence the Chinese diaspora’s opinions on China’s naval sovereignty to the Kimberley Process debacle in Perth earlier this year, when Chinese delegates interrupted the opening speeches and refused to allow the event to continue until the Taiwanese delegation had left.

However, Hanoi also has a long history of keeping tabs on Vietnamese refugee communities that settled in the West after the war, as documented vividly in Viet Thanh Nguyen’s Pulitzer Prize-winning novel The Sympathizer.

Australia’s Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, US President Donald Trump and Vietnam’s Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc with their spouses at the G-20 Summit in Hamburg, Germany, on July 7, 2017. Photo: AFP/John Macdougall


Nothing much will likely come of Phuc’s overture to Turnbull over the flag, something the well-educated and worldly people at Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs would, or should, know.

Vietnam has recently launched yet another harsh crackdown on its dissidents, sentencing several to prison terms for their political opinions. Communist authorities view the flag and the people who fly it overseas as linked to campaigns aimed at undermining or even toppling its rule.

The VCA is regarded with suspicion in Hanoi and its members and associates are firmly banned from returning to Vietnam. Indeed, they are often turned back at the gates of Ho Chi Minh City’s airport upon landing.

Last year the VCA organized large protests in Australian cities against the Vietnamese government’s handling of the Formosa pollution scandal, viewed as one of the country’s worst ever environmental disasters. Many protest leaders were jailed. The Australian protests called on Turnbull to bring political pressure to bear on Hanoi.

Vietnamese protesters demonstrate at a rally in downtown Hanoi on May 1, 2016 against a toxic spill that caused massive fish deaths on country’s central coast. Photo: AFP/Hoang Dinh Nam


Carlyle Thayer, one of the world’s leading experts on Vietnamese politics and security affairs, gave a talk on human rights to the VCA in Dapto, New South Wales, last year.

For this, Thayer believes he may have been prevented from attending the upcoming Center for Strategic and International Studies’ (CSIS) 7th South China Sea conference in Washington due to pressure from Hanoi. Hanoi’s state-run Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV) and its associated Foundation for East Sea Studies will be represented and help to fund the conference.

Thayer, an Australian national, said that DAV had imposed a ‘no Australians’ rule for a conference it held on the South China Sea in 2016. CSIS has since said its decision on participants for its conference was made independently.

The dust-up could reflect quiet diplomatic tension between Vietnam and Australia since last year over an incident that saw Australian envoys unceremoniously sent home from Vietnam. There was also displeasure in Hanoi when its aid was cut, owing to overall huge cuts by Australia and Vietnam’s raised status as a lower-middle income country.

Ethnic Vietnamese celebrate Australia Day at Melbourne City Centre by flying South Vietnam’s flag. Photo: iStock/Getty Images


Still, Australian foreign minister Julie Bishop and her counterpart Pham Binh Minh met late last year in Canberra to agree upon a bilateral 2016 – 2019 Joint Action Plan. The plan, confirmed by Turnbull, is to elevate Australian-Vietnamese ties to a “strategic partnership”, whereas it currently stands at a lesser “enhanced comprehensive partnership.”

Former Australian leader Kevin Rudd decided in 2009 against improving ties to such a degree. His government’s use of the word ‘enhanced’ was a diplomatic compromise. Despite Vietnam’s previous drive to boost strategic ties, sources say it is Australia that is now pushing for better relations in light of the rising strategic uncertainties in the Donald Trump era.

Possibly as a result, Phuc asked Turnbull for the removal of the South Vietnam flags at a time when Australia is inclined for favors. The troubled Turnbull, still unpopular in Australia and within his own party, will almost certainly not grant Phuc’s wish, knowing the public fight he’ll face over a freedom of expression issue if he does.

Last year the VCA’s Brisbane chapter forced the name change of a hipster Vietnamese restaurant known as Uncle Ho, clipped reference to Vietnamese revolutionary leader Ho Chi Minh, a man many in Australia’s diaspora view as a murderer.

If communist kitsch can provoke such a visceral reaction, expect a spirited fight to any suggestion to bring down their proud flags.

 

[Viet]

July 27, 2017 6:42 am JST
NEC, Sumitomo to aid Vietnam satellite project
Japanese team seeks to step up expansion into emerging countries

NEC aims to break into emerging markets by offering low-cost satellites.


TOKYO -- NEC and Sumitomo Corp. will soon sign a contract worth 19 billion yen ($170 million) for a satellite launch project in Vietnam.

The Japanese team will handle one of the two Earth observation satellites Vietnam plans to launch, and intends to bid for the other project as well. The Southeast Asian nation has suffered from typhoon-induced floods in recent years.

https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Companies/NEC-Sumitomo-to-aid-Vietnam-satellite-project

 

[Viet]

That's right, we have a new situation now, the bully said: "stop the drilling or we attack your islands", that's the new chinese way of behaving in this region, they already feel that is almost theirs. Bad situation and there hasn't even been a comment or condemnation from USA, Trump is busy dealing with a lot of internal issues there and they'll have to deal with North Korea soon, so they don't need to open up new fronts right now and of course, the chinese understand that very well.

Bad situation all around.

We are not country the Chinese can intimidate. Once they issue a threat they cross a certain threshold. Depending on how serious is the threat, anyone can expect a proper response from Vietnam. Although I don't expect we will make a decisive preemptive strike as seen in the war against the Song.

 

[Carlosa]

We are not country the Chinese can intimidate. Once they issue a threat they cross a certain threshold. Depending on how serious is the threat, anyone can expect a proper response from Vietnam. Although I don't expect we will make a decisive preemptive strike as seen in the war against the Song.

My feeling is that VN will do a tactical pause to think very well about the options and plan the next steps and consult with friends. I think the drilling will go on again later in the year and by the way, the Spanish company already spent $300 million on this project.

Still, there is no denying that there is a whole new situation in the region now and the chinese are ready to use military force, so there are no easy options, VN is in a bad situation no matter what. The chinese are not going to do a ground war which is where it would be difficult for them and easier for VN. If they take military action it will be where VN is weak and doesn't have any good options and that's precisely what they had threatened to do. VN needs powerful friends in this situation.

 

[Viet]

My feeling is that VN will do a tactical pause to think very well about the options and plan the next steps and consult with friends. I think the drilling will go on again later in the year and by the way, the Spanish company already spent $300 million of this project.

Still, there is no denying that there is a whole new situation in the region now and the chinese are ready to use military force, so there are no easy options, VN is in a bad situation no matter what. The chinese are not going to do a grund war which is where it would be difficult for them and easier for VN. If they take military action it will be where VN is weak and doesn't have any good options and that's precisely what they had threatened to do. VN needs powerful friends in this situation.

We are seen as poor and weak hence we are bullied by every hooligan and the Chinese has proved again and again as the master of all hooligans, having an ugly face behind a friendly mask.

The question is what is the best strategy?

 

[Carlosa]

We are seen as poor and weak hence we are bullied by every hooligan and the Chinese has proved again and again as the master of all hooligans, having an ugly face behind a friendly mask.

The question is what is the best strategy?

Well, in this new situation Vietnam can't act alone or it will lose, Vietnam does not have the military capacity to stop China, we can dream as much as we want, but reality doesn't go away. The only way to oppose China is having a strong alliance with a big power.

We'll have to see what happens between N. Korea and USA, It seems like unless there is a dramatic change in the next few months, US will attack N. Korea and after that, It will be free to take a tough stand against China in SCS.

What is really needed is a NATO of east asia.

 

[Tom99]

Well, in this new situation Vietnam can't act alone or it will lose, Vietnam does not have the military capacity to stop China, we can dream as much as we want, but reality doesn't go away. The only way to oppose China is having a strong alliance with a big power.

"If Vietnam can beat China once" before, so it can easily do it again. This is not 1979.
https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/if-vietnam-can-beat-china-so-can-india-this-is-not-1962.508716/

We'll have to see what happens between N. Korea and USA, It seems like unless there is a dramatic change in the next few months, US will attack N. Korea and after that, It will be free to take a tough stand against China in SCS.

Nope, USA is not going to invade North Korea "in the next few months."