Aqsuperman
FULL MEMBER
- Joined
- Mar 19, 2015
- Messages
- 736
- Reaction score
- 0
- Country
- Location
The first capable fighter of VPAF. Not Russia, not China, not Czechslovakia..........but an American ones, a T-28 Trojan
Vietnam Defence Forum
- Thread starter Viet
- Start date
Viet
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Jun 18, 2012
- Messages
- 29,950
- Reaction score
- 0
- Country
- Location
Vietnam domestic politics is complex. So foreign politics. It is a complicated matter. One should read Vietnam contemporary history to understand from where we came. Also, one should try to understand why the past, current and future actors did, do and will do. Living in a tense environment as we do. I believe with increasing prosperity we will see Vietnam to follow the path of South Korea and Taiwan.
Viet
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Jun 18, 2012
- Messages
- 29,950
- Reaction score
- 0
- Country
- Location
PressTV
US to place military equipment in Vietnam: US officials
Sat May 21, 2016 5:23AM
US Marines landing in Da Nang in 1965 at the start of the American military intervention in Vietnam.
The US is in talks with Vietnam to place military equipment in the country for the first time since the end of the Vietnam War just over forty years ago, according to US officials.
The US and Vietnamese governments have been discussing the use of Da Nang as a site to store military equipment that could purportedly be used to respond to natural disasters in the region.
The coastal city, perched strategically on the South China Sea, is where US combat forces first arrived in Vietnam in 1965.
The talks about pre-positioning equipment have more symbolic significance. The two former enemies share anxiety about a rising China, making them partners over the past two decades.
Beijing, however, accuses Washington of meddling in the regional issues and deliberately stirring up tensions in the South China Sea.
China claims nearly all of the South China Sea, despite partial counterclaims by Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines. China is also locked in disputes with Japan and South Korea over the East China Sea.
US President Barack Obama will arrive in Hanoi on Sunday for a three-day visit that will anoint Vietnam, a one-party communist state, as an essential part of his “pivot” towards Asia.
The Obama administration had hoped to announce the end of an embargo on selling offensive weapons to Vietnam, which would be another symbolic step in normalizing relations, before Obama’s visit.
But the cautious nature of the military engagements between Washington and Hanoi, which include limits on the number of port visits and a stress on humanitarian missions, underlines the sensitivities that surround any US involvement in Vietnam.
The US carried out an eight-year military intervention in the country from 1965-73.
While Vietnam wants to work with the US to challenge China’s expansive territorial claims on the South China Sea, it is concerned about irritating its powerful neighbor, a fellow Communist-run state with which Vietnam shares a complex set of security, trade and political ties.
Hanoi has a complicated past with Beijing, which controlled much of northern Vietnam for centuries.
“As a Communist party, the US and its values pose an existential threat to [Vietnam’s] regime — but China poses an existential threat to the future of Vietnam as a country,” says Marvin Ott, a Southeast Asia expert at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington.
“They have 2000 years of dealing with a China problem and they are better at managing it than anyone else,” Ott said.
Across Southeast Asia, concerns about China and its growing military have created an opportunity for the US to improve relationships.
In recent years, American aircraft and ships have returned to the Philippines for the first time in more than two decades, while US Marines have started training in Australia and new guidelines have allowed for closer cooperation with Japan.
Vietnam has also requested US assistance, albeit at a slower pace.
“Vietnam is going to be very cautious about not crossing red lines with China and the United States is going to respect that,” said Patrick Cronin, Asia director at the Center for a New American Security. “We are not looking for any new bases.”
US to place military equipment in Vietnam: US officials
Sat May 21, 2016 5:23AM
US Marines landing in Da Nang in 1965 at the start of the American military intervention in Vietnam.
The US is in talks with Vietnam to place military equipment in the country for the first time since the end of the Vietnam War just over forty years ago, according to US officials.
The US and Vietnamese governments have been discussing the use of Da Nang as a site to store military equipment that could purportedly be used to respond to natural disasters in the region.
The coastal city, perched strategically on the South China Sea, is where US combat forces first arrived in Vietnam in 1965.
The talks about pre-positioning equipment have more symbolic significance. The two former enemies share anxiety about a rising China, making them partners over the past two decades.
Beijing, however, accuses Washington of meddling in the regional issues and deliberately stirring up tensions in the South China Sea.
China claims nearly all of the South China Sea, despite partial counterclaims by Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines. China is also locked in disputes with Japan and South Korea over the East China Sea.
US President Barack Obama will arrive in Hanoi on Sunday for a three-day visit that will anoint Vietnam, a one-party communist state, as an essential part of his “pivot” towards Asia.
The Obama administration had hoped to announce the end of an embargo on selling offensive weapons to Vietnam, which would be another symbolic step in normalizing relations, before Obama’s visit.
But the cautious nature of the military engagements between Washington and Hanoi, which include limits on the number of port visits and a stress on humanitarian missions, underlines the sensitivities that surround any US involvement in Vietnam.
The US carried out an eight-year military intervention in the country from 1965-73.
While Vietnam wants to work with the US to challenge China’s expansive territorial claims on the South China Sea, it is concerned about irritating its powerful neighbor, a fellow Communist-run state with which Vietnam shares a complex set of security, trade and political ties.
Hanoi has a complicated past with Beijing, which controlled much of northern Vietnam for centuries.
“As a Communist party, the US and its values pose an existential threat to [Vietnam’s] regime — but China poses an existential threat to the future of Vietnam as a country,” says Marvin Ott, a Southeast Asia expert at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington.
“They have 2000 years of dealing with a China problem and they are better at managing it than anyone else,” Ott said.
Across Southeast Asia, concerns about China and its growing military have created an opportunity for the US to improve relationships.
In recent years, American aircraft and ships have returned to the Philippines for the first time in more than two decades, while US Marines have started training in Australia and new guidelines have allowed for closer cooperation with Japan.
Vietnam has also requested US assistance, albeit at a slower pace.
“Vietnam is going to be very cautious about not crossing red lines with China and the United States is going to respect that,” said Patrick Cronin, Asia director at the Center for a New American Security. “We are not looking for any new bases.”
Viet
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Jun 18, 2012
- Messages
- 29,950
- Reaction score
- 0
- Country
- Location
Vietnam new Advanced anti-ship missile Kh-35 Uran-UV
First picutures of the new antiship missile
Code name X-35
Speed: 1,100km/h
Farthest shooting range: 300km
Nearest shooting range: 5km
Ceiling above sea level: 5-10m
Ceiling above sea level approaching the target (final stage): 3-5m
Body length: 3.75m
300 kg warhead
can resist high intensity interference level of enemy firepower, operate in any weather conditions.
First picutures of the new antiship missile
Code name X-35
Speed: 1,100km/h
Farthest shooting range: 300km
Nearest shooting range: 5km
Ceiling above sea level: 5-10m
Ceiling above sea level approaching the target (final stage): 3-5m
Body length: 3.75m
300 kg warhead
can resist high intensity interference level of enemy firepower, operate in any weather conditions.
Carlosa
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Jun 10, 2014
- Messages
- 3,875
- Reaction score
- 3
- Country
- Location
The Case for Lifting the US Vietnam Arms Embargo
http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/the-case-for-lifting-the-us-vietnam-arms-embargo/
Ahead of U.S. President Barack Obama’s visit to Vietnam later this week, U.S. officials – at least publicly – say they have yet to determine whether it is time to fully lift the arms embargo to Vietnam that was eased back in 2014. Though a full lifting of the ban is an issue of when rather than if in the context of the burgeoning U.S.-Vietnam comprehensive partnership, there is a strong case for doing away with it sooner rather than later.
Over the past few years, Vietnam has emerged as a country increasingly central to U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific in spite of the lingering challenges inherent in the two-decade old diplomatic relationship. Economically, for instance, Hanoi is one of just four Southeast Asian countries that is party to the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and is an important partner in ongoing U.S. regional initiatives as well such as the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI). And on defense, Vietnam, a frontline state in the South China Sea disputes, has not only been a member of key U.S. initiatives like the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (MSI), but has worked with Washington to enhance its contributions to global security in fields like peacekeeping (See: “America’s New Maritime Security Initiative for Southeast Asia”).
Despite this , a ban on lethal defense articles – left on the books during Bill Clinton’s presidency even as normalization began – still remains largely in place, despite an easing back in October 2014. Even though speculation has been rife that the Obama administration may finally fully lift it, on Thursday Ben Rhodes, one of the president’s closest advisers, told reporters that no decision had been made, and that Obama would outline how the administration intends to approach the embargo in meetings with Vietnamese officials during the trip (See: “Exclusive: US May Lift Vietnam Arms Embargo for Obama Visit”).
Which ever way the administration chooses to proceed, it is abundantly clear that full lifting of the embargo would advance that relationship both symbolically and substantively. Symbolically, as Vietnamese officials have repeatedly pointed out, a lifting would be a clear indication that relations have been fully normalized. And if it is done before Obama leaves office, it would be in line with the narrative that the administration has embraced in the U.S.-Vietnam relationship: putting aside the past and looking toward the future– whether it be through addressing war legacy issues or opening a new Fulbright University in Vietnam.
More broadly, it would also be yet another powerful case within the Obama administration’s foreign policy that advances can be made even in previously challenging relationships. As Rhodes put it at an event at the Center for New American Security in Washington, D.C. earlier this week, a big part of the Obama administration’s foreign policy has been defined by pursuing previously untapped opportunities to make progress in important relationships – as can be seen in the cases of the Iran nuclear deal, the normalization of ties with Cuba, and greater engagement Myanmar. Though relations with Vietnam were already normalized back in 1995, the lifting of the embargo would nonetheless be the realization of one such untapped opportunity.
Substantively, the embargo would pave the way for eventual U.S. arms sales to Vietnam. Though Vietnam is already scheduled to receive U.S.-made Metal Shark patrol boats soon, Hanoi would be able to buy other maritime and aerial platforms that it could use for its defense. Arms sales are not just a potential economic boost for U.S. companies but a strategic opportunity for Washington to more fully participate in Vietnamese capacity-building, which in turn allows Hanoi to contribute more to global security. Senator John McCain, a former prisoner of war in Vietnam and a longtime proponent of closer ties, summed it up best when he said in a statement Wednesday that “we cannot ask our partners to contribute more while continuing to take steps to directly limit the level of their contribution.”
Lifting the ban would also strengthen Washington’s bargaining position to seek further boosts in the bilateral defense relationship from Hanoi. Given the significance of the move from the U.S. side, there would be an even greater incentive for Vietnam to then consider proposals Washington has made to advance the defense relationship even further which had previously been turned down, including on naval engagements and defense trade as part of the new joint vision statement on defense relations signed by both sides last year during U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter’s visit to the country (See: “US, Vietnam Deepen Defense Ties”).
To be clear, major defense contracts and transfers could take some time because they are contingent on other factors, including growing Vietnam’s familiarization with U.S. procurement procedures relative to its other traditional defense partners like Russia. And it would be unrealistic to expect some kind of dramatic altering of Vietnam’s strategic orientation towards Washington given Hanoi’s omnidirectional foreign policy as well as its own concerns about angering neighboring China. As the administration has rightly internalized, this is not part of some strategy to contain China, but one of a series of steps towards helping nurture a strong and secure Vietnam capable of defending itself and playing a greater role in the region and world. As deals are eventually realized, platforms, when combined with other U.S. capacity-building efforts like MSI, can help boost interoperability and generate other knock-on effects in U.S.-Vietnam defense relations.
The chief argument advanced by opponents of lifting the arms embargo is that a full lifting would fly in the face of lingering concerns about Vietnam’s human rights record. To be sure, this ought to be a factor in U.S. calculations about the pace at which the embargo is lifted, as it has been for years and will continue to be. Rights groups have also rightly pointed to worrying examples of violations in recent weeks ahead of parliamentary elections on May 22, including mistreatment of protesters following an environmental disaster involving contaminated fish. More broadly, the calibration of U.S. ideals and interests has significance not only for the U.S.-Vietnam relationship, but the U.S. rights agenda in the region more generally.
But it is also true that advances in this domain will always be incremental because of the nature of Vietnam’s system, and that pushing Hanoi too hard and too unfairly on the issue will only serve to exacerbate lingering mistrust, rather than ameliorate it. Just like the United States has its issues with rights in Vietnam, Hanoi also has its own concerns – however misplaced – about U.S. attempts to overthrow its socialist regime through “peaceful evolution.” Any U.S. evaluation of Vietnam’s human rights record must be fair and realistic in acknowledging both the progress Hanoi has made thus far as well as the challenges that remain in the context of the country’s domestic political environment. This is not capitulation but compromise – a necessary ingredient in any partnership.
Furthermore, even if the administration decides to lift the ban, there are still ways for the United States to exert leverage on Vietnam with respect to legitimate U.S. rights concerns. For instance, a point often missed in this polarized debate is that even if the ban is fully lifted, as with a partial lifting, there would need to be a process initiated for any potential arms transfers for it to actually take off, which requires congressional approval under U.S. law. That gives the United States the ability to still tie rights improvements to particular sales. Top U.S. Asia diplomat Daniel Russel alluded to that point Wednesday when he told reporters that even the partial lifting had still not resulted in an “opening of floodgates” in terms of new arms sales. Other sources of leverage also exist beyond the embargo, with the most obvious one being the TPP, which has human rights implications as well since Vietnam has already had to make several reforms in fields like labor to meet the standards of the agreement.
Some – including those supportive of the eventual lifting of the ban –have argued that it may be too soon to do so now. They point to the fact that there is significant opposition in pockets of Congress on human rights grounds, as evidenced by comments in recent hearings as well as letters sent by lawmakers ahead of the visit. Though a full lift would ultimately be a State Department policy decision following interagency discussions and consultations with Congress, the administration may have its own strategic reasons for not wanting to push this now. With some lawmakers already opposed to Vietnam being part of TPP for various reasons, the administration may choose to wait until after the lame-duck session of Congress when a crucial TPP vote is held before announcing a full lift, Michael Green, former top White House adviser and longtime Asia expert, said at a briefing Tuesday.
Though there are legitimate considerations to hold off on a full lift, there is a case to be made for urgency too – apart, of course, from the significance of the move being made during a presidential visit to Vietnam, which ought not to be understated. If done soon, the symbolic and substantive benefits of the lifting would occur within the context of an upcoming decision on the much-awaited Philippine South China Sea case against China at the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), expected sometime in the next few months (See: “Does the Philippines’ South China Sea Case Against China Really Matter?”). It would send a powerful message to China that with its destabilizing acts – including positioning an oil rig in Vietnam’s waters in 2014 – Beijing is causing countries to move closer to the United States and effectively containing itself.
Lifting the ban now would also give the Obama administration more time to follow up on other potential items in the U.S.-Vietnam defense relationship before the transition to the next American president begins in January 2017. As I have stressed before, it is imperative that Obama and his team – which have been strongly committed to Southeast Asia – complete as much of their intended subregional agenda as possible before leaving office. Apart from Hillary Clinton, there is no guarantee that any of the other U.S. presidential candidates still standing would necessarily demonstrate the same regard for Southeast Asia. Indeed, with the next U.S. president likely to confront a more tumultuous and fragmented world – with a dangerous Islamic State, simmering Middle East, resurgent Russia, frail Europe and weak global economy – there may be relatively less of a focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, even if the bilateral relationship continues to advance (See: “Why the US-ASEAN Sunnylands Summit Matters”).
Of course, there are also ways to split the difference on this question. The administration may decide, for instance, to further ease the ban but not lift it fully, or perhaps announce some deals under the partial lifting now and leave any policy change for later. What is undisputable, though, is that even with a full lifting, Washington can both realize the symbolic and substantive benefits as well as address the legitimate concerns shared by some. And as a result, there is little reason for this relic to remain in place for much longer as both sides look to the future.
http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/the-case-for-lifting-the-us-vietnam-arms-embargo/
Ahead of U.S. President Barack Obama’s visit to Vietnam later this week, U.S. officials – at least publicly – say they have yet to determine whether it is time to fully lift the arms embargo to Vietnam that was eased back in 2014. Though a full lifting of the ban is an issue of when rather than if in the context of the burgeoning U.S.-Vietnam comprehensive partnership, there is a strong case for doing away with it sooner rather than later.
Over the past few years, Vietnam has emerged as a country increasingly central to U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific in spite of the lingering challenges inherent in the two-decade old diplomatic relationship. Economically, for instance, Hanoi is one of just four Southeast Asian countries that is party to the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and is an important partner in ongoing U.S. regional initiatives as well such as the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI). And on defense, Vietnam, a frontline state in the South China Sea disputes, has not only been a member of key U.S. initiatives like the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (MSI), but has worked with Washington to enhance its contributions to global security in fields like peacekeeping (See: “America’s New Maritime Security Initiative for Southeast Asia”).
Despite this , a ban on lethal defense articles – left on the books during Bill Clinton’s presidency even as normalization began – still remains largely in place, despite an easing back in October 2014. Even though speculation has been rife that the Obama administration may finally fully lift it, on Thursday Ben Rhodes, one of the president’s closest advisers, told reporters that no decision had been made, and that Obama would outline how the administration intends to approach the embargo in meetings with Vietnamese officials during the trip (See: “Exclusive: US May Lift Vietnam Arms Embargo for Obama Visit”).
Which ever way the administration chooses to proceed, it is abundantly clear that full lifting of the embargo would advance that relationship both symbolically and substantively. Symbolically, as Vietnamese officials have repeatedly pointed out, a lifting would be a clear indication that relations have been fully normalized. And if it is done before Obama leaves office, it would be in line with the narrative that the administration has embraced in the U.S.-Vietnam relationship: putting aside the past and looking toward the future– whether it be through addressing war legacy issues or opening a new Fulbright University in Vietnam.
More broadly, it would also be yet another powerful case within the Obama administration’s foreign policy that advances can be made even in previously challenging relationships. As Rhodes put it at an event at the Center for New American Security in Washington, D.C. earlier this week, a big part of the Obama administration’s foreign policy has been defined by pursuing previously untapped opportunities to make progress in important relationships – as can be seen in the cases of the Iran nuclear deal, the normalization of ties with Cuba, and greater engagement Myanmar. Though relations with Vietnam were already normalized back in 1995, the lifting of the embargo would nonetheless be the realization of one such untapped opportunity.
Substantively, the embargo would pave the way for eventual U.S. arms sales to Vietnam. Though Vietnam is already scheduled to receive U.S.-made Metal Shark patrol boats soon, Hanoi would be able to buy other maritime and aerial platforms that it could use for its defense. Arms sales are not just a potential economic boost for U.S. companies but a strategic opportunity for Washington to more fully participate in Vietnamese capacity-building, which in turn allows Hanoi to contribute more to global security. Senator John McCain, a former prisoner of war in Vietnam and a longtime proponent of closer ties, summed it up best when he said in a statement Wednesday that “we cannot ask our partners to contribute more while continuing to take steps to directly limit the level of their contribution.”
Lifting the ban would also strengthen Washington’s bargaining position to seek further boosts in the bilateral defense relationship from Hanoi. Given the significance of the move from the U.S. side, there would be an even greater incentive for Vietnam to then consider proposals Washington has made to advance the defense relationship even further which had previously been turned down, including on naval engagements and defense trade as part of the new joint vision statement on defense relations signed by both sides last year during U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter’s visit to the country (See: “US, Vietnam Deepen Defense Ties”).
To be clear, major defense contracts and transfers could take some time because they are contingent on other factors, including growing Vietnam’s familiarization with U.S. procurement procedures relative to its other traditional defense partners like Russia. And it would be unrealistic to expect some kind of dramatic altering of Vietnam’s strategic orientation towards Washington given Hanoi’s omnidirectional foreign policy as well as its own concerns about angering neighboring China. As the administration has rightly internalized, this is not part of some strategy to contain China, but one of a series of steps towards helping nurture a strong and secure Vietnam capable of defending itself and playing a greater role in the region and world. As deals are eventually realized, platforms, when combined with other U.S. capacity-building efforts like MSI, can help boost interoperability and generate other knock-on effects in U.S.-Vietnam defense relations.
The chief argument advanced by opponents of lifting the arms embargo is that a full lifting would fly in the face of lingering concerns about Vietnam’s human rights record. To be sure, this ought to be a factor in U.S. calculations about the pace at which the embargo is lifted, as it has been for years and will continue to be. Rights groups have also rightly pointed to worrying examples of violations in recent weeks ahead of parliamentary elections on May 22, including mistreatment of protesters following an environmental disaster involving contaminated fish. More broadly, the calibration of U.S. ideals and interests has significance not only for the U.S.-Vietnam relationship, but the U.S. rights agenda in the region more generally.
But it is also true that advances in this domain will always be incremental because of the nature of Vietnam’s system, and that pushing Hanoi too hard and too unfairly on the issue will only serve to exacerbate lingering mistrust, rather than ameliorate it. Just like the United States has its issues with rights in Vietnam, Hanoi also has its own concerns – however misplaced – about U.S. attempts to overthrow its socialist regime through “peaceful evolution.” Any U.S. evaluation of Vietnam’s human rights record must be fair and realistic in acknowledging both the progress Hanoi has made thus far as well as the challenges that remain in the context of the country’s domestic political environment. This is not capitulation but compromise – a necessary ingredient in any partnership.
Furthermore, even if the administration decides to lift the ban, there are still ways for the United States to exert leverage on Vietnam with respect to legitimate U.S. rights concerns. For instance, a point often missed in this polarized debate is that even if the ban is fully lifted, as with a partial lifting, there would need to be a process initiated for any potential arms transfers for it to actually take off, which requires congressional approval under U.S. law. That gives the United States the ability to still tie rights improvements to particular sales. Top U.S. Asia diplomat Daniel Russel alluded to that point Wednesday when he told reporters that even the partial lifting had still not resulted in an “opening of floodgates” in terms of new arms sales. Other sources of leverage also exist beyond the embargo, with the most obvious one being the TPP, which has human rights implications as well since Vietnam has already had to make several reforms in fields like labor to meet the standards of the agreement.
Some – including those supportive of the eventual lifting of the ban –have argued that it may be too soon to do so now. They point to the fact that there is significant opposition in pockets of Congress on human rights grounds, as evidenced by comments in recent hearings as well as letters sent by lawmakers ahead of the visit. Though a full lift would ultimately be a State Department policy decision following interagency discussions and consultations with Congress, the administration may have its own strategic reasons for not wanting to push this now. With some lawmakers already opposed to Vietnam being part of TPP for various reasons, the administration may choose to wait until after the lame-duck session of Congress when a crucial TPP vote is held before announcing a full lift, Michael Green, former top White House adviser and longtime Asia expert, said at a briefing Tuesday.
Though there are legitimate considerations to hold off on a full lift, there is a case to be made for urgency too – apart, of course, from the significance of the move being made during a presidential visit to Vietnam, which ought not to be understated. If done soon, the symbolic and substantive benefits of the lifting would occur within the context of an upcoming decision on the much-awaited Philippine South China Sea case against China at the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), expected sometime in the next few months (See: “Does the Philippines’ South China Sea Case Against China Really Matter?”). It would send a powerful message to China that with its destabilizing acts – including positioning an oil rig in Vietnam’s waters in 2014 – Beijing is causing countries to move closer to the United States and effectively containing itself.
Lifting the ban now would also give the Obama administration more time to follow up on other potential items in the U.S.-Vietnam defense relationship before the transition to the next American president begins in January 2017. As I have stressed before, it is imperative that Obama and his team – which have been strongly committed to Southeast Asia – complete as much of their intended subregional agenda as possible before leaving office. Apart from Hillary Clinton, there is no guarantee that any of the other U.S. presidential candidates still standing would necessarily demonstrate the same regard for Southeast Asia. Indeed, with the next U.S. president likely to confront a more tumultuous and fragmented world – with a dangerous Islamic State, simmering Middle East, resurgent Russia, frail Europe and weak global economy – there may be relatively less of a focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, even if the bilateral relationship continues to advance (See: “Why the US-ASEAN Sunnylands Summit Matters”).
Of course, there are also ways to split the difference on this question. The administration may decide, for instance, to further ease the ban but not lift it fully, or perhaps announce some deals under the partial lifting now and leave any policy change for later. What is undisputable, though, is that even with a full lifting, Washington can both realize the symbolic and substantive benefits as well as address the legitimate concerns shared by some. And as a result, there is little reason for this relic to remain in place for much longer as both sides look to the future.
Carlosa
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Jun 10, 2014
- Messages
- 3,875
- Reaction score
- 3
- Country
- Location
According to Soha.vn, a chinese website, Guancha.cn reported that Russia has refused to sell anti-aircraft missile system S-400 to Vietnam due to great pressure from an extremely important partner.
@Aqsuperman Do you have any info on this?
@Aqsuperman Do you have any info on this?
Aqsuperman
FULL MEMBER
- Joined
- Mar 19, 2015
- Messages
- 736
- Reaction score
- 0
- Country
- Location
I highly doubt the authenticity of those sources. I think an April Fool joke about T-90 "SV" tank from VN manage to come to a China page and somehow became real. Same can be said about Su-35 and various arms deals. Beside, i quite sure neither VN nor China will have S-400 in the foreseeable future, atleast not the variant that surpass the S-300 capabilities. Russia has some first hand experience about China ability at copying, especially the Su-27 - J-11 but cant just sell us the S-400 due to various balancing issue. Until the system got into service then we can be sure who got what
On the side note, check out this guy. A KZKT Heavy Tractor, the company itself go bankupt in 2011 so the vehicle may have a considerable cheaper price. Still, what is it purpose ? Surely not for our tank since MAZ-357 do this job quite good already. What is you guys guess ?
Viet
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Jun 18, 2012
- Messages
- 29,950
- Reaction score
- 0
- Country
- Location
Not only S-400. the chinese website says, back then in August 2014 a Vietnam Army delegation together with Vietnam Ambassador to Russia paid a visit to Russia deputy defence minister Anton Karimov, asking for S-400 missile, Su-35 aircraft and Lada class submarines (AIP project 677). However, Russia refused to sell.
maybe a coincidence: in November 2014, the Chinese agreed to a $400 billion gas deal with Russia.
if you are Russia, how would you decide: a $5 billion deal with Vietnam or $400 billion contract with China?
a hard choice, isn´t it?
Barmaley
FULL MEMBER
- Joined
- Oct 9, 2014
- Messages
- 1,034
- Reaction score
- 6
- Country
- Location
just don't believe to such sources.
Carlosa
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Jun 10, 2014
- Messages
- 3,875
- Reaction score
- 3
- Country
- Location
U.S. to completely lift Vietnam lethal arms embargo
May 23, 2016
HANOI (Reuters) - Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang said on Monday the United States had decided to "completely lift" its embargo on trade in lethal arms with the Southeast Asian country.
"Vietnam very much appreciates the U.S. decision to completely lift the ban on lethal weapon sales to Vietnam, which is the clear proof that both countries have completely normalized relation," Quang said through a translator at a joint news conference with U.S. President Barack Obama.
Obama said the United States was fully lifting the ban but the sale of arms would depend on Vietnam's human rights commitments.
(Writing by John Chalmers; Editing by Robert Birsel)
May 23, 2016
HANOI (Reuters) - Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang said on Monday the United States had decided to "completely lift" its embargo on trade in lethal arms with the Southeast Asian country.
"Vietnam very much appreciates the U.S. decision to completely lift the ban on lethal weapon sales to Vietnam, which is the clear proof that both countries have completely normalized relation," Quang said through a translator at a joint news conference with U.S. President Barack Obama.
Obama said the United States was fully lifting the ban but the sale of arms would depend on Vietnam's human rights commitments.
(Writing by John Chalmers; Editing by Robert Birsel)
Viet
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Jun 18, 2012
- Messages
- 29,950
- Reaction score
- 0
- Country
- Location
you mean it is a wrong rumour and Russia would ignore any chinese objections if we request those advanced weaponry?
WOW a history decision!U.S. to completely lift Vietnam lethal arms embargo
May 23, 2016
HANOI (Reuters) - Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang said on Monday the United States had decided to "completely lift" its embargo on trade in lethal arms with the Southeast Asian country.
"Vietnam very much appreciates the U.S. decision to completely lift the ban on lethal weapon sales to Vietnam, which is the clear proof that both countries have completely normalized relation," Quang said through a translator at a joint news conference with U.S. President Barack Obama.
Obama said the United States was fully lifting the ban but the sale of arms would depend on Vietnam's human rights commitments.
(Writing by John Chalmers; Editing by Robert Birsel)
Similar threads
