yellow?
usually it is black on grey.
anyway ...continue with some recent news
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Sea Platforms
DSA 2016: Russia to supply two Gepard-3.9 frigates to Vietnam in late 2016
Nikolai Novichkov, Kuala Lumpur - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly
21 April 2016
Russia will supply two Gepard 3.9 (Project 11661) frigates to the People's Army of Vietnam Navy (PAVN) in the third quarter of 2016, Renat Mistakhov, Director General of the Zelenodolsk Shipyard, told
IHS Jane's at the Defence Services Asia (DSA) 2016 exhibition.
"Both ships, in anti-submarine warfare variants, will be launched in April and May 2016. Then we will start the basin trials," Mistakhov said, adding, "The ships will be supplied to Vietnam in the third quarter of 2016." He pointed out, that the propulsion systems of both frigates have already been mounted and related electrical work has been completed.
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Land Platforms
DSA 2016: Vietnam may update Soviet era ASU-85s
Richard D Fisher Jr, Kuala Lumpur - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly
21 April 2016
Vietnam apparently acquired some Soviet ASU-85 airborne SPATGs after the 1979 war with China, which recently have been brought out of storage. Source: Via Bao Dat Viet
Officials from the Minotor-Service Corporation of Belarus attending the Defense Services Asia (DSA) 2016 exhibition told
IHS Jane's that Vietnamese officials had expressed "strong interest" in purchasing Minotor's upgrade package for their ASU-85 airborne self-propelled anti-tank guns (SPATGs).
Minotor's upgrade package includes a new more powerful diesel engine powerpack that would increase speed from 45 to 60 km/h and range from 400 km to 450 km.
The revelation that Vietnam People's Army (VPA) had the ASU-85 in its inventory was made in the 16 March 2015 issue of the Bao Dat Viet website, showing vehicles operating in a May 2015 exercise. An informed source has told
IHS Jane's that these were delivered following China's brief war with Vietnam in 1979.
The 15.5 ton ASU-85, based on the chassis of the PT-76 amphibious tank, started arming Soviet Airborne Troops in 1959. It carries 45 rounds for its fixed D-70 85 mm main gun which has a maximum range of 10 km.
The ASU-85 was transported by the large Mi-6 "Hook" helicopter that the Vietnam People's Air Force also operated until the early 1990s.
The Soviet ASU-85s were part of larger shipments of T-62/55/54 tanks, BMP-1 armored personnel carriers and artillery that allowed the VPA to convert its 304th, 308th and 320th Infantry Divisions into Mechanised Infantry Divisions, or Motorised Rifle Divisions in Soviet terminology.
It is possible that the ASU-85s were kept in storage, which would appear to be confirmed by their being in good condition. Other Vietnamese reports indicate they were brought out of storage to provide a new capability for difficult terrain.
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How Low Oil Prices Hamstring Vietnam in the South China Sea Disputes
To maintain its position in the South China Sea, Vietnam needs a strong Russia.
By Linh Tong for The Diplomat
April 13, 2016
Falling oil prices are usually analyzed from an economic point of view; Vietnam is no exception. Myriad domestic and international articles have provided in-depth analysis of the “double-edged” effects that
falling oil prices might have on Vietnam’s GDP. The
Voice of Vietnam concluded that “falling oil price’s negative effects might be offset by well-planned economic strategies, which can turn adversity into opportunities for Vietnam economy.”
However, economic impacts are not the only dangers posed by rock-bottom oil prices for Vietnam. Low oil prices also have a non-negligible geopolitical implication – including on the strength of Vietnam’s position in the South China Sea.
The top geopolitical concern for the Vietnamese government is well-known to be the South China Sea dispute, and particularly China’s maneuvers in the region. As a small nation next to the great power (in terms of both population size and international influence) of China, Vietnam has little chance to balance China on its own. The ASEAN community is too fragmented and divided in its national interests to stay united against China. And neither the United States nor Russia is close or sincere enough for Vietnam to whole-heartedly rely upon. The old era of the Communist bloc has long since passed; the current Russian Federation greatly values its
comprehensive strategic partnership with China. The United States, meanwhile, seems reluctant to take concrete steps to counter China’s rising influence. Given the reality of the current international and regional order, Vietnam’s only realistic choice is to be self-reliant and make use of the multi-polar balance in the international arena.
For the purposes of this balancing, Vietnam generally prefers a stronger Russia, a weaker China, and less anti-Russian America. That combination provides Vietnam a better negotiating position on the South China Sea disputes. The underlying logic is that the better the balance of power among the United States, Russia, and China, the less power China has, and consequently the relatively greater bargaining power Vietnam can get. Unfortunately, low oil prices have effectively driven the balance away from Vietnam’s interests; today we are seeing a weaker Russia, a stronger China, and a strongly anti-Russia America.
First of all, the falling oil prices have not only reduced Russia’s bargaining position in the international arena but also pushed Russia to depend more on Chinese cash. It’s possible weakening Russia through oil prices was intentional — a strategic move by the United States to render Russia helpless right after the economic sanctions from the West to punish Russian aggression in Crimea. “
It’s time to drive Russia bankrupt – again,” read the headline for a 2014
Forbes piece by Louis Woodhill. “We should do to Russia what Ronald Reagan did to its predecessor, the old Soviet Union,” Woodhill argues. “We should drive them into bankruptcy by stabilizing the U.S. dollar” – and thereby driving down oil prices.
It is obviously not a coincidence that this history is repeating itself. In 1983, the notorious oil glut effectively pressed the oil price down from an
annual average of $35 per barrel in 1980 to around $14 in 1986. One of the main causes was Reagan allowing oil prices in the United States to be decided by the free market and increasing American oil production. Again, in 2014, with Russia and the United States at odds over Crimea, Washington announced the possibility of increasing production.
Since then, oil prices have plummet from over $100 a barrel to around $30. The decline in oil prices drove the Russian economy into the corner. According estimates from the International Monetary Fund, Russia’s GDP
shrank by 3.7 percent in 2015, and is projected to contract a further 1 percent in 2016. This constrained economic capacity has consequently harmed Moscow’s political influence.
It has also boosted China’s clout in the Sino-Russian relationship. Eager for more customers, Russia had to rush into the
potentially non-profitable “Power of Siberia” pipeline with China in 2014. The gas deal with China, worth $400 billion, provides an alternative market for Russian energy exports.
Russia’s own problem with Crimea and the current economic doldrums has blocked Russia from taking any definitive stand on the South China Sea disputes. In contrast to tangible support given to China’s neighbors during the Sino-Soviet split — Soviet military advisers were stationed in Vietnam during the Sino-Vietnamese war, while Soviet troops massed at the Sino-Soviet border and Mongolian-Chinese border – Russia’s policy on the South China Sea disputes
has been described as “non-existent.” A weakened and dependent Russia, the result of falling oil prices, is not encouraging for Vietnam’s status in South China Sea Dispute.
Furthermore, the drop in oil prices has strengthened China’s bargaining position as a regional price maker. China ranks third in global gas consumption and second in oil consumption. The falling oil prices lessen the burden on production costs and might help save China from its economic woes. The current oil surplus, and the resulting low prices, benefit China as a global producer and consumer. China stands to gain from the falling oil prices and this is against Vietnam’s geopolitical interests in the South China Sea dispute.
The United States, on the other hand, is busy designing her own game of power in Asia-Pacific. U.S. moves to provide financial aid for the ASEAN countries in strengthening their marine defense capacity (the
Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative, or MSI) and have American ships guarding the Asia-Pacific are welcomed by all the nations involved, including Vietnam. However, from Vietnam’s geopolitical perspective, the U.S. position has not been as beneficial as desired.
It is important to remember that Vietnam is under the leadership of the Communist Party, which has unerasable links with the Russian Federation and remains trapped in a relationship with Communist China. For this reason, while rhetorically declaring support for Vietnam, the United States has chosen the Philippines to
be its strategic partner instead. The American preference is shown in numbers, with Philippines receiving $41 million dollars while Vietnam will receive only $2 million dollars
in the MSI package. Meanwhile, the absence of Russia in the South China Sea disputes, due in part to the falling oil prices, fits with the U.S. desire to exclude Russian influence, but it is contrary to Vietnam’s geopolitical interest. An anti-Russia United States is not good for Vietnam’s standing in the South China Sea disputes.
In short, the falling oil price has more than just economic implications for Vietnam. By assessing carefully the effect of the oil surplus on the balance of power among China, Russia, and the United States, the threats for Vietnam geopolitically become more visible. Of course, a strong Russia does not automatically translate to a constraint on Chinese aggression or balance against American activeness in the South China Sea dispute. Yet, a strong Russia will at least contribute to better maintaining what
Henry Kissinger has called a “global equilibrium” with “a greater harmony of values” compared to the weak and dependent Russia of today. Following such logic, the falling oil prices are having a detrimental effect on Vietnam geopolitical interests in the increasingly intense South China Sea dispute.
Linh Tong is a research assistant at ADA University.
