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Viettel will build a vertical launched anti-aircraft missile system!


http://soha.vn/quan-su/viettel-se-c...ong-thang-dung-hien-dai-20160128103607469.htm

The Google translation is pretty bad and no enough details anyway, but according to the picture, it seems to be quite sophisticated.

It seems like after Viettel success in making an advanced C4ISR (command, control, communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) system for the Vietnamese military, it has gained the trust needed to develop other advanced high tech military projects.
soha is wellknown for spreading rumours and speculations. but in this case, the news is not necessary total nonsense.



Industry
Vietnamese government commits to expanding defence industrial capabilities
Jon Grevatt, Bangkok - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly
25 January 2016

The 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has outlined a commitment to further develop the country's defence industrial base in light of escalating security threats in Southeast Asia.

At the week-long congress, which ends 28 January and will shape government policies until 2020, senior officials of the CVP have made reference to expanding capability in Vietnam to produce "weapons, ammunition, and technical equipment", and have also stated a requirement to support continued development through "international integration".

In a report submitted to the congress, cited by the Ministry of Defence, General Ngo Xuan Lich, chief of the Vietnam People's Army's (VPA's) general political department, said a developed defence industry was required to support the VPA's efforts to "safeguard the country's independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity".
 
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Wish the gun actually fire some rounds :v
 
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soha is wellknown for spreading rumours and speculations. but in this case, the news is not necessary total nonsense..

Yes, I know that about Soha, but this time they are directly quoting a Viettel official, so it should be reliable. ComCom also posted the article.
 
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Yes, I know that about Soha, but this time they are directly quoting a Viettel official, so it should be reliable. ComCom also posted the article.
Hope so. The re-elected communist boss mentions defense of the homeland in his report to the party congress, is one of the four key goals:

- clean up corruption and advance democratic process in the party
- continue with economic reforms, integrating Vietnam into world economy
- defence
- industrialization
 
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Analysis: Successful leader in Vietnam needs to be faceless

By VIJAY JOSHI 12 hours ago



HANOI, Vietnam (AP) — Vietnam's latest political turnover made one thing abundantly clear: being a strong, charismatic leader with a high domestic and international profile will only lead to your downfall. To be successful in Vietnamese politics, you have to work with consensus — and be, for the most part, faceless.

Vietnam's Communist Party ended a weeklong congress on Wednesday sticking with the status quo by re-electing Nguyen Phu Trong as party general secretary, the country's No. 1 leader, for a second five-year term. A contender, reform-minded Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, was cut to size and ousted from the collective leadership because he was seen by party bosses to have become too big for his boots.

Collective leadership is key to understanding how Vietnam's one-party Communist system works.

After Ho Chi Minh, the founding father of modern Vietnam, the party has studiously avoided cultivating a personality cult. Even Vo Nguyen Giap, a celebrated war hero, was never allowed the pedestal after he became a politician. All he got was a state funeral. Not even a statue or a bust or a portrait.

So no surprises that unlike China — its ideological ally where top leaders have been larger-than-life figures such as Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Xi Jinping — Vietnam prefers leaders who do not hog the limelight, and rule by consensus through a Politburo, the elite cream of the party.

Dung was anything but that.

"Dung was more charismatic, becoming a popular figure and generally seen to be becoming larger than the party, which did not go down well with the others who still have the old-fashioned notion that the country should be run by a faceless collective leadership," said Murray Hiebert, a Southeast Asian expert at a Washington, D.C., think tank.

So what does that partial change in leadership mean for Vietnam? Will the economic reforms that Dung was carrying out stop? Will Vietnam start kowtowing to China, with whom Dung had apparently crossed swords? Will corruption and nepotism, which Dung was accused of fostering, cease? Will Vietnam move away from the U.S.?

The answers are no.

Dung and Trong clashed over style, not ideology.

Trong obliquely referred to Dung's style in post-congress comments to the media, saying that even though Vietnam's Communist Party is one-party rule, "we also have principles of democracy and accountability of the leaders. Otherwise, good deeds would be credited to individuals while failure would be blamed on the group and no one would be disciplined."



FILE - In this Thursday, Jan. 28, 2016, file photo, Central Committee members pose for a group photo …

Under Dung, Vietnam's annual per capita GDP tripled to $2,100. The economy grew 6.7 percent last year, and foreign investment reached a record $14.5 billion. Vietnam has become an attractive destination for foreign manufacturers looking for cheap labor as an alternative to China.

As the least developed member of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a 12-nation agreement led by the U.S. to lower trade barriers, Vietnam will benefit the most, according to Fitch Ratings.

All this was seen as Dung's work. For sure, the economic reforms will slow down under the more conservative Trong, especially over the next six months until Dung is replaced by Nguyen Xuan Phuc.

Phuc may not "be a strong personality," but in Vietnam "individuals do not have a very big role, because most of the policies are a collective decision," said Le Hong Hiep, a visiting Vietnamese fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asia Studies in Singapore.

Trong and his allies in the Politburo are aware of the need to push for economic reforms, because the party's existence depends on it.

It relies heavily on foreign investment and international trade to maintain growth, while domestic enterprises — both state-owned and private — are weak and beset with problems.

Some say that Dung's departure may not be such a bad thing.

Despite projecting the image of a pro-Western reformist, he also "sat at the apex of a vast network of rent-seeking interests that involve the government bureaucracy and many large companies in both the state and private sectors," said Alexander L. Vuving, an international relations and Vietnam expert based in Hawaii.

"Dung's exit means that a major obstacle to institutional reform and the reform of state-owned companies has been removed," he said.

It is also wrong to assume that Dung was anti-China as Beijing expands its territorial ambitions in the South China Sea. In fact, Dung may well have been China's choice for the next party leader, Vuving said.

Dung's approach to China was a mixture of nationalist rhetoric, dramatic action, and economic engagement.

Vuving said he was instrumental in tightening Vietnam's structural dependence on China, and in fact China showed more aggression in Vietnamese waters on two occasions when Dung suffered humiliating rebukes by the Politburo at the hands of Trong's camp in 2014 and earlier this year. Apparently it was a subtle warning to Trong to leave Dung alone.

But Dung's exit this week shows the limits of China's ability to influence Vietnam's political decisions, and most observers agree Trong will not allow Beijing to ride roughshod over Vietnam.

"Vietnam will continue to veer farther — but not too far —from China, and closer —but not too close —to the United States," said Vuving.

A larger question is about the pervasive corruption, which Dung is accused of promoting through patronage politics. Trong will go after that, and it's possible that corruption will be reduced at the top leadership.

But don't have too many expectations.

"Corruption is pretty hard-wired in the system, although some obviously have their hands deeper in the trough than others," said Hiebert.

For the vast majority of Vietnam's 93 million people, one more thing is clear: No matter who is at the helm, they, the people, will not have a direct say in electing their leaders as long as the Communist Party maintains its 40-year-old grip on power.

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Joshi is AP's news director for Southeast Asia and has covered the region for nearly two decades. Tran Van Minh in Hanoi and Grant Peck in Bangkok contributed to this report.
 
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Vietnam's National Congress: With Dung out, will reform slow?

Vietnam has just finished its 12th National Congress, the five-yearly event that decides the direction of the country. It is largely conducted behind closed doors, with the local press carrying little more than official statements or excitable-yet-boilerplate copy (see here for some communist elan).

However, there have been some notable changes: two-term Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung failed in his bid to become General Secretary, the ranks of the Politburo and other bodies now have a substantial number of members drawn from the police and security services, and relations with Beijing have been under the spotlight after it moved an oil rig into contested waters just before the Congress began.

I covered the last National Congress in 2011. Like this one, Hanoi was going through an especially miserable winter and the city's mood was low. Corruption and inflation were on everyone's minds and the Government knew citizens' unhappiness couldn't simply be dismissed or managed forever. Dung survived that last Congress and flew into a second term after suggestions he may not have made it. After protests over the Central Highlands bauxite mines he had fought for, and the bullet train project which the legislative National Assembly voted down, it seemed he had been given a second chance to pursue his vision for an industrialised Vietnam by 2020.

I quoted departing General Secretary Nong Duc Manh at the time apologising for the teetering economy and other systemic problems: 'Quality, efficiency and competitiveness remain low. Bureaucracy, corruption, wastefulness, social vices and moral and lifestyle degradation have not been prevented,' he said.

Manh's words bear thinking about now. While much of the coverage has centered on what the latest changes mean for the balancing of US-China relations, the more important story might be how reforms will continue under the new order. With internationalist and 'reformer' Dung not even making it onto the ballot and Secretary Trong staying on for two more years (despite at 72 being seven years over official retirement age), some have questioned Vietnam's direction. However, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) will make some economic reforms inevitable.

A Reuters story from Thursday quoted a less-than-dynamic Trong as saying, 'My age is high, health is limited, knowledge is limited. I asked to step down, but because of the responsibility assigned by the party I have to perform my duty.' A certain amount of self- deprecation is not uncommon among Vietnam's older generation, but Trong also said that while work load was 'heavy' he was committed to keep Vietnam on the path of modernisation.

Pham Binh Minh, a man credited with 'balancing' US and China ties, retains his post as Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister.

Much of the foreign coverage centres on the idea of a binary within the Party: a pro-China and a pro-US camp. This is a broadly useful

lens; old school Party men who want to stick to a Marxist-Leninist path, or at least keep close to Beijing's version of market-oriented socialism, versus reformers and technocrats who realise the world is changing. However it's a limited way of seeing things.

Firstly, Vietnam's foreign policy has never been simply a zero-sum game between great powers. I've written on Vietnam's long standing multilateralism before, and suggested that Australia might benefit from closer ties. Vietnam pursues strategic relations with all permanent members of the UN Security Council, other Asian nations, has good ties with ASEAN and has a longstanding relationship with India (there is a park named for Indira Gandhi in Hanoi), while still quietly competing for influence with China in Laos and Cambodia.

However it's also certain that Beijing's influence is being questioned in some quarters and the general population remains deeply suspicious of China and furious at any slight against Vietnamese sovereignty. That's why China's placement of its enormous oil rig into disputed waters just before Congress seems even more strange. When HD 981 moved into Vietnam's exclusive economic zone in 2014, protests in Vietnam went beyond the usual group of the angry but educated marching around Hoan Kiem Lake. Factories burned, people were killed, Chinese citizens were actually evacuated from Vietnam and relations badly damaged. This episode, compounded by China's island-building, sent the 'pro-China' General Secretary Trong to Washington last year in an unprecedented visit.

On the deployment of the oil rig, Professor Carlyle Thayer of the Australian Defense Force Academy wrote, 'If the deployment of the HD 981 was decided to coincide with the holding of the 12th national congress it was an ill-timed decision that will be counter-productive. In 2014 when China first deployed the HD 981 the first causalty was strategic trust between Hanoi and Beijing.'

Voice of America reported however, that 'Other analysts say the election reveals China's strong hand in the region, and its pressure on its neighbor. Members of Vietnam's General Assembly visited Beijing in December, where some suspect China voiced its concerns about the government's ties with the U.S.'

That visit was less public than Xi Jinping's last year, and certainly garnered less interest than Trong's meeting with Obama. Possibly, real relations between Hanoi and Beijing remain as shadowy as many of the 'grey men' in the Politburo, while ties with the US are always more interesting and showy.

But what else has come from the Congress?

Dung, as Carlyle Thayer said to Bloomberg, didn't have a chance. He 'wasn't even a starter, although he had support earlier in the year.' David Brown, another longtime Vietnam watcher always worth reading, wrote in the Asia Sentinel, 'Chatter on the cybersphere credits Trong with skilful manipulation of party rules and a whispering campaign that caught Dung wrong-footed.'

A southerner, when northerners have always held the top positions,

Dung was noted as a reformer when he came to office. But his real taste for reform was economic, not political. A little more freedom of speech might be granted in service of economic goals, such as WTO accession, but as a rule civil liberties remained as curtailed as ever, especially in regards to mentions of his own considerable fortune or family power (Dung's Harvard-educated son-in-law brought McDonald's to Vietnam).

The worry is now with Trong as place-holder General Secretary and a new, less personality-driven Prime Minister in Nguyen Xuan Phuc, the already slow pace of reform and liberalisation may slow further. As I said, the TPP will alleviate some of those issues. It was the Central Committee (which helps decide the Politburo and top positions) which pushed ahead with the trade agreement, in large part to lessen economic dependence on China, a longstanding problem and a thorny political issue. Others, such as chair of the legislative National Assembly Ms Nguyen Kim Ngan, will push ahead with instituting TPP reforms.

What else matters? Arguably, so long as internet use is not curtailed, people care less about freedom of speech than about a strong economy, reducing corruption and an ending police violence. The latter is particularly important. There have been several high profile cases in recent years of citizens being beaten to death by police for minor infractions. However, the former head of the Ministry of Public Security is now President (not a role which carries much power, but it still has clout), and many others drawn from the ranks of the police have assumed important positions. Without sounding

prematurely alarmist, this could be cause for worry.

Figuring out Vietnamese politics from the outside is always an imprecise exercise, one reason why the death of Hanoi's sacred and mythical turtle Cu Rua two days before Congress began was greeted with such horror, to the point where the Government initially banned papers from reporting on it. In legend, the creature helped Emperor Le Loi defeat the Chinese, and the creature washed up dead in Hoan Kiem Lake at around the same time the Chinese moved their rig into place. What did that say, wondered a still-superstitious citizenry often kept in the dark by their Government? Was the turtle's death a sign of terrible things to come, or a chance for renewal?

Reprinted with permission from the Lowy Interpreter
 
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from a live fire exercise. bombarding virtual enemy positions by heavy artillery.
Bandanthat.jpg
 
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the comments to the article on the diplomat are worth reading, too.


http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/vietnam-should-abandon-non-alignment-now/

Vietnam Should Abandon Non-Alignment Now
The outcome of the recent Party Congress provides Hanoi with the opportunity to rethink its foreign policy.

By Nhung Bui
January 29, 2016

thediplomat_2015-10-15_20-37-52-386x257.jpg

Image Credit: Official White House Photo


This month, Vietnam’s 12th Party Congress reappointed the conservative leader Nguyen Phu Trong for another term as the party’s General Secretary.

In the wake of this political reshuffling, it is important for Vietnamese leaders to rethink their foreign policy directions and explore new strategies to deal with an assertive China. In particular, while Trong’s victory is a disappointment to those championing broader economic liberalization, it provides a window of opportunity for Vietnam’s leaders to abandon the principle of non-alignment which has long served as a basic guideline in its foreign policy without provoking a severe backlash from China.

Vietnam’s non-alignment principle is part of the “three nos” package, summed up as no participation in military alliances, no foreign military bases on Vietnamese territory, and no reliance on one country to fight against another. Supporters of the principle believe that maintaining equal distance between the great powers would serve Vietnam’s interests, for leaning towards the United States would only provoke counterbalancing actions by China.

Yet rising tensions in the South China Sea between Vietnam and China have led to a fierce debate about the merits of this approach, with many voices calling Vietnam to abandon its non-alignment stance. These reformist voices argue that Vietnam needs greater concrete support from and even a military alliance with an outside power – potentially the United States – in order to protect its territory against China’s encroachments.

While there are merits to both sides of the argument, there is a middle path that Vietnam can walk by simultaneously abandoning the non-alignment policy as well as avoid provoking China. General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, who has been less outspoken about China’s assertive actions, is arguably in a better position to walk this path than former premier Nguyen Tan Dung, considered by western observers as a pro-West reformer and vocal opponent of China’s aggressive actions. Secretary Trong can better convince Chinese counterparts that even if Vietnam drops its non-alignment position, it would not form an alliance with an outside actor any time soon. If, on the other hand, the same announcement came from former prime minister Dung, Chinese leaders would take this as a sign that Vietnam is seriously pursuing a balancing posture.

Critics of the current non-alignment stance argue that Vietnam needs to form alliances with external actors in order to check China’s expansion, a position that is reasonable given China’s extensive island reclamation projects and its provocative installation of the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone in 2014.

However, an alliance with the United States or Japan cannot be realized overnight and Vietnam needs time to convince these countries to support it. Even though the United States and Japan have tensions with China, there are limits right now to how far these countries can go to back Vietnam in its territorial disputes. While they might be ready to aid Vietnam’s procurement of surveillance vessels and aircrafts, they would probably be unwilling to provide concrete commitments. The United States is already facing a headache because it is obliged by treaty to defend the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. More broadly, divergent interests and the gap in the willingness to fight would make the United States and Japan unlikely to form a significant pact with Vietnam soon.

Even though drastic alignment changes are unlikely in this sense, abandoning the non-alignment policy now can be beneficial down the road. First, it would signal to other actors with similar interests that Vietnam is willing to consider forming an alliance as an option. This possibility would at least generate interest and policy debates in the United States, Japan or the Philippines. Politicians and military personnel could at least incorporate the possibility of an alliance with Vietnam in back-up scenarios. The change would also stimulate discussions among civilian analysts and the public. These debates and contingency plans could in the long run facilitate policy shifts when actors are willing to commit.


thediplomat_2016-01-27_15-24-37-386x256.jpg

General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong during a 2015 visit to the United States.
Image Credit: U.S. State Department photo



In short, while abandoning the “three nos” policy right now might not lead to an alliance in two years, it could lead to one in ten years. Getting various constituencies on board in general or planning for specific measures like a new military base takes time in these countries. Thus, it is in Vietnam’s interest to at least start the ball rolling now. Of course, Hanoi needs to buy time for all of this to happen, which will require reassuring Beijing in the meantime which Secretary Trong would be more capable of doing.

Second, Beijing might even see an opportunity for itself if Hanoi drops its non-alignment principle if the latter can signal that its alignment choices are still open; in order words, that leaning towards the United States is not the default option. In recent years, certain influential voices in China have called the country to pursue external alliances. If China wants to lead Asia, these individuals contend, it needs to bridge the great gap with the United States, which has a number of reliable and strong allies and security partners in the region. China’s reaction to Vietnam’s abandoning the non-alignment principle under Secretary Trong is still uncertain. The response would depend on how well the new leadership can convince Beijing that no drastic change would occur any time soon and how well they take advantage of Beijing’s own insecurities while firmly protecting Vietnamese interests.

Most importantly, the dangerous scenario that Hanoi needs to protect itself against is a much more aggressive and belligerent Beijing intent on controlling the South China Sea and dominating Vietnamese politics and economics. If this happens in the future and Vietnam decides late in the game to abandon its non-alignment policy, it would send a strong signal to China that Vietnam is seeking help from the outside and is balancing against China. A much more hawkish China would respond with severe forms of punishment. At that time, it would be even harder for Vietnam to maintain strategic ambiguity between the two camps.

In short, abandoning the “three nos” at this point – when Vietnam’s position towards China and the United States is still somewhat balanced with the reappointment of Secretary Trong – is likely more advantageous than at a later point, when an action like that, and especially from a more outspoken leader, would send a much more decisive signal. Vietnam’s leaders should not assume that maintaining the status-quo would help them in the long run; rather they should take this opportunity, while Chinese leaders seem to be content with the Vietnamese party congress outcome, to shake off the non-alignment principle.


Nhung Bui is a PhD Candidate in the Politics Department at Princeton University and a research associate at the Center for International Studies (SCIS) at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Ho Chi Minh City. She works on media and nationalist propaganda in China and Vietnam.
 
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Vietnamese M113 crew in Cambodia back in the 80s , the M2 Browing still remain in many M113 as the primary weapon ........which i dont know how we can supply it with ammunition after so many years :v
 

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is any piece of news about Sigma class project?
 
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Nữ quân nhân của Quân đội Nhân dân Việt Nam
women in the VPA


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is any piece of news about Sigma class project?
latest rumour says the whole project is dead, cancelled due to financial reason.
I assume the US Congress is not in the mood yet to lift arms embargo on Vietnam.
 
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is any piece of news about Sigma class project?
Temporary down for the count , same as the T55M3 . Maybe if a diamond mine is discover then they might return

Galil Ace 31 , Special Pursose verison
 

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