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Limits of US-Vietnam Relations Revealed in Communist Party Leader Visit
The recent trip is not as monumental as some are making it out to be.
By Shawn W. Crispin
July 10, 2015

Limits of US-Vietnam Relations Revealed in Communist Party Leader Visit | The Diplomat

Was Vietnam’s de facto supreme leader Nguyen Phu Trong’s diplomatic tour of Washington, including a White House meeting with President Barack Obama, as monumental as reported? News headlines almost universally heralded Trong’s visit, the first ever by a Communist Party chief to the United States, as a historic milestone in deepening reconciliation and burgeoning ties between the one-time battlefield adversaries.

Beyond the diplomatic niceties, however, Trong returns to Hanoi with few significant military concessions at a time of dire strategic need, including a lack of progress in fully lifting Washington’s decades-old lethal arms embargo imposed against the communist regime’s poor rights record. Obama eased the ban last year, allowing Vietnam to obtain non-lethal maritime wares that so far have done little to curb China’s rising assertiveness in the South China Sea. Analysts had expected lifting the embargo to feature prominently on the meeting agenda and may have even been announced during Trong’s high profile visit.

Agreements from the meeting instead advanced a budding but still largely symbolic ‘comprehensive partnership’ launched in 2013. According to a White House statement, the two leaders achieved concrete agreements on double taxation avoidance, cooperation on pandemic threats, aviation safety and education. They also committed to cooperate on various regional and global issues, including natural disasters, wildlife trafficking and water security, and work towards concluding the Trans-Pacific Partnership preferential trade pact as soon as possible.

Militarily, the two sides agreed to a memorandum of understanding that will pave the cooperative way for Vietnam’s future participation in United Nations’ peacekeeping operations. It is assumed the MoU will entail human rights training for Vietnamese soldiers The New York Times also reported vague agreements on “possible coproduction” of undisclosed defense technologies and equipment, as well as further joint naval operations. The White House statement said the two sides are concerned about recent developments in the South China Sea, but recognized the imperative of “refraining from actions that raise tensions” and reject “coercion, intimidation, and use or threat of use of force.”

The defense agreements announced during Trong’s visit will not significantly bolster Vietnam’s power projection or deterrent capabilities amid intensifying maritime territorial disputes with China. Chinese island-building in the South China Sea, if developed into military bases with air strips, represent a clear and present threat to Vietnam’s strategic position. In a provocatively timed move, China redeployed in late June its Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil exploration rig in waters claimed by Beijing and Hanoi. A similar deployment of the rig last year led to clashes at sea and lethal anti-China riots in Vietnam.

Hanoi is believed to covet U.S.-made P-3 Orion surveillance planes, aerial drones and gun-equipped high speed patrol vessels to counter China – all of which are still banned from sale under the current arms embargo. A recent Reuters report quoting “industry sources” claimed Vietnam was in discussions with the defense wings of Sweden’s Saab, European multinational Airbus, and the U.S.’s Boeing to purchase jets, patrol planes and unarmed drones. Trong viewed a Boeing 787 Dreamliner commercial aircraft to be delivered to Vietnam during his Washington tour; Airbus recently announced plans to establish manufacturing plants in Vietnam.

Maintenance of the embargo is partly a response to Hanoi’s still abysmal rights record. Human Rights Watch, a U.S.-based advocacy group, says there are at least 150 political prisoners now held behind bars. Many of those activists were sentenced on anti-state charges for protesting against China’s perceived encroachment on Vietnamese territory or exploitative business practices. Obama told reporters he had “candid” discussions with Trong on human rights issues, but there was no sign of a breakthrough. For years, the two sides have regularly engaged in a largely ineffectual human rights dialogue. Vietnamese officials have consistently claimed they hold no prisoners of conscience.

Certain reports portrayed U.S.-trained human rights lawyer Le Quoc Quan’s release from prison in late June as a nod to Washington’s concerns, but the activist had already served his full 30-month sentence. Last October’s early release from prison of prominent blogger and anti-China activist Nguyen Van Hai, known as Dieu Cay, was viewed by some analysts as a quid pro quo exchange for access to U.S. maritime patrol vessels. Obama had publicly called for the independent blogger’s freedom and hosted him at the White House after his release and flight to exile in the U.S.

Nor did the Obama-Trong meet advance the U.S.’s call for preferential access to Vietnam’s deep-sea port at Cam Ranh Bay. Reuters reported in March that Washington requested Hanoi to stop Russia from using the strategically important base after Russian bombers used it to refuel while circling an American air base on the Pacific island of Guam. Consistent with its “three no’s” policy against foreign alliances, bases or reliance, widely viewed as a sop to China, Vietnam has declined repeated U.S. requests for exclusive foreign rights to the facilities, according to reports.

With the U.S. embargo still firmly in place, Vietnam will continue to rely on Cold War era ally Russia for its deterrent defenses. The week before Trong’s visit to Washington, Hanoi took delivery at Cam Ranh Bay of a fourth Russian-built, missile-enabled, advanced Kilo-class submarine designed for anti-submarine and anti-surface ship warfare. Vietnam will operate six of the diesel-electric submarines by the end of this year, giving it Southeast Asia’s most advanced fleet. While Vietnam may aspire to upgrade from Russian to U.S. gear, Trong’s symbolic visit highlighted the still high hurdles blocking a fully fledged strategic relationship.
 
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Vietnam After 2016: Who Will Lead?
Vietnam After 2016: Who Will Lead? | The Diplomat

Every five years, the Vietnamese Communist Party holds its National Congress. Among other important policy issues, the party congress chooses the central leadership teams, to govern both the party and the country. If the 11th party congress (2011) is any guide, the new Central Committee, which will be elected by all delegates at the coming 12th party congress (to be held in 2016), will select a new general secretary (Tổng Bí Thư), a new Politburo (Bộ Chính Trị), a new Secretariat (Ban Bí Thư), and a new Central Commission of Inspection (Uỷ Ban Kiểm Tra Trung Ương).

Of particular interest is this: Who will emerge from the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam as the new general secretary?

Political Context

To answer this question, we must first identify the most influential leaders of the party establishment and, second, consider who among them is likely contending for the post of general secretary. Close observation of those leaders sitting at the central table at each of the recent major party meetings yields five familiar names: Lê Hồng Anh (Politburo Standing Committee Chairman), Nguyễn Tấn Dũng (Prime Minister), Nguyễn Sinh Hùng (National Assembly Chairman), Trương Tấn Sang (President), and Nguyễn Phú Trọng (General Secretary).

Backed by strong support from party elders, Anh and Trọng are seen as having led the pro-Chinese conservative faction in direct opposition to Dũng (who leads the pro-Western reformist faction). Between them le the reform-oriented moderate faction led by Sang and Hùng. All operate within a fairly recent party oligarchy (guarded by its military, security, and political elites, who have their own particular interests).

Even though they have not publicly declared their candidacies, each of these senior figures may well aspire to sit in the hot seat of supreme power. Their policy moves and political activities can reveal both the motives they conceal and constraints they face. Of the five, Anh and Hùng can likely be discounted, leaving Dũng, Sang, and Trọng in place to fight it out for general secretary. According to most observers, Hùng is politically the least influential of the five and may be succeeded by his National Assembly Deputy Chairwoman Nguyễn Thị Kim Ngân, whose “confidence vote” scores for her parliamentary leadership performance have been consistently high. Minister of Public Security General Trần Đại Quang is another possible candidate.

Anh, the Standing Committee chairman, is one of the most powerful leaders of the pro-Chinese conservative faction led by Trọng. However, he appears to prefer wielding political power behind the scenes, rather than contending for the general secretary post. Even if he was interested, his candidacy would be a long shot given that he would need to overcome his image as a tough former minister of Public Security as well as his “Chinese connections” (like those of Trọng and Defense Minister General Phùng Quang Thanh).

Sang and his moderate faction, meanwhile, appear to have been marginalized politically. Indeed, Sang’s candidacy for general secretary likely sank following last year’s oil rig crisis, when he was seen to have failed to be “presidential.” Ultimately, Sang may throw his political support behind either Dũng or Trọng, following some political bargaining. His supporters may prefer that he redeem himself with a more dignified exit.

What is thus shaping up is the final phase of a power struggle for party-state leadership between Dũng and Trọng, representing the pro-Western reformist faction and the pro-Chinese conservative faction, respectively.

The Rise of Dũng

Within this context, I argue that Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng will be the next general secretary, barring a major upset. I offer six reasons for this.

First, Dũng will most likely win simply because his archrival Trọng has failed to offer the Vietnamese Communist Party a politically capable leader who can be seen as a superior candidate for the post. Trọng is due to retire after the 12th party congress but has failed to find a politically credible successor because he has unwisely surrounded himself with pro-Chinese party functionaries and die-hard ideologues, rather than the technocrats that Dũng has skillfully chosen to maximize and diversify his party-state influences. Trọng’s days are numbered and his options for a successor as general secretary and for other power seats in his faction have diminished. With the candidacy of Phạm Quang Nghị, first secretary of Hanoi, stumbling after his ill-timed U.S. visit last July, it seems that Trọng and his camp have been grooming Defense Minister General Phùng Quang Thanh to either succeed Trọng as general secretary or to take over from Sang as president.

The first option is unrealistic, given Thanh’s liabilities: his uncharismatic image, his “pro-Chinese” position, and the massive corruption charges mercilessly levelled against him by an extremely controversial blog called “Chân Dung Quyền Lực” (The Profile of Power). The second option, meanwhile, a diplomatically desirable state leadership position, which Carl Thayer suggests could maintain a vital hot link with Beijing, looks more realistic politically, but will nonetheless be an uphill battle. Still, it may explain Thanh’s high profile recently, at home and abroad. For example, Thanh accompanied Trọng on the latter’s highly publicized trip to Beijing in April, hosted Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan for a joint friendship tour along the Sino-Vietnamese border in May, hosted U.S. Senator John McCain Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter in the same month, and visited France in June. While in France, though, Thanh was suddenly “hospitalized,” leaving his candidacy looking rather bleak.

The second factor in Dũng’s favor is that he has the ascendency in the power struggle against the Trọng-led/Beijing-supported conservative faction and has thus neutralized the most deadly obstacle to his peaceful and politically legitimate rise to power. The initial power showdown came in October 2012 when Trọng attempted to remove Dũng from power by having the Politburo to cast a “no confidence vote” against him for his mismanagement of the economy. But the Party Central Committee came to Dũng’s political rescue when it voted to support the embattled prime minister for his overall economic leadership performance instead. This was a major political victory, even if not a complete one, not just for Dũng and his reformist faction, but for the new state as the equal of the old party (the latter still under the firm control of the conservatives).

With the 12th party congress approaching, Trọng tried again to neutralize Dũng in January 2015 with an unprecedented confidence vote (lấy phiếu tín nhiệm) on the top 20 party leaders by the Central Committee. Trọng was hoping that Dũng would score poorly on his job performance because of the economic slowdown and rising corruption, and that Trọng and his associates would do well. In fact, unofficial reports suggest that the prime minister “outperformed his peers and secured the most confidence votes.”

That brings us to our third factor: Dũng has won the political support of the existing Central Committee and influential party elders and can thus secure the critical votes of the next Central Committee. All four “major reasons” that Lê Hồng Hiệp offers in his explanation of Dũng’s “growing influence over the Central Committee” are valid in my view. If Dũng can make good use of “his current political capital to get his protégés and allies elected to the new Central Committee, it is highly likely that he will be elected the next CPV General Secretary.” However, there are some other strategically important reasons why the existing Central Committee has backed Dũng consistently in opposition to Trọng and his powerful Politburo associates, and so will the next Central Committee.

First, it is strategically imperative for the Central Committee to maintain a balance between the two most powerful factions of the Vietnamese Communist Party – the pro-Chinese conservative faction led by Trọng, and the pro-Western reformist led by Dũng – so that party unity can be dialectically guaranteed. By orchestrating this kind of internal party duality (thesis/antithesis) rather than destroying the opposition (the internal antithesis) as President Xi Jinping has been doing in China, both party/state conflict and party/state harmony can be maintained, allowing both the party and Vietnam to retain their independence despite the power politics games played by external actors such as China, the United States, Japan, Russia, and India. Second, by maintaining internal party duality, the Central Committee members can also maintain and protect their personal and factional powers and interests in the way that works best politically and structurally. This in turn may help them avoid be the ultimate disaster: “cảnh nước mất nhà tan” (the country lost and the family destroyed scenario). Why? Well, if the pro-Chinese faction were allowed to emerge as the sole ruling power with the Dũng-led faction effectively destroyed, the Vietnamese Communist Party would be politically helpless in the face of China’s plans to transform Southeast Asia into the first sphere of influence in its pursuit of hegemony.

The fourth reason why Dũng will most likely emerge victorious at the 12th party congress is that a “power compromise” (thỏa thuận quyền lực) may have been made on the advice of party elders to maintain party-state unity and national sovereignty in the face of external forces. This possibility, which is premised on the impasse between the two equally powerful contending party factions, the Dũng-led faction and the Trọng-led faction, can explain two seemingly strange political events. The first was the choice of Dũng – and not Trọng or Sang, which would have been more logical – to be the keynote speaker with top party elders lined up behind him at the national 40th anniversary of the liberation of South Vietnam, and the stuningly anti-American speech that Dũng delivered. It could be argued that Dũng did this as part of a deal to become the next general secretary, allowing him to declare that he followed the official ideological lines and formally honored the indispensible Russian and Chinese contributions to the liberation of South Vietnam. The second strange event was the official announcements of Trọng’s current to visit the United States, granting him an opportunity to enjoy all the associated prestige prior to a graceful exit from power. (Another odd event: Why did Chinese President Xi Jinping invite Trọng to visit China first and grant him a state visit ahead of Trọng’s U.S. trip? Was it to preempt any future deals that Vietnam might make with the U.S. and to remind all concerned that China can still call the shots and that Hanoi is still under Beijing’s effective control?)

The fifth factor favoring Dũng at the 12th party congress: his qualifications for the job. The prime minister is the most impressive leader that the Vietnamese Communist Party has. If we take nine general criteria for power in Vietnam, namely, political vision, economic development/market-oriented management know-how, political/practical wisdom, charisma, national popularity, nationalist credentials, international stature, family wealth, and family life, it is apparent that Dũng does not possess them all, but it is equally apparent that he is ahead of the other senior leaders on most counts. None of his peers have the international stature, extensive connections abroad, and personal relations with other world leaders that Dũng has cultivated during his many foreign visits over the past two years, including his latest trip to Japan for the Seventh Mekong-Japan Summit.

Let’s consider another leadership trait. If the mark of a strong political leader is the courage to make a difficult decision at the right time, then the prime minister seems to have lived up to the original meaning of his name “Tấn Dũng” (which translates as “exceedingly courageous”). The first key decision moment came for the top four VCP leaders and the ruling Politburo, when on May 1, 2014, China installed its oil rig HD-981 inside the special economic zone claimed by Vietnam. Of the top state officials, only Dũng stood firm. Ten days later, on May 11, at the 24th ASEAN Summit in Naypyidaw, the prime minister lodged an official protest. By standing up to the Chinese, Dũng proved himself in the eyes of the armed forces, the Central Committee, and the Vietnamese public. Later, the prime minister surprised observers by publicly denouncing U.S. imperialism during the 40th anniversary celebrations of the liberation of south Vietnam, in the process winning the admiration of Vietnamese patriots and those anti-U.S. conservatives within the Vietnamese Communist party for speaking out against the U.S. even while seeking Washington’s support to counter China.

The sixth and final factor: Dũng seems to have earned the strong support of the armed forces and the powerful military elite, not only because of his nationalist stance but also because of his military modernization programs in pushing for the rapid development of the defense industry and purchases of jet fighters and six Kilo submarines during his 2009 visit to Russia, a visionary move in light of the Chinese encroachment into the South China Sea (which Vietnam calls the East Sea). Any resistance from Trọng and his pro-Chinese Politburo leaders to this kind of military preparedness may have cost them their claim to leadership in the eyes of the military elite, especially among nationalistic generals who have now rallied behind Dũng. The latest evidence of the military support that Dũng now commands is his presiding over the IXth “Determined To Fight And Determined to Win Convention” of the national armed forces in Hanoi on July 1 (with Trọng, Sang and Hùng all absent).

I would not go as far as Lê Hồng Hiệp and call Dũng “Vietnam’s most powerful politician over the past thirty years.” Like Carl Thayer, I would suggest that the prime minister is presently the most capable of all the top Vietnamese Communist Party leaders, and the one best able to lead Vietnam and safeguard its sovereignty.

However, if Vietnam’s next leader is to be truly effective and powerful both at home and abroad, the next Central Committee should unify the current separate party-state positions into one politically unified leadership post, by electing Nguyễn Tấn Dũng president of Vietnam, commander-in-chief of the Vietnamese armed forces, and general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party. The party should also begin work to create a modern republic with features such as a presidential democracy, a bicameral congress, two-party system, and a free press. This will avoid the rise of dynastic rule or dictatorship of whatever type, and enable it to better manage sociopolitical ills such as corruption.

Chánh Công Phan, Ph.D. (University of Chicago), is an assistant professor of humanities and philosophy at the San Jose State University, San Jose, California, and editor of The Eastern Paths to Philosophic Self-Enlightenment (Kendall Hunt, 2002).
 
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For checking mine-suspected object , made in Spanish
 

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Vietnam´s first ever Sail Training Ship

Almost done, built by Marine Projects Shipyard at Gdansk, Poland: the Sail Training Ship "Lê Quý Đôn", named after a 18th-century Vietnamese philosopher: length 67 m, wide 10 m, sail area 1,400 m2, weight 857 tons, 3 poles of 40 m height, 30 Senior officers with 80 men training crew, 4 machine guns 12,7 mm WKM-Bm.

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Artillery

Targeting enemy positions with M46 130mm Howitzer. firing rate 8 shots a minute, range 38 km.

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airfield defence forces :)
 

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8 Developments in US-Vietnam Relations Show Emerging Partnership
By Carl Thayer
July 13, 2015

http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/8-developments-in-us-vietnam-relations-show-emerging-partnership/

Various analysts and commentators have erred in their analysis of the recent visit to Washington by the secretary-general of the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP), Nguyen Phu Trong, by placing too much emphasis on the lack of a break through in defense relations. Trong’s visit was not a tipping point in Vietnam’s relations with the United States and China. Nor were arms sales and U.S. access to Cam Ranh Bay the major items on the agenda.

In 2013, when Vietnam and the United States raised their bilateral relations to a comprehensive partnership, they used this formulation because both sides independently concluded that a strategic partnership was premature. Reportedly, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proposed a strategic partnership with Vietnam in mid-2010. Prior to her visit, the Defense Department released its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that mentioned developing “new strategic relations” with Vietnam. The 2014 QDR identified Vietnam as a “key partner.”

The same situation arose in Australia’s relations with Vietnam. In 2009 the then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd rejected Vietnam’s request to raise bilateral relations to a “strategic partnership” reportedly because he refused to sign an agreement that was largely symbolic. In addition, Rudd felt that defense relations with Vietnam had not developed sufficient intimacy to be called a “strategic partnership.” In the end, after much angst, Vietnam agreed to characterize bilateral relations with Australia as a comprehensive partnership.

The parallel does not end here. This year, when Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung visited Australia he met with Prime Minister Tony Abbott. They reached an agreement to enhance their comprehensive partnership in coming years but fell short from declaring a formal strategic partnership. After Secretary-General Trong’s meeting with President Obama, the two leaders issued a Joint Vision Statement that emphasized intensifying their comprehensive partnership. No strategic partnership was announced.

During the course of Trong’s five-day visit (July 6-10), he met with President Barack Obama, Vice President Joe Biden, National Security Advisor Susan Rice, Secretary of State John Kerry, Secretary of the Treasury Jack Lew, U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman, Senators John McCain and Patrick Leahy, American religious leaders, Vietnamese-American community representatives, American entrepreneurs, the head of the Communist Party of the United States, former President Bill Clinton, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, and a group of Harvard University professors.

Make no mistake, Nguyen Phu Trong’s visit to Washington was historic and a major development in Vietnam-United States relations. It was also substantive for eight reasons.

First, the centerpiece of Trong’s visit was his face-to-face meeting with President Obama in the Oval Office at the White House. Normally, only heads of government or state are given this honor. The Obama-Trong meeting accorded de factorecognition to the role of the VCP in Vietnam’s one-party state and the importance of the party secretary-general in Vietnam’s political system. If President Obama visits Hanoi before the end of his term in office, this will further underpin U.S. respect for Vietnam’s political system. The meeting between Trong and Obama broke political ice and a set a precedent for future visits by Vietnam’s party leader.

Second, Obama and Trong agreed to pursue “a deepened, sustained, and substantive relationship on the basis of respect for each other’s political systems, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.” These words are important because ideological conservatives in Vietnam voice suspicions that the United States wants to overturn Vietnam’s socialist regime through “peaceful evolution.” The fact that Trong was received in the Oval Office by Obama and the commitment of the U.S. president to respect Vietnam’s political system exposed the outdated worldview of Vietnam’s ideological conservatives.

Third, both leaders pledged to advance their 2013 agreement on comprehensive partnership by stepping up high-level visits and creating mechanisms to implement cooperation in the nine major areas outlined in the 2013 agreement. On July 7, the U.S. and Vietnam signed four agreements, including on double taxation, assistance for UN peacekeeping missions, cooperation in addressing emerging pandemic threats, and technical assistance for aviation safety.

In addition, PetroVietnam and Murphy Oil signed a cooperation agreement, Harvard University was given approval to establish the Fulbright University in Vietnam, and Vietnam took delivery of its first Boeing 777 Dreamliner aircraft.

Fourth, both leaders committed themselves, in cooperation with other nations, to complete negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and to carry out reforms necessary to reach a high-standard agreement. There are clearly several hurdles to be overcome.

The U.S. insists that Vietnam meet four principles included in the International Labor Organisation’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. One of the principles is the right of workers to “freely associate” and to bargain collectively (form their own labor union). Vietnam is pushing the United States to grant it market economy status so that tariffs will be lowered on imports to the United States. Crunch time will come in late July as negotiators attempt to conclude TPP negotiations.

Fifth, both leaders pledged that Vietnam and the United States would work more closely together to contribute to peace, stability, cooperation and prosperity in the Asia Pacific both bilaterally and through regional multilateral organisations such as APEC, and ASEAN-related institutions, such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus and the East Asia Summit.

Sixth, Obama and Trong set out a framework for resolving territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Their Joint Vision States basically repeated the standard formulations on both sides–maritime disputes should be settled on the basis of international law and by peaceful means. Nevertheless, the leaders prefaced their remarks by noting:

Both countries are concerned about recent developments in the South China Sea that have increased tensions, eroded trust, and threatened to undermine peace, security and stability. They recognize the imperative of upholding the internationally-recognized freedoms of navigation and overflight; unimpeded lawful commerce, maritime security and safety; refraining from actions that raise tensions; ensuring that all actions and activities taken comply with international law and rejecting coercion, intimidation, and the use or threat of force.

In other words, there is considerable convergence of strategic interests regarding the South China Sea and both leaders easily accommodated the key concerns of their counterpart.

Seventh, Obama and Trong agreed to step up defense and security cooperation in maritime security, maritime domain awareness, defense trade and information sharing, and defense technology exchange. These commitments open new areas for cooperation. Nonetheless, the key agencies are the U.S. Department of Defense and Vietnam’s Ministry of National Defense, not the secretary-general of the Vietnam Communist Party.

When the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR) were first adopted in the 1980s, Vietnam was included, not because of human rights violations, but because it was already subject to a U.S. trade embargo. The ITAR restrictions have remained in place despite the end of the trade embargo. ITAR restrictions have now been linked with Vietnam’s human rights record. This is a political decision taken by successive U.S. Administrations.

It is likely that Vietnam wants all ITAR restrictions removed to end what it views as discrimination rather than to purchase high-end offensive weaponry. Senator McCain has announced on more than one occasion that it is time to lift all ITAR restrictions. Viewed within this context, continuing ITAR restrictions are not as significant as some analysts assert. Vietnam has yet to reveal its hand about what weapons or defense technology it wants to procure under the partial lifting of ITAR restrictions. The U.S. has made clear that sales will be limited to materiel enhancing maritime security and the capability of Vietnam’s Coast Guard.

Vietnam’s Deputy Minister of National Defense Senior Lt. General Nguyen Chi Vinh and U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia-Pacific Security David Shear signed a Memorandum of Understanding on U.S. assistance to Vietnam for UN peacekeeping. Vietnam is poised to raise it commitment to the UN from five military officers to deployment of a level 2 field hospital and engineer company.

Eighth, both leaders directly addressed difficulties and challenges in their bilateral relations, including human rights and market economy status, and pledged to conduct positive, frank and constructive political dialogues to reduce these differences and build trust. In sum, the future trajectory of bilateral has been reset, but it will take time to flesh out the comprehensive partnership.

The meeting between Obama and Trong has set the foundations for the development of bilateral relations in the coming years. Trong will step down as party secretary-general early next year when the VCP’s convenes its 12th national congress. Obama will retire when his second terms comes to an end following presidential elections in November. In the words of John McCain, Vietnam is an “emerging partner” for the United States.
 
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Artillery

Targeting enemy positions with M46 130mm Howitzer. firing rate 8 shots a minute, range 38 km.

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Perhaps India can aid pur Vietnamese partners in upgrading this gun to 155mm we have the sanegun & are upgrading it to 155mm standardb
 
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Perhaps India can aid pur Vietnamese partners in upgrading this gun to 155mm we have the sanegun & are upgrading it to 155mm standardb
how can you "upgrade" 130 to 155mm? that is a totally different caliber?
 
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155 mm is automatic refill and build in GPS and mobile for fast in position. more effective.
 
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how can you "upgrade" 130 to 155mm? that is a totally different caliber?
You can upgrade the M46 to 155mm , very simple by the way . Just need to replace the cannon breach , adjust the chamber and install a new barrel , you can check out the M46S by the Israeli or the M46/84 by the Yogoslavian ( Now Serbia hold the right to it ) , and of course , India have 1 too which is called IOB M46 FG :)

the entrance :)
 

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Nice, a major milestone for our defence industry.

In cooperation with Damen Shipyard (Netherland), launch of two brand new landing ships built by Hạ Long shipyard for Venezuela Navy. Roro 5612 class, coded 1 and 02. Specs: Length 57,27m, wide 12m, weight 600 tons, speed 10.4 kn per hour. 2 more under construction.


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