US State Department approves sale of long range land attack missiles and mobile rocket systems to Taiwan

[FairAndUnbiased]

The reverse also applies: That China's offensive capabilities are within range of Taiwan's.

We have gone thru this already and the speculation does not favor China. Those PLAAF AWACS? Taiwan can target them and once Taiwan's SAMs are launched, PLAAF AWACS must relocate or die. Here is what you do not understand: A single SAM is enough to compel cease operations and begin evasive maneuvers. As long as Taiwan can create this threat, PLAAF advantage will be %50 degraded.

You talk as if Taiwan is alone in this fight. No, the US may not enter the fight. But you are looking at an adversary that have an ally that carry decades of air combat that you cannot match. The US literally wrote the manual on AWACS operations when China was still struggling with how to conduct the most basic of air combat tactic: Ground Control Intercept (GCI). Those PLAAF AWACS are much more vulnerable than you think, especially when US AWACS will be assisting Taiwan.

When will PLAAF AWACs be within range of Taiwan's SAMs with 500 km range radar? Yes, closer is better but typically AWACs are far from SAM threats. This is as insane as saying HQ-9s can threaten US E-3s.

 

[My-Analogous]

I think that was tried once -- did not worked out too well.

We never know when situation changes. China have Cuba, Argentina, Chile and Bolivia in the list

 

[gambit]

When will PLAAF AWACs be within range of Taiwan's SAMs with 500 km range radar? Yes, closer is better but typically AWACs are far from SAM threats. This is as insane as saying HQ-9s can threaten US E-3s.

Do you know why North Viet Nam survived? Because of the 17th parallel.

The 17th parallel is a virtual, not physical, barrier. US airpower ignored it, but on the ground, the US/SVN alliance obeyed it. The result is that North Vietnamese forces have a place and time to recoup and rebuild.

Unlike the 17th, the Taiwan Strait is a physical, not virtual, barrier. Chinese airpower can ignore it but on the surface, like the 17th, China must obey it, at least to the extent that China have a limited window of opportunity to invade Taiwan. We have debated this before and you, after some education, had no choice but to admit your ignorance.

Am not going to detail AWACS operations here. Suffice to say that just because an AWACS have an antenna range of X, mission operation WILL NOT allow the AWACS to stay at max antenna range all the time. Inside the AWACS is an array of human sector operators. Each operator is responsible for a part of the total antenna scan area and we can say 360 deg for ease of discussion. Does not matter if the antenna is a fixed ESA or rotodome, the monitor partitioning schema is still the same. We, meaning most in this forum, do not know the mission requirements of a Chinese AWACS over Taiwan. But I can say that if there is a need, from surface or air or both, the Chinese AWACS may decide to put itself at risk from Taiwanese SAM and fighters.

https://www.jber.jb.mil/News/Articles/Article/291616/seres-help-airmen-refresh-survival-skills/

Why does the US send our AWACS crew to SERE training? Because the AWACS, despite supposedly staying far from combat, actually have equal risk as fighter pilots at being shot down and captured.

Just as how much ignorance you guys have about an amphibious landing on Taiwan, that will be an even greater task than D-day, do not presume that you know everything about how an AWACS mission goes.

 

[FairAndUnbiased]

Do you know why North Viet Nam survived? Because of the 17th parallel.

The 17th parallel is a virtual, not physical, barrier. US airpower ignored it, but on the ground, the US/SVN alliance obeyed it. The result is that North Vietnamese forces have a place and time to recoup and rebuild.

Unlike the 17th, the Taiwan Strait is a physical, not virtual, barrier. Chinese airpower can ignore it but on the surface, like the 17th, China must obey it, at least to the extent that China have a limited window of opportunity to invade Taiwan. We have debated this before and you, after some education, had no choice but to admit your ignorance.

Am not going to detail AWACS operations here. Suffice to say that just because an AWACS have an antenna range of X, mission operation WILL NOT allow the AWACS to stay at max antenna range all the time. Inside the AWACS is an array of human sector operators. Each operator is responsible for a part of the total antenna scan area and we can say 360 deg for ease of discussion. Does not matter if the antenna is a fixed ESA or rotodome, the monitor partitioning schema is still the same. We, meaning most in this forum, do not know the mission requirements of a Chinese AWACS over Taiwan. But I can say that if there is a need, from surface or air or both, the Chinese AWACS may decide to put itself at risk from Taiwanese SAM and fighters.

https://www.jber.jb.mil/News/Articles/Article/291616/seres-help-airmen-refresh-survival-skills/

Why does the US send our AWACS crew to SERE training? Because the AWACS, despite supposedly staying far from combat, actually have equal risk as fighter pilots at being shot down and captured.

Just as how much ignorance you guys have about an amphibious landing on Taiwan, that will be an even greater task than D-day, do not presume that you know everything about how an AWACS mission goes.

Interesting for you to mention the 17th parallel. it was significant not only because North Vietnam had a place to rebuild but also because China opened its borders to Soviet aid, opened its borders to North Vietnam, and also provided its own aid. If China closed the border, then the 17th parallel would have meant nothing as the USAF ground the PAVN down with attrition. Taiwan is nothing like Vietnam because no one borders it to provide it with continuous resupply. All resupply efforts will be totally visible at known ports of entry.

The main thing is that no matter how hard it is for PLAAF AWACs, Taiwan will have far worse situational awareness because their AWACs are obsolete, their ground radar can be targetted in a first strike and even with US AWAC assistance, half their fighters - their F-5s and F-CK-1s - cannot accept Link 16 datalinks.

Logistically they're also fucked. They have 1000+ Magic and MICA missiles for just 60 Mirages that can't be launched by their F-5s and F-16s. They have 130 F-CK-1s which can't fire the MICA, Magic or AIM-120 missiles, just AIM-9s and some domestic copies of AIM-120A that somehow are not interoperable with actual AIM-120s. Then they have their F-5 and F-16 fleet of 150 planes which fire AIM-120s but they only have 636 AIM-120s. This substantially lowers their own air force's interoperability while all PLA planes are standardized around the PL series, including PL-15 which has longer range and an AESA seeker.

 

[Oldman1]

US is giving Taiwan false hope and will shrug their shoulder when Taiwan gets bombed into rubble. Not conceivable in anyway how Taiwan can defend an outright onslaught by China.US will keep selling weapons and keeping their workers in jobs but the poor Taiwanese will end up in graves. As I said before it's best for Taiwan to negotiate integration into Mainland China.

Taiwan has developed long range cruise missiles without U.S. help. They are doing things themselves. Obviously we cannot sell them long range missiles more than 300 km because of the MTCR treaty. Unless Taiwan can figure it out themselves. Just need the deterrence enough to deter China. I mean isn't this like Iran against the U.S.? Iran can hurt the U.S. even though the U.S. could destroy Iran. Just need enough to hurt the U.S. to deter from attack. Same thing applies.

 

[khansaheeb]

Taiwan has developed long range cruise missiles without U.S. help. They are doing things themselves. Obviously we cannot sell them long range missiles more than 300 km because of the MTCR treaty. Unless Taiwan can figure it out themselves. Just need the deterrence enough to deter China. I mean isn't this like Iran against the U.S.? Iran can hurt the U.S. even though the U.S. could destroy Iran. Just need enough to hurt the U.S. to deter from attack. Same thing applies.

Can't really compare Iran and Taiwan; Iran is a mountainous country of 80 million people and Taiwan is small island of 24 million people. The theme is about not to destroy but but to occupy. China can occupy Taiwan but I don't think the US can occupy Iran , just as it couldn't maintain occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan.

 

[LeGenD]

by 2024-2026 PLAAF will have 200+ J-20s that the F-16 regardless of block can neither detect at BVR or kinematically fight against WVR (not that they'll ever make it there). This is in addition to newly built 50+ 052C, 052D and 055 destroyers with 300 km range SAMs guided by 50+ KJ-2000, KJ-500, KJ-600 AWACs and of course, potentially 500+ J-10C and J-16 with AESA radar.

You are correct to point out that China will have sheer numbers on its side which is an advantage in itself. I pointed out the same as well: "China does have FIREPOWER on its side - sheer amount of it - which it can subject Taiwan to with ease."

Taiwan cannot cope with China in open-ended conflict and prioritized survivability instead. Taiwan have coasts and mountains which helped shape its defensive strategy in the long-term. The coasts are believed to be heavily mined and mountains are believed to house a number of sophisticated underground tunnel complexes which in turn enable Taiwanese armed forces to safeguard valuable equipment, snipe at Chinese military positions from different spots* (if necessary), and ambush invading Chinese armed forces from different spots (if necessary). China desire unification with Taiwan and invasion might be on the cards for the needful. Enter this: "However, well-dug armies are not easily vanquished."

Geography of Taiwan at a glance: http://static.maphill.com/12/img/t.gif

I rechecked some sources to make sure that I am not missing something.

RoCAF F-16s (already in service) are being uplifted to the F-16V standard as WE speak. This program (dubbed Phoenix Rising)** commenced in 2018: https://adbr.com.au/taiwan-receives-first-upgraded-f-16v/

**and will be complete in 2022: https://www.defensenews.com/global/...s-recon-pods-that-can-watch-chinas-coastline/

RoCAF have 144 x F-16s in total and all will be upgraded by 2022.

Taiwan is looking forward to expand the F-16 fleet of RoCAF by placing an order of additional 66 x F-16 Block 70/72 standard from USA: https://www.defensenews.com/global/...e-officially-cleared-by-trump-administration/

- and Taiwan might receive them in the (2024 - 2026) period but Americans can expedite this process. This is assuming that the next American administration will see this order through, and China will not attack/invade Taiwan meanwhile.

RoCAF F-16s are receiving excellent sensor systems including the AN/APG-83 AESA radar system (5th generation technologies), Terma ALQ-213(V) electronic warfare suite, AN/AAQ-33 Sniper XR targeting pod, and a helmet-mounted cueing system. You must not underestimate sensitivity levels of this sensor package and particularly the Sniper XR targeting pod which enable FLIR (Air-to-Air Tracking) up to 185 KM mark although information is scarce in Public domain (Russian OLS-35 solution enables the same up to 90 KM mark assuming tracking from rear hemisphere in ideal conditions). High quality FLIR illuminates virtually every airborne target within its Line-of-Sight (LOS) and F-16s have data fusion, therefore, Sniper XR targeting pod might enable aerial target engagement(s) in the BVR regime (vs. stealthy targets).

"IRST sensors offer a valuable alternative and complement to radars when it comes to spotting stealthy aircraft at extended ranges, which could be particularly useful for Taiwan given China's stealth advances, such as the J-20, which is now in active service in increasing numbers." - Joseph Trevithick (The Drive)

J-20 is a Chinese accomplishment deserving of admiration (I like it really) but not without weaknesses which aviation experts might elaborate in detail but many remain tight-lipped for obvious reasons. J-20 is VLO in frontal aspect only and not so much in other aspects; robust assessment in following link: https://www.aereo.jor.br/2020/09/11/a-furtividade-do-caca-chines-j-20-mighty-dragon/

There are additional sources which tell the same. I have noticed a glimpse of (manufacturer) research about J-20 leaking in a forum but I won't expand on this part in person (you will have to sharpen your searching skills instead). Just so you know that your enemies are busy extracting valuable information about your assets and learning from such leaks - espionage is not your forte only. J-20 also need a revolutionary pair of engines to enhance its performance and stealthy characteristics because those Russian engines in Chinese inventory will not do but this is easier said than done: https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2020/...inese-fighters-have-a-serious-engine-problem/

According to Taiwan, RCS of J-20 is not uniform across all aspects and fall in the (0.01 m^2 - 1.0 m^2) range; lowest figure correspond to the frontal aspect. Taiwan received one incredibly powerful radar system from USA in 2012*** and numerous mobile radar systems to monitor activities of PLAAF near its terrain (more on this below).

Now - in order to fight and degrade a well-dug military force, ballistic missiles will not be sufficient on their own and airstrikes are a must (many sorties will be required in fact). Typical PLAAF strike package might be a mix of J-20 + J-16 + J-10C + AWACS which will be dispatched over Taiwan for desired ends.

RoCAF have 328 fighter jets in total and some might be used to draw PLAAF towards locations where F-16s might be scrambled to ambush them from sophisticated underground tunnel complexes in short order (5 - 6 minutes). The upgraded/new F-16s will provide a fighting a chance to RoCAF even against the very best of PLAAF assets airborne and they won't be dealing with F-16s only****. Probable J-20 losses will make for upsetting headlines in Chinese press on the other hand and Taiwan will capitalize on these kills for propaganda purposes to galvanize much-needed Public support. Continue to read below.

that is the true nightmare for Taiwan. You note that they need to repair the runways. Do they get the chance to repair? Even if they repair, when their planes take off they can be detected by AWACs and shot down. Their weapons are too short ranged to shoot back against the AWACs or the destroyers. That is the fundamental question: how do you fight an air war when your airfields are inside your adversary's air defense bubble? Taiwan starts inside the air defense equivalent of 10 US carrier strike groups. Good luck lmao.

****Taiwan is investing in surface defenses and standoff munitions lately.

RELATED: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zo...int-defense-missile-system-to-guard-key-sites

Taiwanese officials have asserted that defensive positions will not remain fixed in case of hostilities.

***Sniping options against Chinese military positions in the mainland:

The Hsiung Feng IIE program likely started in 2001 to give Taiwan the ability to strike targets deeper in mainland China. Prior to its development, most Taiwanese missiles could only reach a few hundred kilometers, limiting strike capabilities to coastal areas. The extended range of the Hsiung Feng IIE makes it possible for the Taiwanese military to target surveillance and reconnaissance assets, radar, missile sites, airfields, and other critical PLA installations.1 The Hsiung Feng IIE was developed by the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST).

Hsiung Feng IIE | Missile Threat

The Hsiung Feng IIE is a subsonic land-attack cruise missile. It is among Taiwan’s longest range missiles, and is the only one of Taiwan’s Hsiung Feng cruise missile variants specifically designed for land-attack missions. Hsiung Feng IIE Development The Hsiung Feng IIE program likely started in...

missilethreat.csis.org

Sniping options against PLAN operating near Taiwan:

Development of the Wan Chien is believed to have started around 2000, led by Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST). Taiwan reportedly began developing its own guided munitions after the United States – Taiwan’s main arms supplier – declined to sell it such systems.1 The program became known publicly in November 2005, and the missile entered service in 2011.2 Full production was expected to begin in 2015, but former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-Jeou chose to reduce the quantity to be produced. In June 2017, however, a Taiwanese report claimed that current President Tsai Ing-wen’s government had plans to restore production of the Wan Chien to above 100 weapons.3

Wan Chien | Missile Threat

The Wan Chien is an air-to-ground, subsonic cruise missile developed by Taiwan. The missile program was first reported in 2005.

missilethreat.csis.org

RELATED: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zo...ive-harpoon-anti-ship-missiles-to-deter-china

Taiwan have also placed an order for MS-110 Recce external sensor pods to advance its maritime engagement possibilities: https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-...onnaissance-pod-sale-to-taiwan/140737.article

the real kicker is situational awareness. unlike Pakistan and India, where both sides have very weak situational awareness, PLAAF enjoys an overwhelming advantage in situational awareness and network centric doctrine over the ROCAF which only has 6 AWAC planes, all small E-2Ts which are E-2C standard with Doppler radar. India has 5 large AWAC planes, Pakistan has 8 small AWAC planes. China has almost 50, all AESA radar, 35 of which are large 4 engine turboprop or turbofan. This is in addition to 100+ optical, radar and IR recon satellites vs. 0 for Taiwan. Then you have the problem that most of Taiwan's air force is obsolete Mirage, F-5, F-16A and F-CK-1.

Pakistan is not lacking in situational awarness thanks in part to following radar systems in use: https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/defense-systems/an-tps-77/

- among others in use.

Pakistan have established network-centric warfare capabilities lately which were put to good use on 27-02-19 (Operation Swift Retort).

Operation Swift Retort one year on

One year after Pakistan and India almost went to war, Alan Warnes...

www.keymilitary.com

Pakistan cannot take its defenses lightly given its enmity with India. However, this conversation risk moving in another direction so I will stop here.

Coming back to Taiwan - it is not lacking in situational awareness actually.

**This monster for instance:

Location = Mount Leshan (elevated position to facilitate surface scanning across the horizon)

Taiwan's Massive, Mega-Powerful Radar System Is Finally Operational

After more than a decade and $1.4 billion, Taiwan can now see missiles and warplanes from 3,000 miles away with its ultra-advanced new radar system. Which is good, because China's pointing a lot of missiles at it.

www.wired.com

Think about the sheer amount of valuable INTEL it provided to Taiwan (and also to USA by extension) over the course of years - INTEL which helped Taiwan shape its defenses and develop tactics in relation. USA would have learned much as well.

Taiwanese radar coverage include both fixed and mobile installations and is believed to be extensive. They are able to keep tabs on Chinese military movements from a distance.

Taiwan also have military interoperability arrangement with USA to offset reliance on Taiwan-operated reconnaissance systems for tracking and engaging Chinese military assets stationed close to and/or operating above Taiwanese terrain. American intervention can make much difference for Taiwan in short.

the problem with Pakistani thinking is that you are limited by your experience with India. With India, both side have very low situational awareness, both sides rely on low interoperability hodge podge of western, Russian and Chinese equipment, both sides can't use their navy to support themselves.

China is totally different - we have a full network centric warfare doctrine with the situational awareness to back it up, and a massive navy with long range air defense. Why wouldn't we use it? The entire way of thinking for Chinese is totally alien to a Pakistani or Indian, tbh.

See above.

How a war between Pakistan and India will pan out depend upon where it is being fought (God forbid).

I am aware of Chinese investments in developing situational awareness but China also have a massive terrain to watch over and defend in case of hostilities.

China might start a war with Taiwan one day but it would be premature to assume best possible outcome only - much can go wrong in a conflict. China might be able to invade and occupy Taiwan but this won't be a walk-in-the-park experience; even if about 50% of Taiwanese population is willing to resist Chinese invasion, you are in for a long drawn out conflict to maintain control of this island. It is possible that other Chinese enemies will capitalize on this development to their advantage and attempt to distract China in the process. USA might also decide to intervene on behalf of Taiwan if the latter show determination against all odds. Look at developments in Afghanistan and Iraq where occupations materialized.

Peaceful unification remains best course and option.

I understand your POV but I am reiterating that a WAR can lead to undesired mess in the region.

 

[Oldman1]

Can't really compare Iran and Taiwan; Iran is a mountainous country of 80 million people and Taiwan is small island of 24 million people. The theme is abut being to destroy but but to occupy. China can occupy Taiwan but I don't think the US can occupy Iran , just as it couldn't maintain occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan.

China can try to occupy Taiwan, but its going to be costly as I've been saying. We can invade Iran, occupy, but too big and costly in the long run, Iraq we left because of dispute with possible persecution of U.S. troops between Obama and Iraqi Prime Minister. Afghanistan, well 20 years of occupation, not something Iran would want to happen after seeing what happened to Iraq.

 

[FairAndUnbiased]

You are correct to point out that China will have sheer numbers on its side which is an advantage in itself. I pointed out the same as well: "China does have FIREPOWER on its side - sheer amount of it - which it can subject Taiwan to with ease."

Taiwan cannot cope with China in open-ended conflict and prioritized survivability instead. Taiwan have coasts and mountains which helped shape its defensive strategy in the long-term. The coasts are believed to be heavily mined and mountains are believed to house a number of sophisticated underground tunnel complexes which in turn enable Taiwanese armed forces to safeguard valuable equipment, snipe at Chinese military positions from different spots* (if necessary), and ambush invading Chinese armed forces from different spots (if necessary). China desire unification with Taiwan and invasion might be on the cards for the needful. Enter this: "However, well-dug armies are not easily vanquished."

Geography of Taiwan at a glance: http://static.maphill.com/12/img/t.gif

I rechecked some sources to make sure that I am not missing something.

RoCAF F-16s (already in service) are being uplifted to the F-16V standard as WE speak. This program (dubbed Phoenix Rising)** commenced in 2018: https://adbr.com.au/taiwan-receives-first-upgraded-f-16v/

**and will be complete in 2022: https://www.defensenews.com/global/...s-recon-pods-that-can-watch-chinas-coastline/

RoCAF have 144 x F-16s in total and all will be upgraded by 2022.

Taiwan is looking forward to expand the F-16 fleet of RoCAF by placing an order of additional 66 x F-16 Block 70/72 standard from USA: https://www.defensenews.com/global/...e-officially-cleared-by-trump-administration/

- and Taiwan might receive them in the (2024 - 2026) period but Americans can expedite this process. This is assuming that the next American administration will see this order through, and China will not attack/invade Taiwan meanwhile.

RoCAF F-16s are receiving excellent sensor systems including the AN/APG-83 AESA radar system (5th generation technologies), Terma ALQ-213(V) electronic warfare suite, AN/AAQ-33 Sniper XR targeting pod, and a helmet-mounted cueing system. You must not underestimate sensitivity levels of this sensor package and particularly the Sniper XR targeting pod which enable FLIR (Air-to-Air Tracking) up to 185 KM mark although information is scarce in Public domain (Russian OLS-35 solution enables the same up to 90 KM mark assuming tracking from rear hemisphere in ideal conditions). High quality FLIR illuminates virtually every airborne target within its Line-of-Sight (LOS) and F-16s have data fusion, therefore, Sniper XR targeting pod might enable aerial target engagement(s) in the BVR regime (vs. stealthy targets).

"IRST sensors offer a valuable alternative and complement to radars when it comes to spotting stealthy aircraft at extended ranges, which could be particularly useful for Taiwan given China's stealth advances, such as the J-20, which is now in active service in increasing numbers." - Joseph Trevithick (The Drive)

J-20 is a Chinese accomplishment deserving of admiration (I like it really) but not without weaknesses which aviation experts might elaborate in detail but many remain tight-lipped for obvious reasons. J-20 is VLO in frontal aspect only and not so much in other aspects; robust assessment in following link: https://www.aereo.jor.br/2020/09/11/a-furtividade-do-caca-chines-j-20-mighty-dragon/

There are additional sources which tell the same. I have noticed a glimpse of (manufacturer) research about J-20 leaking in a forum but I won't expand on this part in person (you will have to sharpen your searching skills instead). Just so you know that your enemies are busy extracting valuable information about your assets and learning from such leaks - espionage is not your forte only. J-20 also need a revolutionary pair of engines to enhance its performance and stealthy characteristics because those Russian engines in Chinese inventory will not do but this is easier said than done: https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2020/...inese-fighters-have-a-serious-engine-problem/

According to Taiwan, RCS of J-20 is not uniform across all aspects and fall in the (0.01 m^2 - 1.0 m^2) range; lowest figure correspond to the frontal aspect. Taiwan received one incredibly powerful radar system from USA in 2012*** and numerous mobile radar systems to monitor activities of PLAAF near its terrain (more on this below).

Now - in order to fight and degrade a well-dug military force, ballistic missiles will not be sufficient on their own and airstrikes are a must (many sorties will be required in fact). Typical PLAAF strike package might be a mix of J-20 + J-16 + J-10C + AWACS which will be dispatched over Taiwan for desired ends.

RoCAF have 328 fighter jets in total and some might be used to draw PLAAF towards locations where F-16s might be scrambled to ambush them from sophisticated underground tunnel complexes in short order (5 - 6 minutes). The upgraded/new F-16s will provide a fighting a chance to RoCAF even against the very best of PLAAF assets airborne and they won't be dealing with F-16s only****. Probable J-20 losses will make for upsetting headlines in Chinese press on the other hand and Taiwan will capitalize on these kills for propaganda purposes to galvanize much-needed Public support. Continue to read below.


****Taiwan is investing in surface defenses and standoff munitions lately.

RELATED: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zo...int-defense-missile-system-to-guard-key-sites

Taiwanese officials have asserted that defensive positions will not remain fixed in case of hostilities.

***Sniping options against Chinese military positions in the mainland:

The Hsiung Feng IIE program likely started in 2001 to give Taiwan the ability to strike targets deeper in mainland China. Prior to its development, most Taiwanese missiles could only reach a few hundred kilometers, limiting strike capabilities to coastal areas. The extended range of the Hsiung Feng IIE makes it possible for the Taiwanese military to target surveillance and reconnaissance assets, radar, missile sites, airfields, and other critical PLA installations.1 The Hsiung Feng IIE was developed by the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST).

Hsiung Feng IIE | Missile Threat

The Hsiung Feng IIE is a subsonic land-attack cruise missile. It is among Taiwan’s longest range missiles, and is the only one of Taiwan’s Hsiung Feng cruise missile variants specifically designed for land-attack missions. Hsiung Feng IIE Development The Hsiung Feng IIE program likely started in...

missilethreat.csis.org

Sniping options against PLAN operating near Taiwan:

Development of the Wan Chien is believed to have started around 2000, led by Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST). Taiwan reportedly began developing its own guided munitions after the United States – Taiwan’s main arms supplier – declined to sell it such systems.1 The program became known publicly in November 2005, and the missile entered service in 2011.2 Full production was expected to begin in 2015, but former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-Jeou chose to reduce the quantity to be produced. In June 2017, however, a Taiwanese report claimed that current President Tsai Ing-wen’s government had plans to restore production of the Wan Chien to above 100 weapons.3

Wan Chien | Missile Threat

The Wan Chien is an air-to-ground, subsonic cruise missile developed by Taiwan. The missile program was first reported in 2005.

missilethreat.csis.org

RELATED: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zo...ive-harpoon-anti-ship-missiles-to-deter-china

Taiwan have also placed an order for MS-110 Recce external sensor pods to advance its maritime engagement possibilities: https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-...onnaissance-pod-sale-to-taiwan/140737.article


Pakistan is not lacking in situational awarness thanks in part to following radar systems in use: https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/defense-systems/an-tps-77/

- among others in use.

Pakistan have established network-centric warfare capabilities lately which were put to good use on 27-02-19 (Operation Swift Retort).

Operation Swift Retort one year on

One year after Pakistan and India almost went to war, Alan Warnes...

www.keymilitary.com

Pakistan cannot take its defenses lightly given its enmity with India. However, this conversation risk moving in another direction so I will stop here.

Coming back to Taiwan - it is not lacking in situational awareness actually.

**This monster for instance:

Location = Mount Leshan (elevated position to facilitate surface scanning across the horizon)

Taiwan's Massive, Mega-Powerful Radar System Is Finally Operational

After more than a decade and $1.4 billion, Taiwan can now see missiles and warplanes from 3,000 miles away with its ultra-advanced new radar system. Which is good, because China's pointing a lot of missiles at it.

www.wired.com

Think about the sheer amount of valuable INTEL it provided to Taiwan (and also to USA by extension) over the course of years - INTEL which helped Taiwan shape its defenses and develop tactics in relation. USA would have learned much as well.

Taiwanese radar coverage include both fixed and mobile installations and is believed to be extensive. They are able to keep tabs on Chinese military movements from a distance.

Taiwan also have military interoperability arrangement with USA to offset reliance on Taiwan-operated reconnaissance systems for tracking and engaging Chinese military assets stationed close to and/or operating above Taiwanese terrain. American intervention can make much difference for Taiwan in short.


See above.

How a war between Pakistan and India will pan out depend upon where it is being fought (God forbid).

I am aware of Chinese investments in developing situational awareness but China also have a massive terrain to watch over and defend in case of hostilities.

China might start a war with Taiwan one day but it would be premature to assume best possible outcome only - much can go wrong in a conflict. China might be able to invade and occupy Taiwan but this won't be a walk-in-the-park experience; even if about 50% of Taiwanese population is willing to resist Chinese invasion, you are in for a long drawn out conflict to maintain control of this island. It is possible that other Chinese enemies will capitalize on this development to their advantage and attempt to distract China in the process. USA might also decide to intervene on behalf of Taiwan if the latter show determination against all odds. Look at developments in Afghanistan and Iraq where occupations materialized.

Peaceful unification remains best course and option.

I understand your POV but I am reiterating that a WAR can lead to undesired mess in the region.

I just have 3 things to say, since I can't reply to everything though it is good insight.

1. Why do you think there's no countermeasures to these countermeasures? The ROC armed forces are on Taiwan because they lost. Historically it proves that they aren't capable of outthinking the PLA even when they had more money and men. Now they have less, they are more capable of thinking?

2. It was found that Leshan PAVE PAWS has been subject to jamming ever since it was activated. The original article was removed for some reason but the text was posted multiple times, including in PDF itself. This was later confirmed by China.

https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/new-chinese-radar-may-have-jammed-taiwans-srp.317731
http://www.guancha.cn/military-affairs/2014_06_07_235631.shtml

" 英国《简氏防务周刊》网站报道，曾被台湾媒体吹嘘为“能够发现3000公里上飞行的高尔夫球”的美国“铺路爪”雷达在台湾投入使用一年，却成了“瞎子的眼睛——摆设”。 原因在于大陆在与之隔海相望的福建惠安部署了针对“铺路爪”进行干扰的一部大型相控阵雷达，两者距离仅240公里，几乎相当于“脸贴脸”

PLA put a more powerful AESA radar 240 km from Leshan and is jamming it continuously.

This is expected because PAVE PAWS is a 1970's era system, the radar installed in Taiwan is exactly that. And can it even detect a stealthy sub launched cruise missile flying low as the first strike on the radar system, even if it did work?

3. SNIPER is not an air to air targetting pod, it is an evolution of the LANTIRN which is an air to ground targetting pod. Why did you try to imply that it could guide BVR missiles?

As for the rest, they rely on the PLA making mistakes and the ROC Air Force making none. Where's the evidence that this has ever happened? Now the PLA has much more money, more men, and more situational awareness, and they're going to make more mistakes? Instead, you find that it is the ROC that is making hilariously stupid mistakes like shooting Hsiung Feng III at their own fishing boats.

 

[khansaheeb]

You are correct to point out that China will have sheer numbers on its side which is an advantage in itself. I pointed out the same as well: "China does have FIREPOWER on its side - sheer amount of it - which it can subject Taiwan to with ease."

Taiwan cannot cope with China in open-ended conflict and prioritized survivability instead. Taiwan have coasts and mountains which helped shape its defensive strategy in the long-term. The coasts are believed to be heavily mined and mountains are believed to house a number of sophisticated underground tunnel complexes which in turn enable Taiwanese armed forces to safeguard valuable equipment, snipe at Chinese military positions from different spots* (if necessary), and ambush invading Chinese armed forces from different spots (if necessary). China desire unification with Taiwan and invasion might be on the cards for the needful. Enter this: "However, well-dug armies are not easily vanquished."

Geography of Taiwan at a glance: http://static.maphill.com/12/img/t.gif

I rechecked some sources to make sure that I am not missing something.

RoCAF F-16s (already in service) are being uplifted to the F-16V standard as WE speak. This program (dubbed Phoenix Rising)** commenced in 2018: https://adbr.com.au/taiwan-receives-first-upgraded-f-16v/

**and will be complete in 2022: https://www.defensenews.com/global/...s-recon-pods-that-can-watch-chinas-coastline/

RoCAF have 144 x F-16s in total and all will be upgraded by 2022.

Taiwan is looking forward to expand the F-16 fleet of RoCAF by placing an order of additional 66 x F-16 Block 70/72 standard from USA: https://www.defensenews.com/global/...e-officially-cleared-by-trump-administration/

- and Taiwan might receive them in the (2024 - 2026) period but Americans can expedite this process. This is assuming that the next American administration will see this order through, and China will not attack/invade Taiwan meanwhile.

RoCAF F-16s are receiving excellent sensor systems including the AN/APG-83 AESA radar system (5th generation technologies), Terma ALQ-213(V) electronic warfare suite, AN/AAQ-33 Sniper XR targeting pod, and a helmet-mounted cueing system. You must not underestimate sensitivity levels of this sensor package and particularly the Sniper XR targeting pod which enable FLIR (Air-to-Air Tracking) up to 185 KM mark although information is scarce in Public domain (Russian OLS-35 solution enables the same up to 90 KM mark assuming tracking from rear hemisphere in ideal conditions). High quality FLIR illuminates virtually every airborne target within its Line-of-Sight (LOS) and F-16s have data fusion, therefore, Sniper XR targeting pod might enable aerial target engagement(s) in the BVR regime (vs. stealthy targets).

"IRST sensors offer a valuable alternative and complement to radars when it comes to spotting stealthy aircraft at extended ranges, which could be particularly useful for Taiwan given China's stealth advances, such as the J-20, which is now in active service in increasing numbers." - Joseph Trevithick (The Drive)

J-20 is a Chinese accomplishment deserving of admiration (I like it really) but not without weaknesses which aviation experts might elaborate in detail but many remain tight-lipped for obvious reasons. J-20 is VLO in frontal aspect only and not so much in other aspects; robust assessment in following link: https://www.aereo.jor.br/2020/09/11/a-furtividade-do-caca-chines-j-20-mighty-dragon/

There are additional sources which tell the same. I have noticed a glimpse of (manufacturer) research about J-20 leaking in a forum but I won't expand on this part in person (you will have to sharpen your searching skills instead). Just so you know that your enemies are busy extracting valuable information about your assets and learning from such leaks - espionage is not your forte only. J-20 also need a revolutionary pair of engines to enhance its performance and stealthy characteristics because those Russian engines in Chinese inventory will not do but this is easier said than done: https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2020/...inese-fighters-have-a-serious-engine-problem/

According to Taiwan, RCS of J-20 is not uniform across all aspects and fall in the (0.01 m^2 - 1.0 m^2) range; lowest figure correspond to the frontal aspect. Taiwan received one incredibly powerful radar system from USA in 2012*** and numerous mobile radar systems to monitor activities of PLAAF near its terrain (more on this below).

Now - in order to fight and degrade a well-dug military force, ballistic missiles will not be sufficient on their own and airstrikes are a must (many sorties will be required in fact). Typical PLAAF strike package might be a mix of J-20 + J-16 + J-10C + AWACS which will be dispatched over Taiwan for desired ends.

RoCAF have 328 fighter jets in total and some might be used to draw PLAAF towards locations where F-16s might be scrambled to ambush them from sophisticated underground tunnel complexes in short order (5 - 6 minutes). The upgraded/new F-16s will provide a fighting a chance to RoCAF even against the very best of PLAAF assets airborne and they won't be dealing with F-16s only****. Probable J-20 losses will make for upsetting headlines in Chinese press on the other hand and Taiwan will capitalize on these kills for propaganda purposes to galvanize much-needed Public support. Continue to read below.


****Taiwan is investing in surface defenses and standoff munitions lately.

RELATED: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zo...int-defense-missile-system-to-guard-key-sites

Taiwanese officials have asserted that defensive positions will not remain fixed in case of hostilities.

***Sniping options against Chinese military positions in the mainland:

The Hsiung Feng IIE program likely started in 2001 to give Taiwan the ability to strike targets deeper in mainland China. Prior to its development, most Taiwanese missiles could only reach a few hundred kilometers, limiting strike capabilities to coastal areas. The extended range of the Hsiung Feng IIE makes it possible for the Taiwanese military to target surveillance and reconnaissance assets, radar, missile sites, airfields, and other critical PLA installations.1 The Hsiung Feng IIE was developed by the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST).

Hsiung Feng IIE | Missile Threat

The Hsiung Feng IIE is a subsonic land-attack cruise missile. It is among Taiwan’s longest range missiles, and is the only one of Taiwan’s Hsiung Feng cruise missile variants specifically designed for land-attack missions. Hsiung Feng IIE Development The Hsiung Feng IIE program likely started in...

missilethreat.csis.org

Sniping options against PLAN operating near Taiwan:

Development of the Wan Chien is believed to have started around 2000, led by Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST). Taiwan reportedly began developing its own guided munitions after the United States – Taiwan’s main arms supplier – declined to sell it such systems.1 The program became known publicly in November 2005, and the missile entered service in 2011.2 Full production was expected to begin in 2015, but former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-Jeou chose to reduce the quantity to be produced. In June 2017, however, a Taiwanese report claimed that current President Tsai Ing-wen’s government had plans to restore production of the Wan Chien to above 100 weapons.3

Wan Chien | Missile Threat

The Wan Chien is an air-to-ground, subsonic cruise missile developed by Taiwan. The missile program was first reported in 2005.

missilethreat.csis.org

RELATED: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zo...ive-harpoon-anti-ship-missiles-to-deter-china

Taiwan have also placed an order for MS-110 Recce external sensor pods to advance its maritime engagement possibilities: https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-...onnaissance-pod-sale-to-taiwan/140737.article


Pakistan is not lacking in situational awarness thanks in part to following radar systems in use: https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/defense-systems/an-tps-77/

- among others in use.

Pakistan have established network-centric warfare capabilities lately which were put to good use on 27-02-19 (Operation Swift Retort).

Operation Swift Retort one year on

One year after Pakistan and India almost went to war, Alan Warnes...

www.keymilitary.com

Pakistan cannot take its defenses lightly given its enmity with India. However, this conversation risk moving in another direction so I will stop here.

Coming back to Taiwan - it is not lacking in situational awareness actually.

**This monster for instance:

Location = Mount Leshan (elevated position to facilitate surface scanning across the horizon)

Taiwan's Massive, Mega-Powerful Radar System Is Finally Operational

After more than a decade and $1.4 billion, Taiwan can now see missiles and warplanes from 3,000 miles away with its ultra-advanced new radar system. Which is good, because China's pointing a lot of missiles at it.

www.wired.com

Think about the sheer amount of valuable INTEL it provided to Taiwan (and also to USA by extension) over the course of years - INTEL which helped Taiwan shape its defenses and develop tactics in relation. USA would have learned much as well.

Taiwanese radar coverage include both fixed and mobile installations and is believed to be extensive. They are able to keep tabs on Chinese military movements from a distance.

Taiwan also have military interoperability arrangement with USA to offset reliance on Taiwan-operated reconnaissance systems for tracking and engaging Chinese military assets stationed close to and/or operating above Taiwanese terrain. American intervention can make much difference for Taiwan in short.


See above.

How a war between Pakistan and India will pan out depend upon where it is being fought (God forbid).

I am aware of Chinese investments in developing situational awareness but China also have a massive terrain to watch over and defend in case of hostilities.

China might start a war with Taiwan one day but it would be premature to assume best possible outcome only - much can go wrong in a conflict. China might be able to invade and occupy Taiwan but this won't be a walk-in-the-park experience; even if about 50% of Taiwanese population is willing to resist Chinese invasion, you are in for a long drawn out conflict to maintain control of this island. It is possible that other Chinese enemies will capitalize on this development to their advantage and attempt to distract China in the process. USA might also decide to intervene on behalf of Taiwan if the latter show determination against all odds. Look at developments in Afghanistan and Iraq where occupations materialized.

Peaceful unification remains best course and option.

I understand your POV but I am reiterating that a WAR can lead to undesired mess in the region.

Wow, the video was more like a Hollywood production a fabulous exposition of what happened.

 

[LeGenD]

I just have 3 things to say, since I can't reply to everything though it is good insight.

Thanks.

1. Why do you think there's no countermeasures to these countermeasures? The ROC armed forces are on Taiwan because they lost. Historically it proves that they aren't capable of outthinking the PLA even when they had more money and men. Now they have less, they are more capable of thinking?

Chinese radar coverage of the Taiwan Strait region is also robust, with multiple radar complexes dedicated to monitor airspace and sea traffic in the said region. China receive further insight from its satellite systems in orbit. China also outgun Taiwan in the conventional military regime. Therefore, China can do much to Taiwan in a potential conflict - no ifs and buts.

China will find invasion and subsequent occupation of Taiwan as its most challenging initiative in years however - Taiwan prepared for this eventuality and both USA and geographic features of Taiwan helped shape Taiwanese defenses for the needful (there are aspects to these preparations which is not public knowledge).

You mentioned this: "The ROC armed forces are on Taiwan because they lost." I would contend that Taiwan learned something from China as well. I just wanted to provide an overview of what China is up against in Taiwan in the present - for discussion sake.

It is important to realize/understand that a war can lead to undesired mess in the region (1). Even with good planning and sophisticated weapons brought to the fore, things can go wrong at times because human beings are not infallible themselves.

China might surprise distant observers though. Time will tell.

2. It was found that Leshan PAVE PAWS has been subject to jamming ever since it was activated. The original article was removed for some reason but the text was posted multiple times, including in PDF itself. This was later confirmed by China.

https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/new-chinese-radar-may-have-jammed-taiwans-srp.317731
http://www.guancha.cn/military-affairs/2014_06_07_235631.shtml

" 英国《简氏防务周刊》网站报道，曾被台湾媒体吹嘘为“能够发现3000公里上飞行的高尔夫球”的美国“铺路爪”雷达在台湾投入使用一年，却成了“瞎子的眼睛——摆设”。 原因在于大陆在与之隔海相望的福建惠安部署了针对“铺路爪”进行干扰的一部大型相控阵雷达，两者距离仅240公里，几乎相当于“脸贴脸”

PLA put a more powerful AESA radar 240 km from Leshan and is jamming it continuously.

This is expected because PAVE PAWS is a 1970's era system, the radar installed in Taiwan is exactly that.

I see.

Some statements are issued to placate/alleviate concerns of the Public and instill confidence, to give the impression that bold moves of hostile actor(s) will not go unaswered - PSYOPS in short. I respect your decision to conform to this revelation but there are additional realities to consider.

Chinese account was challenged: https://www.asiaone.com/asia/chines...taiwans-early-warning-system-defense-ministry

- which is not surprising.

Perhaps my explanation will provide much-needed perspective in relation.

Americans have HISTORY of fielding technologies in advance which could not be replicated/matched by others until a decade or two later. How many countries were able to land a man on the moon in the 1960s and even in the present?

PAVE-PAWS represented a significant leap in the domain of radar systems when it was first fielded in 1980. Its design-related considerations and accomplished performance parameters continue to impress even today.



PAVE-PAWS is credited as being the world's first radar system to incorporate solid-state phased array antenna technology. PAVE-PAWS is also the first in its class to be equipped with ultra-low sidelobe antennas (ULSA). According to one declassified source, the ULSA is much harder to jam because it radiates almost no stray—sidelobe—energy. By the same token, it is also much less vulnerable to radiation-homing missiles.

In more technical terms/jargon: The PAVE-PAWS antenna radiates like any antenna of comparable aperture (in wavelengths) and taper. The main beam is nominally 2° wide at its half-power points. The first sidelobes are 20dB or more below the mainlobe in power gain and are contained within a cone around the main beam of about 4° half angle (second nulls at about 4° off the main beam). Secondary sidelobes are at least 30db below the main lobe in power gain; they are distributed in a roughly random manner across the angular field across the main lobe, tapering in density but not in peak gain at angles remote from the main beam. This is the kind of pattern that results from a design that minimizes the maximum secondary lobes.

PAVE-PAWS has corporate feed mechanism to it (uses some type of closed transmission path to provide the antenna with radiating power (e.g. Waveguide*); in many radar systems the feed mechanism is of space or optical type, using a horn, or cluster of horns, to directly radiate the antenna) which allows for the use of fewer transmitters than dipole elements, making it possible to have dummy elements in place for future expansion. Thinned Phased Array in short: https://www.radartutorial.eu/06.antennas/Thinned Array.en.html

*Further elaboration in the following image:

Although PAVE-PAWS is officially advertised as Early Warning platform but it can do more than Early Warning Including Battle Management. It is capable of detecting and tracking some of the most elusive objects in both endo- atmospheric and exo- atmospheric conditions and is particularly useful in monitoring movements of sophisticated ICBM technologies. Further insight in the following link: http://att.newsmth.net/bbsanc.php?p...thers/electronic/radar/M.1065961278.70&ap=694

Americans continue to upgrade PAVE-PAWS because threat environment changes with time and they can afford to.

The gigantic radar system(s) are a threat to any country which is being subjected to one's surveillance. Best course of action is to take it out but China risk loosing its own asset in Fujian Hui'an in potential counter-response from Taiwan. China avoided escalating matters to this level up to now but this might change if (or when) China decide to attack Taiwan in force.

And can it even detect a stealthy sub launched cruise missile flying low as the first strike on the radar system, even if it did work?

PAVE-PAWS is designed to detect and track movements of some of the most elusive threats in existence given its sheer size, technological sophistication, and where and how it is positioned in Taiwan (significantly elevated position to overcome curvature of the horizon limitation). It is also surrounded by missile defense systems suited to engage incoming cruise missiles in particular and these systems can be made to take cues from the PAVE-PAWS itself (probably do).

China have sufficient military capacity and options to neutralize this threat in the present, but has to make a serious effort for the needful.

Until China does that, PAVE-PAWS remains a valuable source of INTEL for Taiwan and USA by extension.

Please keep in mind that Taiwanese revelation about RCS of J-20 is not valid for every country in existence; Taiwan have PAVE-PAWS but many do not.

3. SNIPER is not an air to air targetting pod, it is an evolution of the LANTIRN which is an air to ground targetting pod.

Err...

Sniper ATP contain 3rd generation imaging IR sensor to provide both air-to-ground and air-to-air targeting capability:

Why did you try to imply that it could guide BVR missiles?

WVR engagement range = ~30 KM
BVR engagement range = 37 KM and beyond

As pointed out earlier, Sniper ATP provide long range target visual ID to the host aircraft (exact range in this capacity is classified). More importantly, Sniper ATP is designed to fuse with, and provide meaningful cues, to the radar system of its host aircraft to facilitate its aerial engagement possibilities versus elusive airborne targets - this is important consideration.

"So, what you have is a suite of three complementary sensors—radar, IRST, and targeting pod—that work together to maintain tracking on a target and collect disparate forms of data on said target. Radar has the longest reach, followed by the IRST which has intermediate range, followed by the targeting pod. But regardless of range, the IRST can spot what the radar can't, and the IRST, like the radar, can put the targeting pod's imaging sensors on the target, as well. Without the IRST, if the radar loses the target before the targeting pod is within range, and it can't re-acquire it, that's that."

U.S. Fighter Jets Are About To Get Infrared Sensors That Could Be Huge For UFO Reporting

Infrared search and track sensors are designed to detect stealth planes that radars have trouble with, which makes them also ideal for spotting UFOs.

www.thedrive.com

In the case of F-16V (or Block 70/72 standard), Sniper ATP will be made to work with cutting-edge AN/APG-83 (4th generation AESA) radar system which can do much on its own:

You can do the math.

Since F-16V is lacking in the RCS reduction regime, it will rely upon sophisticated Electronic Warfare (EW) techniques and EO/IR solution(s) to cope with elusive airborne threats. J-20 is particularly vulnerable in the IR spectrum in its current form - it needs a new pair of VLO-compliant engines with sophisticated IR reduction measures in place to mitigate stated vulnerability (this might be accomplished at some point in the future - time will tell). Another consideration is that every BVR shot does not necessarily produce a kill (misses should be expected) and engagements in the WVR regime cannot be ruled out: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/a...5/180024/china-joins-the-dogfight-debate.html

The aforementioned measures (AESA radar system + EO/IR targeting pod) do not exactly guarantee victory in all manner of aerial engagements but provide a fighting chance to the host aircraft against otherwise elusive airborne threats - understand the difference and this was my point all along.

On the flip side, weather conditions can affect output of EO/IR solution(s) and jet fighters can be made elusive even in the IR spectrum, therefore, FLIR tracking range and possibilities will vary accordingly. EO/IR solution(s) continue to evolve nevertheless; the latest Legion Pod is even better than Sniper ATP for instance.

While WE are discussing machines, WE also need to be mindful of the caliber of pilots and tactics involved in these matters. I was alluding to 'ambush opportunities' accorded to F-16s in Taiwan given its geography and enabling underground tunnel complexes with other assets made to draw attention of PLAAF in the mix - this is a realistic consideration and possibility. I can see both PLAAF and RoCAF suffering losses under these circumstances.

As for the rest, they rely on the PLA making mistakes and the ROC Air Force making none. Where's the evidence that this has ever happened? Now the PLA has much more money, more men, and more situational awareness, and they're going to make more mistakes? Instead, you find that it is the ROC that is making hilariously stupid mistakes like shooting Hsiung Feng III at their own fishing boats.

I am not expecting Taiwan to cope with China in open-ended conventional military clashes for long but PLAN and PLAAF will suffer casualties in these clashes and real test for China would come on the ground while attempting to invade and occupy Taiwan because well-dug armies are not easily vanquished. How long this war will last is contingent upon how determined Taiwanese are in terms of providing resistance to Chinese armed forces at all levels of the conflict. A long-drawn-out war can be heavy on the pockets of the invading force relying upon sophisticated technologies for its missions (economic implications). If USA is willing to play a more proactive role in this conflict then this war can turn into a regional mess for China - a dynamic which China may not wish to be dragged into because China have other enemies to deal with.

Best case scenario: China is able to invade and occupy Taiwan in a span of months with acceptable losses.

Worst case scenaro: China manage to invade Taiwan but faces stiff resistance on the ground and the war continues to drag costing lives and money in the process. Global pressures also mount on China and it might decide to abort.

I am highlighting possibilities for the belligerents - for discussion sake.

Its been a while WE had a constructive conversation. Good for this forum as well.

 

[925boy]

Thanks.


Chinese radar coverage of the Taiwan Strait region is also robust, with multiple radar complexes dedicated to monitor airspace and sea traffic in the said region. China receive further insight from its satellite systems in orbit. China also outgun Taiwan in the conventional military regime. Therefore, China can do much to Taiwan in a potential conflict - no ifs and buts.

China will find invasion and subsequent occupation of Taiwan as its most challenging initiative in years however - Taiwan prepared for this eventuality and both USA and geographic features of Taiwan helped shape Taiwanese defenses for the needful (there are aspects to these preparations which is not public knowledge).

You mentioned this: "The ROC armed forces are on Taiwan because they lost." I would contend that Taiwan learned something from China as well. I just wanted to provide an overview of what China is up against in Taiwan in the present - for discussion sake.

It is important to realize/understand that a war can lead to undesired mess in the region (1). Even with good planning and sophisticated weapons brought to the fore, things can go wrong at times because human beings are not infallible themselves.

China might surprise distant observers though. Time will tell.


I see.

Some statements are issued to placate/alleviate concerns of the Public and instill confidence, to give the impression that bold moves of hostile actor(s) will not go unaswered - PSYOPS in short. I respect your decision to conform to this revelation but there are additional realities to consider.

Chinese account was challenged: https://www.asiaone.com/asia/chines...taiwans-early-warning-system-defense-ministry

- which is not surprising.

Perhaps my explanation will provide much-needed perspective in relation.

Americans have HISTORY of fielding technologies in advance which could not be replicated/matched by others until a decade or two later. How many countries were able to land a man on the moon in the 1960s and even in the present?

PAVE-PAWS represented a significant leap in the domain of radar systems when it was first fielded in 1980. Its design-related considerations and accomplished performance parameters continue to impress even today.



PAVE-PAWS is credited as being the world's first radar system to incorporate solid-state phased array antenna technology. PAVE-PAWS is also the first in its class to be equipped with ultra-low sidelobe antennas (ULSA). According to one declassified source, the ULSA is much harder to jam because it radiates almost no stray—sidelobe—energy. By the same token, it is also much less vulnerable to radiation-homing missiles.

In more technical terms/jargon: The PAVE-PAWS antenna radiates like any antenna of comparable aperture (in wavelengths) and taper. The main beam is nominally 2° wide at its half-power points. The first sidelobes are 20dB or more below the mainlobe in power gain and are contained within a cone around the main beam of about 4° half angle (second nulls at about 4° off the main beam). Secondary sidelobes are at least 30db below the main lobe in power gain; they are distributed in a roughly random manner across the angular field across the main lobe, tapering in density but not in peak gain at angles remote from the main beam. This is the kind of pattern that results from a design that minimizes the maximum secondary lobes.

PAVE-PAWS has corporate feed mechanism to it (uses some type of closed transmission path to provide the antenna with radiating power (e.g. Waveguide*); in many radar systems the feed mechanism is of space or optical type, using a horn, or cluster of horns, to directly radiate the antenna) which allows for the use of fewer transmitters than dipole elements, making it possible to have dummy elements in place for future expansion. Thinned Phased Array in short: https://www.radartutorial.eu/06.antennas/Thinned Array.en.html

*Further elaboration in the following image:

Although PAVE-PAWS is officially advertised as Early Warning platform but it can do more than Early Warning Including Battle Management. It is capable of detecting and tracking some of the most elusive objects in both endo- atmospheric and exo- atmospheric conditions and is particularly useful in monitoring movements of sophisticated ICBM technologies. Further insight in the following link: http://att.newsmth.net/bbsanc.php?path=/groups/sci.faq/MilitaryTech/weapon/others/electronic/radar/M.1065961278.70&ap=694

Americans continue to upgrade PAVE-PAWS because threat environment changes with time and they can afford to.

The gigantic radar system(s) are a threat to any country which is being subjected to one's surveillance. Best course of action is to take it out but China risk loosing its own asset in Fujian Hui'an in potential counter-response from Taiwan. China avoided escalating matters to this level up to now but this might change if (or when) China decide to attack Taiwan in force.


PAVE-PAWS is designed to detect and track movements of some of the most elusive threats in existence given its sheer size, technological sophistication, and where and how it is positioned in Taiwan (significantly elevated position to overcome curvature of the horizon limitation). It is also surrounded by missile defense systems suited to engage incoming cruise missiles in particular and these systems can be made to take cues from the PAVE-PAWS itself (probably do).

China have sufficient military capacity and options to neutralize this threat in the present, but has to make a serious effort for the needful.

Until China does that, PAVE-PAWS remains a valuable source of INTEL for Taiwan and USA by extension.

Please keep in mind that Taiwanese revelation about RCS of J-20 is not valid for every country in existence; Taiwan have PAVE-PAWS but many do not.


Err...

Sniper ATP contain 3rd generation imaging IR sensor to provide both air-to-ground and air-to-air targeting capability:






WVR engagement range = ~30 KM
BVR engagement range = 37 KM and beyond

As pointed out earlier, Sniper ATP provide long range target visual ID to the host aircraft (exact range in this capacity is classified). More importantly, Sniper ATP is designed to fuse with, and provide meaningful cues, to the radar system of its host aircraft to facilitate its aerial engagement possibilities versus elusive airborne targets - this is important consideration.

"So, what you have is a suite of three complementary sensors—radar, IRST, and targeting pod—that work together to maintain tracking on a target and collect disparate forms of data on said target. Radar has the longest reach, followed by the IRST which has intermediate range, followed by the targeting pod. But regardless of range, the IRST can spot what the radar can't, and the IRST, like the radar, can put the targeting pod's imaging sensors on the target, as well. Without the IRST, if the radar loses the target before the targeting pod is within range, and it can't re-acquire it, that's that."

U.S. Fighter Jets Are About To Get Infrared Sensors That Could Be Huge For UFO Reporting

Infrared search and track sensors are designed to detect stealth planes that radars have trouble with, which makes them also ideal for spotting UFOs.

www.thedrive.com

In the case of F-16V (or Block 70/72 standard), Sniper ATP will be made to work with cutting-edge AN/APG-83 (4th generation AESA) radar system which can do much on its own:

You can do the math.

Since F-16V is lacking in the RCS reduction regime, it will rely upon sophisticated Electronic Warfare (EW) techniques and EO/IR solution(s) to cope with elusive airborne threats. J-20 is particularly vulnerable in the IR spectrum in its current form - it needs a new pair of VLO-compliant engines with sophisticated IR reduction measures in place to mitigate stated vulnerability (this might be accomplished at some point in the future - time will tell). Another consideration is that every BVR shot does not necessarily produce a kill (misses should be expected) and engagements in the WVR regime cannot be ruled out: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/a...5/180024/china-joins-the-dogfight-debate.html

The aforementioned measures (AESA radar system + EO/IR targeting pod) do not exactly guarantee victory in all manner of aerial engagements but provide a fighting chance to the host aircraft against otherwise elusive airborne threats - understand the difference and this was my point all along.

On the flip side, weather conditions can affect output of EO/IR solution(s) and jet fighters can be made elusive even in the IR spectrum, therefore, FLIR tracking range and possibilities will vary accordingly. EO/IR solution(s) continue to evolve nevertheless; the latest Legion Pod is even better than Sniper ATP for instance.

While WE are discussing machines, WE also need to be mindful of the caliber of pilots and tactics involved in these matters. I was alluding to 'ambush opportunities' accorded to F-16s in Taiwan given its geography and enabling underground tunnel complexes with other assets made to draw attention of PLAAF in the mix - this is a realistic consideration and possibility. I can see both PLAAF and RoCAF suffering losses under these circumstances.


I am not expecting Taiwan to cope with China in open-ended conventional military clashes for long but PLAN and PLAAF will suffer casualties in these clashes and real test for China would come on the ground while attempting to invade and occupy Taiwan because well-dug armies are not easily vanquished. How long this war will last is contingent upon how determined Taiwanese are in terms of providing resistance to Chinese armed forces at all levels of the conflict. A long-drawn-out war can be heavy on the pockets of the invading force relying upon sophisticated technologies for its missions (economic implications). If USA is willing to play a more proactive role in this conflict then this war can turn into a regional mess for China - a dynamic which China may not wish to be dragged into because China have other enemies to deal with.

Best case scenario: China is able to invade and occupy Taiwan in a span of months with acceptable losses.

Worst case scenaro: China manage to invade Taiwan but faces stiff resistance on the ground and the war continues to drag costing lives and money in the process. Global pressures also mount on China and it might decide to abort.

I am highlighting possibilities for the belligerents - for discussion sake.

Its been a while WE had a constructive conversation. Good for this forum as well.

The simple truth and reality is that Taiwan can never beat China in a military conflict....the only question now is WHAT COST China pays for that...thats the only variable..when you said "Taiwan is watching China and lets not assume Taiwan has no strategy"....Taiwan has A STRATEGY...but Taiwan has NO SUCCESFUL STRATEGY EVEN TODAY to counter China...Crap, US cant even contain China TOday and US has no funds to do so despite all the "ARLEIGH BURKE CLASS PATROLS NEAR TAIWAN"....Taiwan is a sitting duckfor China.

NONE OF you have also mentioned the issue of morale in Taiwan to fight CHina...i dont believe many Taiwanese will fight long and hard against CHina..because their morale wont allow it, it will be low, because they already know the odds are badly stacked against them....and US wont come and help them..US has already abandoned Persian Gulf allies, and with CHina's economy today being bigger than US's, we all know US will abandon Taiwan so fast. this isnt year 2000 anymore...

 

[Oldman1]

The simple truth and reality is that Taiwan can never beat China in a military conflict....the only question now is WHAT COST China pays for that...thats the only variable..when you said "Taiwan is watching China and lets not assume Taiwan has no strategy"....Taiwan has A STRATEGY...but Taiwan has NO SUCCESFUL STRATEGY EVEN TODAY to counter China...Crap, US cant even contain China TOday and US has no funds to do so despite all the "ARLEIGH BURKE CLASS PATROLS NEAR TAIWAN"....Taiwan is a sitting duckfor China.

NONE OF you have also mentioned the issue of morale in Taiwan to fight CHina...i dont believe many Taiwanese will fight long and hard against CHina..because their morale wont allow it, it will be low, because they already know the odds are badly stacked against them....and US wont come and help them..US has already abandoned Persian Gulf allies, and with CHina's economy today being bigger than US's, we all know US will abandon Taiwan so fast. this isnt year 2000 anymore...

If they believe the U.S. won't help them, and Taiwan is opened for the taking, then why has China yet invade it? And the U.S. hasn't abandoned the ME allies, not sure how you got that idea.

 

[gambit]

Interesting for you to mention the 17th parallel. it was significant not only because North Vietnam had a place to rebuild but also because China opened its borders to Soviet aid, opened its borders to North Vietnam, and also provided its own aid. If China closed the border, then the 17th parallel would have meant nothing as the USAF ground the PAVN down with attrition. Taiwan is nothing like Vietnam because no one borders it to provide it with continuous resupply. All resupply efforts will be totally visible at known ports of entry.

The problem with this argument is that US airpower reached the limits of the VN-China border, and still, US bombers and fighters were targeted by North Vietnamese air defenses. So assume that the PLAAF managed to cover the entirety of the Taiwan island, all PLAAF aircrafts will be targeted. There is no way the PLAAF can destroy all of Taiwan's air defense in the first strike. This is fantasy. We could not destroy all of Iraq's air defense on the first day of Desert Storm. Further, North Viet Nam is not like today's Taiwan. The Taiwanese have been preparing for war for decades in peace whereas the North Vietnamese did not have the same. Unless China go nuclear, Taiwanese defense will outlast PLAAF offense.

The main thing is that no matter how hard it is for PLAAF AWACs, Taiwan will have far worse situational awareness because their AWACs are obsolete, their ground radar can be targetted in a first strike and even with US AWAC assistance, half their fighters - their F-5s and F-CK-1s - cannot accept Link 16 datalinks.

Taiwan do not need to get airborne to have an effective defense, especially in denial of airspace to the PLAAF.

Mountains have always presented clutter problems for radars, even for AWACS. If the PLAAF established airspace control over the island, PLAAF AWACS will become surface surveillance platforms. Taiwan's terrain will provide plenty of issues for PLAAF AWACS, such as undulating return signals due to closely grouped terrain peaks. What is 'closely grouped' does not mean within a few meters of each other but in tens of meters, plenty of room to hide a SAM launcher. The same effects are produced by cities with clusters of tall structures.

https://earth.esa.int/web/guest/mis...nG/content/radar-course-2-sar-image-geocoding

The amount of distortion depends on the particular side-looking geometry and on the magnitude of the undulation of the terrain's surface.​

​

If PLAAF AWACS stay at altitude high enough, it will not be able to distinguish certain surface resolutions, such as for battle damage assessments, and that will enable Taiwanese defense to survive. If the PLAAF AWACS aircraft descends down enough, it will become increasingly vulnerable to Taiwanese SAMs.

Let me guess...You did not know that AWACS must become surface surveillance platforms under certain combat scenarios?

 

[FairAndUnbiased]

The problem with this argument is that US airpower reached the limits of the VN-China border, and still, US bombers and fighters were targeted by North Vietnamese air defenses. So assume that the PLAAF managed to cover the entirety of the Taiwan island, all PLAAF aircrafts will be targeted. There is no way the PLAAF can destroy all of Taiwan's air defense in the first strike. This is fantasy. We could not destroy all of Iraq's air defense on the first day of Desert Storm. Further, North Viet Nam is not like today's Taiwan. The Taiwanese have been preparing for war for decades in peace whereas the North Vietnamese did not have the same. Unless China go nuclear, Taiwanese defense will outlast PLAAF offense.


Taiwan do not need to get airborne to have an effective defense, especially in denial of airspace to the PLAAF.

Mountains have always presented clutter problems for radars, even for AWACS. If the PLAAF established airspace control over the island, PLAAF AWACS will become surface surveillance platforms. Taiwan's terrain will provide plenty of issues for PLAAF AWACS, such as undulating return signals due to closely grouped terrain peaks. What is 'closely grouped' does not mean within a few meters of each other but in tens of meters, plenty of room to hide a SAM launcher. The same effects are produced by cities with clusters of tall structures.

https://earth.esa.int/web/guest/mis...nG/content/radar-course-2-sar-image-geocoding

The amount of distortion depends on the particular side-looking geometry and on the magnitude of the undulation of the terrain's surface.​

​

If PLAAF AWACS stay at altitude high enough, it will not be able to distinguish certain surface resolutions, such as for battle damage assessments, and that will enable Taiwanese defense to survive. If the PLAAF AWACS aircraft descends down enough, it will become increasingly vulnerable to Taiwanese SAMs.

Let me guess...You did not know that AWACS must become surface surveillance platforms under certain combat scenarios?

True, US B-52s were being shot at by North Vietnamese SAMs and Mig-21s were still able to not just take off but intercept despite US having air superiority. It is also true that surface surveillance is more challenging due to clutter and terrain than air surveillance. But that does not change the fundamental question. Plus, air launched munitions have only gotten deadlier since Vietnam which still primarily used dumb bombs.

Taiwan still has mostly MIM Hawks as their primary air defense, not Patriots. The radar regardless of missile still has to turn on to target PLAAF planes. And they need to coordinate with their ASMs such that PLAAF cannot target those. Sure the PLA can't destroy all their SAMs on day 1 or all their runways. But it can degrade it to a point that they cannot effectively protect their ASM launchers, radars or civilian infrastructure.

Then there's the whole 'decades of preparation' deal. Taiwan has mostly prepared to go on the offensive against the PRC until Chiang Kai Shek's death. They only truly became defensive after Chiang died and his delusions died with him. The real starting point of Taiwanese defense planning could be said to be the Han Kuang exercises starting in 1984 with Defense Minister Hau Pei-Tsun.

Those Han Kuang exercises are hilarious, as you've previously seen. Neat rows of tanks and artillery lined up on the beach waiting for an amphibious invasion that won't come until the bombs and missiles do. Helicopters and drones, as seen in the Armenia conflict, would be devastating to such static armor concentrations, and the Taiwan Strait is narrow enough for helicopters and drones to just fly directly across.

Basically, the problem for Taiwan is not only technical, but also doctrinal. They literally are engaged in wishful thinking - that the PLA will send in unprotected amphibious ships without first using air and naval power to clear the beach - and practice that same wishful thinking as official military doctrine.