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US Ballistic missile defense (BMD)


Overview
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Aegis BMD

Aegis BMD Overview
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Missile Evolution concept

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Sm-3 IA vs SM-3 IB (currently employed)

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USS Shiloh (CG-67) launches an SM-3
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THAAD (Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense)

Overview
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Missile Design
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AN/TPY-2
AN/TPY-2: America’s Portable Missile Defense Radar

From the article...

"The THAAD Ground-Based Radar (GBR), now known as the AN/TPY-2, is an X-Band, phased array, solid-state, long-range air defense radar. It was developed and built by Raytheon at its Andover, MA Integrated Air Defense Facility, as the main radar for the US Army’s THAAD late midcourse ballistic missile defense system.

For THAAD, targeting information from the TPY-2 is uploaded to the missile immediately before launch, and continuously updated in flight via datalinks. The TPY-2 is always deployed with THAAD, but it can also be used independently as part of any ABM (anti ballistic missile) infrastructure. That flexibility, and ease of deployment, is carving out an expanding role for the TPY-2/ “FBX” that reaches beyond THAAD. If a recent NRC report is adopted, that role will expand again to include national-scale ballistic missile defense."

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THAAD Launch

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US Ballistic missile defense (BMD)


Overview
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Aegis BMD

Aegis BMD Overview
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Missile Evolution concept

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Sm-3 IA vs SM-3 IB (currently employed)

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USS Shiloh (CG-67) launches an SM-3 View attachment 144290

THAAD (Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense)

Overview
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Missile Design
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AN/TPY-2
AN/TPY-2: America’s Portable Missile Defense Radar

From the article...

"The THAAD Ground-Based Radar (GBR), now known as the AN/TPY-2, is an X-Band, phased array, solid-state, long-range air defense radar. It was developed and built by Raytheon at its Andover, MA Integrated Air Defense Facility, as the main radar for the US Army’s THAAD late midcourse ballistic missile defense system.

For THAAD, targeting information from the TPY-2 is uploaded to the missile immediately before launch, and continuously updated in flight via datalinks. The TPY-2 is always deployed with THAAD, but it can also be used independently as part of any ABM (anti ballistic missile) infrastructure. That flexibility, and ease of deployment, is carving out an expanding role for the TPY-2/ “FBX” that reaches beyond THAAD. If a recent NRC report is adopted, that role will expand again to include national-scale ballistic missile defense."

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THAAD Launch

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Can't forget about the new land-based system: Aegis Ashore

Aegis Ashore is a land-based capability of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System to address the evolving ballistic missile security environment. The re-locatable deckhouse is equipped with the Aegis BMD weapon system and Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), with upgrades being phased during this decade. Each Aegis BMD upgrade provides increased capability for countering ballistic missile threats.
In addition to Aegis BMD ships, Aegis Ashore is part of Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) Phases II and III.

Development
  • Uses the same combat system elements (AN/SPY-1 Radar, Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence systems, Vertical Launching System, computer processors, display system, power supplies and cooling) that are used onboard the Navy’s new construction Aegis BMD Destroyers.
  • Conducting flight tests at the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Complex at Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) in Kauai, Hawaii. Each test will increase the operational realism and complexity of targets and scenarios and will be witnessed by Navy and Department of Defense test agents.
  • Integrates advances in sensor technology such as launch of an SM-3 missile in response to remote sensor data.
  • Defeats short- to intermediate-range ballistic missile threats.
  • Incorporates future capability upgrades in association with Aegis BMD Program of Record.
Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Complex (AAMDTC)
  • The AAMDTC at the PMRF is a test and evaluation center in the development of the PAA. The test complex leverages the Aegis BMD Weapon System and the new SM-3 Block IB missile for PAA Phase II deployment, as well as, supports deployment decisions and upgrades of future PAA Phase capabilities.
  • The AAMDTC fired the first land-based SM-3 Block IB missile in May 2014.
Deployment
  • In 2015, Aegis Ashore will be installed in Romania as part of the PAA Phase II. This deployed capability will use Aegis BMD 5.0 CU and SM-3 Block IB to provide ballistic missile coverage of southern Europe.
  • In 2018, Aegis Ashore will be installed in Poland, as part of the PAA Phase III. This deployed capability will use Aegis BMD 5.1 and SM-3 Blocks IB and IIA to support increased additional defense of Europe.
Future Capabilities
  • Engagement of longer range ballistic missiles
And GMD

Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System provides Combatant Commanders the capability to engage and destroy limited intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile threats in space to protect the United States

Overview
  • GMD employs integrated communications networks, fire control systems, globally deployed sensors, and Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) that are capable of detecting, tracking and destroying ballistic missile threats.
  • The Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) is a sensor/propulsion package that uses the kinetic energy from a direct hit to destroy the incoming target vehicle. This hit-to-kill technology has been proven in a number of successful flight tests, including three using GBIs.
Details
  • Ground-based Midcourse Defense is composed of GBIs and Ground Support & Fire Control Systems components.
  • The GBI is a multi-stage, solid fuel booster with an EKV payload. When launched, the booster carries the EKV toward the target’s predicted location in space. Once released from the booster, the EKV uses guidance data transmitted from Ground Support & Fire Control System components and on-board sensors to close with and destroy the target warhead. The impact is outside the Earth’s atmosphere using only the kinetic force of the direct collision to destroy the target warhead.
  • Ground Support & Fire Control Systems consist of redundant fire control nodes, interceptor launch facilities, and a communications network. GMD Fire Control (GFC) receives data from satellites and ground based radar sources, then uses that data to task and support the intercept of target warheads using GBIs.The GFC also provides the Command & Control, Battle Management & Communications element with data for situational awareness.
Deployment
  • GBIs are emplaced at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif. A total of 30 interceptors have been emplaced—26 at Fort Greely and four at Vandenberg.
  • Fire control, battle management, planning, tasking, and threat analysis take place via a dual-node, human-in-control interface located in Fort Greely, Alaska, and Colorado Springs, Colo. Warfighters of the 49th Missile Defense Battalion at Fort Greely, Alaska, and of the 100th Missile Defense Brigade at Colorado Springs, Colo., operate
    the system.
  • All GMD components communicate through the GMD communications network, a secure data and voice communications system using SATCOM and fiber optic cabling for long-haul communications.
 

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DARPA advances ship-based MALE UAV concept
DARPA advances ship-based MALE UAV concept - 10/14/2014 - Flight Global

The US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is one step closer to demonstrating the launch and recovery of a medium-sized unmanned air vehicle (UAV) from a small vessel, following a $19 million preliminary design contract award to AeroVironment.

Under phase II of DARPA’s tactically exploited reconnaissance node (Tern) programme, the company will conduct “subscale flight demonstrations” over the next 12 months that will subsequently lead on to a sole-source phase III at-sea demonstration contract award.

DARPA launched the TERN effort in 2013, but joined with the US Navy’s Office of Naval Research (ONR) in May 2014 to continue the programme, which was retitled “Tern”.

The agency considers assets that provide worldwide airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) as having weaknesses – specifically helicopters being limited by range and flight time, and manned and unmanned fixed-wing aircraft being restricted by large base and runway requirements.

“Tern envisions using smaller ships as mobile launch and recovery sites for medium-altitude long-endurance [MALE] unmanned aircraft,” DARPA says. “Ideally, Tern would enable on-demand, ship-based unmanned aircraft system operations without extensive, time-consuming and irreversible ship modifications.”

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DARPA

Ships would have a “mission truck” to transport ISR and strike payloads, and would support field-interchangeable mission packages for overland and at-sea missions from multiple ship types.

According to a broad agency announcement (BAA) released by DARPA in March 2013, TERN was to match emerging land-based MALE UAV capabilities – the ability to carry out persistent ISR and strike missions – with payloads of 272kg (600lb) and at a range of 900nm (1,670km) from the host ship.

The BAA also claimed TERN’s objective would be for UAVs to operate from multiple ship types. This would be from ships such as the USN’s Littoral Combat Ship 2-class. However, following the ONR teaming announcement, the target host vessel was changed to Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.

The first two phases of the programme focus on preliminary design and risk reduction for the Tern system, DARPA says.

Five teams were under contract for phase I, and one or more of these was expected to be selected to continue in phase II, although it is unclear whether any firms in addition to AeroVironment have also been selected.

In phase III, one contractor is expected to be selected to build a full-scale demonstrator Tern system for ground-based testing, culminating in an at-sea demonstration of launch and recovery. The 2013 BAA cited 2017 as the target date for the at-sea demonstration.
 
I've had the opportunity to fly in some of the old prop engines aircraft of the WWII era and without a G-suit it is a crappy experience. "clench your fists, clench your legs" - that's what I was told to do to prevent G-lock. This was to be done once every three seconds and your fists and legs clenched and held for one second. Praise be to the engineers that created the G-suit because without it flying high performance aircraft sucks.
You said 'crappy experience' and I am sure it was figuratively.

The USAF have a program call 'Incentive Flight' where a non-pilot would be taken up for a flight, not possible for a single seater, of course, to give him/her a taste of what he/she is supporting. The recipient could be someone in maintenance or even an 'office puke', but always must be someone outstanding in every way. There were/are a lot of inflight reenlistments where the pilot would officiate the process. Those inflight reenlistments were definitely NOT ceremonial as any commissioned officer could administer the oath and it is tough to beat an inflight reenlistment in a jet fighter. Those were the days of chemical film cameras so there were a lot of blurry photos of the reenlistments. No 'selfies' back then.

Anyway...When I was at RAF Upper Heyford back in the 80s, we had an 'office puke' senior airman (E4) who was nominated and approved for an incentive flight and wanted to reenlist in an F-111. For any day's sorties, there are always back up jets should any scheduled jet failed to make take off for any reasons, usually mechanically related. If the back up jets are not needed, they are either stand down or used for other purposes. For that day, we had a VIP full bird from the Pentagon who needed his required monthly air time to keep his flight pay. He recently came from the FB-111, Pease AFB, a SAC base, so our 'wing king' approved the guest's taking a jet up with our 'office puke' along for the ride.

The story was that after the 'office puke' reenlisted and the colonel took the usual blurry photo of the process, the colonel decided to relive his glory days in the -111. He performed a few maneuvers, not stressing the jet since the -111 is not really a 'fighter', then he took the jet for what the -111 was famous for: hard terrain following (TF) flight. Back then, the Soviets never failed to bring up the -111s stationed in England as part of the arms reduction talks. The Warsaw Pact never had a real defense against a four-ship F-111s in hard TF flight all the way to Moskva. They wanted the -111s back to the States.

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In the -111, the weapons system officer (WSO) have a hood for his scope (above). The WSO's seat is also where the incentive flight recipient, or VIP guest, or media specialist, sits for the flight.

After a few hard dives in this hard TF flight, the 'office puke' blew chunks into the hood. Blew chunks or technicolor yawn, whatever you want to call the action. He also blew chunks from his lower bodily orifice as well. He later said to the flight surgeon that he 'lost it' when the g-suit squeezed him extra hard during the 3rd or 4th dive, he could not remember. It was literally a 'crappy experience' for the poor guy.

The colonel declared an inflight emergency (IFE), specifically a minor medical IFE. It was not enough to warrant the full display of fire trucks and ambulance, but just a very quiet ambulance for an embarrassed flight crew member. I also heard that the crew chief and the avionics guys were not happy -- to start. Next, Egress had to perform the full cockpit safe procedures to remove the WSO's seat for cleaning, inspection, and recert.
 
U.S. Marines to Retire Harrier Fleet Early Than Planned, Extend Life of Hornets
U.S. Marines to Retire Harrier Fleet Early Than Planned, Extend Life of Hornets - USNI News


AV-8B Harriers sit on the flight deck at night aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Bataan (LHD-5) on Oct. 3, 2014. US Navy Photo

The U.S. Marine Corps will phase out the Boeing AV-8B Harrier II jump jet by 2025 — about five years earlier than planned — and will instead extend the life of its fleet of aging Boeing F/A-18 Hornet strike fighters, according to the service’s recently released 2015 aviation plan.

In previous years, the service had said it would replace its increasingly older fleet of original model Boeing F/A-18A – D Hornet strike fighters before retiring the Harriers before replacing both fighters with the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lighting II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

Now, the Harrier will be retired in 2025 and the Hornets will hang on until 2029 for the active duty Marines.

“The TACAIR 2030 Roadmap is a departure from the previous AVPLAN’s TACAIR transition order,” reads the Marine Corps’ 2015 aviation plan.
“The F-35 transition continues per the program of record, while the AV-8B and F/A-18 order of transition has changed.”

The Marine short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B is planned to operational in the summer of 2015 will eventually replace the Harrier.

The Hornets will finally leave the Marine inventory in 2030 when the reserve component transitions to the F-35B.


An AV-8B Harrier from the Black Sheep of Marine Attack Squadron (VMA) 214 on the flight deck of the amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) on Aug. 4, 2013. US Navy Photo

“Visibility and Management of Operating and Supporting Cost (VAMOSC) analysis estimated changing transition order would result in cost avoidance of over one billion dollars through 2030,” the document reads.

The first Harrier squadron to transition to the F-35B will be VMA-211, which will make the switch in Fiscal Year 2016 (FY 2016). If all goes according to plan, the entire West Coast Harrier force will transition to the JSF by 2020.

The remaining East Coast Harriers will be retired 2025. In the meantime—since the AV-8B still has another 11 years to go in service—the Marines will focus on improving the fleet’s readiness.

“The AV-8B program will continue to focus on readiness by solving chronic parts inventory shortfalls. In 2015 the aircraft will transition support from Boeing to NAVSUP [Naval Supply Systems Command],” the document reads.

The Marines will also continue to modernize the aging jet. The jet will receive new ALE-47 V2 countermeasures dispenser, ALR-67 radar warning receivers and ALQ-164 electronic countermeasures pods. The Harriers will also be modified with variable message format terminals, full Link-16 data-link capability and possibly the Tactical Targeting Network Technologies high-speed data-link.
With full integration of the fourth generation Litening pod, it will be able to self-designate the AGM-65E missiles and GBU-54 Laser Joint Direct Attack Munitions.

The Marines are also planning on integrating the AIM-120C/D AMRAAM and AIM-9X Block II air-to-air missiles onto the AV-8B. Flight testing of the AMRAAM onboard the Harrier is slated for 2016.


US Marine Corps tactical aviation plan into FY 2032 from the service’s new 2015 aviation plan

Meanwhile, the Hornet fleet will have to be modified stay in service. The Navy and Marines have implemented a Center Barrel Replacement Plus (CBR+) program to increase the service life of 200 Lot 17 and below Hornets

Further, a High Flight Hour (HFH) inspection has extended the life of 110 F/A-18 A-D aircraft beyond 8000 hours with another 129 aircraft awaiting inspections. In addition to those efforts, a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) will modify about 150 hand selected F/A-18 C/D aircraft so that they will be able to fly up to 10,000 hours.
The SLEP program has run into serious delays because of personnel shortages resulting from the sequestration cuts to the Pentagon as part of the 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA) , several sources told USNI News.

The problem is so severe that when the Department of the Navy pulled engineers from the Super Hornet program to help resolve the issue, it has also caused a severe readiness shortfall on the F/A-18E/F program, USNI News understands.



An F/A-18C Hornet, assigned to the Checkerboards of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMA) 312, launches from the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) on Oct. 13, 2014. US Navy Photo

T
he Marines acknowledged part of the problem in the document: “The USMC F/A-18 A-D community is enduring a sustained shortage in excess of 40 aircraft fleet wide due to “Out Of Reporting” (OOR) maintenance.”
The Marine Hornets are also going to be upgraded with new computers and displays. The jets will also receive new weapons.

Those include the Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System (APKWS), AIM-120D and AIM-9X Block II. The Marines will also, “pursue minimum of two stand-off Net Enabled Weapons.”

Both the Hornet and Harrier—along with Northrop Grumman EA-6B Prowler–will be replaced by the F-35. The Marines hope to buy a total of 353 F-35Bs and 67 F-35Cs.

The Marines’ plans is to have nine squadrons with 16 F-35Bs, five squadrons of 10 F-35Bs and four squadrons of carrier-based F-35Cs with ten jets each. There would also eventually be two reserve squadron of 10 F-35B aircraft each and two 25-aircraft F-35B training units.

It will take the Marines until 2030 to completely transition to the JSF, but the Marines hope to boost production of the jet.

“Increasing F-35B production from 20 to 24 aircraft per year would reduce the Marine TACAIR transition timeline by four years,” the document said.







 
This is definitely a good plan, but I've found that with dedicated branch threads, such as the JMSDF thread, that they quickly devolve into a general discussion about the entire military of a nation - now the JMSDF thread is just the JSDF. It's hard to keep them unified and on topic, even when off topic posts are reported or deleted and an outline is provided. I am eagerly awaiting a formal US military thread, in the mean time though I thought people would like a place to discuss the US military and share some pictures.
Good idea. I cant wait till a us forum is opened.:victory:

Im the guy who opened the thread about it. :p:
 
What happens when a pilot had to eject and failed to safely reach the ground ?

German fighter pilot rescued from tree branches after parachuting to safety seconds before Tornado jet crashes | Daily Mail Online
A German fighter pilot had to be rescued from tree branches after he was forced to parachute to safety just seconds before his Tornado jet crashed.
Movies do not bother with medical issues involved when a pilot is stranded in the trees above ground. Movie pilots always managed to extricate themselves heroically.

Nothing could be further from the truth. But then, if action movies obeys the laws of physics, of common sense, and of medical reality, we would not have actors paid tens of millions of dollars per project, do we ?

So enter a medical reality...Harness Induced Pathology (HIP)...

Safety and Health Information Bulletins | Suspension Trauma/Orthostatic Intolerance
Orthostatic intolerance may be experienced by workers using fall arrest systems. Following a fall, a worker may remain suspended in a harness. The sustained immobility may lead to a state of unconsciousness. Depending on the length of time the suspended worker is unconscious/immobile and the level of venous pooling, the resulting orthostatic intolerance may lead to death. While not common, such fatalities often are referred to as "harness induced pathology" or "suspension trauma."

For the men of the USAF Pararescue units...

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...Whenever they hear a call for a rescue of a suspended pilot, the first thing that goes thru the PJs' minds is HIP. It is the helo pilots' job to get to the scene and while others worry about their jobs, the mission's PJs prepares their climbing gear so they will lose no time in saving the suspended pilot's life and limbs.

As the suspended pilot is trapped by his harness and height from the ground, his harness begins to put abnormal levels of pressure on his body, particularly the joints. His harness straps could, but more like would, be digging into the joints and other soft areas in his groin, possibly crushing nerves, and certainly shutting off blood vessels. Those parachute harness were never designed for long term wear, unlike what action movies implies.

Victims of HIP, in the civilian and military situations, have lost consciousness in as little as ten minutes. For the military pilot, he may not have any combat wounds that came from how he was shot down, but if he was trapped in suspension in a tree after ejection and if he was suspended long enough before being rescued, he will not be able to stand, let alone walk, and if the toxin filled blood that have been trapped in the legs are allowed to swiftly recirculated, he could, but more likely would, go into shock and cardiac arrest.

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While recently training for roof-top work requiring a full body harness, the instructor spoke briefly of suspension trauma and the need for anyone having a fall to be rescued within five minutes to prevent the onset of harness-induced pathology.

We were also warned that, whatever the type of harness, motionless suspension is not physiologically safe and will eventually lead to very serious blood circulation problems.

Further questioning and research led me to the following: if a person is motionless for any longer than five minutes, the normal exchange of waste and oxygen between muscle and blood does not occur due to compression of the femoral arteries by the harness leg straps. The femoral arteries are the large arteries running down the inside of the upper thigh. Once the compression is released, the toxins that have built up are pumped back into the body and can do significant damage to the internal organs. The legs can contain up to one third of the body's blood, so if a person has a fall but is not rendered unconscious, the lack of blood flow can lead to the person 'passing out' or vomiting.
For the PJs who finally arrived on the scene, they must assess the immediate area to see how quickly can they get to the trapped and suspended pilot. Is the tree on level ground, or on a hill side, or even in a swamp ? The PJs must be expert climbers along with their medical training. Now add in the possibility of the rescue being behind enemy lines and/or under hostile gun fire.
 
Guys before they open a u.s defense forum i suggest we plan out all of the sticky thread so that way everything is done right and organized from the beggining. Maybe a thread for each service branch along with threads for important topics such as uav programs, naval programs, small arms etc.

I think this format for threads would be a good idea to use when starting threads in the new forum:

Huge Projects of Türkiye

It doesnt have to be exactly the same but the concept of listing the thread contents in the opening post is a good idea. As new major things are added the op is updated by a mod. Im hoping that the u.s defence forum gets its own mod so that way the forum gets managed well,

Excellent idea--have you heard anything from the admins about whether they have agreed to create such a forum, and what the timetable might be?

Sorry for the late reply, but I seem to be missing a lot of functionality these days. My bookmarks are gone, and now I don't seem to get alerts anymore, so apologies to anyone who tags me and doesn't get a response.
 
@SvenSvensonov Thanks for opening this thread to provide a much-needed mini-forum for the US. I see that much of the thread thus far seems to focus on various systems or military history, both of which are beyond my area of competence. However, I try to keep up to date with the high-level geopolitical and strategic issues, at least, but please let me know if the following article doesn't fit what you are trying to achieve here.

---

The Army Gropes Toward A Cultural Revolution « Breaking Defense - Defense industry news, analysis and commentary

The Army Gropes Toward A Cultural Revolution
By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR.on October 22, 2014 at 4:41 PM

AUSA: A new generation of generals is rising in the Army. It’s a generation forced to get creative by more than a decade of ugly unconventional conflicts. It’s a generation disillusioned by the mistakes of superiors, military and civilian alike. It’s a generation willing to take on the Army’s bureaucratic culture of top-down management, which dates back toElihu Root becoming Secretary of War in 1899.

But can they shift the notoriously slow-moving service? “I think the Army would acknowledge they are in the earliest stages of figuring out how to design and field the force we will need in the future,” Michele Flournoy, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, told my colleague Colin Clark today at the Bipartisan Policy Center.

To make change stick in the largest service, you have to start by rewriting holy writ, the service’s official doctrine. For the first time, for example, an official Army Operating Concept – published just this month — addresses the problem that’s bedeviled the military since Vietnam: how to turn tactical victories into strategic success. “That was a very deliberate decision [to include],” Gen. David Perkins, head of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), told reporters during the new concept’s roll-out at the annual Association of the US Army conference. “We are very, very good at the operational and tactical level,” Perkins said, “[but] this was written by people who’ve actually done this since 9/11, and we realize that actually the operational and tactical level of war is inadequate. It’s important, but it is inadequate to get at what the Army needs to provide our nation.”

“That’s why we start with Win In A Complex World,” the title of the new concept , Perkins said: “‘Win’ is a strategic-level construct.”

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Gen. David Perkins, TRADOC commander.

The Army’s not only adding a new emphasis on strategy, it’s taking away a longstanding emphasis on top-down control. In fact, the venerable term “command and control” itself is gone, replaced by “mission command.”

In military jargon, “control” meant making sure your subordinates followed orders: That’s still necessary, but it’s far from sufficient for a world so complex and quickly changing that no commander, staff, or war plan can keep up, Gen. Perkins told me. Enforcing “compliance to specific orders” is less important than forging “a common understanding” between superiors and subordinates,” he said. Wireless networks are the Army’s top investment priority because they help share and update this common understanding — when they work, Perkins added wryly — but it has to start with a meeting of human minds.

Perkins himself exercised extraordinary initiative — to the point some old-school commanders might consider insubordination — as a brigade commander spearheading the US drive into Baghdad in 2003. (More on that below). 11 years and four stars later, he’s now, since March, the chief of TRADOC, the oft-hidebound priesthood of the Army. His deputy is no less an iconoclast than Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, whose career was once nearly killed by traditionalist promotion boards.

Are the inmates running the asylum? They’re certainly driven to shake things up.”It is not a feel-good document,” Perkins said of the new concept. “It is meant to be a very serious document written by very serious people… who have seen a lot of blood spilled since 9/11 and are very serious about really capturing the essence of war.”

“It’s in our doctrine now, because we know the world is unknown and constantly changing, [that] you can’t possibly control compliance with everything,” Perkins told reporters at the service’s largest gathering, the annual Association of the US Army conference. “You have got to figure out how you empower subordinates to exploit the initiative.”

“It’s not chaos. It’s not ‘cross the line of departure and everybody self-actualize,’ because that’s not empowering,” Perkins told me. “If you want to empower somebody, you better have a common understanding of what you think the problem is, [so] you understand where you can take initiative” — for example, by taking a hill or visiting a sheikh — “and where you can’t” — say, by shelling a mosque or violating an international border.

If you read an Army “Case Study in Mission Command” that Perkins commissioned, that leeway can be wide indeed.



Thunder-Run-case-study-cover.jpg
A Surprising Turn


In April 2003, as his brigade made ready for the second “Thunder Run” into Baghdad, then-Colonel David Perkins had a plan. It wasn’t a plan his superiors had approved. It was, in fact, a plan the three-star commander of all ground troops in Iraq had “dismissed” when the colonel presented it through the usual channels, according to the official Army case study. So Lt. Gen. William Wallace was understandably “stunned” when he watched the GPS-tracked positions of Perkins’ brigade turn right towards downtown Baghdad instead of making the expected U-turn to leave the city.

Wary of urban warfare, for good reason, the generals had decided to besiege Baghdad and wear Saddam down with repeated raids. But the weak resistance to the first such raid, the first “Thunder Run,” had convinced Perkins that the regime would shatter if his brigade went downtown, seized its palaces and stayed. He’d told his subordinates to be ready to do just that, despite his orders to hit and run. After the first few hours of fighting went well, he’d convinced his immediate superior to let him try that critical right turn downtown — or at least not countermand it: The two-star general didn’t “giv[e] a definitive answer,” but that was permission enough.

So the brigade went downtown. Lt. Gen. Wallace, swiftly getting over his surprise, told Perkins to go for it. The regime fell.

Then, of course, the looting started and everything went downhill. The US military did not have a plan to restore order, nor the manpower, nor even that “common understanding of what you think the problem is” that would let someone take the initiative.


The Strategy Problem

Perkins’ seizing the initiative and Saddam’s palace in 2003 highlighted both the tactical strengths and the glaring strategic weaknesses of the American Army. Despite all our tactical and operational skills, Perkins told reporters at AUSA, we still need to step up our strategic game: “The strategic level, that’s another level of difficulty, but that’s really where we want our nation to prevail.”

So far, we haven’t, neither in Afghanistan, where the outcome remains in doubt as we draw down, nor in Iraq, where we are being drawn back in. US forces won rapid victories in both countries in 2001-2003, but after toppling the regimes, we couldn’t “conclude the deal” by delivering lasting strategic gains, said Lt. Gen. Charles Cleveland, head of U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC).

It’s not the sergeants and junior officers that were at fault, Cleveland told the AUSA conference: “My own experience is failure occurs actually on the colonel to general level, because…we haven’t given these guys the tools to think about the problems properly.”

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Lithuanian president Dalia Grybauskaite greets the 173rd Airborne Brigade during a deployment to deter Russia.

That has to change, said Perkins. Instead of waiting for War College to teach strategic issues, the service needs to imbue strategic awareness from the start. “We have this company commander from the 173rd [Airborne Brigade] meeting with the president of Lithuania,” Perkins told reporters at AUSA. “He has to understand the strategic aspect, [and] that has been a failing in previous Army Operating Concepts.”

So the new Army Operating Concept released this month, Win In A Complex World, makes a point of addressing strategy. “This concept, for the first time, focuses on all three levels of war; tactical, operational, and strategic,” Perkins writes in his foreword. “The problem we are focusing on is how to ‘Win in a Complex World’ [and] ‘Win’ occurs at the strategic level.”

That new emphasis on strategy, however, has implications for how the military deals with its civilian masters.

“There’s a lot of lies in military doctrine,” said former Pentagon official Janine Davidson at the AUSA panel on the new concept. “There’s a lot of myths…that basically tell you all the civilians are somehow divinely inspired enough to know exactly what endstate they want when something bad happens.” Not so, she said. “When the civilians look to the military leadership for answers, they want options…they want creativity — and this is also what I see in this concept.”

“We, the Army, need to provide our policymakers multiple options,” not “ultimatums,” Perkins said at AUSA. But what kind of “creative” input does the military need to offer? Since war is an extension of politics and a contest of wills, Perkins said, invoking Clausewitz, any savvy enemy will target America’s political will to fight. That means US military leaders have to understand domestic politics and what military options it can stomach, he said: “You have to influence the US policymakers’ political risk analysis.” (Emphasis mine).

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Janine Davidson and Gen. David Perkins at AUSA.

The Enduring Advantage

The generals’ new willingness to question politicians is the high-level analog to soldiers’ new willingness to question the generals. TRADOC is now seeking to cultivate “critical thinking” from boot camp up. “It’s inadequate to say, ‘well, it ought to be an elective at the War College,’” Gen. Perkins said during a panel discussion at AUSA. “We’re actually changing aspects of basic training so they have to start applying critical thinking skills between the bus and the drill sergeant.”

By contrast, Perkins says, when he was a young lieutenant in West Germany during the Cold War, what the Army wanted from him was not critical thinking but compliance: precise execution of a predefined plan against the thoroughly studied and slow-changing Soviet Union. But even the stodgy Russians are making surprising use of proxies and hackersthese days. Compliance without creativity won’t cut it anymore.

“What you can do is train in ways and develop leaders in ways that allow them to adapt to whatever the circumstances are,” said McMaster, Perkins’ deputy, when I caught him in the halls at AUSA. Officers will still learn conventional combined-arms warfare using infantry, tanks, artillery, and air support in lightning maneuvers — skills eroded over a decade of counterinsurgency — “but we place these [training scenarios] now in the kind of complex environments that replicate all those human, social, political dynamics we have to consider….as an integral part of war and warfare, not as something separate.”

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Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster

What kind of war should those troops be training for, precisely? With a frankness that’s refreshing — if hardly reassuring — the new Army Operating Concept says that we don’t know:

“The environment the Army will operate in is unknown. The enemy is unknown, the location is unknown, and the coalitions involved are unknown,” Perkins writes in his foreword. Indeed, although the concept only makes this point implicitly, it’s even unknown whether the US military will still enjoy the across-the-board technological superiority — aka “overmatch” — it’s counted on for decades. It probably won’t. But if technology isn’t our enduring advantage, what is?

“We want to have the best technology to overmatch the enemy,” McMaster told me. “Obviously, in an activity that involves killing and the prospect of death, right, you want to make sure you can have overmatch, [but] our competitive advantage is not any single technology, it’s how we combine…different technologies together in combined arms and joint operations.” That requires a level of skill and inter-service cooperation that adversaries can’t easily replicate, no matter how much technology they buy or steal.

“We are the best at doing the whole joint thing,” Perkins told reporters. “Though not perfect…. we probably do it better than anybody else and we’ve been forced to do it since [the] Goldwater-Nichols [Act of 1986].”

“We don’t want to lose that,” Perkins continued. “In fact, we want to get even better at it — which is not what usually happens during interwar periods: You generally go back to your corners because it’s all about competition for resources.”



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Gen. Ray Odierno unexpectedly takes the floor at AUSA.

Getting Beyond The Budget Wars

Some skeptics, myself included, wondered how the Army could even think about the future when it’s fighting for every dollar today.

Both the war abroad — the need to train and equip those fighting in Afghanistan — and the war at home — sequestration and other budget pressures — have greatly complicated the Army’s ability to plan, Flournoy told Colin Clark. “I’m told the Army last year did seven POMSs [Program Objective Memorandums, the five-year budget plan]. If you’re doing that, there isn’t much bandwidth left….You are trying to simply survive today.”

No less a figure than the Army Chief of Staff acknowledged the problem when he unexpectedly took the floor at the AUSA panel. “Everybody’s heard my feelings onsequestration,” said Gen. Ray Odierno, “[but] the Army Operating Concept is based on what we believe the future environment we’re going to have to operate in…no matter how much money we have.”

In fact, thinking through the future “becomes more important the less money we have,” Odierno said. “The one thing we can’t ever back off on is leader development and our ability to continue to adjust and adapt.”

Since 1775, the enduring advantage of the American soldier has been his ability to take initiative, innovate, and adapt, without waiting for orders — or even necessarily following the orders he had. Since George Washington took command, the Army’s enduring dilemma has been how to reconcile that initiative with a disciplined professional force. That is the challenge the new doctrine takes on.



Colin Clark also contributed to this story.
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A companion piece to the previous post. Again, apologies if this kind of post falls outside the parameters of the thread, or if it's too dumbed-down for the main readers of this thread.

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The Army Wants To Fully Integrate Conventional and Special Operations Forces - Defense One

The Army Wants To Fully Integrate Conventional and Special Operations Forces
By Col. Michael Rauhut

October 22, 2014

Among the many conceptual arguments posited by the U.S. Army’s new Operating Concept (AOC), “Win in a Complex World,” one of its more practical directions is the explicit embrace of special and conventional force integration. A decade’s worth of joint, interorganizational, and multinational combat experience has validated the utility of combining special operations and conventional forces and its critical importance for success in future operational environments. Further innovating special and conventional force integration will provide strategic flexibility to the nation and its leaders while also expanding the range of strategic options.

Last week at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) annual conference, Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commander General David Perkins, and panelists of “Persistent Influence and the Strategic Quality of Landpower,” made abundantly clear that the Army intends to apply this past decade’s lessons. Their candid perspectives highlight important points the Army must explore further during future concept experimentation, “Force 2025 and Beyond.” How special operations and conventional forces “combine capabilities across warfighting functions” must lead to innovative outcomes. To paraphrase author Marshall Goldsmith, “What got us here, won’t get us there”.

There are both enduring and evolving aspects of conventional-special operations force integration and interdependence. On one level—much like it has done since special operations force inception—the conventional force provides capacity. Conventional forces provide the human capital from which to draw special operators. Soldiers often gain years of conventional force experience before attending a rigorous assessment, selection, and qualification process that tests candidates’ physical, emotional, and mental suitability for continued special operations service. Individually qualified and further trained as teams, these deployed, experienced special operations forces thus prove very capable in achieving strategic effects.

Conventional forces also enable the sustained commitment of special operations forces, either directly by performing warfighting functions on its behalf or indirectly as an economy of force, freeing limited numbers of special operators to pursue other strategic objectives. Directly, special operations forces may tap into existing conventional forces for maneuver support, protection, or even sustainment. Indirectly, conventional force employment in foreign internal defense (FID) or security force assistance (SFA) functions—both of which Army forces conduct to help partner nations strengthen their own ability to perform security-related tasks—may allow the strategic reallocation of special operations forces to other theaters where their special skill sets are required.

On another level, operations around the world—most prominently in Iraq and Afghanistan—have proven the mutual benefits derived through joint operations. Operating in shared spaces and against common foes allowed conventional and special operations forces to leverage respective strengths and mitigate vulnerabilities. Mutually supporting, intelligence-driven operations build understanding and present enemies complex problems enemies otherwise would not face if allowed to address in detail.

Small-team centric special operations forces often derive a degree of wider area protection and depth afforded by contiguous, larger conventional formations. Likewise, conventional forces often rely on special operations forces for expertise and intelligence. Integrated combinations of conventional and special operations forces thus achieve better effects. These positive—and necessary—adaptations “got us here,” but alone are not sufficient to meet the demands of the future operational environment and “harbingers of future conflict.”

Operations around the world—most prominently in Iraq and Afghanistan—have proven the mutual benefits derived through joint operations.

The AOC rightfully recognizes the benefits of this symbiosis—and others—using terms like “simultaneity” and “endurance” to describe respectively “overwhelm[ing] the enemy physically and psychologically” while retaining our “ability to sustain efforts for sufficient duration with the capacity necessary to accomplish the mission.” It acknowledges the necessity to deal with the nexus of transnational terrorist and criminal organizations which operate across current geographic and functional command authority lines.The AOC also amplifies how the Army must integrate special operations and conventional forces to engage regionally, respond globally, and consolidate gains, “shaping security environments and preventing conflict” by combining special operations and regionally aligned conventional forces.

The Army envisages special and conventional forces combining capabilities in progressively more innovative ways to maintain or establish “a global land network of relationships” with the security services of our partners. These relationships, the argument goes, further enable combatant, functional, and joint force commanders to engage regionally and (by design) achieve desired strategic effect. The AOC makes allowance for a range of mission-centered activities for whichever force—special, conventional, or both—is best suited to lead the effort given desired outcomes, required methods, and available resources.

(Related: Inside America's Shadow War on Terror—and Why It Will Never End)

It rightly follows that the Army is adding special operations to its operating concept as an Army core competency. Doing so for the first time acknowledges war’s enduring nature, evolving characteristics, and the need for military’s to innovate. Special operations and conventional force integration must achieve an interdependent homeostasis to deliver what the AOC requires; but the AOC’s desired outcomes go beyond this more narrow aspect. To achieve the strategic outcomes it describes, the AOC must foster a conversation within the Department of Defense, other U.S. government departments and agencies, and its international partners—or risk coming up short.

Whether the AOC generates this needed and broader national security discussion within and among U.S. government departments remains to be seen. Smart action will require reflection, dialogue, and positive action by all stakeholders to leverage the instruments of national power in an era of increasing complexity. On the other hand, preemptive or reactive measures will suffer for lack of coherence.

You can watch the entirety of the October 15 panel discussion on the “Persistent Influence and Strategic Quality of Landpower” here.
 
‘Loss of confidence’: US Air Force fires two more nuclear commanders, disciplines third
Published time: November 04, 2014 04:46
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Two Air Force nuclear commanders have been fired, with a third facing disciplinary measures, after the service cited a “loss of confidence” in their ability to lead their units, once again drawing attention to troubles within the US nuclear corps.

The terminations come as the Air Force continues to reckon with leadership problems. Earlier this year, nine nuclear commanders were fired in connection to a test-cheating scandal, which implicated dozens of missile launch officers.

Col. Carl Jones, the No. 2 commander of the 90th Missile Wing at F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming, was the most high-profile of the two commanders to be dismissed on Monday. Jones was responsible for 150 Minuteman 3 nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles – the Air Force has 450 total – but his superiors determined there was “a loss of trust and confidence in his leadership abilities."

According to Air Force Global Strike Command spokesman Lt. Col. John Sheets, Jones displayed conduct unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman, as well as mistreatment of those below his rank.

“In four separate instances, Jones acted in a manner that degraded his status as a senior officer and wing leader, including maltreating a subordinate,” Sheets told AP.

Meanwhile, Lt. Col. Jimmy "Keith" Brown was also fired due to questions over his leadership, with Sheets saying he “engaged in unlawful discrimination or harassment.” Brown apparently “made statements to subordinates that created a perception within his squadron that pregnancy would negatively affect a woman's career.”



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AFP Photo/ US Air Force



Finally, Col. Michael Pagliuco, commander of the 91st Operations Group, was disciplined for failing to“promote and safeguard the morale, well-being and welfare of the airmen under his command.” Details of his punishment were not released.

Based on the statements made by Sheets, it is unclear if the latest round of discipline meted out by the Air Force is directly related to the cheating scandal that erupted last year and claimed the job of its top commander. At the heart of the matter was that officers were texting each other the answers to the exams they needed to pass.

Back in January, some 34 nuclear missile launch officers were implicated in the scandal and stripped of their security clearance. In March, nine nuclear missile base commanders were fired. They were not found to be explicitly involved in the cheating, but they were let go for failing their leadership responsibilities.

“There was cheating that took place with respect to this particular test. Some officers did it. Others apparently knew about it, and it appears that they did nothing, or at least not
 
All that equipment and training is good but what of it in Afghanistan :)? whats happened there do you know the reality do you know what this is being used for?
 
GBU-53/B SDB II
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The Raytheon GBU-53/B Small Diameter Bomb II is now in development, it will be equipped with a multimode terminal seeker and two way datalink, and is intended to enter full rate production in 2017. Intended production numbers in 2010 were 17,000 rounds, of which 12,000 are intended for the USAF, and 5,000 for the US Navy/Marines.
The design objectives for the GBU-53/B are quite different from those for the GBU-39/B. The GBU-39/B is a weapon optimised for fixed targets, especially hardened infrastructure and basing, whereas the GBU-53/B is intended for attacks on moving battlefield targets, especially vehicles and heavy armour. In the simplest of terms the GBU-53/B is a glidebomb equivalent to the AGM-65 Maverick missile, but with a more flexible and countermeasures resistant seeker.
The GB
U-53/B guidance system combines seeker with a GPS/inertial autopilot, and a Rockwell Collins TacNet bidirectional dual band datalink, which provides JTIDS connectivity with aircraft and a UHF link with a ground designator. This is a refinement of the JTIDS based arrangement trialled for moving target engagements using the JDAM tailkit.

The tri-mode seeker employs semi-active laser homing, MMWI radar, and uncooled thermal imaging components to maximise flexibility in employment and counter-measures resistance. The semi-active laser mode permits the use of the SDB II with legacy airborne and ground based designators, against fixed and moving targets. The MMWI and thermal imaging modes permit autonomous fire-and-forget engagements, under a wide range of weather conditions, accepting that some fog and haze conditions will impair both thermal imaging and MMWI acquisition. The seeker optical dome is protected by a clamshell shroud which is jettisoned before the seeker is activated.

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The warhead design is optimised for battlefield targets, parked aircraft, and unhardened structures, combining a shaped charge with blast/fragmentation effects. It will also be highly effective against unhardened and hardened air defence targets, such as SAM batteries, and maritime targets such as warships. A redesign of the warhead was performed during the development cycle to provide the capability to disable or kill main battle tanks.
Initial deployment is planned for the F-15E and later F-35. Initial weapon sizing was done to fit the F-22A Raptor, which could carry up to 8 rounds.

From : Boeing GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bomb I / Raytheon GBU-53/BSmall Diameter Bomb II

2 GBU-53s + AMRAAM in the weapons bay of an F-22
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GBU-53 on a F-15E
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Concept Video by Raytheon









 
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