US clears up myths on defence pacts for India

[INDIAPOSITIVE]

Ahead of defence secretary Ash carter’s coming visit to India the US is keen to address “myths” and “inaccuracies” about a set of defence agreements it has proposed to New Delhi.

Drafts for three of these agreements, which are together referred to as “foundational” sometimes, were turned over to India over past some weeks, following President Barack Obama’s visit.

Despite being labelled “foundational”, a senior defense official said Tuesday, “they are not prerequisites to bilateral defence cooperation... there is nothing foundational about them.” The official insisted there was no pressure on India to sign them, any or all of them, nor was there a timeline on it.

They may come up during Carter’s visit next month — his first since becoming secretary of defence — to formally renew the 10-year Defense Framework Agreement.

The agreements are General Security of Military Information Agreement, Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), Logistics Support Agreement, and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Intelligence.

The first was signed in 2002. Progress on the rest has been slow. The US call these agreements “routine”, which it has signed — some or all of them — with over 100 other countries.

Though the absence of these agreements has had no bearing on ties, India has had to settle for stripped down versions of high-tech defence equipment it has bought. For example, India could have added an advanced terrain mapping software to the C-130Js it has bought if it had signed the CISMOA, the defence official said.

But there are misconceptions about the agreements in India, the official said, which are “distracting”.

US clears up myths on defence pacts for India

 

[Chanakya's_Chant]

For example, India could have added an advanced terrain mapping software to the C-130Js it has bought if it had signed the CISMOA, the defence official said.

The IAF added similar equipment produced indigenously to the aircraft after delivery.

The GPS aided geo augmented navigation or GPS and geo-augmented navigation system (GAGAN), an implementation of a regional satellite-based augmentation system (SBAS) by the Indian government - a system to improve the accuracy of a GNSS receiver by providing reference signals is being integrated to C-130's instead of US's High Precision GPS.

 

[K M Cariappa]

The IAF added similar equipment produced indigenously to the aircraft after delivery.

The GPS aided geo augmented navigation or GPS and geo-augmented navigation system (GAGAN), an implementation of a regional satellite-based augmentation system (SBAS) by the Indian government - a system to improve the accuracy of a GNSS receiver by providing reference signals is being integrated to C-130's instead of US's High Precision GPS.

In a way these stripped down orders have helped the domestic industry... Just look at the above example...
1. BEL's radar are the first thing that come to my mind when thinking about indigenous domestic naval tech...
2. Data link II on the P-8I
3. The IFF interrogator and transponder system from HAL & BEL on P-8I
4. The speech secrecy system from ECIL on P-8I

 

[sathya]

GAGAN itself done with US help..

so its not just self reliance, probably

 

[Srinivas]

India needs advanced tech. In dealing with the changing threat scenario.

India should try to get access and also must indigenize.

 

[Chanakya's_Chant]

In a way these stripped down orders have helped the domestic industry... Just look at the above example...
1. BEL's radar are the first thing that come to my mind when thinking about indigenous domestic naval tech...
2. Data link II on the P-8I
3. The IFF interrogator and transponder system from HAL & BEL on P-8I
4. The speech secrecy system from ECIL on P-8I

And many more -

Some observations while I was going through the controversial Indo-US Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) and it's implications for India -

>> The LSA is similar to the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) that the US has with many of its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. The ACSA is governed by legal guidelines and is used for contingencies, peacekeeping operations, unforeseen emergencies and also exercises to correct logistic deficiencies which cannot be met by a nation on its own.

>> In South Asia, Washington has a similar arrangement with Sri Lanka. In March 2007, both countries signed ACSA (valid for 10 years) to transfer and exchange logistics supplies, support and re-fuelling of services during peacekeeping missions, humanitarian operations, and joint exercises.

>> Stripped down to its basics, the LSA would require both countries to provide their bases, fuel and other kinds of logistics support to each others' fighter jets and naval warships. Logistical support with regard to weapons facilities would involve non-offensive military equipment ONLY. This support will involve cashless transactions on a reciprocal basis. The LSA would be particularly beneficial at the time of disaster relief operations like the one India undertook in the wake of the Asian Tsunami in 2004.

>> The important aspect here is 'interoperability' meaning the Indian and US forces can work together in times of emergency without wasting any time in familiarizing themselves with each other's forces. India and the US are no strangers to the arrangement outlined under the LSA.During the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the Indian government had provided refueling facility to American fighter jets at Mumbai's Sahar international airport (In fact it was forced to do so for availing a loan from the IMF in which the Americans had majority of the voting rights) However, this move had come under criticism from opposition parties and the government had to withdraw the facility subsequently.

>> The past records of many NATO allies have shown that merely by signing the LSA or ACSA, they did not necessarily have to identify with the US' global agenda, evident from the policies adopted by France and Germany during the US invasion of Iraq in 2004 and as recently as last fortnight when Australia (which is part of the US-led security alliance -- ANZUS) decided to withdraw from the quadrilateral initiative. Financially too the LSA makes good sense for India. According to some official estimates, with LSA in place, India would be able to save around US$20 million per war game, when Indian forces take part in any of the joint military exercises with the US on American soil like the Red Flag War Games.

>> If India signs the Logistic Support Agreement(LSA), India’s maritime industry and shipyards can benefit through USA’s pivot and enhance India’s access to US Naval logistics and co-operation for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief(HADR). The LSA is a mutual naval support agreement, with no strings attached and has been reviewed in the South Block to suit India’s foreign policy.

>> The Indian Navy already has a fuel exchange agreement with the US Navy tankers, and works with USA’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The LSA only extends such co-operation and permits use of Indian shipyards for repairs and refits of US ships, on strictly commercial basis.

>> The LSA agreement includes directions for exercises, training, and for UN Peacekeeping operations, which are standard operating procedures (SOPs) in Malabar exercises and for co-operation in UN operations. The Indian Navy pays an annual fee to the US Navy to fly a USN Deep Sea Rescue Vessel (DSRV) in case of a submarine accident, and has an informal Fuel Exchange Agreement (FEA). Indian warships can take on fuel at sea from US tankers with reciprocal facilities. The Indian Navy buys spares from the US Foreign Military Sales(FMS) with an escrow account to maintain the 17,000 LPD INS Jalsahwa (Ex USS Trenton). The IAF also uses FMS.

>> With LSA USA will be able to offer latest technologies, and set up maintenance and repair organizations (MROs), which India lacks to support civil airlines too, and save FFE.

Comment >>

Opposition to the LSA comes mainly from the Left parties who do not want India to be party to the 'wrong designs' of the US military in the region and in the process, compromise India's strategic sovereignty. The LSA they argue, would oblige India to comply with Washington's agenda. However, the concerns of the Left parties seem unfounded as the past records of many NATO allies have shown that merely by signing the LSA or ACSA, they did not necessarily have to identify with the US' global agenda, evident from the policies adopted by France and Germany during the US invasion of Iraq in 2004 and as recently as last fortnight when Australia (which is part of the US-led security alliance -- ANZUS) decided to withdraw from the quadrilateral initiative.

The logistics support agreements that the US has signed with many other countries are mutually beneficial agreements. India thus should move on the pending LSA to strengthen defence and strategic relationship with the US. So far, the Indian government has not clearly indicated any objections to the provisions of the agreement. If there is any objectionable element in the proposed agreement, then it should be identified and the two sides should negotiate to arrive at an agreement that is consistent with their national interests and policies. As mentioned above, the agreement has several benefits from both the defence and strategic aspects. It helps in mitigating capability gaps and logistics shortfalls. The systems and methods of LSSS, when integrated and supplemented with the proposed agreement, would decrease wait time and increase sustainable capabilities. Since it is a two-way agreement, the two countries would share both the responsibility and benefits of the agreement. Thus, from both the strategic and economic aspects, the LSA works largely in India's favour.

What will India get after signing the Indo-US Logistics Support Agreement (LSA)?

 

[tsinga]

GAGAN itself done with US help..

so its not just self reliance, probably

With the IRNSS coming online and fully functional in 2016, there would be no need to depend on US GPS.

 

[K M Cariappa]

And many more -

View attachment 221101​

Some observations while I was going through the controversial Indo-US Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) and it's implications for India -

>> The LSA is similar to the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) that the US has with many of its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. The ACSA is governed by legal guidelines and is used for contingencies, peacekeeping operations, unforeseen emergencies and also exercises to correct logistic deficiencies which cannot be met by a nation on its own.

>> In South Asia, Washington has a similar arrangement with Sri Lanka. In March 2007, both countries signed ACSA (valid for 10 years) to transfer and exchange logistics supplies, support and re-fuelling of services during peacekeeping missions, humanitarian operations, and joint exercises.

>> Stripped down to its basics, the LSA would require both countries to provide their bases, fuel and other kinds of logistics support to each others' fighter jets and naval warships. Logistical support with regard to weapons facilities would involve non-offensive military equipment ONLY. This support will involve cashless transactions on a reciprocal basis. The LSA would be particularly beneficial at the time of disaster relief operations like the one India undertook in the wake of the Asian Tsunami in 2004.

>> The important aspect here is 'interoperability' meaning the Indian and US forces can work together in times of emergency without wasting any time in familiarizing themselves with each other's forces. India and the US are no strangers to the arrangement outlined under the LSA.During the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the Indian government had provided refueling facility to American fighter jets at Mumbai's Sahar international airport (In fact it was forced to do so for availing a loan from the IMF in which the Americans had majority of the voting rights) However, this move had come under criticism from opposition parties and the government had to withdraw the facility subsequently.

>> The past records of many NATO allies have shown that merely by signing the LSA or ACSA, they did not necessarily have to identify with the US' global agenda, evident from the policies adopted by France and Germany during the US invasion of Iraq in 2004 and as recently as last fortnight when Australia (which is part of the US-led security alliance -- ANZUS) decided to withdraw from the quadrilateral initiative. Financially too the LSA makes good sense for India. According to some official estimates, with LSA in place, India would be able to save around US$20 million per war game, when Indian forces take part in any of the joint military exercises with the US on American soil like the Red Flag War Games.

>> If India signs the Logistic Support Agreement(LSA), India’s maritime industry and shipyards can benefit through USA’s pivot and enhance India’s access to US Naval logistics and co-operation for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief(HADR). The LSA is a mutual naval support agreement, with no strings attached and has been reviewed in the South Block to suit India’s foreign policy.

>> The Indian Navy already has a fuel exchange agreement with the US Navy tankers, and works with USA’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The LSA only extends such co-operation and permits use of Indian shipyards for repairs and refits of US ships, on strictly commercial basis.

>> The LSA agreement includes directions for exercises, training, and for UN Peacekeeping operations, which are standard operating procedures (SOPs) in Malabar exercises and for co-operation in UN operations. The Indian Navy pays an annual fee to the US Navy to fly a USN Deep Sea Rescue Vessel (DSRV) in case of a submarine accident, and has an informal Fuel Exchange Agreement (FEA). Indian warships can take on fuel at sea from US tankers with reciprocal facilities. The Indian Navy buys spares from the US Foreign Military Sales(FMS) with an escrow account to maintain the 17,000 LPD INS Jalsahwa (Ex USS Trenton). The IAF also uses FMS.

>> With LSA USA will be able to offer latest technologies, and set up maintenance and repair organizations (MROs), which India lacks to support civil airlines too, and save FFE.

Comment >>

Opposition to the LSA comes mainly from the Left parties who do not want India to be party to the 'wrong designs' of the US military in the region and in the process, compromise India's strategic sovereignty. The LSA they argue, would oblige India to comply with Washington's agenda. However, the concerns of the Left parties seem unfounded as the past records of many NATO allies have shown that merely by signing the LSA or ACSA, they did not necessarily have to identify with the US' global agenda, evident from the policies adopted by France and Germany during the US invasion of Iraq in 2004 and as recently as last fortnight when Australia (which is part of the US-led security alliance -- ANZUS) decided to withdraw from the quadrilateral initiative.

The logistics support agreements that the US has signed with many other countries are mutually beneficial agreements. India thus should move on the pending LSA to strengthen defence and strategic relationship with the US. So far, the Indian government has not clearly indicated any objections to the provisions of the agreement. If there is any objectionable element in the proposed agreement, then it should be identified and the two sides should negotiate to arrive at an agreement that is consistent with their national interests and policies. As mentioned above, the agreement has several benefits from both the defence and strategic aspects. It helps in mitigating capability gaps and logistics shortfalls. The systems and methods of LSSS, when integrated and supplemented with the proposed agreement, would decrease wait time and increase sustainable capabilities. Since it is a two-way agreement, the two countries would share both the responsibility and benefits of the agreement. Thus, from both the strategic and economic aspects, the LSA works largely in India's favour.

What will India get after signing the Indo-US Logistics Support Agreement (LSA)?

Found this counter argument :
What is CISMOA?
The Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement is another facet of bureaucratic and sometimes political attributes of doing business and allying with the United States. The CISMoA should not be confused with the EULA which is a totally different agreement covering the use of systems purchased. The CISMoA provides guidance on how the systems will function with other systems. The CISMoA however, can be abused as an agreement and become an extension of /or a replacement for a EULA which can defeat the entire purpose of any cooperation and the purpose of the CISMoA.

The recent exercises between the Indian and U.S. militaries were a success and both sides are continuing to get acquainted with each others people, equipment, and doctrine. There were probably issues with interoperability that were uncovered for which, neither side is telling. They will however work to fix any technical and collaborative issues, so that when the next joint exercise occurs, at least those first problems will be fixed.

In the 21st century, communications equipment arena just some solid state radios where each side only needs to know a particular frequency to communicate on. Communications equipment are highly complex pieces of computerized hardware running equally complex software and encryption products. Sometimes its difficult to get the same equipment with the same country to work properly much less trying to conduct joint operations with different countries using different equipment.

The CISMoA attempts to facilitate agreements on how each nations radios will communicate with each other effectively. For example, India troops may want to call in an air strike with U.S. air assets, this will require Indian ground radios to be compatible with U.S. strike aircraft radios to include encryption. Likewise, U.S. Special Ops may want to call in Indian long range artillery. The U.S. SpecOps on the ground will need their radios to communicate with Indian ground based artillery batteries.

Communications such as these are only a fraction of what CISMoA can cover. Going back to the air strike scenario, if laser guided bombs are employed, the Indian ground troops may require a laser designator. Its not just point and the aircraft shoots as the press and media will have you believe. That laser designator must be set to a specific agreed upon frequency of invisible laser light. The laser guided bombs loaded on the aircraft will also be set to accept that specific frequency. You cant have the enemy using a similar frequency of laser light to direct our bombs back on us (unlikely). If the frequencies do not match, the bombs won't register a signal.

Another real world example is with the Patriot missile system that the U.S. has sold to Japan. It turns out that the frequency the U.S. system uses to send a launch command to the missiles is the same frequency used by Japanese commercial cell phone carriers. OOPS! This required a tweaking of the Patriot systems in Japan to use a different frequency that likewise while good for military use in Japan, can not be used inside the U.S.

A current real world problem for which the U.S. and other allies in the war theater’s (possibly even Indian units) are experiencing issues with unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) communications. The frequencies are becoming ever more difficult to manage and they are jamming each other, making command and control more and more difficult if not impossible. Actually, the U.S. lost another Reaper last week in Afghanistan for an unknown reason which has already been traced to a loss of comm link.

A further problem is the creation of device to defeat the improvised explosive device or IED. The U.S. Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization or JIEDDO based out of the Pentagon has poured billions of dollars in development & deployment of specialized electronic equipment. One such device is used to jam the cell phones and other devices used to remote detonate IEDs. Unfortunately one of these devices uses the same frequency that the Blackhawk helicopter uses for firing IR countermeasure flares. OOPS!

Ultimately the term for this is called Spectrum Management and the U.S. and her allies try diligently to prevent problems like this from occurring. CISMoA helps, but in a fluid theater of operations with many different nations with many different types of communications platforms operating, this is showing to be impossible.

CISMoA may also cover electronic warfare or EW. EW, if properly employed can be a powerful weapon against your enemies. However, since its an area weapon with broad reach, if the management of operations and spectrum are not perfect, then you may jam your own forces and/or your allies to your own detriment.

At least with India and the U.S. there will be fewer different systems and only two players. Theoretically spectrum management should be easier and more feasible.

CISMoA does not just cover hardware and software; it also covers doctrine and interaction. We can share a command center which could be transferring Indian commanders to U.S. ships or transferring U.S. Commanders to Indian ground command facilities. These commanders will be responsible for their respective forces. They will need to know how each other works. One Generals decision to bomb a target may be in conflict with the other Generals plan to take the target, hence, friendly fire incident. Or one General may want to continue negotiating while another General might want to bypass a village instead. CISMoA tries to create a framework for commanders to operate in so that they dont have to halt operations and call Washington or New Delhi for guidance. One regulating factor for a CISMoA can be the Rules of Engagement or ROE.

An example is the ongoing media blitz of the German commander in Afghanistan who called in an American aircraft to conduct an airstrike on a fuel tanker truck that had been compromised. Needless to say there was a lot of death and destruction. The communications and weapons performed exactly as designed and agreed upon, however the politics and media have twisted the event from a proper combat decision of a valued commander to a television treasure trove that the Taliban and or Al-Qaeda can take to the Pakistani mountains.

A CISMOA can be a powerful tool to help operations, but it can be horribly tainted and twisted into a hindrance or a scapegoat of policy because of politics.

 

[Prajapati]

In a way these stripped down orders have helped the domestic industry... Just look at the above example...
1. BEL's radar are the first thing that come to my mind when thinking about indigenous domestic naval tech...
2. Data link II on the P-8I
3. The IFF interrogator and transponder system from HAL & BEL on P-8I
4. The speech secrecy system from ECIL on P-8I

View attachment 221193

I hope you realize that these equipments do not even cover 1% of the price of the deal

 

[K M Cariappa]

I hope you realize that these equipments do not even cover 1% of the price of the deal

Watch Sr. no 4 = Long Range Maritime Recce Anti Submarine warfare Aircraft a.k.a P8I...
Cost of deal =10684... Off set = 3205.... i.e 30% of the deal...

Next time do some research before commenting...

 

[Prajapati]

View attachment 221223
Watch Sr. no 4 = Long Range Maritime Recce Anti Submarine warfare Aircraft a.k.a P8I...
Cost of deal =10684... Off set = 3205.... i.e 30% of the deal...

Next time do some research before commenting...

I meant the Indian systems that went onboard P-8I you Moron.

Next time learn to read and understand english.

Also read what CAG has said about how Boeing has scammed India for offset.

 

[K M Cariappa]

I meant the Indian systems that went onboard P-8I you Moron.

Next time learn to read and understand english.

And here I thought we were engaging in discussion in a civilised manner but alas... Bye bye Ciao and hey please Die quickly....

 

[Chanakya's_Chant]

Found this counter argument :
What is CISMOA?
The Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement is another facet of bureaucratic and sometimes political attributes of doing business and allying with the United States. The CISMoA should not be confused with the EULA which is a totally different agreement covering the use of systems purchased. The CISMoA provides guidance on how the systems will function with other systems. The CISMoA however, can be abused as an agreement and become an extension of /or a replacement for a EULA which can defeat the entire purpose of any cooperation and the purpose of the CISMoA.

The recent exercises between the Indian and U.S. militaries were a success and both sides are continuing to get acquainted with each others people, equipment, and doctrine. There were probably issues with interoperability that were uncovered for which, neither side is telling. They will however work to fix any technical and collaborative issues, so that when the next joint exercise occurs, at least those first problems will be fixed.

In the 21st century, communications equipment arena just some solid state radios where each side only needs to know a particular frequency to communicate on. Communications equipment are highly complex pieces of computerized hardware running equally complex software and encryption products. Sometimes its difficult to get the same equipment with the same country to work properly much less trying to conduct joint operations with different countries using different equipment.

The CISMoA attempts to facilitate agreements on how each nations radios will communicate with each other effectively. For example, India troops may want to call in an air strike with U.S. air assets, this will require Indian ground radios to be compatible with U.S. strike aircraft radios to include encryption. Likewise, U.S. Special Ops may want to call in Indian long range artillery. The U.S. SpecOps on the ground will need their radios to communicate with Indian ground based artillery batteries.

Communications such as these are only a fraction of what CISMoA can cover. Going back to the air strike scenario, if laser guided bombs are employed, the Indian ground troops may require a laser designator. Its not just point and the aircraft shoots as the press and media will have you believe. That laser designator must be set to a specific agreed upon frequency of invisible laser light. The laser guided bombs loaded on the aircraft will also be set to accept that specific frequency. You cant have the enemy using a similar frequency of laser light to direct our bombs back on us (unlikely). If the frequencies do not match, the bombs won't register a signal.

Another real world example is with the Patriot missile system that the U.S. has sold to Japan. It turns out that the frequency the U.S. system uses to send a launch command to the missiles is the same frequency used by Japanese commercial cell phone carriers. OOPS! This required a tweaking of the Patriot systems in Japan to use a different frequency that likewise while good for military use in Japan, can not be used inside the U.S.

A current real world problem for which the U.S. and other allies in the war theater’s (possibly even Indian units) are experiencing issues with unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) communications. The frequencies are becoming ever more difficult to manage and they are jamming each other, making command and control more and more difficult if not impossible. Actually, the U.S. lost another Reaper last week in Afghanistan for an unknown reason which has already been traced to a loss of comm link.

A further problem is the creation of device to defeat the improvised explosive device or IED. The U.S. Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization or JIEDDO based out of the Pentagon has poured billions of dollars in development & deployment of specialized electronic equipment. One such device is used to jam the cell phones and other devices used to remote detonate IEDs. Unfortunately one of these devices uses the same frequency that the Blackhawk helicopter uses for firing IR countermeasure flares. OOPS!

Ultimately the term for this is called Spectrum Management and the U.S. and her allies try diligently to prevent problems like this from occurring. CISMoA helps, but in a fluid theater of operations with many different nations with many different types of communications platforms operating, this is showing to be impossible.

CISMoA may also cover electronic warfare or EW. EW, if properly employed can be a powerful weapon against your enemies. However, since its an area weapon with broad reach, if the management of operations and spectrum are not perfect, then you may jam your own forces and/or your allies to your own detriment.

At least with India and the U.S. there will be fewer different systems and only two players. Theoretically spectrum management should be easier and more feasible.

CISMoA does not just cover hardware and software; it also covers doctrine and interaction. We can share a command center which could be transferring Indian commanders to U.S. ships or transferring U.S. Commanders to Indian ground command facilities. These commanders will be responsible for their respective forces. They will need to know how each other works. One Generals decision to bomb a target may be in conflict with the other Generals plan to take the target, hence, friendly fire incident. Or one General may want to continue negotiating while another General might want to bypass a village instead. CISMoA tries to create a framework for commanders to operate in so that they dont have to halt operations and call Washington or New Delhi for guidance. One regulating factor for a CISMoA can be the Rules of Engagement or ROE.

An example is the ongoing media blitz of the German commander in Afghanistan who called in an American aircraft to conduct an airstrike on a fuel tanker truck that had been compromised. Needless to say there was a lot of death and destruction. The communications and weapons performed exactly as designed and agreed upon, however the politics and media have twisted the event from a proper combat decision of a valued commander to a television treasure trove that the Taliban and or Al-Qaeda can take to the Pakistani mountains.

A CISMOA can be a powerful tool to help operations, but it can be horribly tainted and twisted into a hindrance or a scapegoat of policy because of politics.

My argument was for Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) not CISMoA.

 

[Capt.Popeye]

GAGAN itself done with US help..

so its not just self reliance, probably

HeHeHe; and you have forgotten the IRNSS system? Nothing US there; while GAGAN is an add-on to GPS.

 

[tsinga]

HeHeHe; and you have forgotten the IRNSS system? Nothing US there; while GAGAN is an add-on to GPS.

Can GAGAN enhance the IRNSS signals as well ?