Unternehmen Zitadelle

[SarthakGanguly]

Just as a FYI.. the term Schwerpunkt did not refer to an initial thrust as much as the crucial thrust.. or core focus... say much like the mission statement of a firm. It was included because if the offensive failed for reasons being :
A. Incorrect choice of Schwerpunkt,
B. Incorrect execution of Schwerpunkt.
C. Inability to rally around the initial push.

The term is still used today in strategy planning to identify where the core energies of an initiative lie/should lie.

True. I believe it was a combination of all three in this case of Zitadelle.

 

[AUSTERLITZ]

Just as a FYI.. the term Schwerpunkt did not refer to an initial thrust as much as the crucial thrust.. or core focus... say much like the mission statement of a firm. It was included because if the offensive failed for reasons being :
A. Incorrect choice of Schwerpunkt,
B. Incorrect execution of Schwerpunkt.
C. Inability to rally around the initial push.

The term is still used today in strategy planning to identify where the core energies of an initiative lie/should lie.

Schwerpunkt essentially means 'concentration principle' i believe.Mission statement of a firm is very nice way of putting it.
About inability to rally i guess clausewitz's quote is quite appropiate here-Any offensive movement that fails to achieve its objective must inevitably turn into the defensive.

 

[Mighty Caty]

Soviet defences have been strengthened enormously. A sample is shown below (for 13 Guards Army)

As can be seen these are multiple independent defensive cauldrons in depth. And by in depth I mean in fcuking depth! Also the presence of reserves and supplies(//// lines) is tactically placed. A successful breakthrough is difficult. It requires -
i. Local surprise - Vital for success. Artillery preparation should be no more than 30 minutes.
ii. Tactical Air support should be provided by the entire Luftflotte III and IV. Air superiority is a must. The objective would be not only to eliminate the defences, but also bomb the supply dumps, enemy reserve staging areas etc.
iii. Adequate commitment of German reserves - after the initial breakthrough is complete. Maintaining momentum is vital. If the Russians get time to recover, flanking attacks will delay our spearhead considerably.
iv. Owing to the lack of numerical superiority, the initial thrust or the Schwerpunkt must be placed in flat terrain - with overwhelming force.

But what is obvious is that the German losses will be huge - as the panzers will be required to move through such difficult defenses. Also the infantry must keep up as well.

This was what the Germans did.

So here's my Plan

Fall B - Zitadelle - July 05, 1943

Geheim

i. Concentrate 4. Panzer Armee from Glukhov.
ii. Keep Armeeabteilung Kempf to guard it's right flank.
iii. Attack at 2:30 am, with only infantry + Ferdinands as fire support(Elefant) Maximum use of mobile artillery. Artillery preparation kept to 30 mins for start, then approaching for another 15 mins each for the next 1 hour(means the infantry will begin assault 30mins after artillery opens up the barrage, further artillery strikes must be done in a rolling fashion).
iv. Complete radio silence, bogus Panzer divisions at Kharkov in the South and apparently approaching Ponyri in the North(3 phantom Panzer divisions under direct Heeresgruppe Mitte, represented by 3 Schwere PanzerAbteilungs(Heavy Panzer battalion).
iii. Keep 9. Armee on the defensive in Orel till 'Code Green'.
iv. XLII and Raus Korps stay on the defensive in the Southern Pincer till 'Code Green'.
View attachment 23675
Objective - Kursk

Plan of action and possible Russian counterstrokes
View attachment 23676
Orange - projected initial advance. Green - Post Code Green.

The basic plan is -
i. Commit the forces used historically in the North pincer to defense in the Northern bulge, and center. Detach the panzers and keep them in reserve for the thrust at Code Green. Till then only defense and flanking support duty.

ii. Commit the forces used historically in the South pincer for the Center, around Rylsk.

iii. Keep the two corps which stayed on defense in the Center on the flanks.

This would concentrate around 5 panzer divisions and 11 infantry divisions against 5 divisions of Sixtieth Army.

iv. Attack along the border of responsibility between the Voronezh front and the Central Front. Take advantage of the confusion and comparative lack of defenses. Aerial reconnaissance did report that the defenses were far from complete in the center. Problem is the Panzers need to cover almost twice the distance. But with proper supplies that can be done.

v. Point is to reach Kursk and at least destroy or take the Railway station. That would prevent the strategic commitment of the STAVKA reserves of both the Central and Voronezh Fronts.

vi. Compared to the 7 defensive lines in the South and North, there were barely 3 in the Center.

viii. The Russians did not expect any attack here, as it would go against eh very basics of pincer warfare

ix. ULTRA had got wind of the pincers. So this could fool them for some time. The radio silence should help. Also the phantom panzer divisions with proper camouflage is vital.

x. Initial breakthrough must be made with Grenadiers along with Heavy Armor Support and intensive tactical air ground support. Once the breakthrough is done, 2 Panzer divisions of II SS should be committed to move directly to Kursk. Point is to beat the Soviet reserves. After the initial attack, once surprise is reached and an initial breakthrough made, Soviet reserves will be held back for some time - fearing this to be a diversion. (this was what actually happened). A minor nuisance reconnaissance in force will have to be attempted in the Southern phantom pincer. This is nearest to the reserves. Even if they are not committed, they would at least stay and wait to determine the situation. If they are committed in the South, great!

xi. Once the II SS reaches Kursk suburbs( within 50 kms at least), signal Code green. By this time Kempf should also reach the Fifth Guards assembly area. Henceforth - move towards the North linking up at Kursk.

x. Once II SS reaches Kursk, other XLVII Panzerkorp needs to push North and with increased pressure from the Northern pincer unhinge the defences from the rear.

xi. Once Kursk is taken, no heavy weapons can leave the area - because Kursk had the only serviceable road. The lines of supply are cut for at least 5 Russian armies. facing them are 5 more armies of the reserve.

xii. Major advantage is - instead of getting a shortcut from the North and South, a center attack would open up the defenses from the rear.

This attack would have certainly got Kursk for the Germans, but the battle of attrition would have forced them to siffer heavy losses. About 5 to 7 Panzer and around 10 infantry divisions would have to remain committed to Kesselslacht (Cauldron battles) and they could not be sent to Italy or the Adriatic/West Europa. So in the end, the line would be shortened, but only temporarily as Kutusov would be launched in the North. And the exhausted Germans would have little chance of holding that.

Your plan resemble the one Ariel Sharon used during the October War for the breakthrough of Sinai

Well, your plan is sound, but I am afraid it would not work in this case.

If I understand your plan exactly, you are calling for a frontal spearhead attack into the salient toward Kursk and directly move outward to capture or destroy the Soviet supply route and cut off the reinforcement. Meanwhile using both Flanks (Orel and Belgorod) to prevent a spill.

The problem I can see is Germany would need a swift victory on Kursk to disperse the reinforcement, the swiftness is within 1 or 2 days. Which I don't think it's possible. Look at this map.

Soviet have 11 Infantry Corp inside the salient. in 3 defensive lines, before even touching the reserve. That's about 900,000 people in there. (with another 1 million reserve) And for the soviet, they do not need to win the battle too, the only thing they are require to do is to hold the ground and grind off the Germany attacks.

The strategic depth of Soviet defense would eat away the German attacking force to either bleed them or simply absorb the attacks, and while the German being grinded away, the German command will need to funnel the troop from the battle line into the central breakout, and that would present a good chance for the soviet to make a Stalingrad style envelopment once again. It would be not wise to attack the Soviet from inside the salient, that is where their troop were most concentrated. (11 crops on the lines vs 4 crops on each flanks)

Then take a look at this map.

This map lay out the static defense in and around Kursk, as you can see the front of the Kursk Salient is heavily defense with trenches and minefield, Even the original Battle of Kursk insertion point did not have that much of defense on it. Any frontal attack I am afraid will only proof suicidal.

The original plan was to penetrate both side toward Kursk and close the road thru it so nothing can reach Kursk and then a grinding war would trap and eliminated the salient. by closing the door on both flanks, they would also close the flushing supply into Kursk. And that aimed at diminishing the supply day by day during the attack, by closing the gap and eventually cut off the whole salient

Your plan would have an open road to Kursk (Unchanged supply rate) until the point Kursk is liberated and the supply route is either destroyed or captured. That mean an uninterrupted reinforcement and supply during the whole campaign. To which the rear would keep constant logistic flow toward the most concentrated part of the line.

I would say the original plan of Kursk would have < 50% chance of success if the German attack on April/May, less than 30% when doing so in July. Your plan would have about the same chance of success if the German attack on April/May but would have less than the original plan when the attack is carried out in July.

I could be wrong, this is just my simple opinion.

 

[SarthakGanguly]

Your plan resemble the one Ariel Sharon used during the October War for the breakthrough of Sinai

Well, your plan is sound, but I am afraid it would not work in this case.

If I understand your plan exactly, you are calling for a frontal spearhead attack into the salient toward Kursk and directly move outward to capture or destroy the Soviet supply route and cut off the reinforcement. Meanwhile using both Flanks (Orel and Belgorod) to prevent a spill.

The problem I can see is Germany would need a swift victory on Kursk to disperse the reinforcement, the swiftness is within 1 or 2 days. Which I don't think it's possible. Look at this map.

Soviet have 11 Infantry Corp inside the salient. in 3 defensive lines, before even touching the reserve. That's about 900,000 people in there. (with another 1 million reserve) And for the soviet, they do not need to win the battle too, the only thing they are require to do is to hold the ground and grind off the Germany attacks.

The strategic depth of Soviet defense would eat away the German attacking force to either bleed them or simply absorb the attacks, and while the German being grinded away, the German command will need to funnel the troop from the battle line into the central breakout, and that would present a good chance for the soviet to make a Stalingrad style envelopment once again. It would be not wise to attack the Soviet from inside the salient, that is where their troop were most concentrated. (11 crops on the lines vs 4 crops on each flanks)

Then take a look at this map.

This map lay out the static defense in and around Kursk, as you can see the front of the Kursk Salient is heavily defense with trenches and minefield, Even the original Battle of Kursk insertion point did not have that much of defense on it. Any frontal attack I am afraid will only proof suicidal.

The original plan was to penetrate both side toward Kursk and close the road thru it so nothing can reach Kursk and then a grinding war would trap and eliminated the salient. by closing the door on both flanks, they would also close the flushing supply into Kursk. And that aimed at diminishing the supply day by day during the attack, by closing the gap and eventually cut off the whole salient

Your plan would have an open road to Kursk (Unchanged supply rate) until the point Kursk is liberated and the supply route is either destroyed or captured. That mean an uninterrupted reinforcement and supply during the whole campaign. To which the rear would keep constant logistic flow toward the most concentrated part of the line.

I would say the original plan of Kursk would have < 50% chance of success if the German attack on April/May, less than 30% when doing so in July. Your plan would have about the same chance of success if the German attack on April/May but would have less than the original plan when the attack is carried out in July.

I could be wrong, this is just my simple opinion.

Brilliant evaluation.


But here's the deal.

The SarthakPlan Ost(yes that's my plan ) will have a greater chance of success after July 05.

Why?

Because of the following reasons -

1. For a classical pincer - there are always at least two spearheads. For an obtuse bulge(Kursk salient) this would have two possible pincer assembly areas. It was obvious to the Russians where the German attacks would be. So the defensive preparation was maximum there.

2. Commitment of huge number of troops - Facing the Southern pincer before the attack were 5 armies and facing the Northern pincer another 6 armies. The center had only 2 armies and that too belonging to two different Fronts(Central and Voronezh fronts).

3. Proximity of reserves - Russian reserves were close to the Southern pincer. Why? Because Kursk was the road link to the entire bulge. Fro Kursk there went a road to the west (center) and also to the South. Depending on the German attack, the reserves could mobilize quickly and take these very roads. The southern road was the shortest.

4. In the original plan - the rate of advance was very low for the Germans - reason was the number of defensive lines. There were not 3 but 7 lines of defense in the South, last being at Prokhorovkha. Also reserves came quickly. The SarthakPlan Ost would have allowed the panzers to move faster. In fact that's what panzers are for. Not for facing enemies in head on combat, but maneuver. A pincer attack would have killed the maneuver( as it did).

Also commitment of the reserves on the German side would have been important as you rightly pointed out. But considering that forces are to be concentrated only in the Center, there would be more Panzers available to be committed. Provided the supplies keep up, the rate of advance would have been much higher.

Let's also see the road to Kursk -
From the Original Southern Pincer, the road was flat but the flanks remained open and exposed. Same for the Northern pincer.

So let's see the situation for SarthakPlan Ost

The original attack made it easier for the Russians to move their forces around. Besides the defences were the strongest because that's where the attack was expected.

On the other hand let's look at the situation in center.

If you see the map carefully you will find the advantage in moving over open terrain. True - this could have been the ideal tank battle area - but incidentally, the Russians kept two Infantry armies belonging to two different Fronts. So coordination would have been difficult for the Ruskies. Taking advantage of this the spearhead could have moved deep into the road (E38) and head straight.

Another advantage is the absolute lack of cover, low defenses, also the Russians would not be able to lay an ambush or attack from the flanks without the Germans knowing. Only one road moves to the right, this road would have to be taken by Armeeabteilung Kempf, thereby protecting the right flank.

The primary question is, once the Russians understand the main spearhead they will send the reserves to Kursk and that would defeat the Germans, even though the bulge would be drastically reduced. Though a phantom attack from the 'pincers' in the North and the South would confuse them, this ruse would not work for more than 2 days. So let's see the road from the Reserves assembly(Stary Oskhol) to Kursk.

The road from Stary Oskhol to Kursk is essential. On the road, (please check the map), the shortest road is P189 - P190 - E38. And this road has several choke points. Also this road crosses two streams, and that means there are bridges. With some bombing they can be delayed for another 2 days. The road to the Southern Pincer however has no chokepoint. It goes straight. So the SarthakPlan Ost may look intimidating at first glance but had a greater chance of success, IMO

 

[Mighty Caty]

Brilliant evaluation.


But here's the deal.

The SarthakPlan Ost(yes that's my plan ) will have a greater chance of success after July 05.

Why?

Because of the following reasons -

1. For a classical pincer - there are always at least two spearheads. For an obtuse bulge(Kursk salient) this would have two possible pincer assembly areas. It was obvious to the Russians where the German attacks would be. So the defensive preparation was maximum there.

2. Commitment of huge number of troops - Facing the Southern pincer before the attack were 5 armies and facing the Northern pincer another 6 armies. The center had only 2 armies and that too belonging to two different Fronts(Central and Voronezh fronts).

3. Proximity of reserves - Russian reserves were close to the Southern pincer. Why? Because Kursk was the road link to the entire bulge. Fro Kursk there went a road to the west (center) and also to the South. Depending on the German attack, the reserves could mobilize quickly and take these very roads. The southern road was the shortest.

4. In the original plan - the rate of advance was very low for the Germans - reason was the number of defensive lines. There were not 3 but 7 lines of defense in the South, last being at Prokhorovkha. Also reserves came quickly. The SarthakPlan Ost would have allowed the panzers to move faster. In fact that's what panzers are for. Not for facing enemies in head on combat, but maneuver. A pincer attack would have killed the maneuver( as it did).

Also commitment of the reserves on the German side would have been important as you rightly pointed out. But considering that forces are to be concentrated only in the Center, there would be more Panzers available to be committed. Provided the supplies keep up, the rate of advance would have been much higher.

Let's also see the road to Kursk -
From the Original Southern Pincer, the road was flat but the flanks remained open and exposed. Same for the Northern pincer.

So let's see the situation for SarthakPlan Ost
View attachment 23829
The original attack made it easier for the Russians to move their forces around. Besides the defences were the strongest because that's where the attack was expected.

On the other hand let's look at the situation in center.
View attachment 23830
If you see the map carefully you will find the advantage in moving over open terrain. True - this could have been the ideal tank battle area - but incidentally, the Russians kept two Infantry armies belonging to two different Fronts. So coordination would have been difficult for the Ruskies. Taking advantage of this the spearhead could have moved deep into the road (E38) and head straight.

Another advantage is the absolute lack of cover, low defenses, also the Russians would not be able to lay an ambush or attack from the flanks without the Germans knowing. Only one road moves to the right, this road would have to be taken by Armeeabteilung Kempf, thereby protecting the right flank.

The primary question is, once the Russians understand the main spearhead they will send the reserves to Kursk and that would defeat the Germans, even though the bulge would be drastically reduced. Though a phantom attack from the 'pincers' in the North and the South would confuse them, this ruse would not work for more than 2 days. So let's see the road from the Reserves assembly(Stary Oskhol) to Kursk.

The road from Stary Oskhol to Kursk is essential. On the road, (please check the map), the shortest road is P189 - P190 - E38. And this road has several choke points. Also this road crosses two streams, and that means there are bridges. With some bombing they can be delayed for another 2 days. The road to the Southern Pincer however has no chokepoint. It goes straight. So the SarthakPlan Ost may look intimidating at first glance but had a greater chance of success, IMO

I can see what is your problem....

You are assuming the Russian would response the same way they did in the original battle of Kursk. But if you change the plan like that, you don't expect the Russia to have the same response.

Say you and me refight the battle. You use your plan and I use mine. What you plans is a blitz in the center of epidemic and try to move as quickly as possible to diverge the troop into surrounding Kursk.

What I will do if I were the Russians? I have two choices. First, either I have to access the situation and see if the German can breach the defense. I will either throw my soldier to stop your advance and defend the static sector and slow down your progression rate, then I will move my armor to counter you. You need to remember German are outnumbered in armor and infantry in the first place, and what you are planning on is for the armor to ditch the infantry protection and speed up and attack alone. Which would make those armor sitting duck to a combine AT Gun - Tank - Infantry attack. Or I simply wait and probe your line and see which way is vulnerable and attack there. Loop around your spear and attack your rear.

As I said before the Russian do not need to win this engagement as long as they can blog down the German offensive. And the German 4 Armor corps are facing up to 11 armies lay out in 3 layer of defenses (Not static defense line) It would take longer than the original plan to punch thru to Kursk.

And worst, when you are doing this, you essentially take most to all of the armor from skirting to central. If my infantry can hold the line, then I will use my armor to jump you, in the end, you will lose more than just Kursk. Even if you can do what you said and restrict the reserve move into Kursk, the Russia can also as easily to redirect their reserve to attack both your flank and envelope you, they don't need to retake Kursk, they can as well attack your flank guard.

For battle of Kursk to succeed, you need to take the road lead up to Kursk first, then to Kursk itself, but you plan on taking on Kursk first, then the roadwork. It would only work if your force are significantly larger. But with 1:2 infantry and 1:3 armor ratio, I don't think you can punch thru the line. The Russian only need to keep their cool and they will prevail, the Russian know that too, I will not recommend any sort of frontal attack...

 

[SarthakGanguly]

I can see what is your problem....

You are assuming the Russian would response the same way they did in the original battle of Kursk. But if you change the plan like that, you don't expect the Russia to have the same response.

Say you and me refight the battle. You use your plan and I use mine. What you plans is a blitz in the center of epidemic and try to move as quickly as possible to diverge the troop into surrounding Kursk.

What I will do if I were the Russians? I have two choices. First, either I have to access the situation and see if the German can breach the defense. I will either throw my soldier to stop your advance and defend the static sector and slow down your progression rate, then I will move my armor to counter you. You need to remember German are outnumbered in armor and infantry in the first place, and what you are planning on is for the armor to ditch the infantry protection and speed up and attack alone. Which would make those armor sitting duck to a combine AT Gun - Tank - Infantry attack. Or I simply wait and probe your line and see which way is vulnerable and attack there. Loop around your spear and attack your rear.

As I said before the Russian do not need to win this engagement as long as they can blog down the German offensive. And the German 4 Armor corps are facing up to 11 armies lay out in 3 layer of defenses (Not static defense line) It would take longer than the original plan to punch thru to Kursk.

And worst, when you are doing this, you essentially take most to all of the armor from skirting to central. If my infantry can hold the line, then I will use my armor to jump you, in the end, you will lose more than just Kursk. Even if you can do what you said and restrict the reserve move into Kursk, the Russia can also as easily to redirect their reserve to attack both your flank and envelope you, they don't need to retake Kursk, they can as well attack your flank guard.

For battle of Kursk to succeed, you need to take the road lead up to Kursk first, then to Kursk itself, but you plan on taking on Kursk first, then the roadwork. It would only work if your force are significantly larger. But with 1:2 infantry and 1:3 armor ratio, I don't think you can punch thru the line. The Russian only need to keep their cool and they will prevail, the Russian know that too, I will not recommend any sort of frontal attack...

True, SarthakPlan Ost makes a crucial assumption -

1. The Russians have been fooled to continue to believe that the main attack would come on the two sides. Only then would this plan work.

2. I did not say that Infantry will attack alone or for that matter panzers. The initial breach will be made by Infantry with Ferdinand(Panzerjaegar) and Wespe(mobile artillery) support. Also remember that the 65th Army in the Center had only anti tank guns. After the initial break it will be regular German approach.

3. If the heavily reinforced Prokhorovkha (5 Armies + 3 reinforced) barely managed to halt the II SS Panzer, I believe a similar thrust out of the blue would have sliced the center in a few hours.

Also interesting and important to note is that this method of breach with infantry and exploit with armor was used by the Russians in Operation Bagration as well as by the Germans in Wacht am Rhein(Ardennes) and that too without (German)air support. In the Ost Front the Luftwaffe still had air superiority and so such a move would have had succeeded, though lesser number of Russians would have been encircled.

Check in the Center from the situation map - the defenses are few as compared to the South and the North of the bulge. The Southern part has an enormous stack of Russian forces. At Prokhorovkha for example about 200 German tanks met almost 750 Russian tanks. The Germans lost 40 odd while the Russian lost 600-650. But the Germans lost the time.

When you are dealing with Russians, what matters is time. Sarthakplan Ost would have saved time and Kursk would have been taken. The line would have also been shortened but the number of Red army prisoners would have been fewer.

 

[AUSTERLITZ]

True, SarthakPlan Ost makes a crucial assumption -

3. If the heavily reinforced Prokhorovkha (5 Armies + 3 reinforced) barely managed to halt the II SS Panzer, I believe a similar thrust out of the blue would have sliced the center in a few hours.

However prokhorovka was a open fiedl battle among tanks,a meeting engagement that german panzers excelled in.The type of operation ur proposing would entail a swift breakthrough through a deep defense,not the same thing.

 

[SarthakGanguly]

However prokhorovka was a open fiedl battle among tanks,a meeting engagement that german panzers excelled in.The type of operation ur proposing would entail a swift breakthrough through a deep defense,not the same thing.

True - it was a Battle of Panzers. But there the Germans won so decisively because of the German skill and Russian piecemeal use of its armor. The buggers(I must use this term) even sent in battalions at a time in panic. An After Action Report even admonished the Commander of the Steppe Front for the same. Though it was an ideal hunting ground, it was useless ultimately to capture Kursk. Why?

Rewind back to 1941. In Kiev, 650,000 Russians encircled and destroyed. In the Rzev, Bryansk, Vyazma encirclement another 1.5 million Russians went into captivity. But still the Russians prevailed. Losses don't hurt the Russian war machine. Only reaching objective does.

In Sarthakplan Ost, the Panzers would have the crucial engagement after or at the approaches of reaching Kursk, thus saving time. While in the original plan the battle had to be completed successfully before reaching Kursk.
SarthakPlan Ost could have avoided the costly(in terms of time) engagement of panzers, which is romantic and numerically successful, but ultimately useless. German Panzer doctrine as designed by Heinz Guderian(as mentioned in Achtung Panzer) depended on maneuver and not set battles. So a dash had more chance of success.

 

[AUSTERLITZ]

True - it was a Battle of Panzers. But there the Germans won so decisively because of the German skill and Russian piecemeal use of its armor. The buggers(I must use this term) even sent in battalions at a time in panic. An After Action Report even admonished the Commander of the Steppe Front for the same. Though it was an ideal hunting ground, it was useless ultimately to capture Kursk. Why?

Rewind back to 1941. In Kiev, 650,000 Russians encircled and destroyed. In the Rzev, Bryansk, Vyazma encirclement another 1.5 million Russians went into captivity. But still the Russians prevailed. Losses don't hurt the Russian war machine. Only reaching objective does.

In Sarthakplan Ost, the Panzers would have the crucial engagement after or at the approaches of reaching Kursk, thus saving time. While in the original plan the battle had to be completed successfully before reaching Kursk.
SarthakPlan Ost could have avoided the costly(in terms of time) engagement of panzers, which is romantic and numerically successful, but ultimately useless. German Panzer doctrine as designed by Heinz Guderian(as mentioned in Achtung Panzer) depended on maneuver and not set battles. So a dash had more chance of success.

My contention is ur never going to get that deep fast enough before reserves are in play through those fortified belts using a frontal attack.Also germans don't have enough infantry support to expand the gap or hold the penetration indefinitely without which logistics for the spearhead columns will be jeopardized.Engagement with russian tanks was actually more fruitful for germans than assaulting heavy fortified lines.

 

[SarthakGanguly]

My contention is ur never going to get that deep fast enough before reserves are in play through those fortified belts using a frontal attack.Also germans don't have enough infantry support to expand the gap or hold the penetration indefinitely without which logistics for the spearhead columns will be jeopardized.Engagement with russian tanks was actually more fruitful for germans than assaulting heavy fortified lines.

No actually, the original pincers had to face both heaviest fortifications + Soviet reserves.
Sarthakplan Ost will face lighter fortifications and no reserves, initially. The crucial point would come later. It is a gamble and a race - reaching before the Russian reserves. But this gamble would have a greater chance of success than the traditional one.

 

[AUSTERLITZ]

No actually, the original pincers had to face both heaviest fortifications + Soviet reserves.
Sarthakplan Ost will face lighter fortifications and no reserves, initially. The crucial point would come later. It is a gamble and a race - reaching before the Russian reserves. But this gamble would have a greater chance of success than the traditional one.

But one thing i don't understand is then what?U make a penetration,let's say u manage it.But unless u can create a pocket to trap the soviet forces,u will face attacks from sides and rear,plus counterattacking soviet reserves from front.

 

[SarthakGanguly]

But one thing i don't understand is then what?U make a penetration,let's say u manage it.But unless u can create a pocket to trap the soviet forces,u will face attacks from sides and rear,plus counterattacking soviet reserves from front.

Correct evaluation. The forces captured would be less. But then the Germans were capable for such only. As for the counterattacking Soviet forces - these attacks would be beaten back with greater ease near or from Kursk, especially if both the roads and the railway line going out from it were in German hands. But this plan is good only in retrospect. At that time, the chances were even - 50 50.

 

[victor07]

Never Said German soldiers are Not good they are The best But Its their Top Leadership who Messed It up
Three outstanding Russian writers, unanimously admiring the worst enemies of Communism! (Very serious intellectual crime all over ‘the civilized world’ today)

Speaks Daniil Granin (born in 1919), who spent 3 years in the blockading (by German and Finnish troops) Leningrad:

“The Germans fought better, much better than our soldiers. Moreover — we`ve managed to win that war only by human flesh!”

Boris Vasiljev was the Red Army battle officer during WW2:

“The Germans waged war perfectly. Even when they were encircled, they fought excellently! I know it. I saw it by myself!”

The author of several military and patriotic novels, Vasiljev tells:

“We`ve managed to win the war by chance, absolutely. Evald von Kleist simply decided to stop his tanks for several days just near Moscow. Therefore, the Soviets received some free time in order to transfer the fresh troops, which attacked the Germans very successfully”

While General Andrej Andreevitch Vlasov is reputed officially in modern “free capitalist” Russia as a “vicious pro-Nazi collaborator and traitor”, Vasiljev considers absolutely differently:

“Vlasov was magnificent, properly Russian national military Commander! He decided to revenge himself upon Stalin, who committed terrible crimes against all peoples of Russia. Vlasov had high ideal of the Free Russia, as well as the real sense of responsibility towards his soldiers.”

The Red Army generals en masse were the direct opposite as compared with Vlasov, thinks Vasiljev:

“There were killed 1.300.000. Russian soldiers near Rzhev — through Soviet commanders’ faults only, and nobody speaks about the terrible tragedy so far in my country!”

The late Viktor Astafjev was on the Soviet-German front all the war long, 1941-1945:

“The Germans fought much, much better — in all respects! The Communists chose to shed rivers of the Russian blood literally in order to win the War. The Soviets won over Germany only by their extreme brutality and inhumanity!”

The best WW2 Commander? “Field-Marshall Erich von Manstein, of course!”, tells the great Russian national writer:

“He managed to push three Bolshevik armies into the Azov and Black Seas with the help of two German corpses only! He was the great military genius — yes, really!”

And Zhukov?

“Honest Russian patriot? Ha! This bastard covered half-Europe by the millions of the Russian guys` corpses by his extremely sadistic personal kind of war waging! He deserves neither honor, nor respect, never!”
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Quotes out of context, without reference to the books look like a bullshit. For example, Daniil Granin wrote to the Novoye Vremya newspaper (newtimes.ru in Russian): "Первый период войны немцы замечательно воевали и продвигались с большой скоростью. И чудом было то, что враг захватил промышленные районы, дошел до Ленинграда, Москвы - а мы не капитулировали. Мы продолжали воевать и даже перешли в наступление. ....." Translation: "At the first period of the war the Germans fought great and moved with great speed. And the miracle was that the enemy occupied industrial areas, came to Leningrad, Moscow - and we have not surrendered. We continued to fight and even went on the offensive. ....." Out of context it looks like "Germans fought great and moved with great speed. And the miracle was that the enemy occupied industrial areas, came to Leningrad, Moscow - and we have not surrendered."
«У меня была очень тяжелая война»