Unternehmen Zitadelle

[SarthakGanguly]

A real defence thread in defence.pk. I feel good.

 

[AUSTERLITZ]

When talking losses however note that i used the word armoured vehicles ,that includes assault guns and tank destroyers which are not technically panzers but present in very large numbers in wehrmacht.

A real defence thread in defence.pk. I feel good.

Ur a ww2 fanatic,i see.Hopefully u'll pay a visit when i get around to doing blitzkrieg.

 

[SarthakGanguly]

When talking losses however note that i used the word armoured vehicles ,that includes assault guns and tank destroyers which are not technically panzers but present in very large numbers in wehrmacht.
Ur a ww2 fanatic,i see.Hopefully u'll pay a visit when i get around to doing blitzkrieg.

True. WW2 was a real war.
I sure will. There is an excellent game that allows you to immerse yourself in various scenarios. It's Hearts of Iron III. It gives you the seat of the Supreme Commander of the country you wish to play with. Its exhaustive and brilliant. Compared to HoI III, other games are - well - just games.

 

[AUSTERLITZ]

Total german armour concentrated for citadel.

True. WW2 was a real war.
I sure will. There is an excellent game that allows you to immerse yourself in various scenarios. It's Hearts of Iron III. It gives you the seat of the Supreme Commander of the country you wish to play with. Its exhaustive and brilliant. Compared to HoI III, other games are - well - just games.

I played and replayed hoi 3 so many times it now boring.Been playing hoi series since hoi2 doomsday.Black ice mod is most challenging of hoi 3 mods.Op barbarossa is difficult due to huge soviet buildup and bonuses.

 

[ExtraOdinary]

True. WW2 was a real war.
I sure will. There is an excellent game that allows you to immerse yourself in various scenarios. It's Hearts of Iron III. It gives you the seat of the Supreme Commander of the country you wish to play with. Its exhaustive and brilliant. Compared to HoI III, other games are - well - just games.

I tried playing that grand strategy HOI-3, too much micromanaging, not my cup of tea so stuck with company of heroes.

@AUSTERLITZ Im waiting for Operation Barbarossa , but yeah it would be difficult for you, 3 massive fronts involved

 

[AUSTERLITZ]

I tried playing that grand strategy HOI-3, too much micromanaging, not my cup of tea so stuck with company of heroes.

@AUSTERLITZ Im waiting for Operation Barbarossa , but yeah it would be difficult for you, 3 massive fronts involved

I'll do them in parts- army gr north,centre and south.

 

[500]

Operation Citadel (Unternehmen Zitadelle) was the German code name for the thrust by Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Center) to take Kursk in July, 1943. This was the last German strategic offensive on the Eastern Front. Pitting 912000 men of the best of the Wehrmacht and the Waffen SS, Germany hoped to deal a crushing blow to the Soviet Red Army, thereby wresting initiative from them. In the end, the battle ended in a stalemate, which ultimately paved the way for total domination of the Red Army on the Ost Front.

Legend - GA - Guards Army., Abt - Abteilung, PzA - PanzerArmee, AK - Armeekorps

After participating in several juvenile threads, here I welcome you to discuss and analyze over the following points vis a vis the battles involved.

1. Was Hitler and the OKH(Oberkommando Der Heer) correct in beginning such a high stake offensive?

2. Did Zitadelle have a substantial chance of success?

3. Would a successful Zitadelle have changed the situation in Germany's favor in a major way?

4. Was Manstein correct in his evaluation of the scenario - that victory was close?

5. Was Hitler correct in withdrawing the Panzer divisions especially the entire II SS Panzer Korps was detached from the OOB(Order of Battle) and sent to Italy(to prepare for Achse, the planned occupation and possible fight in post surrender Italy)?

@Joe Shearer @INDIC @jarves @Indischer @scorpionx @Oscar @Hyperion @RAMPAGE @Armstrong @Pakistanisage @500 @Dillinger @chak de INDIA @jaibi @genmirajborgza786 @Aeronaut @Roybot @DRAY @Informant @Pakistani Exile @Chinese-Dragon @Jaanbaz @Khan_patriot @NKVD @vostok @45'22' and others.

Please feel free to invite others for a fruitful discussion

@AUSTERLITZ answered all questions well. I can only add that in 1943 USSR produced 2500 tans a month + 250 tanks a month they got through lend lease 2850 tanks a month total. Germans on the other hand were producing 890 tanks a month and sent some 800 to East Front.

3.5 times more. So the situation for Germans was very grim.

 

[SarthakGanguly]

@AUSTERLITZ answered all questions well. I can only add that in 1943 USSR produced 2500 tans a month + 250 tanks a month they got through lend lease 2850 tanks a month total. Germans on the other hand were producing 890 tanks a month and sent some 800 to East Front.

3.5 times more. So the situation for Germans was very grim.

Agreed, but such was the case always. Germans were always outproduced, right from the beginning of the war.

 

[500]

Agreed, but such was the case always. Germans were always outproduced, right from the beginning of the war.

In 1941, when Soviet factories were evacuated and there was no Lend Lease, the difference was "only" 1.7 times in favor of Soviets.

 

[NP-complete]

The Russians were not about to give the Germans a break. On August 3, 1943, the Red Army attacked Kursk and overwhelmed the troops that had been on the attack a month earlier. The Germans were on the run. Ignoring pleas for reinforcements, Hitler instead ordered the creation of a fortified line, the East Wall not to give his troops a place to fall back to and hold, but rather to prevent a retreat. German forces never again threatened Moscow and, from that point on, the Russians seized the initiative and did not let up until reaching Berlin.

This is quite frankly nonsense. Anyone one would try to fortify a defensive line as much as possible against an attacking enemy. I dont know what you are trying to say. But I must add the calmness of German soldier from that era is legendary, go dig up some military lit. Whether it was the man behind the machine gun on that poorly held river bank as Russians massed up division after division on the other side or a soldier on a picket duty looking out for signs of imminent Soviet flood, German soldier was know to be devoid of any trace of panic.

 

[NKVD]

This is quite frankly nonsense. Anyone one would try to fortify a defensive line as much as possible against an attacking enemy. I dont know what you are trying to say. But I must add the calmness of German soldier from that era is legendary, go dig up some military lit. Whether it was the man behind the machine gun on that poorly held river bank as Russians massed up division after division on the other side or a soldier on a picket duty looking out for signs of imminent Soviet flood, German soldier was know to be devoid of any trace of panic.

Never Said German soldiers are Not good they are The best But Its their Top Leadership who Messed It up
Three outstanding Russian writers, unanimously admiring the worst enemies of Communism! (Very serious intellectual crime all over ‘the civilized world’ today)

Speaks Daniil Granin (born in 1919), who spent 3 years in the blockading (by German and Finnish troops) Leningrad:

“The Germans fought better, much better than our soldiers. Moreover — we`ve managed to win that war only by human flesh!”

Boris Vasiljev was the Red Army battle officer during WW2:

“The Germans waged war perfectly. Even when they were encircled, they fought excellently! I know it. I saw it by myself!”

The author of several military and patriotic novels, Vasiljev tells:

“We`ve managed to win the war by chance, absolutely. Evald von Kleist simply decided to stop his tanks for several days just near Moscow. Therefore, the Soviets received some free time in order to transfer the fresh troops, which attacked the Germans very successfully”

While General Andrej Andreevitch Vlasov is reputed officially in modern “free capitalist” Russia as a “vicious pro-Nazi collaborator and traitor”, Vasiljev considers absolutely differently:

“Vlasov was magnificent, properly Russian national military Commander! He decided to revenge himself upon Stalin, who committed terrible crimes against all peoples of Russia. Vlasov had high ideal of the Free Russia, as well as the real sense of responsibility towards his soldiers.”

The Red Army generals en masse were the direct opposite as compared with Vlasov, thinks Vasiljev:

“There were killed 1.300.000. Russian soldiers near Rzhev — through Soviet commanders’ faults only, and nobody speaks about the terrible tragedy so far in my country!”

The late Viktor Astafjev was on the Soviet-German front all the war long, 1941-1945:

“The Germans fought much, much better — in all respects! The Communists chose to shed rivers of the Russian blood literally in order to win the War. The Soviets won over Germany only by their extreme brutality and inhumanity!”

The best WW2 Commander? “Field-Marshall Erich von Manstein, of course!”, tells the great Russian national writer:

“He managed to push three Bolshevik armies into the Azov and Black Seas with the help of two German corpses only! He was the great military genius — yes, really!”

And Zhukov?

“Honest Russian patriot? Ha! This bastard covered half-Europe by the millions of the Russian guys` corpses by his extremely sadistic personal kind of war waging! He deserves neither honor, nor respect, never!”
​

 

[Mighty Caty]

1. Was Hitler and the OKH(Oberkommando Der Heer) correct in beginning such a high stake offensive?

If you asked 10 modern day commander this question, giving the information they have already knows, 10 out of 10 would say they would prefer a defensive action at that point rather than an offensive action. Reason why is, the German just lost 250.000 men from Stalingrad 3 month prior and the German Heer would not have enough man to mount an offensive campaign like that.

In fact, many of Hilter General would advice Hilter to wait it out and save whatever resource to counteract with the Soviet offensive. Save resource and man power then you can talk about a full on counter-offensive like in the Battle of Kursk.

However, if you put yourselves in the shoes of Hilter minus all the knowledge you know now. Things are not quite the same.

1.) The situation at Kursk developed because of 2 successful counter offensive in Kharkov and Orel, hence the bulge exist in the first place, as German are gaining ground merely a month after the failure at Stalingrad. Which seen as a moral boost

2.) It's a common sense that German Tank are better leveling out with the Soviet. While the lacking in number, they are generally regarding as better equipment and better trained bunch. With a better master plan, odds could be even or even swing toward the German.

3.) Time is not on Hilter side, he know if Soviet is not at least deal a costly blow, they will not have enough resource to fight the west when, not if, the western allied open up a second front in the west (Which history told us, Western Allied opened a front in Italy in September 1943 and France in June 1944.) If the Russia problem is not dealt with soon, when the Western front and southern front open up eventually, that would be the ball game for Germany.

Commander is train to exploit the advantage, the gift, this time is 2 sudden victories from Battle of Orel and Battle of Kharkov, now, it's commonly taught that your enemy is weakest when they hit slack on their attack, that's mean Soviet is at their weakest of the moment, immediately after their defeat in both Orel and Kharkov. Now seeing this, and put in the strategic consideration, I don't think the same 10 general you'd asked would have the same things to say anymore.

I am not saying I agree on what Hilter think, or what he do, I see the point why he want to, or rather he need to play into this gamble. The situation is similar to Market Garden in 1944, with the only different is, by then Germany is losing and by Market Garden, it's quite clear that the allied is winning.

2. Did Zitadelle have a substantial chance of success?

You asked the wrong question, in military planning, if your plans has gone all the way you like, then your campaign would have a great chance of success automatically, simply because nobody would plan for yourselves to lose. (Still some do, hence I say would not must)

What you should ask is, is Operation Citadel a sound plans?

The answer is, it was. However, to success, the timing factor will be seriously weighted on the campaign. Remember what I said about Germany is taking on an advantage that Soviet is at the weakest at that point? There are a window for the follow on attacks, but 3 months goes by with Germany doing nothing, that's when the time factor expired.

See, everyday you did not attack would allow your enemy to regroup and resupply, The limit is when your enemy realize what you are going to do when you start to capitalize your gain, and every day you wait, you allow your enemy to recuperate and adapt to your way of fighting. At some point, your advantage would start to drift away day by day and to a point where it simply work against you. It's common view within military historian that had Germany attack the Soviet within 1 month the battle of Orel and Kharkov, that would have the best chance of success, then the chances drop as any delay kick in. To a point when the German actually did attack in July, the chance is worse then slim.

3. Would a successful Zitadelle have changed the situation in Germany's favor in a major way?

In hindsight, no.

The soviet troop trapped inside the Kursk salient is not as big, not in the way when you compare with the German troop trapped in battle of Stalingrad. The subsequent soviet operation lost more men and equipment than the Battle of Kursk, that's an indication that the Soviet can afford even for Soviet to lose Kursk and the situation would not affect as much, the Soviet can digest the lost in Kursk not the same way the German can regarding their lost at Stalingrad.

The battle of Kursk, in hindsight, would therefore only serve as a morale booster and buy time for better defense at German border..

But all these information are not available real time when the battle is being fought. When you are fighting a war, you goes as the flow takes you, you take every victory you can get, at that time, when the attack is formulated, it's seems like a good idea to attack

4. Was Manstein correct in his evaluation of the scenario - that victory was close?

If you access the battle information real time, No. The battle is no where near victory being fought out with the German.

The battle plan given by the German have very little chance of success. First, you would have expect the enemy would dig in with the 3 months idling previously. You would not expect when you roll your tank toward Kursk that the Soviet line and expect there are no defensive line established. Army were taught to move or dig in, any minute you are not moving, you are digging defenses.

So to smash head on with a 3 months old defensive establishment with not even more than half the necessary troop would be suicidal, it will not win the battle that way.

If you look at the map before the battle, the salient is a 3-side defenses compacted into a small area (The salient) where the defense network would have 3 times the protection from an oncoming enemy. (If you dig a trench along the salient, they are covered by 3 sides as 3 sides are facing the enemy, for a front line, where only 1 side facing the enemy, the defensive position is not multiplied. Hence the defense in salient act as a force multiplier.

If I were the German command and I want to take Kursk, what I will do is more or less what the American do in the first Iraq war. You know you are facing with a superior static defense, the only way to attack is not attacking those defense head on, penetrate the line elsewhere and use mobile warfare to swing back and attack your target from behind. In the American case, the American move West instead of North to attack into Iraq instead directly toward Kuwait, and later swing around to attack the Iraqi troop in Kuwait which now facing the wrong direction.

So, what I will do is, I will attack East parallel Kursk fro both Orel and Belgorod and swing North-West from Belgorod and Swing South West from Orel to attack the enemy from behind. Kempf group in the Germany army did exactly just that and although they are way smaller force than any other german group, they hold their section of the lines better than anyone else. If they do that, that would increase the chance of success, but a success is by no mean certain.

5. Was Hitler correct in withdrawing the Panzer divisions especially the entire II SS Panzer Korps was detached from the OOB(Order of Battle) and sent to Italy(to prepare for Achse, the planned occupation and possible fight in post surrender Italy)?

What I personally think the withdrawal of II SS Panzer division is the only thing Hilter did right almost to the entire war, the division was transfer when he knew the attack is not going to be a success. And based on his persona as in Stalingrad, it's commonly accepted there would be no retreat and every committed force are forced to fight to the finish.

By pulling the II SS out when hope is lost, they save the manpower and resource and live and fight for another day. Noted that the outcome of Market Garden is mainly because of the unexpected location of II SS in Netherlands that forced the British to surrender in Arnhem and the II SS is instrumental to that success, as well as the scared Battle of the bulge after Operation Market Garden.

 

[SarthakGanguly]

If you asked 10 modern day commander this question, giving the information they have already knows, 10 out of 10 would say they would prefer a defensive action at that point rather than an offensive action. Reason why is, the German just lost 250.000 men from Stalingrad 3 month prior and the German Heer would not have enough man to mount an offensive campaign like that.

In fact, many of Hilter General would advice Hilter to wait it out and save whatever resource to counteract with the Soviet offensive. Save resource and man power then you can talk about a full on counter-offensive like in the Battle of Kursk.

However, if you put yourselves in the shoes of Hilter minus all the knowledge you know now. Things are not quite the same.

1.) The situation at Kursk developed because of 2 successful counter offensive in Kharkov and Orel, hence the bulge exist in the first place, as German are gaining ground merely a month after the failure at Stalingrad. Which seen as a moral boost

2.) It's a common sense that German Tank are better leveling out with the Soviet. While the lacking in number, they are generally regarding as better equipment and better trained bunch. With a better master plan, odds could be even or even swing toward the German.

3.) Time is not on Hilter side, he know if Soviet is not at least deal a costly blow, they will not have enough resource to fight the west when, not if, the western allied open up a second front in the west (Which history told us, Western Allied opened a front in Italy in September 1943 and France in June 1944.) If the Russia problem is not dealt with soon, when the Western front and southern front open up eventually, that would be the ball game for Germany.

Commander is train to exploit the advantage, the gift, this time is 2 sudden victories from Battle of Orel and Battle of Kharkov, now, it's commonly taught that your enemy is weakest when they hit slack on their attack, that's mean Soviet is at their weakest of the moment, immediately after their defeat in both Orel and Kharkov. Now seeing this, and put in the strategic consideration, I don't think the same 10 general you'd asked would have the same things to say anymore.

I am not saying I agree on what Hilter think, or what he do, I see the point why he want to, or rather he need to play into this gamble. The situation is similar to Market Garden in 1944, with the only different is, by then Germany is losing and by Market Garden, it's quite clear that the allied is winning.


You asked the wrong question, in military planning, if your plans has gone all the way you like, then your campaign would have a great chance of success automatically, simply because nobody would plan for yourselves to lose. (Still some do, hence I say would not must)

What you should ask is, is Operation Citadel a sound plans?

The answer is, it was. However, to success, the timing factor will be seriously weighted on the campaign. Remember what I said about Germany is taking on an advantage that Soviet is at the weakest at that point? There are a window for the follow on attacks, but 3 months goes by with Germany doing nothing, that's when the time factor expired.

See, everyday you did not attack would allow your enemy to regroup and resupply, The limit is when your enemy realize what you are going to do when you start to capitalize your gain, and every day you wait, you allow your enemy to recuperate and adapt to your way of fighting. At some point, your advantage would start to drift away day by day and to a point where it simply work against you. It's common view within military historian that had Germany attack the Soviet within 1 month the battle of Orel and Kharkov, that would have the best chance of success, then the chances drop as any delay kick in. To a point when the German actually did attack in July, the chance is worse then slim.


In hindsight, no.

The soviet troop trapped inside the Kursk salient is not as big, not in the way when you compare with the German troop trapped in battle of Stalingrad. The subsequent soviet operation lost more men and equipment than the Battle of Kursk, that's an indication that the Soviet can afford even for Soviet to lose Kursk and the situation would not affect as much, the Soviet can digest the lost in Kursk not the same way the German can regarding their lost at Stalingrad.

The battle of Kursk, in hindsight, would therefore only serve as a morale booster and buy time for better defense at German border..

But all these information are not available real time when the battle is being fought. When you are fighting a war, you goes as the flow takes you, you take every victory you can get, at that time, when the attack is formulated, it's seems like a good idea to attack


If you access the battle information real time, No. The battle is no where near victory being fought out with the German.

The battle plan given by the German have very little chance of success. First, you would have expect the enemy would dig in with the 3 months idling previously. You would not expect when you roll your tank toward Kursk that the Soviet line and expect there are no defensive line established. Army were taught to move or dig in, any minute you are not moving, you are digging defenses.

So to smash head on with a 3 months old defensive establishment with not even more than half the necessary troop would be suicidal, it will not win the battle that way.

If you look at the map before the battle, the salient is a 3-side defenses compacted into a small area (The salient) where the defense network would have 3 times the protection from an oncoming enemy. (If you dig a trench along the salient, they are covered by 3 sides as 3 sides are facing the enemy, for a front line, where only 1 side facing the enemy, the defensive position is not multiplied. Hence the defense in salient act as a force multiplier.

If I were the German command and I want to take Kursk, what I will do is more or less what the American do in the first Iraq war. You know you are facing with a superior static defense, the only way to attack is not attacking those defense head on, penetrate the line elsewhere and use mobile warfare to swing back and attack your target from behind. In the American case, the American move West instead of North to attack into Iraq instead directly toward Kuwait, and later swing around to attack the Iraqi troop in Kuwait which now facing the wrong direction.

So, what I will do is, I will attack East parallel Kursk fro both Orel and Belgorod and swing North-West from Belgorod and Swing South West from Orel to attack the enemy from behind. Kempf group in the Germany army did exactly just that and although they are way smaller force than any other german group, they hold their section of the lines better than anyone else. If they do that, that would increase the chance of success, but a success is by no mean certain.


What I personally think the withdrawal of II SS Panzer division is the only thing Hilter did right almost to the entire war, the division was transfer when he knew the attack is not going to be a success. And based on his persona as in Stalingrad, it's commonly accepted there would be no retreat and every committed force are forced to fight to the finish.

By pulling the II SS out when hope is lost, they save the manpower and resource and live and fight for another day. Noted that the outcome of Market Garden is mainly because of the unexpected location of II SS in Netherlands that forced the British to surrender in Arnhem and the II SS is instrumental to that success, as well as the scared Battle of the bulge after Operation Market Garden.

Brilliant analysis. I have similar conclusions as well. In retrospect, the plan was not not great, but at that time and place, it was inevitable. But the Germans lost too much time.

Here is my counter plan for a what if scenario. Actually I am preparing it - will post asap.

 

[SarthakGanguly]

Soviet defences have been strengthened enormously. A sample is shown below (for 13 Guards Army)

As can be seen these are multiple independent defensive cauldrons in depth. And by in depth I mean in fcuking depth! Also the presence of reserves and supplies(//// lines) is tactically placed. A successful breakthrough is difficult. It requires -
i. Local surprise - Vital for success. Artillery preparation should be no more than 30 minutes.
ii. Tactical Air support should be provided by the entire Luftflotte III and IV. Air superiority is a must. The objective would be not only to eliminate the defences, but also bomb the supply dumps, enemy reserve staging areas etc.
iii. Adequate commitment of German reserves - after the initial breakthrough is complete. Maintaining momentum is vital. If the Russians get time to recover, flanking attacks will delay our spearhead considerably.
iv. Owing to the lack of numerical superiority, the initial thrust or the Schwerpunkt must be placed in flat terrain - with overwhelming force.

But what is obvious is that the German losses will be huge - as the panzers will be required to move through such difficult defenses. Also the infantry must keep up as well.

This was what the Germans did.

So here's my Plan

Fall B - Zitadelle - July 05, 1943

Geheim

i. Concentrate 4. Panzer Armee from Glukhov.
ii. Keep Armeeabteilung Kempf to guard it's right flank.
iii. Attack at 2:30 am, with only infantry + Ferdinands as fire support(Elefant) Maximum use of mobile artillery. Artillery preparation kept to 30 mins for start, then approaching for another 15 mins each for the next 1 hour(means the infantry will begin assault 30mins after artillery opens up the barrage, further artillery strikes must be done in a rolling fashion).
iv. Complete radio silence, bogus Panzer divisions at Kharkov in the South and apparently approaching Ponyri in the North(3 phantom Panzer divisions under direct Heeresgruppe Mitte, represented by 3 Schwere PanzerAbteilungs(Heavy Panzer battalion).
iii. Keep 9. Armee on the defensive in Orel till 'Code Green'.
iv. XLII and Raus Korps stay on the defensive in the Southern Pincer till 'Code Green'.

Objective - Kursk

Plan of action and possible Russian counterstrokes

Orange - projected initial advance. Green - Post Code Green.

The basic plan is -
i. Commit the forces used historically in the North pincer to defense in the Northern bulge, and center. Detach the panzers and keep them in reserve for the thrust at Code Green. Till then only defense and flanking support duty.

ii. Commit the forces used historically in the South pincer for the Center, around Rylsk.

iii. Keep the two corps which stayed on defense in the Center on the flanks.

This would concentrate around 5 panzer divisions and 11 infantry divisions against 5 divisions of Sixtieth Army.

iv. Attack along the border of responsibility between the Voronezh front and the Central Front. Take advantage of the confusion and comparative lack of defenses. Aerial reconnaissance did report that the defenses were far from complete in the center. Problem is the Panzers need to cover almost twice the distance. But with proper supplies that can be done.

v. Point is to reach Kursk and at least destroy or take the Railway station. That would prevent the strategic commitment of the STAVKA reserves of both the Central and Voronezh Fronts.

vi. Compared to the 7 defensive lines in the South and North, there were barely 3 in the Center.

viii. The Russians did not expect any attack here, as it would go against eh very basics of pincer warfare

ix. ULTRA had got wind of the pincers. So this could fool them for some time. The radio silence should help. Also the phantom panzer divisions with proper camouflage is vital.

x. Initial breakthrough must be made with Grenadiers along with Heavy Armor Support and intensive tactical air ground support. Once the breakthrough is done, 2 Panzer divisions of II SS should be committed to move directly to Kursk. Point is to beat the Soviet reserves. After the initial attack, once surprise is reached and an initial breakthrough made, Soviet reserves will be held back for some time - fearing this to be a diversion. (this was what actually happened). A minor nuisance reconnaissance in force will have to be attempted in the Southern phantom pincer. This is nearest to the reserves. Even if they are not committed, they would at least stay and wait to determine the situation. If they are committed in the South, great!

xi. Once the II SS reaches Kursk suburbs( within 50 kms at least), signal Code green. By this time Kempf should also reach the Fifth Guards assembly area. Henceforth - move towards the North linking up at Kursk.

x. Once II SS reaches Kursk, other XLVII Panzerkorp needs to push North and with increased pressure from the Northern pincer unhinge the defences from the rear.

xi. Once Kursk is taken, no heavy weapons can leave the area - because Kursk had the only serviceable road. The lines of supply are cut for at least 5 Russian armies. facing them are 5 more armies of the reserve.

xii. Major advantage is - instead of getting a shortcut from the North and South, a center attack would open up the defenses from the rear.

This attack would have certainly got Kursk for the Germans, but the battle of attrition would have forced them to siffer heavy losses. About 5 to 7 Panzer and around 10 infantry divisions would have to remain committed to Kesselslacht (Cauldron battles) and they could not be sent to Italy or the Adriatic/West Europa. So in the end, the line would be shortened, but only temporarily as Kutusov would be launched in the North. And the exhausted Germans would have little chance of holding that.

 

[SQ8]

pearhead considerably.
iv. Owing to the lack of numerical superiority, the initial thrust or the Schwerpunkt must be placed in flat terrain - with overwhelming force.

Just as a FYI.. the term Schwerpunkt did not refer to an initial thrust as much as the crucial thrust.. or core focus... say much like the mission statement of a firm. It was included because if the offensive failed for reasons being :
A. Incorrect choice of Schwerpunkt,
B. Incorrect execution of Schwerpunkt.
C. Inability to rally around the initial push.

The term is still used today in strategy planning to identify where the core energies of an initiative lie/should lie.