What's new

U.S. Sends Second Carrier to Asia Amid Tensions with China

The enemy target at most has 10s escape time. If DF-21C/D warhead changed flight path, only 5s. If China launch >10x DF-21C/D into A.C groups water, more hit chance. Of course China can provide more chicks to welcome our "guest".

You are talking about ballistic missiles, not cruiser missiles.
You would need MLRS to spread thousand of ballistic missiles at once.
 
@cnleio ,

In Naval terminology, we refer to this as fanning maneuver, which enables a capital ship to turn in steep angles. Ships such as carriers are capable of making this maneuver as in any other capital ships (cruisers and destroyers et al) as a defensive tactic to evade missiles fired at it. In the case of the DF, you're dealing not with a static object. US Aircraft Carriers are moving at 30+ knots and making repetitive turning maneuvers that makes any strike rather futile.

Refer to the following illustration,
original.jpg




Refer to another illustration,
turning_an_aircraft_carrier_07.jpg

notice it turning at 90 degree angle


Refer to another illustration,
US_Navy_050107-N-6074Y-046_The_Nimitz-class_aircraft_carrier_USS_Abraham_Lincoln_%28CVN_72%29_makes_a_turn_in_the_waters_of_the_Indian_Ocean_just_off_the_coast_of_Sumatra,_Indonesia.jpg

You also have to remember that for the DF-21 to be effective it has to have the space and maritime ISR assets to be able to target a moving ship across the vast expanse of the Pacific. Those will be targeted by the US at the opening of a conflict. If they can't track the ship the DF-21 is essentially blind. The US is also developing electromagnetic countermeasures to disrupt and deceive the sensors of the DF-21. Naval officials have talked openly about the "kill chain" of the Df-21, and how they can exploit that. The DF-21 is likely a very unreliable weapon at this point.
 
I wonder if someone here who happens to be too genocidal is prepared to see real war between NATO and SCO/CSTO, where blood and crap and rotting corpses are everywhere.

I can't tell whether the poster is a troll or serious...because I see those comments as "serious"
 
Last edited:
You also have to remember that for the DF-21 to be effective it has to have the space and maritime ISR assets to be able to target a moving ship across the vast expanse of the Pacific. Those will be targeted by the US at the opening of a conflict. If they can't track the ship the DF-21 is essentially blind. The US is also developing electromagnetic countermeasures to disrupt and deceive the sensors of the DF-21. Naval officials have talked openly about the "kill chain" of the Df-21, and how they can exploit that. The DF-21 is likely a very unreliable weapon at this point.

That's what exactly what I was thinking, in fact the Chinese Strategic Missile Corp, which is responsible for land based ballistic missiles -- and spread across 10 provinces in the PRC-- admit that the DF-21 Carrier Killer is dependent on their Over the horizon radar systems. Eliminate these, and the mechanism is practically blind. The United States as the dominant Air Power , would most probably target these satellites (who said it hasn't already?). Second point I would like to bring is the fact that these are Ballistic Missile Launches. Who's to say that these aren't carrying nuclear warheads. The United States would have already taken this threat -- to DEFCON level.
 
You are talking about ballistic missiles, not cruiser missiles.
You would need MLRS to spread thousand of ballistic missiles at once.
DF-21 is a intermediate range ballistic missile, DF-21C/D is the A.C-attack version.
 
You also have to remember that for the DF-21 to be effective it has to have the space and maritime ISR assets to be able to target a moving ship across the vast expanse of the Pacific. Those will be targeted by the US at the opening of a conflict. If they can't track the ship the DF-21 is essentially blind. The US is also developing electromagnetic countermeasures to disrupt and deceive the sensors of the DF-21. Naval officials have talked openly about the "kill chain" of the Df-21, and how they can exploit that. The DF-21 is likely a very unreliable weapon at this point.
LOL, the cost of several DF-21s == the cost of a FFG or DDG.

How much money u think U.S and Airforce will throw into the War to plan to destroy China satellite chains, China DF-21 launch sites, PLAAF fighters, PLAAF air-defence system/ missiles/ radars ?

This is called Asymmetric Warfare, some cheaper China DF-21C/D warheads can change ur strategy and make ur money burn.

whatever you call, no one use ballistic missiles as antiship missile, so Chinese is the first one.
Catch ur rival's weakness as possible as u can, if u wanna win the game.
 
Last edited:
That's what exactly what I was thinking, in fact the Chinese Strategic Missile Corp, which is responsible for land based ballistic missiles -- and spread across 10 provinces in the PRC-- admit that the DF-21 Carrier Killer is dependent on their Over the horizon radar systems. Eliminate these, and the mechanism is practically blind. The United States as the dominant Air Power , would most probably target these satellites (who said it hasn't already?). Second point I would like to bring is the fact that these are Ballistic Missile Launches. Who's to say that these aren't carrying nuclear warheads. The United States would have already taken this threat -- to DEFCON level.

The recent launch of the two highly maneuverable Geosynchronous Satellites will enable our Space Command to gather significant intel on Chinese satellites. Their Pacific radar coverage won't last long.
 
LOL, the cost of several DF-21s == the cost of a FFG or DDG.

How much money u think U.S and Airforce will throw into the War to plan to destroy China satellite chains, China DF-21 launch sites, PLAAF fighters, PLAAF air-defence system/ missiles/ radars ?

This is called Asymmetric Warfare, some cheaper China DF-21C/D warheads can change ur strategy and make ur money burn.


Catch ur rival's weakness, if u wanna win the game.

We'll do what is necessary to cripple your military, I guarantee you that. Also, I fail to see how that pertains to targeting your ISR nodes.
 
Catch ur rival's weakness, if u wanna win the game.

You are true, cnleio. We have been applying that tactic to counter potential enemy.
That's why Vietnam doesn't need DDG, AC.
Air superiority, AEW, ASW, passive radar and good short to medium missiles are enough
 
Aircraft Carriers: R.I.P?
March 14, 2013 In the News Source: The Diplomat
Two detailed arguments on the end of the aircraft carrier emerged earlier this month. The first, which has already received notable attention in the naval blogosphere, comes from Captain Jerry Hendrix in the form of the first Center for a New American Security (CNAS) “Disruptive Defense” paper. CNAS’s Disruptive Defense series seeks to provide analysts an opportunity to “present hard-hitting arguments” on controversial U.S. defense issues.

Hendrix argues that the modern American nuclear aircraft carrier (CVN) is, in cost-effectiveness terms, unequal to the task of managing the proliferation of anti-access technologies, particularly China’s DF-21D Anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM).

This argument has not gone unchallenged. As Bryan McGrath argues over at Information Dissemination, a straight comparison between the costs of a CVN and of 1,227 DF-21s is surely misleading; both weapons require support systems not included in that cost, and the carrier is considerably more flexible in usage than the ballistic missile.

Moreover, many of the key problems identified by Hendrix involve decisions about the air group rather than about the platform itself. Carriers need planes, and any assessment of the cost of a carrier requires an analysis of the price and capabilities of its aircraft. At the same time, carriers tend not to be bound to a single specific air group configuration, and over the lifespan of the platform will be expected to employ many different aircraft.

The blogger Sir Humphrey presents a broader challenge to the aircraft carrier, arguing that it is in decline across the globe. Spain has given up its lone carrier in preference for a (somewhat larger) amphibious multi-purpose ship, the Principe de Asturias. Italy may soon do the same and the future of France and Brazil’s carrier fleets are increasingly in doubt.

I’m sympathetic with parts of this argument, as it seems clear that states are more frequently opting for multi-purpose aircraft carrying ships that can conduct amphibious, command, and relief missions in addition to serving as platforms for high-intensity air combat.

The key transition, however, involves less a decision to forego carriers than the lack of an affordable successor to the Harrier jump jet, which has long served as the staple of naval air forces unable to operate CATOBAR (Catapult Assisted Take Off But Arrested Recovery) aircraft. The last Harrier II was delivered in 2003, making it not particularly old for a modern jet airframe, but the maintenance and training requirements exceed the capabilities and resources of many small and medium size navies.

An affordable, user-friendly successor to the Harrier II might find numerous international customers, although perhaps not enough demand to justify design costs. Perhaps UAC could devote some attention to developing a useful successor to the Yak-38? However, during the Libya conflict the French and British navies ameliorated this gap by launching attack helicopters from amphibious assault ships, a project that emphasized the flexibility of the flat deck aircraft carrying ship.

I suspect that we will continue to see navies devoting resources to multi-purpose flat-deck aircraft carrying warships. Put simply, as long as states continue to see utility in such ships, they’ll continue to build them. Larger ships with dedicated equipment will carry more and better aircraft. The largest ships, operated by the largest states, will carry an array of exceedingly advanced aircraft, both manned and unmanned.

At the same time, the constitution of a carrier air group will always be an imperfect fit with the tasks of the day, because development of the air group generally takes place long before the specifics of future conflict are known. And this fact underscores the utility of aircraft carriers.

Any air group (whether consisting of F-35s, F/A-18s, Yak-38s, A-6s, or Sea Hawk helicopters) represents a best guess at the demands of future conflict, mediated through the lenses of bureaucracy and the defense industrial base. Many of the assumptions behind these decisions can and often do turn out to be incorrect. The carrier’s primary virtue is therefore its flexibility and adaptability to different circumstances, not in its unique capacity to solve specific problems.

Aircraft Carriers: R.I.P? | Center for a New American Security
 
1. China follow that old tracks
2. The Eliminate of medium range missile between Soviet Union and USA benefited China.
Now they would not let it happen again.
3. USA has ability to detect any missile launch on earth
 
Back
Top Bottom