U.S-Pakistan Brainstorm on WoT

[fatman17]

the "fog of war" is correct - no one knows whats going on here - US/NATO have killed innocent civilians in both afghanistan and pakistan before so what is so different now. dont get me wrong, i dont support these actions!
pakistan is right in demanding uptodate intelligence from the US/NATO (which is being held back) and in return we will provide ours, then the next step should be joint action (if there is 100% agreement) on the suspected militant hideouts.

 

[batmannow]

GEO Pakistan
20 feared killed in US drones attack in N Waziristan
Updated at: 1321 PST, Monday, September 08, 2008
MIRANSHAH: Over 20 people reportedly killed and several injured during missile attack by US drones near Miranshah in North Waziristan on Monday.

Sources said that US drones fired ten guided missiles at a house and madarssah of son of Afghan commander Jalaluddin Haqqani in Danday Darpakhel area near Miranshah.

More than 20 people have been killed and dozens injured reportedly in the attack. Women and children are also included among the killed and injured.

The injured have been shifted to Miranshah headquarter hospital and other nearby hospitals.

NO let down in this unjustice, & unlegal attacks.

 

[muse]

Haqqani the old Mujahideen commander from the Afghan jihad, has been very successful against the NATO/coalition and if you will recall the Mark Mazzetti articles and the effort to transfer the ISI to ministry of interior from the armed forces, has been focused around Haqqani.

 

[batmannow]

Haqqani the old Mujahideen commander from the Afghan jihad, has been very successful against the NATO/coalition and if you will recall the Mark Mazzetti articles and the effort to transfer the ISI to ministry of interior from the armed forces, has been focused around Haqqani.

Dear muse sir,
thanks a lot sir, yes i had an idea about matter you had mentioned in your post. but still this govt isnt doing anything to stop these attacks, surly govt is lacking the efforts in this regards & there is a urgent need that GOP should be doing real and urgent efforts quickly in this regards, to put an end to these attacks.
till now, this govt. was saying that, they dont have accses to full powers.
But now, i guss they already got what ever they wanted, its the time to move forward. its the time to do some thing to stop these attacks seriously!
Its still very bad picture in the public eyes of pakistani nation, how our COAS went to the meeting on the aircraft carrier & got the brain hammaring from US central militry command, scince that there is criminal quitness on the part of pakarmy, thus the attacks are going up in numbers.....WHY???

 

[batmannow]

The War Within | Rift
Outmaneuvered And Outranked, Military Chiefs Became Outsiders
By Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, September 8, 2008; Page A01

At the Joint Chiefs of Staff in late November 2006, Gen. Peter Pace was facing every chairman's nightmare: a potential revolt of the other chiefs. Two months earlier, the JCS had convened a special team of colonels to recommend options for reversing the deteriorating situation in Iraq. Now, it appeared that the chiefs' and colonels' advice was being marginalized, if not ignored, by the White House.

During a JCS meeting with the colonels Nov. 20, Chairman Pace dropped a bomb: The White House was considering a "surge" of additional troops to quell the violence in Iraq. "Would it be a good idea?" Pace asked the group. "If so, what would you do with five more brigades?" That amounted to 20,000 to 30,000 more troops, depending on the number of support personnel.

Pace's question caught the chiefs and colonels off guard. The JCS hadn't recommended a surge, and Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the Iraq commander, was opposed to one of that magnitude. Where had this come from? Was it a serious option? Was it already a done deal?

Pace said he had another White House meeting in two days. "I want to be able to give the president a recommendation on what's doable," he said.

A rift had been growing between the country's military and civilian leadership, and in several JCS meetings that November, the chiefs' frustrations burst into the open. They had all but dismissed the surge option, worried that the armed forces were already stretched to the breaking point. They favored a renewed effort to train and build up the Iraqi security forces so that U.S. troops could begin to leave.


"Why isn't this getting any traction over there, Pete?" Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, the Army chief, asked at one session inside the "tank," the military's secure conference room for candid and secret debates. Was the president being briefed?

"I can only get part of it before him," Pace said, "and I'm not getting any feedback."

Pace, Schoomaker and Casey found themselves badly out of sync with the White House in the fall of 2006, finally losing control of the war strategy altogether after the midterm elections. Schoomaker was outraged when he saw news coverage that retired Gen. Jack Keane, the former Army vice chief of staff, had briefed the president Dec. 11 about a new Iraq strategy being proposed by the American Enterprise Institute, the conservative think tank.

"When does AEI start trumping the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this stuff?" Schoomaker asked at the next chiefs' meeting.

Pace, normally given to concealing his opinions, let down the veil slightly and gave a little sigh. But he didn't answer. Schoomaker thought Pace was too much of a gentleman to be effective in a business where forcefulness and a willingness to get in people's faces were survival skills. "They weren't listening to what Pete [Pace] was saying," Schoomaker said later in private. "Or Pete wasn't carrying the mail, or he was carrying it incompletely."

In several tank meetings, Adm. Michael Mullen, chief of naval operations, voiced concern that the politicians were going to find a way to place the blame for Iraq on the military. "They're orchestrating this to dump in our laps," Mullen said. He raised the point so many times that Schoomaker thought the Navy leader sounded "almost paranoid."
The atmosphere in the tank was tense Monday, Nov. 27, 2006, as Pace briefed the chiefs and the colonels on a White House meeting about Iraq the day before. J.D. Crouch, a deputy to national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley, had presented the results of a secret strategy review on how to respond to the escalating violence. "I walked out happy because I got my views on the table," Pace said, making it clear that this was not always the case.

The president, Pace told the group, is "leaning into announcing a new phase in the war that will help us achieve our original end state. . . . By April 1, 2007, we would have five more brigades in Iraq."

Schoomaker was dismayed. Suppose the surge didn't work? "What is our fallback plan?" he asked.

There was no fallback, Pace replied.

"Are people engaged on this," Schoomaker asked almost defiantly of the surge proponents, "or is this politics?"

"They are engaged," Pace replied. But if progress is still lacking "after we surge five brigades," Pace said, "then you are forced to conscription, which no one wants to talk about." To mention a draft was to invite the ghosts of Vietnam into the tank.

"Folks keep talking about the readiness of U.S. forces. Ready to do what?" Schoomaker growled. "We need to look at our strategic depth for handling other threats. How do we get bigger? And how do we make what we have today more ready? This is not just about Iraq!"

Part of the chiefs' job was to figure out how to accelerate the military's overall global readiness and capacity, Schoomaker said. "I sometimes feel like it is hope against hope," he said. "I feel like Nero did when Rome was burning. It just worries the hell out of me."


Several colonels wanted to applaud. It worried them, too. Others disagreed, feeling it was more important to focus on the current war. But they all maintained their poker faces.

"Look, no one is whistling 'Dixie' here," Pace told the group. "The president and the White House understand the resource constraints."

It was not clear that anyone believed what the chairman was saying, or whether even Pace believed it.
"We need to position ourselves properly for the decision likely to come," Pace said. "The sense of urgency is over Iraq, but not over the other issues."

Mullen said the all-volunteer force might break under the strain of extended and repeated deployments. "I am still searching for the grand strategy here," Mullen said. "How does a five-brigade surge over the next few months fit into the larger picture? We have so many other issues and challenges: Afghanistan, Pakistan, North Korea and places we are not even thinking about today."


* * *

In Baghdad, Gen. Casey realized that he had lost a basic, necessary ingredient for a commanding general in wartime. He had lost the confidence of the president, a stunning and devastating realization.

He wasn't alone. The president was not listening to Casey's boss, Gen. John P. Abizaid at Central Command, anymore, either.

"Yeah, I know," the president said to Abizaid at a National Security Council session in December, "you're going to tell me you're against the surge."

Yes, Abizaid replied, and then presented his argument that U.S. forces needed to get out of Iraq in order to win.

"The U.S. presence helps to keep a lid on," Bush responded. There were other benefits. A surge would "also help here at home, since for many the measure of success is reduction in violence," Bush said. "And it'll help [Iraq Prime Minister Nouri al-] Maliki to get control of the situation. A heavier presence will buy time for his government."


The rest of Iraq wasn't as tenuous as Baghdad, Abizaid said. "But it's the capital city that looks chaotic," Bush said. "And when your capital city looks chaotic, it's hard to sustain your position, whether at home or abroad."


* * *
The chiefs' frustration grew so intense that Pace told Bush, "You need to sit down with them, Mr. President, and hear from them directly."

Hadley saw it as an opportunity. He arranged for Bush and Vice President Cheney to visit the JCS in the tank Dec. 13, 2006. The president would come armed with what Hadley called "sweeteners" -- more budget money and a promise to increase the size of the active-duty Army and Marine Corps. It would also be a symbolic visit, important to the chiefs because the president would be on their territory.

"Mr. President," Schoomaker began, "you know that five brigades is really 15."

Schoomaker was in charge of generating the force for the Army. Sending five new brigades to Iraq meant another five would have to take their place in line, and to sustain the surge, another five behind them. This could not be done, Schoomaker said, without either calling up the National Guard and Reserves or extending the 12-month tours in Iraq. The Army had hoped to go in the other direction and cut tours to nine months.

Would a surge transform the situation? Schoomaker asked. If not, why do it? "I don't think that you have the time to surge and generate enough forces for this thing to continue to go," he said.

"Pete, I'm the president," Bush said. "And I've got the time."

"Fine, Mr. President," Schoomaker said. "You're the president."

Several of the chiefs noted that the five brigades were effectively the strategic reserve of the U.S. military, the forces on hand in case of flare-ups elsewhere in the world. Surprise was a way of international life, the chiefs were saying. For years, Bush had been making the point that it was a dangerous world. Did he want to leave the United States in the position of not being able to deal with the next manifestation of that danger?


Bush told the chiefs that they had to win the war at hand. He turned again to Schoomaker. "Pete, you don't agree with me, do you?"

"No," Schoomaker said. "I just don't see it. I just don't. But I know right now that it's going to be 15 brigades. And how we're going to get those 15 brigades, I don't know. This is going to require more than we can generate. You're stressing the force, Mr. President, and these kids just see deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan for the indefinite future."


* * *
The tank meeting was a very important meeting," Bush told me during a May 2008 interview. "In my own mind, I'm sure I didn't want to walk in with my mind made up and not give these military leaders the benefit of a discussion about a big decision."
The president said that if he were just pretending to be open-minded, "you get sniffed out. . . . I might have been leaning, but my mind was open enough to be able to absorb their advice."

I told him that, based on my reporting, some of the chiefs thought he had already decided, that they had sniffed him out.

"They may have thought I was leaning, and I probably was," Bush said, noting that the chiefs had felt free to express themselves. "But the door wasn't shut."

Still, Bush fully understood the power of his office.

"Generally," he said, "when the commander-in-chief walks in and says, done deal, they say, 'Yes sir, Mr. President.' "


* * *

Just after Christmas, while in the United States, Casey got an e-mail from one of his contacts. "Hey, you need to know that the White House is throwing you under the bus," it read.

A couple of days later, Abizaid phoned Casey with a warning. "Look," Abizaid said, "the surge is coming. Get out of the way." Casey was soon offered a promotion to Army chief of staff, and in February 2007, he left Iraq, replaced by Gen. David H. Petraeus.

The president said later in an interview, "The military, I can remember well, said, 'Okay, fine. More troops. Two brigades.' And I turned to Steve [Hadley] and said, 'Steve, from your analysis, what do you think?' He, being the cautious and thorough man he is, went back, checked, came back to me and said, 'Mr. President, I would recommend that you consider five. Not two.' And I said, 'Why?' He said, 'Because it is the considered judgment of people who I trust and you trust that we need five in order to be able to clear, hold and build.' "


The views of those trusted people came largely through back channels, rather than through the president's established set of military advisers -- Casey's deputy saying that a surge wouldn't work with fewer than five brigades and Jack Keane making the same case to Hadley and Vice President Cheney.

Hadley maintained that the number "comes out of my discussions with Pete Pace."

"Okay, I don't know this," Bush said, interrupting. "I'm not in these meetings, you'll be happy to hear, because I got other things to do."

So the president did not know what his principal military adviser, Gen. Pace, had recommended. Pace, however, had told the chiefs Nov. 20, 2006, that the White House had asked what could be done with five extra brigades.


* * *

The president announced the surge decision Jan. 10, 2007. Five more brigades would go to Baghdad; 4,000 Marines would head to Anbar province.

The next morning, he went to Fort Benning, Ga., to address military personnel and their families. His decision had been opposed by Casey and Abizaid, his military commanders in Iraq. Pace and the Joint Chiefs, his top military advisers, had suggested a smaller increase, if any at all. Schoomaker, the Army chief, had made it clear that the five brigades didn't really exist under the Army's current policy of 12-month rotations. But on this morning, the president delivered his own version of history.

"The commanders on the ground in Iraq, people who I listen to -- by the way, that's what you want your commander-in-chief to do. You don't want decisions being made based upon politics or focus groups or political polls. You want your military decisions being made by military experts. They analyzed the plan, and they said to me and to the Iraqi government: 'This won't work unless we help them. There needs to be a bigger presence.' "

Bush went on, "And so our commanders looked at the plan and said, 'Mr. President, it's not going to work until -- unless we support -- provide more troops.' "

Brady Dennis and Evelyn Duffy contributed to this report.

 

[batmannow]

Russia and Venezuela Confirm Joint Military Exercises


By SIMON ROMERO and CLIFFORD J. LEVY
Published: September 8, 2008
CARACAS, Venezuela — Chafing at the reactivation in recent weeks of an American naval fleet in Latin American waters, President Hugo Chávez said Sunday that Venezuela could engage in naval exercises with Russian ships in the Caribbean before the end of the year.

Mr. Chávez’s words echoed news reports here over the weekend that four warships with as many as 1,000 sailors from Russia’s Pacific Fleet could take part in a training exercise in November off Venezuela’s coast. Salvatore Cammarata Bastidas, Venezuela’s chief of naval intelligence, said the exercises were aimed at strengthening military ties.

Russian officials confirmed on Monday that Russian naval ships, including the nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser Peter the Great and the anti-submarine ship Admiral Chabanenko, will dock in Venezuela by the end of the year.

The ships will engage in joint exercises with Venezuelan warships in the Atlantic Ocean, Russian Navy Assistant Commander Capt. Igor Dygalo told the Interfax news agency on Monday. “The ships will have joint maneuvers, practice search and rescue at sea and check communications," he said.

Anatoly Nesterenko, a Russian foreign ministry spokesman, said, “The temporary deployment of Russian Navy anti-sub aircraft at an air field in that country is also planned.”

He said the operations were not a reaction to the tensions between the United States and Russia over Georgia. “This is a planned operation, and is not in any way connected to current political events, nor to the situation in the Caucasus,” he said.

“These exercises will in no way be directed against the interests of a third country.”

But Mr. Chávez made clear he had the United States in mind when discussing the joint naval operations. “Go ahead and squeal, Yanquis,” Mr. Chávez said in a mocking tone on his Sunday television program, adding, “Russia’s naval fleet is welcome here.” But Mr. Chávez qualified his remarks by saying that planning for the maneuvers was in the “preparation phase,” pending decisions by the Russian government.

After the war in Georgia, the Kremlin has expressed increasing frustration over the presence of NATO and American ships in the Black Sea. On Saturday, after an American ship delivered humanitarian aid to Georgia at its Black Sea port of Poti, President Dmitri A. Medvedev of Russia suggested that the United States was encroaching on Russia’s sphere of influence.

A few days before the conflict in Georgia, Russia’s prime minister, Vladimir V. Putin, announced that Russia would bolster its relations with Cuba, Venezuela’s top ally. But Russian officials at the same time denied that they would deploy military hardware there.

Venezuela has gone out of its way to strengthen relations with Russia. In addition to welcoming Russian investment, Mr. Chávez has emerged as a major buyer of Russian arms. Last month, he also backed Russia’s recognition of two Georgian breakaway regions.

Mr. Chávez has framed his warming to Russia within his government’s concern over the reactivation in July of the United States Navy’s Fourth Fleet in Latin American waters after a five-decade lull.
Simon Romero reported from Caracas, and Clifford J. Levy from Moscow. Ellen Barry contributed reporting from Moscow.

 

[batmannow]

GEO World
France criticises missile strikes in Pakistan


Updated at: 1931 PST, Tuesday, September 09, 2008
PARIS: France warned Tuesday that missile strikes by suspected US drones in Pakistani tribal areas were undermining international efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

"Not only are these creating human tragedies but also situations that have counterproductive effects on the political dynamics that we would like to see, and that means a partnership between Afghanistan, Pakistan and the international community," said foreign ministry spokesman Eric Chevallier.

At least 21 people including women and children were killed Monday in a missile strike by suspected US drones on a Pakistan tribal town near the Afghan border, officials told reporters.

The drone fired several missiles that hit a house in North Waziristan, they said, in the fourth such strike in the rugged tribal region in almost a week.

"Anything that creates suffering in the civilian population creates problems in trying to reach an understanding and an acceptance of these populations of the international presence in the region," said the foreign ministry spokesman.

Chevallier did not single out the United States for criticism, but referred to the "bombings that took place in Pakistan and left civilian casualties, in particular in the Pakistani tribal areas on Monday."

 

[batmannow]

Editorial
Caught in the Cross-Fire
NYTimes.com
Published: September 9, 2008
Civilians in Afghanistan are paying a deadly price in the war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. America is fast losing the battle for hearts and minds, and unless the Pentagon comes up with a better strategy, the United States and its allies may well lose the war.

According to Human Rights Watch, at least 540 Afghan civilians died in fighting related to the conflict in the first seven months of this year. It says the Taliban were responsible for 367 of those deaths; 119 Afghans died in United States and NATO airstrikes, while 54 died in other American and NATO attacks.

The group’s numbers for American and NATO-caused civilian deaths were much higher last year — 434 deaths, including 321 from airstrikes — but the 2008 figures are still unacceptably high. And they do not count an airstrike last month in which Afghan officials charge that 95 people died. Washington disputes that number, and there needs to be a credible investigation.

Afghans once looked on American troops as their liberators, but far too many have come to see them as enemies. Add to that the corruption and incompetence of the government of Afghanistan’s American-backed president, Hamid Karzai, and we fear Afghans are being driven back into the hands of the repressive Taliban.

There are too few American and NATO troops in Afghanistan to wage this fight on the ground. So the war against an increasingly powerful Taliban is often fought from the sky. Bombs dropped in populated areas increase the chances of deadly mistakes. In 2007, under pressure from Mr. Karzai, NATO made changes in targeting tactics, including delaying attacks in areas where civilians might be harmed. This has had some impact but obviously not enough.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates wants to send 4,500 more American ground troops to Afghanistan — if they can be spared from the war in Iraq. But American commanders in Afghanistan have been pleading for months for about three times that number. NATO needs to step up its military efforts, and with other states build up Afghanistan’s security forces, administrative capacity and rural development.

NATO commanders are also trying to coordinate operations more closely with the Afghan military, giving it a bigger role in planning operations and conducting searches. These changes are welcome but long overdue.

We have similar concerns about Pakistan. This week, helicopter-borne American Special Operations forces attacked Qaeda militants in a Pakistani village near the Afghan border. At least one civilian, a child, was killed and possibly more in what may be the start of a new American offensive.

Pakistan’s political situation is extremely fragile, and anti-American sentiment there is fierce. Sending more American troops and planes into Pakistan’s lawless border regions might be worth the backlash if the mission apprehended a top Qaeda operative. That apparently did not happen this week.

Pakistan’s army, with intelligence help and carefully monitored financial support, should do most of the fighting. Asif Ali Zardari, expected to be Pakistan’s new president, has promised to work to defeat the Taliban and ensure that the country is not used for terrorist attacks. We hope he delivers.

 

[muse]

The future of the Pakistan-US friendship

Wednesday, September 10, 2008
by Khalid Aziz

The two recent ISAF-US led attacks on South Waziristan have generated anger against the US. It is tragic that in these attacks innocent Pakistani women and children were killed. The depth of Pakistan's annoyance and hurt was evident when the US ambassador to Pakistan was summoned to the Foreign Office and a protest lodged. Later the foreign minister condemned this attack on Pakistan's sovereignty in the National Assembly.

There is something quite bizarre about what is happening between two nations which consider themselves friends. Furthermore, it is difficult to understand the US motives for these attacks. These attacks have imperilled the lives of hundreds of Pakistani military personnel who are spread over the tribal areas in small guard units. The tribes will seek revenge from them.

Experts on the war on terrorism are unanimous in concluding that it cannot be won by military action alone but by combining the military with winning the hearts and minds of the people strategy. Secondly, this incident comes at a time when the Pakistan military achieved ascendency over the militants in Bajaur Agency; the US attacks have destroyed the government's credibility painstakingly built amongst the tribes for community based action against the militants. The government was successful in mobilising the Salarzai tribe of Bajaur against the militants – unfortunately that moral high ground has been lost after the US attack and a very good opportunity for gaining ascendency by the government squandered.

These attacks indicate that perhaps the time has come both for the US and Pakistan to frankly re-examine what is now beginning to look like a brittle alliance. I feel that this war is being driven by the US media rather than a saner political vision. I have a visceral feeling that these two attacks were the outcome of US reservations of three months ago and perhaps related to the dynamics of the forthcoming US elections in November. The recent operations showed that the Pakistan military was taking robust action against militants in Bajaur, Swat and elsewhere in contrast with the previous lukewarm approach.

The main causes for tension in the existing relationship are the divergent perceptions of both the US and Pakistan. I will attempt to compare these perceptions to indicate how better results can be achieved if the respective points of views are understood and a change in the war strategy made. The first erroneous US perception is its belief that it can fight the war in Afghanistan unilaterally and that it does not need a political solution. Secondly, the US believes that it can run its Afghan operations independently without anyone's assistance. Thirdly, the US has shown that it is not concerned too much with the consequences of its actions on Pakistani people or politics. In other words, Pakistan is considered irrelevant.

On the other hand, there is ambivalence in Pakistan's commitment to the war on terrorism, which is dictated by certain political and geostrategic compulsions driven by its location and its social and political aspects. Pakistan's interest in Afghanistan is dictated firstly by the need to maintain goodwill of the Afghan Pashtuns who are the real power brokers in that country. If foreign presence in Afghanistan ends that country would revert soon to its base model of a loose tribal and ethnic confederation in which the Pashtuns have a predominant role. This basic fact was ignored when the US attacked Afghanistan in October 2001 and later in the reconstruction of the Afghan state under the Bonn Accord. Secondly, Pakistan has a volatile and large Pashtun population inhabiting FATA, NWFP, Balochistan and Karachi. Pakistan's nationhood cannot be cohesive and healthy if its Pashtuns are killed and kept marginalised. The allied operations in Afghanistan and Pakistani military actions in FATA and NWFP is causing disenchantment among Pashtuns; to them this war appears to be directed only against them. Pakistani leaders fear that if there is no change in the violent approach adopted towards the Pashtuns, it is likely that the Afghan and Pakistani Pashtuns will coalesce into a larger entity; if that ever comes about Central and South Asia will fragment like nine pins. Is not the current flawed security strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan inevitably leading towards that?

Thirdly, the Pakistani military and political leaderships know that they must maintain leverage with the Afghan Pashtuns to prevent India from playing a spoiler's role on Pakistan's northwest. This is Pakistan's soft underbelly. Such a fear has been further reinforced by the preferential treatment meted to India by the US for instance in the matter of the transfer of nuclear technology recently. The nuclear agreement provides India with an opportunity to produce plutonium for its nuclear weapons. Such a partial attitude of the US towards India provides scoring points to the increasingly powerful nationalistic lobby in Pakistan which accuses the leadership of being a US proxy, not friend.

Pakistan has suffered a lot for providing support to the US. It has lost more than 4,000 soldiers another 2,000 civilians have died either as collateral casualties or as a consequence of suicide bombings undertaken by the Pashtuns to avenge the military action. In 2007 there were 56 suicide bombings. Forty-six of these attacks were directed against targets associated with the state military apparatus. The corresponding figure for 2006 was only six suicide attacks. It was in 2007 that the collateral deaths increased manifold; this period also saw an increase in US Predator attacks in the tribal areas. US unilateralism has persuaded many Pakistanis to believe that the US does not really care what the impact of its actions will be on Pakistan or its citizens. Clearly a reliance on a strategy which leads to more collateral deaths whether by Pakistan or US is a bad policy in terms of winning the hearts and minds of the people. Continued reliance on such a strategy will ultimately force the Pashtuns to consider other alternatives which would require heavy policing and stabilisation operations which few countries, including the US, can afford indefinitely.

It is also clear that the root cause of the problem is the ineffectiveness of the security policies in Afghanistan, including the presence of foreign troops. The allies have spent about $15 billion there and have been fighting for seven years, but what are the results? First, the insurgency has gained strength, it is not ebbing. Second, despite the presence of such a large number of international troops, Afghanistan has become the largest producer of poppy in the world, which, according to Barnett Rubin of New York University, provides the militants with more than $100 million a year for fighting the war. Third, neither the US nor the EU countries accept casualties. It is bad politics in their countries when soldiers die and there are stringent demands for a troop recall when the body bags increase. Apparently it is thus clear that it is not the efforts of the international force in Afghanistan alone that will provide results in the fight against militancy but assistance from Pakistan which will remain a critical ingredient in any solution to the Afghan problem.

One fact that is easily overlooked is that Pakistan is also the logistical hub for the supply of oil and material to US forces operating in Afghanistan. Every day 300 trucks carry more than three million gallons of fuel by road to the military forces there. Additionally plenty other military goods are also transited via Karachi. Furthermore, Pakistan's pivotal role becomes more pronounced in the context of the recent Russian resurgence.

If the Pakistan-US relationship is to prosper, especially with a new president now in office, then the time has come for the US to recognise Pakistan's genuine reservations and to re-strategise the Afghan war, so as to make it more acceptable to Pakistan.


The writer is a former chief secretary of NWFP. He can be contacted via his website: Khalid Aziz :: A Voice From NWFP

 

[batmannow]

Thursday September 11, 7:38 AM
Pakistan army chief criticises US raids

ISLAMABAD (AFP) - Pakistan army chief General Ashfaq Kayani late Wednesday strongly criticised cross-border raids by US-led coalition forces and said the country would defend its sovereignty "at all cost"."The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country will be defended at all cost and no external force is allowed to conduct operations inside Pakistan," he said in a statement.

Kayani was commenting on a cross-border raid last week allegedly by US-led coalition troops based in neighbouring Afghanistan in which 15 people were killed.
In Washington, US military chief Admiral Michale Mullen said Wednesday he had ordered the military to draw up a new strategy that encompasses insurgent safe havens in Pakistan.

But Kayani said there was no "agreement or understanding with the coalition forces whereby they are allowed to conduct operations on our side of the border," according to the statement issued by the military's media wing.
Kayani regretted the killing of civilians in the September 4 raid and said "such like reckless actions only help the militants and further fuel the militancy in the area."
In a bloody reminder of the violence Pakistan is struggling to combat, at least 20 worshippers were killed and 30 wounded when suspected militants hurled grenades and fired into a mosque in a northwest border district Wednesday evening.
Last week's raid in South Waziristan tribal region marked the first time Pakistan has accused international troops based in Afghanistan of a direct attack on its soil since they were deployed in late 2001 to oust the hardline Taliban regime from power.
"We can hunt down and kill extremists as they cross over the border from Pakistan," Admiral Mullen said Wednesday. "But until we work more closely with the Pakistani government to eliminate safe havens from which they operate, the enemy will only keep coming."

Kayani met Mullen and other senior US officers on August 27 aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier.
The Pakistani general said he had conveyed to them the need for patience in the fight against extremism and stressed that military action alone could not solve the problem.
"Political reconciliatory effort was required to go along with the military prong to win the hearts and minds of the people," the statement said.
Kayani said there had to be a collaborative approach and "that trust deficit and misunderstandings can lead to more complications and increase the difficulties for all," the statement said.
"He re-emphasised there are no quick fixes in this war. Falling for short-term gains while ignoring our long term interest is not the right way forward.

"To succeed the coalition would be required to display strategic patience and help the other side the way they want it rather than adopting a unilateral approach which maybe counterproductive," the statement quoted him as saying.
US and Afghan officials say Pakistan's border tribal areas are a safe haven for Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants who sneaked into the rugged region after the fall of the Taliban regime in late 2001.
A recent series of missile strikes targeting rebels in Pakistan has been attributed to US-led coalition forces or CIA drones based in Afghanistan.
Violence in the remote tribal regions on the border has often spread to other parts of Pakistan, including the capital Islamabad.

Nearly 1,200 people have been killed in bombings and suicide attacks across the country in the past year.
Wow, cant belive that, at last COAS did the right thing, which wasnt expected from him!

 

[batmannow]

washingtonpost.com
U.S.'s Top Military Officer Calls for Better Strategy in Afghanistan
Mullen Says Victory Is Possible but Will Require More U.S. Troops and Involvement

By Ann Scott Tyson
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, September 10, 2008; 12:37 PM

The nation's top military officer today offered a blunt assessment of the war in Afghanistan, saying that although victory is possible, the current strategy is not necessarily leading in that direction.
"I am not convinced that we're winning it in Afghanistan," said Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but added, "I'm convinced we can."

Mullen called for a "more comprehensive" strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, warning that an intensifying insurgency there urgently requires more U.S. troops and greater U.S. military involvement in cross-border tribal areas. As insurgents grow more sophisticated, coordinated and brazen, launching "infantry-like attacks," the risk of not sending more troops is "too great a risk to ignore," he said.
"Frankly, we are running out of time," Mullen said in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee this morning. He said the new influx of U.S. forces into Afghanistan announced yesterday by President Bush -- an Army brigade and Marine battalion with a total of about 4,500 troops -- remained inadequate to meet the demands of commanders there, but was "a good start."
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates also warned in testimony of the "greater ambition" of insurgents in Afghanistan and said that attacks there had increased steadily since the spring of 2006, resulting partly from insurgent safe havens in Pakistan. He noted that the total number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan has grown from 21,000 in 2006 to nearly 31,000 today.

The strategy Mullen said he intends to commission would broaden the current approach by addressing both sides of the rugged border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and by stressing not only the U.S. military role but also civilian efforts that he said are critical to success.

Afghanistan and Pakistan "are inextricably linked in a common insurgency that crosses the border between them," Mullen said.

On Pakistan, Mullen said in extensive meetings this year he has "pressed hard" on Pakistani military leaders to do more against insurgents in tribal areas and to allow the U.S. military to become more involved in helping them.
"Until we work more closely with the Pakistani government to eliminate the safe havens from which they operate, they enemy will only keep coming," he said. The U.S. military in recent months has intensified its unilateral attacks on insurgent safe havens in Pakistan, using artillery and other munitions fired from unmanned drones as well as, recently, according to Pakistani officials, U.S. military air assault by helicopter into Pakistan's South Waziristan.
Yet even with a better coordinated regional military strategy, Mullen stressed that U.S. forces can only do so much in pacifying the area. "No amount of troops in no amount of time can ever achieve all the objectives we seek," he said, adding later: "We can't kill our way to victory."
Greater efforts by U.S. civilian agencies of government and the international community are essential, Mullen said. For example, he criticized the shortage of civilian personnel in Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, saying that without more experts in agriculture, education, commerce and jurisprudence, the PRTs "will remain but empty shells."

Gates also underscored that civilian efforts "must be on the same page" as those of the military. "I am still not satisfied with the level of coordination and collaboration" on reconstruction and building capacity of the Afghan government, he said.

Although the hearing focused on Afghanistan, both Gates and Mullen said that the situation in Iraq remains uncertain and could require more forces in the future. "I worry that the great progress" by U.S. and Iraqi forces could override caution and lead to a too-rapid drawdown, said Gates, noting that U.S. commanders in Iraq remain concerned about "many challenges and potential for reversals in the future."

In sum, Gates said, "we should expect to be involved in Iraq for years to come."

 

[batmannow]

washingtonpost.com
Mullen Visits Pakistan as U.S. Raids Stir Tensions
By Pamela Constable
Washington Post Foreign Service
Wednesday, September 17, 2008

KABUL, Sept. 16 -- The United States' top military officer flew unexpectedly into Pakistan on Tuesday night to meet with senior officials amid a tense confrontation between the two allies over recent U.S. military incursions into Pakistan in pursuit of al-Qaeda and Taliban extremists.
The unannounced visit by Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, came hours after a spokesman for Pakistan's army was reported as saying that the country's soldiers had orders to "open fire" if U.S. forces attempt a cross-border raid similar to a Sept. 3 commando operation in which about 20 people were killed.
Lt. Col. Gary Tallman, a spokesman for Mullen, said the admiral would focus "on working more closely with the Pakistani military to improve coordination and effectiveness in operations against extremist safe havens in the border regions." It is Mullen's fifth visit to Pakistan since he became chairman nearly a year ago; he plans to meet Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani and army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani.
The U.S. raids have embarrassed and angered Pakistan's military, and stirred widespread public outcry. The reported comments by Pakistani army spokesman Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas underlined the tensions.
"The orders are clear," Abbas was quoted as saying by the Associated Press. "In case it happens again in this form, that there is very significant detection, where it is very definite, no ambiguity across the board, on the ground or in the air: open fire."
The Sept. 3 raid, which followed a series of U.S. airstrikes by unmanned Predator planes, was the first known incursion into Pakistan by U.S. ground forces. The commandos flew by helicopter into the South Waziristan tribal region and attacked a compound thought to harbor several key Islamist extremist figures. The successive attacks have killed dozens, including many civilians.
Kiyani has protested the U.S. actions, warning that his country's sovereignty would be "defended at all cost," and asked his American counterparts to "please look at the public reaction to this kind of adventure and incursion."
Privately, Pakistani analysts said they did not expect Pakistani troops to shoot at U.S. forces, with whom they have been closely -- if uneasily -- allied against Islamist extremists since shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Moreover, Pakistan's military has received roughly $6 billion in U.S. aid during that time.
Pakistani officials said Tuesday night that Abbas had been misquoted. A Pentagon spokesman, Bryan Whitman, said late Tuesday that Pakistan would "correct the record" and that the United States enjoyed "good cooperation with Pakistan on the border," the AP reported. The incident has brought into focus the conflicting agendas and mutual frustrations that have plagued the U.S.-Pakistan military partnership since inception. Concern also has intensified in Washington and other capitals over whether Pakistan, a nuclear power that is experiencing increasing violence by Islamist extremists, will remain a firm ally under the civilian leadership that this year replaced longtime military ruler Pervez Musharraf. As Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan have gained strength and influence, staging hundreds of attacks against military and civilian targets this year and taking control of many rural areas, U.S. officials have increasingly sought to deny them safe haven among like-minded militants in Pakistan's tribal areas.

Pakistan's army recently launched a series of large operations against Islamist militants in some tribal areas, but only after a long period of halfhearted or failed actions that have frustrated U.S. officials. At the same time, Pakistani officials have insisted that no foreign troops enter their sovereign territory. So the U.S. raids this month have put them in an awkward position. "Every country has certain red lines. The army wants to have good relations with the U.S., but it cannot tolerate operations on its turf," said Talat Masood, a retired Pakistani general, speaking from Islamabad. "These American operations have caused a lot of collateral damage. . . . Some Pakistanis think the Americans may want to stabilize Afghanistan at the cost of destabilizing Pakistan."
Although Pakistani officials routinely declare support for the war against Islamist militants, they are keenly aware that public support for it in their country is deeply ambivalent and that Musharraf was ousted in part because many Pakistanis viewed him as doing America's bidding. The new president, Asif Ali Zardari, has said nothing about the U.S. raids and is increasingly criticized as being too close to Washington.

Some analysts said the new U.S.-Pakistan tensions might undermine what they called the growing success of Pakistani operations against militants.
"The U.S. actions show a lack of confidence in Pakistan, which the army must be very unhappy about, considering their increasingly successful attacks," said Shuja Nawaz, a Pakistani military scholar based in Washington. "My biggest fear is that people will latch onto this and turn it into a rallying cry against the government. It is a very dangerous moment, and if it is not smoothed over, U.S.-Pakistani relations are headed for a train wreck."
Staff writer Ann Scott Tyson at the Pentagon contributed to this report.

 

[batmannow]

Political Tea Leaves in Afghanistan
Greg Bruno
Council on Foreign Relations
Monday, September 15, 2008; 2:00 PM

On most matters of social development, from health care to literacy, the United States and Afghanistan are worlds apart. But on presidential politics, the disparate democracies both find themselves enmeshed in prolonged electoral contests with potentially transformative results. A year before Afghans cast ballots for their president, voters, politicians, and analysts already are dissecting President Hamid Karzai's political record. And like the American contest, the race for Afghanistan's top office often is cast as a referendum on the country's future.

In five years as Afghanistan's first democratically elected president, analysts view Karzai's record as decidedly mixed. Afghan officials point to progress expanding citizens' access to health care, education, and a healthy growth in tax revenue. According to the International Monetary Fund's most recent figures, Afghanistan's gross domestic product (GDP) increased 8.2 percent between 2006 and 2007, to $7.7 billion (PDF). And in a new 2008 survey of the opium trade, the United Nations credited strong leadership (as well as bad weather) for a 19 percent decline in opium poppy cultivation from 2007. The majority of the heroin-derived crop is now confined to the country's southwestern provinces (PDF), where permanent Taliban settlements and organized crime rings remain active.


Karzai has vowed to build on these gains. In an interview with the Associated Press on August 19, Karzai confirmed he would seek reelection. Afghanistan's constitution allows for presidential candidates to run for two consecutive five-year terms (PDF); Karzai was elected to his first term in 2004 with 55 percent of the vote. But Karzai's mandate has not translated into unwavering support. An October 2007 opinion poll (PDF) by the Asia Foundation found that despite generally positive feelings about the direction of their country, the vast majority of Afghans felt the government cared little about the public's problems. Of late, Karzai has appeared intent on challenging those opinions by highlighting popular nationalist themes. Reacting to continued anger over errant U.S. air strikes, including an August 22 strike in Herat that may have killed dozens of children (Reuters) -- the Pentagon disputes the death toll -- Karzai fired two senior Afghan army officers for "negligence" (al-Jazeera). Karzai's government has also called for a status of forces agreement to govern the presence of U.S. and NATO troops (Guardian).

Some aspects of Afghanistan's troubles are beyond Karzai's control. Resurgent Taliban and al-Qaeda elements have regrouped in neighboring Pakistan, and the lawless border region has become a staging ground for the planning and execution of attacks in Afghanistan. Pakistani officials are unwilling or unable to reign in the militants, according to an investigation by the New York Times' Dexter Filkins. To fill the void President Bush has said he will increase the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan in coming months, and has called for a massive increase in the size of the Afghan National Army. U.S. Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen, meanwhile, told House lawmakers on September 10 that he is commissioning a strategy overhaul for the Afghan war effort, one that covers both sides of the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. "I'm not convinced we're winning it in Afghanistan; I am convinced we can" (Stars and Stripes), he said.

But the help can't arrive soon enough for critics and potential challengers, who see many reasons to dump Karzai. They cite a surge in insurgent violence (CDI), drug-related corruption (NYT), and high poverty rates among them. Former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik with roots in the Soviet-era insurgency whose 1996 ouster cleared the way for the Taliban's rise, called Karzai's tenure "a great tragedy" (Bloomberg). Rabbani says Afghans are "looking for a change," and opposition candidates are already stepping forward to offer it.

One announced candidate is former Attorney General Abdul Jabbar Sabit, an anti-corruption crusader, whom Karzai tossed from office a day after announcing plans to run (Pajhwok). (Karzai claimed Sabit's presidential bid was illegal). A host of other current and former Afghan politicians have also announced or appear poised to do so, according to a list of "contenders" compiled by the Afghan news website Quqnoos. Other names cited among Afghan political analysts as possible contenders include former Interior Minister Ali Ahmad Jalali and U.S. Ambassador to the UN Zalmay Khalilzad (though neither man has announced plans to run).

Whether Afghanistan will see a strong opposition ticket, or even hold free and fair elections, is another matter. But as some U.S.-based Afghan experts see it, elections won't solve Afghanistan's problems. Seth G. Jones of the RAND Corporation says Karzai remains the most popular politician in a war-ravaged country, is Pashtun, and owns broad multiethnic support. "In other words," Jones writes in Foreign Policy, "Karzai is still the best game in town."