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By HARSH V. PANT
May 27, 2014 11:51 a.m. ET
Narendra Modi's rise to the Prime Minister office represents a decisive break from Indian politics of the past. The resounding mandate voters gave him will have implications not only domestically but on the global stage. While some view his historically shaky relationship with Washington with suspicion, it is much more likely Mr. Modi will be a big benefit to long-flagging U.S.-India ties.
Washington revoked Mr. Modi's visa in 2005, citing an obscure law banning visits by foreign officials responsible for serious violations of religious freedom. As the chief minister of Gujarat state, Mr. Modi was accused of being complicit in the deadly communal conflagration in 2002 that left at least 1000 people dead, most of them Muslims. This despite the fact that the Indian judicial system failed to find any evidence against Mr. Modi over the last several years in any of the number of cases filed against him.
The U.S. only ended its decade-long boycott this past February –long after European countries had already done so –when then-U.S. Ambassador to India, Nancy Powell, visited Mr. Modi.
Now that Mr. Modi has one of the largest mandates in Indian electoral history, it may seem like U.S.-Indian ties will continue to be rocky. Some strategists have suggested that Mr. Modi's warmth will be reserved for countries like Japan, Israel and China who went out of the way to accommodate him when the West shunned him. Even the fact that Mr. Modi took longer to mention a call from Barack Obama or a tweet from John Kerry has incurred speculation.
The Obama Administration has moved swiftly to restore some semblance of normalcy in its dealings with Mr. Modi. President Obama personally called Mr. Modi to invite him to Washington, and Secretary of State John Kerry followed this up with a statement underlining Washington's readiness "to work closely with Prime Minister Modi and the new government to promote shared prosperity and strengthen our security."
Under outgoing Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the U.S.-India partnership has been steadily losing momentum over the past few years. The December 2013 arrest and strip-search of India's deputy consul general, Devyani Khobragade, in New York sank relations even further.
Washington's attitude toward India has soured for a number of reasons. There is a sense of betrayal on the nuclear front. After the U.S. invested significant diplomatic capital in getting the civil nuclear deal through in 2008, India reciprocated by passing a nuclear liability law that makes it virtually impossible for U.S. nuclear operators to go to India. New Delhi's stance on regional security issues, especially pertaining to the Middle East, also alienated a significant portion of Americans. India has been unable to emerge as a credible regional balancer, which many in the U.S. were expecting.
A lack of political direction within the U.S. and Indian bureaucracies has allowed the relationship to drift. Washington has not prioritized India, given its trade-related irritants and visa restrictions on IT professionals. Both Mr. Obama and Mr. Singh have had other priorities.
There are good reasons to worry about the future of U.S.-India partnership but Mr. Modi at the helm is not one of them. In fact, this is perhaps the best news that Washington could have hoped for. Mr. Modi has publicly stated that "relations between the two countries cannot be determined or be even remotely influenced by incidents related to individuals." His policy vision and decisive mandate make him the best possible partner for the U.S.
Mr. Modi's emphasis on putting "our own house in order so that the world is attracted to us" should come as a welcome change to Washington. So should his view that "the current dysfunction in Delhi has prevented even much-needed military modernization and the upgradation of India's defence infrastructure."
Mr. Modi's priorities will certainly be domestic but a conducive external environment is essential for achieving his highly ambitious domestic agenda. An India that is growing economically will automatically impart a new dynamism to its foreign policy. Mr. Modi will soon recognize, if he has not already, that the challenges that India faces –a domestically fragile Pakistan, political uncertainty in Afghanistan and an ever more assertive China –cannot be managed without a productive U.S.-India relationship. Strong ties with the U.S. will help sustain Mr. Modi's vision of an economically advanced and militarily robust India.
Washington needs to reach out to Mr. Modi and assure him that while the past cannot be swept under, the future of U.S.-India relations can be bright if managed productively. There is no reason to be alarmist. If his past is any guide, Mr. Modi is the man best-placed to turn the tide around on U.S.-India relations.
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles...=hp_opinion&fpid=2,7,121,122,201,401,641,1009
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A far better indicator of the direction US-India bilateral relations might take is the last 80 years of Indian foreign policy practice rather than the personality of Narendra Modi. Indian foreign policy over the last several decades has been extremely consistent and the unusually friendly relations between the United States and India under President Bush was not a mere quirk but an adaptation. Seen in context the period under Bush was just a blip along the evolutionary foreign policy timescale. The objective of Indian foreign policy since 1947 has been to achieve the status of regional hegemon whether by piggybacking on the USSR or the USA. Relations between the US and India faced a set back as New Delhi was wary of US involvement in South Asia and its attempts to balance China which both could potentially hamper Indian strategic objectives by rendering it a junior player in its own backyard. This was an intolerable situation for Indian foreign policy makers in South Block as well as the military, intelligence, business and Hindu religious establishment elite. It seems likely that India will attempt to enforce its preeminence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean with a tie up with Russia and China and seek greater economic interaction with Japan. For more on these issues please read my book The India Doctrine -
https://www.academia.edu/5690262/The_India_Doctrine_1947-2007_
May 27, 2014 11:51 a.m. ET
Narendra Modi's rise to the Prime Minister office represents a decisive break from Indian politics of the past. The resounding mandate voters gave him will have implications not only domestically but on the global stage. While some view his historically shaky relationship with Washington with suspicion, it is much more likely Mr. Modi will be a big benefit to long-flagging U.S.-India ties.
Washington revoked Mr. Modi's visa in 2005, citing an obscure law banning visits by foreign officials responsible for serious violations of religious freedom. As the chief minister of Gujarat state, Mr. Modi was accused of being complicit in the deadly communal conflagration in 2002 that left at least 1000 people dead, most of them Muslims. This despite the fact that the Indian judicial system failed to find any evidence against Mr. Modi over the last several years in any of the number of cases filed against him.
The U.S. only ended its decade-long boycott this past February –long after European countries had already done so –when then-U.S. Ambassador to India, Nancy Powell, visited Mr. Modi.
Now that Mr. Modi has one of the largest mandates in Indian electoral history, it may seem like U.S.-Indian ties will continue to be rocky. Some strategists have suggested that Mr. Modi's warmth will be reserved for countries like Japan, Israel and China who went out of the way to accommodate him when the West shunned him. Even the fact that Mr. Modi took longer to mention a call from Barack Obama or a tweet from John Kerry has incurred speculation.
The Obama Administration has moved swiftly to restore some semblance of normalcy in its dealings with Mr. Modi. President Obama personally called Mr. Modi to invite him to Washington, and Secretary of State John Kerry followed this up with a statement underlining Washington's readiness "to work closely with Prime Minister Modi and the new government to promote shared prosperity and strengthen our security."
Under outgoing Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the U.S.-India partnership has been steadily losing momentum over the past few years. The December 2013 arrest and strip-search of India's deputy consul general, Devyani Khobragade, in New York sank relations even further.
Washington's attitude toward India has soured for a number of reasons. There is a sense of betrayal on the nuclear front. After the U.S. invested significant diplomatic capital in getting the civil nuclear deal through in 2008, India reciprocated by passing a nuclear liability law that makes it virtually impossible for U.S. nuclear operators to go to India. New Delhi's stance on regional security issues, especially pertaining to the Middle East, also alienated a significant portion of Americans. India has been unable to emerge as a credible regional balancer, which many in the U.S. were expecting.
A lack of political direction within the U.S. and Indian bureaucracies has allowed the relationship to drift. Washington has not prioritized India, given its trade-related irritants and visa restrictions on IT professionals. Both Mr. Obama and Mr. Singh have had other priorities.
There are good reasons to worry about the future of U.S.-India partnership but Mr. Modi at the helm is not one of them. In fact, this is perhaps the best news that Washington could have hoped for. Mr. Modi has publicly stated that "relations between the two countries cannot be determined or be even remotely influenced by incidents related to individuals." His policy vision and decisive mandate make him the best possible partner for the U.S.
Mr. Modi's emphasis on putting "our own house in order so that the world is attracted to us" should come as a welcome change to Washington. So should his view that "the current dysfunction in Delhi has prevented even much-needed military modernization and the upgradation of India's defence infrastructure."
Mr. Modi's priorities will certainly be domestic but a conducive external environment is essential for achieving his highly ambitious domestic agenda. An India that is growing economically will automatically impart a new dynamism to its foreign policy. Mr. Modi will soon recognize, if he has not already, that the challenges that India faces –a domestically fragile Pakistan, political uncertainty in Afghanistan and an ever more assertive China –cannot be managed without a productive U.S.-India relationship. Strong ties with the U.S. will help sustain Mr. Modi's vision of an economically advanced and militarily robust India.
Washington needs to reach out to Mr. Modi and assure him that while the past cannot be swept under, the future of U.S.-India relations can be bright if managed productively. There is no reason to be alarmist. If his past is any guide, Mr. Modi is the man best-placed to turn the tide around on U.S.-India relations.
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles...=hp_opinion&fpid=2,7,121,122,201,401,641,1009
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A far better indicator of the direction US-India bilateral relations might take is the last 80 years of Indian foreign policy practice rather than the personality of Narendra Modi. Indian foreign policy over the last several decades has been extremely consistent and the unusually friendly relations between the United States and India under President Bush was not a mere quirk but an adaptation. Seen in context the period under Bush was just a blip along the evolutionary foreign policy timescale. The objective of Indian foreign policy since 1947 has been to achieve the status of regional hegemon whether by piggybacking on the USSR or the USA. Relations between the US and India faced a set back as New Delhi was wary of US involvement in South Asia and its attempts to balance China which both could potentially hamper Indian strategic objectives by rendering it a junior player in its own backyard. This was an intolerable situation for Indian foreign policy makers in South Block as well as the military, intelligence, business and Hindu religious establishment elite. It seems likely that India will attempt to enforce its preeminence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean with a tie up with Russia and China and seek greater economic interaction with Japan. For more on these issues please read my book The India Doctrine -
https://www.academia.edu/5690262/The_India_Doctrine_1947-2007_
