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U.S. Approves $1.5 Billion Ballistic Missile Defense Deal With Japan

early warning is mainly composite of early warning satellite, large AESE radar array.
They could provide missile information as long as missiles are fired.
I guess only US have both of satellite.
Russia and China all only depending on radar array.
What Japan have on AEGIS ships are less effective and can only detect the missiles when they approach..
It will not leave much time for interception.

Umm thats why you have radar for that. Early warning system you know?
Here it shows for example where and when it was launched.
 
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early warning is mainly composite of early warning satellite, large AESE radar array.
They could provide missile information as long as missiles are fired.
I guess only US have both of satellite.
Russia and China all only depending on radar array.
What Japan have on AEGIS ships are less effective and can only detect the missiles when they approach..
It will not leave much time for interception.

Considering that the U.S. is allied with Japan and we have our own forces in Japan, wouldn't worry too much about Japan's Aegis ships detection capabilities.

US radar deployment in Japan draws Chinese rebuke - News - Stripes

US radar deployment in Japan draws Chinese rebuke

YOKOSUKA NAVAL BASE, Japan — China has criticized the U.S. deployment of an anti-missile radar at a base in Japan, saying the move undermines “mutual trust.”

Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying avoided naming the United States, but her response came after a question about the X-band radar’s recent arrival at a seaside base in Kyoto Prefecture.

“The anti-missile deployment in the Asia-Pacific by a certain country in the pursuit of unilateral security goes against regional strategic stability and mutual trust, as well as peace and stability in Northeast Asia,” Hua told a news conference Thursday.

China has been rapidly developing an advanced missile system that could potentially be used to restrict U.S. Navy movement in the international waters of the East and South China seas, according to Pentagon reports.

In its “terminal mode,” the new Army Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance system, or AN/TPY-2, can cue the Navy’s ship-based Aegis missile defense systems.

On Oct. 16, the Navy announced it would move two additional Aegis-equipped destroyers, USS Benfold and USS Milius, to its Japan-based 7th Fleet in 2015 and 2017, respectively.

The “Tippy Two” radar also links to the Army’s ground-based Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, better known as THAAD.

The new radar is no surprise to China, nor is it positioned with China in mind, U.S. officials said. The U.S. already had one AN/TPY-2 deployed in northern Japan’s Aomori Prefecture.

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced plans for the second radar move during an October 2013 news conference in Tokyo, as a response to North Korean missile tests and threats.

“This additional radar will bolster our ability to defend the U.S. homeland and Japan against North Korea’s ballistic missiles,” Hagel said.

A U.S. official at the time said the new radar would “close the gaps” in its Korean Peninsula missile launch detection. The radar has a 600-mile range in its forward-based mode, according to Defense Industry Daily.

Although China remains one of North Korea’s few allies, signs of strain in the relationship have appeared in recent years. Beijing protested Pyongyang’s third nuclear test in February 2013 and implemented trade sanctions against its neighbor.

However, China has also continued to defend North Korea on human rights issues and fears the consequences of a regime collapse, wrote Adam Segal, senior fellow at the non-partisan Council on Foreign Relations.

“The idea that the Chinese would turn their backs on the North Koreans is clearly wrong,” Segal stated.
 
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I never doubt that.
Japan is always play an assistance role in the US ally system.
tight control under US troops..

Considering that the U.S. is allied with Japan and we have our own forces in Japan, wouldn't worry too much about Japan's Aegis ships detection capabilities.

US radar deployment in Japan draws Chinese rebuke - News - Stripes

US radar deployment in Japan draws Chinese rebuke

YOKOSUKA NAVAL BASE, Japan — China has criticized the U.S. deployment of an anti-missile radar at a base in Japan, saying the move undermines “mutual trust.”

Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying avoided naming the United States, but her response came after a question about the X-band radar’s recent arrival at a seaside base in Kyoto Prefecture.

“The anti-missile deployment in the Asia-Pacific by a certain country in the pursuit of unilateral security goes against regional strategic stability and mutual trust, as well as peace and stability in Northeast Asia,” Hua told a news conference Thursday.

China has been rapidly developing an advanced missile system that could potentially be used to restrict U.S. Navy movement in the international waters of the East and South China seas, according to Pentagon reports.

In its “terminal mode,” the new Army Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance system, or AN/TPY-2, can cue the Navy’s ship-based Aegis missile defense systems.

On Oct. 16, the Navy announced it would move two additional Aegis-equipped destroyers, USS Benfold and USS Milius, to its Japan-based 7th Fleet in 2015 and 2017, respectively.

The “Tippy Two” radar also links to the Army’s ground-based Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, better known as THAAD.

The new radar is no surprise to China, nor is it positioned with China in mind, U.S. officials said. The U.S. already had one AN/TPY-2 deployed in northern Japan’s Aomori Prefecture.

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced plans for the second radar move during an October 2013 news conference in Tokyo, as a response to North Korean missile tests and threats.

“This additional radar will bolster our ability to defend the U.S. homeland and Japan against North Korea’s ballistic missiles,” Hagel said.

A U.S. official at the time said the new radar would “close the gaps” in its Korean Peninsula missile launch detection. The radar has a 600-mile range in its forward-based mode, according to Defense Industry Daily.

Although China remains one of North Korea’s few allies, signs of strain in the relationship have appeared in recent years. Beijing protested Pyongyang’s third nuclear test in February 2013 and implemented trade sanctions against its neighbor.

However, China has also continued to defend North Korea on human rights issues and fears the consequences of a regime collapse, wrote Adam Segal, senior fellow at the non-partisan Council on Foreign Relations.

“The idea that the Chinese would turn their backs on the North Koreans is clearly wrong,” Segal stated.
 
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US-Japanese military cooperation is no secret , at least not anymore ; i was watching the news on the France24 news channel and it was about joint US-japanese army drills , and what i noticed interestingly was a Commanche helicopter , among some Appache's :lol: , how ironic the murican tests their Commanche in japan
 
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We have intercepted every test ballistic missile with 100% accuracy. That should be a message.
you can only detect short range and tactical ballistic missiles. and those missiles must have a depressed trajectory for sm-3 to take it down. the df-21d is has a range of 1500km so thats a medium range thermospheric missile. its more of a warning o the Us that they can take down there aircraft carrier if they want to. but they wont unless its a full scale war. upon research the sm-3 is claimed to have capabilities of shooting down an irbm. i would assume this is when its very early in flight.

The system is integrated by US.
What Japan buys is only last level of the missile defense system.
The most important part of missile defense system, like early warning, missile tracing, are still in US hand.
Japan only receive order from US and prepare to fire.
China is building AEGIS system on its war ship.
China is also testing its own missile defense system. But mostly missile fired from land, not from AEGIS ships..



Frankly I doubt if SM-6 or SM2 can intercept ballistic missile effectively..
It is SM-3 that should do the job.
SM6 & SM2 are mainly targeting at planes and normal anti ship missiles..
the sm2 is a short/ medium range sam
the sm6 is a long range sam- modified versions successfully intercepted a ballistic missile
the sm3 is an abm its designed for intercepting ballistic missiles
 
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you can only detect short range and tactical ballistic missiles. and those missiles must have a depressed trajectory for sm-3 to take it down.

You've got that backwards, depressed trajectories are theorized to escape SM-3 interceptions, since SM-3 is optimized for long-range, high-altitude engagements:

Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress

It's theoretical though and I can't find a source to support your claim that SM-3 can only defeat depressed trajectory targets or that they can actively defeat SM-3. Please offer supporting evidence.

upon research the sm-3 is claimed to have capabilities of shooting down an irbm.


No need for claims, it's been demonstrated against E-LRALT, LRALT and SRALT IRBM/MRBM targets:

SRALT

SRALT-sm.jpg


LRALT

lralt__2.jpg


and HERA as seen here prior to impact from a RIM-161 seeker:

RIM-161-SM-3-Missile-Target-1S.jpg


Hera_rocket_on_launch_pad.jpg


Little public information exists on E-LRALT, but THAAD didn't have a problem with one either:


SM-3's capability to down MRBMs was demonstrated during FTM-22


As well as FTM-15 - HERA was used during this test


the sm2 is a short/ medium range sam

Apply your SM-6 evaluation to the SM-2 as well as the SM-2 Block IV is being developed as part of Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense:

The SM-2 Block IV can engage ballistic missiles within the atmosphere in the terminal phase of a missile's trajectory.

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) System

i would assume this is when its very early in flight.

Evaluation and demonstration was conducted with the target missile in mid-course and terminal stages, no interceptor will get close enough to launch facilities to engage a missile during assent. Alternative options are being explored for interception during this phase.
 
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An excerpt from a Congressional Research Service report on countering the DF-21D.

Breaking the ASBM’s Kill Chain

Countering China’s projected ASBMs could involve employing a combination of active (i.e., “hard-kill”) measures, such as shooting down ASBMs with interceptor missiles, and passive (i.e., “soft-kill”) measures, such as those for masking the exact location of Navy ships or confusing ASBM reentry vehicles.
Employing a combination of active and passive measures would attack various points in the ASBM “kill chain”—the sequence of events that needs to be completed to carry out a successful ASBM attack. This sequence includes detection, identification, and localization of the target ship, transmission of that data to the ASBM launcher, firing the ASBM, and having the ASBM reentry vehicle find the target ship.

Attacking various points in an opponent’s kill chain is an established method for countering an opponent’s military capability. A September 30, 2011, press report, for example, quotes Lieutenant General Herbert Carlisle, the Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for operations, plans, and requirements, as stating in regard to Air Force planning that “We’ve taken [China’s] kill chains apart to the ‘nth’ degree.”
In an interview published on January 14, 2013, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations, stated:

"In order for one to conduct any kind of attack, whether it is a ballistic missile or cruise missile, you have got to find somebody. Then, you have got to make sure it is somebody you want to shoot. Then, you’ve got to track it, you’ve got to hold that track. Then, you deliver the missile. We often talk about what I would call hard kill—knocking it down, a bullet on a bullet—or soft kill; there is jamming, spoofing, confusing; and we look at that whole spectrum of operations."

"And frankly, it is cheaper in the left-hand side of that spectrum."

To attack the ASBM kill chain, Navy surface ships, for example, could operate in ways (such as controlling electromagnetic emissions or using deception emitters) that make it more difficult for China to detect, identify, and track those ships.
The Navy could acquire weapons and systems for disabling or jamming China’s long-range maritime surveillance and targeting systems, for attacking ASBM launchers, for destroying ASBMs in various stages of flight, and for decoying and confusing ASBMs as they approach their intended targets. Options for destroying ASBMs in flight include developing and procuring improved versions of the SM-3 BMD interceptor missile (including the planned Block IIA version of the SM-3), accelerating the acquisition of the Sea-Based Terminal (SBT) interceptor (the planned successor to the SM-2 Block IV terminal-phase BMD interceptor),
and accelerating development and deployment of the electromagnetic rail gun (EMRG), and solid state lasers (SSLs). Options for decoying and confusing ASBMs as they approach their intended targets include equipping ships with systems, such as electronic warfare systems or systems for generating radar-opaque smoke clouds or radar-opaque carbon-fiber clouds, that could confuse an ASBM’s terminal-guidance radar.

An August 9, 2014, press report states that Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, in response to a question about the threat posed to U.S. Navy aircraft carriers by China’s ASBMs, stated, “We are very well aware of the capabilities that China has and is trying to develop and I’m very confident we would be able to carry out any mission that we have to.” The press report states that Harris said he could not state the nature of the technology used to counter the ASBM, but that “We work in it every day. I’m confident of our ability to defeat any Chinese missile threat and to be able to do whatever we need to do.”

A May 29, 2014, press report states:

When the next-generation aircraft carrier CVN 78 Gerald R. Ford takes to the seas later this decade, it will face one of the most dangerous threats to the U.S. maritime military behemoth—the Chinese DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM).

But U.S. Navy officials remain confident that the technological improvements to the Ford as well as the other ships shielding the carrier from attack should be able to protect the vessel....

... zeroing in on a carrier with such a missile is more difficult than it seems, says Rear Adm. Michael Manazir, director of air warfare.

Eyeing the Ford from the ship’s flight deck, he notes: “People think this is a big target. But they have to get to the carrier and then discern that it is a carrier.”

In addition, the U.S. Navy has a layered network of defensive systems.

“It’s a series of systems,” Manazir explains during a recent exclusive tour of the Ford at the Newport News Shipbuilding yard in the Tidewater part of Virginia. “We want to attack it on the left side of the kill chain.”

A May 21, 2014, press report states:

When asked whether a new Chinese anti-ship weapon—the DF-21D missile—might render carriers obsolete in the Pacific, [Admiral Jonathan] Greenert [the Chief of Naval Operations] said the U.S. is developing countermeasures to protect the prized vessels from the weapon that is sometimes referred to as a “carrier killer.”

“It’s a good weapon that they’ve developed. But there’s nothing that doesn’t have vulnerabilities, and we continue to pursue ideas in that regard. … We’re working quite feverishly on that, and I’m pretty comfortable with where we can operate our carriers,” Greenert said.

The Navy chief said the U.S. has “lots of intelligence” on the Chinese weapon, but wouldn’t elaborate, nor would he discuss what specific steps the military is taking to counter it.

In the future, Greenert said that new electromagnetic weapons, unmanned aircraft and other standoff weapons will help mitigate the threat of anti-ship missiles.

An April 24, 2014, press report states that:

The U.S. Navy has no silver-bullet concept to defeat the Chinese DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), but will rather rely on a network of defensive systems to do the job.

“It’s a series of systems,” Rear Adm. Michael Manazir, director of air warfare, tells the Aviation Week Intelligence Network (AWIN). “We want to attack it on the left side of the kill chain.”

During an exclusive tour and interview this month of the next-generation aircraft carrier CVN-78 Gerald R. Ford while under construction at the Newport News Shipbuilding yard in Virginia, Manazir says, “People think this is a big target. But they have to get to the carrier and then discern that it is a carrier.”

The Navy’s various networks of defensive shields aboard the carrier, and other vessels elsewhere, will make that very difficult, he says.”

Document: Report to Congress on Chinese Naval Modernization and Implications for U.S. Navy - USNI News
 
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You've got that backwards, depressed trajectories are theorized to escape SM-3 interceptions, since SM-3 is optimized for long-range, high-altitude engagements:

Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress

It's theoretical though and I can't find a source to support your claim that SM-3 can only defeat depressed trajectory targets or that they can actively defeat SM-3. Please offer supporting evidence.




No need for claims, it's been demonstrated against E-LRALT, LRALT and SRALT IRBM/MRBM targets:

SRALT

sralt.jpg


LRALT

lralt.jpg


and HERA as seen here prior to impact from a RIM-161 seeker:

RIM-161-SM-3-Missile-Target-1S.jpg


Hera_rocket_on_launch_pad.jpg


Sometimes they are launched at sea using USS Tripoli, as noted here with a SCUD simulator

Tgtlaunchlg3.jpg


No public information exists on E-LRALT.

It's capability to down MRBMs was demonstrated during FTM-22


As well as FTM-15


the sm2 is a short/ medium range sam
the sm6 is a long range sam- modified versions successfully intercepted a ballistic missile
the sm3 is an abm its designed for intercepting ballistic missiles




Apply your SM-6 evaluation to the SM-2 as well as the SM-2 Block IV is being developed as part of Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense:

The SM-2 Block IV can engage ballistic missiles within the atmosphere in the terminal phase of a missile's trajectory.

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) System



Evaluation and demonstration was conducted with the target missile in mid-course and terminal stages, no interceptor will get close enough to launch facilities to engage a missile during assent. Alternative options are being explored for interception during this phase.[/QUOTE]

reply starts here.......

depressed missiles are more unpredictable than the typical missiles that goes out to the stratosphere, missile that are depressed are typically short/ medium range missiles. as irbm,s and icbm's would go too high to be intercepted. the sm-3 is made for this and is used by japan and the US to counter north Korean missiles. you dont need a source but common sense to determine it's characteristics, a good analysis is good enough.
the spectrum of missiles type will include the irbm shortly.

also you do know the hera missile range is only 1100km where as the sm-3 can take on missiles that can take down missiles at ranges at 5000km so they claim. point being they cant test full capability of the sm3 with a mrbm

rms12_sm3_infographic_download.jpg


i just mentioned the sm-6 was tested recently (July 2015) as an abm for short range missiles, or as you call it, missile defence. but it's a high altitude SAM for the navy really.

when i talked about the interception mid course is what i mean i.e. just after launch but no where near it's peak altitude,
beyond mid course theres no chance of stopping a missile unless its a tactical or short range missile. medium range if the system is good like the arrow3. an irbm if you're lucky.
 
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reply starts here.......


also you do know the hera missile range is only 1100km where as the sm-3 can take on missiles that can take down missiles at ranges at 5000km so they claim.

View attachment 246019

You're reading the chart wrong. 5000km is the upper range of missile considered to be IRBMs:

An intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) is a ballistic missile with a range of 3,000–5,500 km (1,864–3,418 miles)

Intermediate-range ballistic missile

SM-3 Block IIA's range is estimated at around 2500 KM. The above graphic doesn't state SM-3 has a range of 5000KM, just that it can intercept missiles with those range profiles.

Raytheon: Standard Missile-3 (SM-3)

EPAA-JOan-op-ed-figure2.jpg


point being they cant test full capability of the sm3 with a mrbm

Which is why IRBM's are used as well, such as LV-2, an adaptation of Trident C4:

_RAC2581_09-MDA-4861%20%2828%20AUG%2009%29.jpg


the sm-3 is made for this and is used by japan and the US to counter north Korean missiles. you dont need a source but common sense to determine it's characteristics, a good analysis is good enough.

No really, provide a source. Asking people to take your word at face value isn't going to fly.

but it's a high altitude SAM for the navy really.

Right now yes, tomorrow no. SM-6 is a duel capability system, that its counter missile (ABM not cruise) profile is only now being refined doesn't invalidate that profile.

Missile Defense Agency, Raytheon demonstrate SM-6's new anti-ballistic missile... -- PACIFIC MISSILE FIRING RANGE, Hawaii, Aug. 3, 2015 /PRNewswire/ --

SM-6 is an integral part of US fleet missile defense as an augment to the longer-ranged SM-3 and to supplement the SM-2 Block IV, but at greater ranges.

 
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You're reading the chart wrong. 5000km is the upper range of missile considered to be IRBMs:

An intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) is a ballistic missile with a range of 3,000–5,500 km (1,864–3,418 miles)

Intermediate-range ballistic missile

SM-3 Block IIA's range is estimated at around 2500 KM. The above graphic doesn't state SM-3 has a range of 5000KM, just that it can intercept missiles with those range profiles.

Raytheon: Standard Missile-3 (SM-3)

EPAA-JOan-op-ed-figure2.jpg
why do i feel you're saying what im saying but in a different way.
i do know what what ranges specifies a missile at what category. the sm-3 is designed for irbm's eventually regardless of altitude. as long as if its with in the specified range that classes the missile as an irbm.

Which is why IRBM's are used as well, such as LV-2, an adaptation of Trident C4:

_RAC2581_09-MDA-4861%20%2828%20AUG%2009%29.jpg
fair enough, you got me there. the trident 1 is a good slbm to be used as a test dummy.
No really, provide a source. Asking people to take your word at face value isn't going to fly.
i can see where you're coming, from but it's based on experience and also on what im taught, and what im allowed to say. sorry.

Right now yes, tomorrow no. SM-6 is a duel capability system, that its counter missile (ABM not cruise) profile is only now being refined doesn't invalidate that profile.
yes thats what i said the sm-6 was tested to intercept a missile. and future variants will be able to intercept missiles at short/tactical ranges. as compared to the sm-3 which is more for longer range missiles

SM-6 is an integral part of US fleet missile defense as an augment to the longer-ranged SM-3 and to supplement the SM-2 Block IV, but at greater ranges.#
yes that sound about right. a multi layered defence.
 
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You've got that backwards......missile
the sm3 is an abm its designed for intercepting ballistic missiles.....to engage a missile during assent. Alternative options are being explored for interception during this phase.
You're reading the chart.........defense as an augment to the longer-ranged SM-3 and to supplement the SM-2 Block IV, but at greater ranges.

My head hurts reading all of that ! :crazy:

One of these days I am going to reply in kind by giving you a crash course in the use of shared based Options to value projects and then well see if you loose a couple of neurons or not processing so much technical stuff ! :tsk:
 
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My head hurts reading all of that ! :crazy:

One of these days I am going to reply in kind by giving you a crash course in the use of shared based Options to value projects and then well see if you loose a couple of neurons or not processing so much technical stuff ! :tsk:

:o:I lost a few neurons just reading your post, and we haven't even started on the technical data:D.

We really need Sven back, we're too serious without him:hitwall:.
 
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depressed missiles are more unpredictable than the typical missiles...
True...As a side note, normal missiles do not like to fly or even hang out in the silos with depressed missiles precisely because of those unpredictable behaviors. Worst case scenario is that a depressed missile may go off just for the hell of it. The US is working hard to recruit and train psychoanalysists to deal with depressed missiles at the back end, while working with manufacturers on the front end to identify areas that maybe the cause or causes of mental deficiencies that gave US depressed missiles.

The US is also giving cultural sensitivity to missileers regarding the negative stigma associated with mental health issues with these depressed missiles. There is always an officer, keyboard readied, at the launch panel ready to talk to any depressed missile. Understanding and compassion are paramount, after all, we dealing with highly explosive entities here.
 
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