What's new

Type 055 DDG News & Discussions

China's New Destroyer, The U.S. Navy's Anti-Ship Missile Failure, And Preemption


Anders Corr






China unveiled its Type 055 naval destroyer on June 28, the latest step in its decade and a half of military buildup. The new Chinese destroyer outcompetes U.S. destroyers and cruisers, highlighting a major failure in U.S. Navy planning that stretches back to the 1990s. Given the 055’s long-range supersonic YJ-18 and YJ-12over the horizon (OTH) anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), the Chinese destroyer currently outcompetes U.S. Arleigh Burke class destroyers and bigger Ticonderoga class cruisers. Both ships rely on fewer and shorter-range Harpoon anti-ship missiles (ASMs) and aircraft carriers that are themselves vulnerable to China’s ballistic missiles. The U.S. Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), under development since 2009, would right the balance, but not for years to come, and meanwhile we must assume China will continue improving its capabilities. Reaction times to the latest supersonic and hypersonic anti-ship weapons can be as short as 15-30 seconds. The YJ-18 and YJ-12 are inspired by Russian design, and the threat environment is complicated by unconventional technologies such as Russian-made anti-ship missiles camouflaged as commercial shipping containers. The U.S. Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) ASCM variant, which may be deployed before 2020, has less range than its Chinese counterparts. China’s military development cooperation with Russia, and fielding of the 055 destroyer, will fuel already-existing incentives for conventional first strike options, political tension and an arms race with the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Australia, Indonesia, and India. The arms race and tensions will hurt each country’s economic growth and international trade, as well as increase the risk of military conflict.

960x0.jpg

Chinese officers from the 24th Chinese navy are seen onboard a Harbin Type 052 destroyer, which arrived as part of the Chinese fleet at Shuwaikh Port in Kuwait City, on February 1, 2017. The visit is the first to Kuwait in 5 years, and comes after finishing a watch mission at the Gulf of Aden and the Somali waters. Credit: YASSER AL-ZAYYAT/AFP/Getty Images


As military technology gets more sophisticated, a naval arms race in Asia will lead to military systems on hair-trigger alerts. The danger is that, as in World War II with Japan, China could one day calculate a military advantage to striking first with an array of air, sea, and rocket-delivered conventional weapons that could debilitate U.S. Navy vessels in the Pacific, as well as other regional U.S. bases. China is prepared to do so, at least in the South China Sea. According to Captain James Fanell (USN ret), former Director of Intelligence for U.S. Pacific Fleet, China has since 2015 adopted a man-to-man, rather than zonal, defense against U.S. Navy ships that traverse those international waters. China’s trend towards shadowing U.S. ships in the East China Sea is the same, according to Fanell, so we should assume that U.S. destroyers and cruisers there have been highly vulnerable over the past two years, and until at least 2021 when a subsonic U.S. ship-based ASCM will be fielded.

A Chinese conventional first strike against U.S. military forces in Asia is now technically plausible, and backed by China’s consistently preemptive naval, missile and cyber doctrines. This gives an incentive to the U.S. to itself strike first, especially if Chinese nuclear retaliation is calculated as unlikely. Such preemptive strikes, by either side, would lead to major power military conflict that would start with multiple nuclear powers, rather than end with one nuclear power as did World War II. It would be the most destructive war in world history, and so military technologies such as China’s 055 destroyer armed with YJ-18 ASCM that upset the balance of power in Asia are profoundly destabilizing and contrary to what one should expect from a status quo power. Such technologies are therefore ultimately counter to China’s broader commercial and security interests.
According to Fanell, U.S. Navy warship anti-ship cruise missile programs are just now being developed. Fanell said, "And how long will [it be before] LRASM or SM-6 numbers reach the numbers the PRC already has with the YJ-18? We appear to be behind the power curve for what could be a rather long time just as the PRC begins to consolidate its territorial claims in the maritime domain of the South and East China Seas over the next decade." Fanell has long argued for increased U.S. naval spending.


China’s 055 destroyer is for the first time among Chinese surface combatants capable of land attack missions. Just as U.S. and Russian destroyers have attacked land targets in Syria, we will likely see the advent of a more territorially aggressive Chinese navy in the next decade. Last month, China’s state-run media, the Global Times, quoted military expert Song Zhongping as saying, "The 052D, a 7,000-ton-destroyer with 64 launch units, is designed for tasks including anti-aircraft, anti-submarine and anti-warship defense, while it does not and should not be required to have ground attack capability, which should be carried out by bigger destroyers, the coming 055." The 055 modular weapons system includes the capability to launch the nuclear capable CJ-10 land-attack cruise missile.

The 055 is a 10,000-ton destroyer, but under a full load it displaces 12,000 to 14,000 tons of water. It could as easily be classed as a cruiser. There are 3 more under construction, and 4 on order, for a total of 8 “Renhai” 055 destroyers. The 055 has stealth features and up to 128 Vertical Launch System (VLS) tubes for missiles capable of hitting air, land, and sea targets. The VLS can also launch anti-satellite and anti-ballistic missiles currently under development by China. The stern of the ship has a hangar to accommodate two Z-18 anti-submarine warfare helicopters and vertical-launch unmanned aerial vehicles. The sophisticated 055 bow-mounted and variable depth sonars and dual x- and s-band radar systems can see hostile air, surface, and underwater objects up to 600 km away, as well as track smaller nearby projectiles. The 055 fuses this data with other Chinese ship, air, and satellite sensors for a global view of the battlespace.

The 052 destroyers can also launch nuclear-capable missiles, and each has 64 VLS tubes. There are 4 operational 052-class destroyers, and 8 more under construction. This makes 20 total 052 and 055 Chinese destroyers capable of blue water operations far from shore. The relative lack of Chinese rearmament ships will not heavily affect Chinese destroyer operations in the South and East China seas, on which China appears to be focusing its maritime territorial growth.
960x0.jpg

Singapore Navy's RSS Independence sails past China's class 054 navy frigate Huangshan (R) and French navy vessel Frigate FS Prairial (C) during the inaugural maritime review along the strait near Changi Naval Base in Singapore on May 15, 2017. Twenty-eight foreign warships from 20 navies participated in the inaugural review, which is part of Singapore Navy's 50th anniversary celebration. Credit: ROSLAN RAHMAN/AFP/Getty Images


Another 25 smaller 056-class Chinese frigates are operational, with 60 likely to be constructed in the coming years. These are also optimal for operations closer to China, for example in the South and East China Seas, or against Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan.

The 055 competes directly with the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh Burke class destroyers and Ticonderoga cruisers, which are the main delivery system for naval surface combatant firepower globally. The Ticonderoga class cruisers currently have 16 operational ships and 6 undergoing refurbishment at any given time.

There are 62 Arleigh Burke’s worldwide, and the U.S. Navy is building 14 more. They are smaller and carry less firepower than the 055’s. The Arleigh Burke destroyers displace 8,000 to 10,000 tons and have up to 96 VLS launch tubes each. That is a lot of potential firepower. But what debilitates the Arleigh Burke destroyers is their reliance on 8 Harpoon ASM tubes each, the range of which is limited to only 67 nautical miles compared with the YJ-18’s 290 nm range. Harpoon missiles do not fit into VLS tubes.

According to naval analysts, some of the U.S. destroyers in Asia do not even carry their full complement of Harpoon ASMs, and since 1999, the Arleigh Burkes have not had any Harpoon launchers installed. Most U.S. destroyers, therefore, have only token anti-ship capabilities, making them vulnerable to a debilitating first strike in case of war. As Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Bryan Clark noted in testimony to Congress in 2015,
“So if I want to shoot another ship and I am a surface ship, I have to wait until I am within Harpoon range if I have Harpoons even onboard, which means I am probably half of the distance that he can reach me. So he can — I am well within his weapons envelope when I do that.”


Professor of Strategy James Holmes at the U.S. Naval War College has some harsh words for the lack of a long-range ASM capability on U.S. cruisers and destroyers.

“The originators of this mismatch were the service chiefs back in 1992, who in a directive called From the Sea declared that there was no one left to fight after the Cold War and thus that our navy should reinvent itself as a "fundamentally different" naval force, [i.e.], a force that didn't have to fight to control the sea, and thus could concentrate on noncombat missions. When you get a signal like that from top leadership, what do you do? You stop training and equipping to fight rival navies, and you stop upgrading your armaments. After that it was inertia. No one corrected the mistake, and no one really started trying until CNO Greenert.”

Admiral Jonathan Greenert served as Chief of Naval Operations from 2011 to 2015. Bryan McGrath, who commanded an Arleigh Burke class destroyer from 2004 to 2006, told Congress in 2015 that because of the lack of an effective anti-surface warfare (ASuW) capability on the surface fleet, it has to rely for defense on air and submarine-delivered capabilities.

That decision and decisions about how to allocate missions within the portfolio — surface, subsurface and aviation — has led to a situation in which ... the Navy looks at the surface force, as something that needs to be protected by the air wing. I think that needs to be questioned…. As part of the peace dividend and in recognition of the lack of a blue water threat, the Harpoon missile system was removed from the Flight IIA Arleigh Burke Destroyers as a corporate Navy decision was made to rely on the carrier air wing and the submarine force to perform the ASuW mission.”

960x0.jpg

The Republic of Korea destroyers Sejong the Great (DDG 991) and Yang Manchun (DDH 973), the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers USS Wayne E. Meyer (DDG 108), USS Michael Murphy (DDG 112) and USS Stethem (DDG 63), the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Lake Champlain (CG 57) and the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) patrol May 3, 2017 in the western Pacific Ocean. Credit: Z.A. Landers/U.S. Navy via Getty Images


Reliance on submarines and the carrier air wing limits the ability of surface combatants to execute missions individually, and entails risk from destruction of a single component in the system, effectively making the entire highly complex network as vulnerable as its weakest link. Fanell says, "We have this belief that Carrier air cover will always be there to protect our fleet and sink enemy ships … but what happens when a DF-21D or DF-26 sinks or seriously damages our aircraft carriers? Or when one of the PLAN Song, Yuan, or Shang submarines attacks our carriers with supersonic YJ-18 ASCMs … or PLAAF/PLANAF fighter bombers attack with air launched ASCMs? It seems to me that prudent military planning would take this into account and adjust our acquisition strategy accordingly … meaning the USN would have a surface fleet that could survive on its own by having the capability to fight other PLAN combatants mano-e-mano."

The U.S. Navy has made efforts at improving its ship-based ASuW capabilities. The SM-6 was recently converted for use as an ASM, but its range is only 250 nm compared to the 290 nm range of China’s YJ-18. The Navy has not even fielded the ASM variant of the SM-6. According to Fanell, “the SM-6 ASM variant that was successfully tested in Hawaii last year ...may be fielded sooner than 2020 … but again, it is a piecemeal approach that is behind the timeline of PLAN production and fielding.”

The Next Generation Land Attack Weapon (NGLAW), which also has an anti-ship function, will not enter U.S. Navy service until 2028 or 2030. Tomahawk cruise missiles, with a range of 1,000 nm, are also undergoing modification for an ASCM capability, but are subsonic and therefore more easily targeted. They will not be fielded until 2021, and will likely go out of service in 2040. Until then, and if China’s surface fleet has an anti-missile system capable of downing the slow Tomahawk, Navy destroyers and cruisers are uniquely vulnerable to China’s 052 and 055, armed with the long-range YJ-12 and YJ-18 ASMs. This vulnerability is a major mistake in naval planning that has led to the dangerous reliance of destroyers and cruisers on deterrence from aircraft carriers, submarines, and strategic escalation.

China’s new destroyer will fuel already-existing plans in the U.S. for increased naval spending, which will in turn lead to more naval spending in China. This is a costly arms race fueled by a security dilemma on the U.S. side, and territorial aggression on the Chinese side. China knows it has nothing to worry about in terms of U.S. initiating conflict were China a status quo power. But China is courting major power war through new military technologies that alter the status quo, at the same time as it initiates zero-sum territorial conflicts with multiple U.S. allies, including Japan in the East China Sea, the Philippines in the South China Sea, Taiwan (for its sovereignty), India in the Himalayas, and South Korea through China’s proxy North Korea.
The ground attack capability of the 055 should be of especial concern to Taiwan, whose territory is already under threat by ground-based missiles across the strait in mainland China. Because of China’s military buildup and territorial aggression, even during President Obama’s 8 years of relative pacifism toward China, it appears that China does not seek to be a responsible member of the international system. It seeks regional hegemony, even at the expense of strong U.S. allies like Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines. It seeks increased global influence and power projection capabilities, including through a string of naval ports reaching to Africa, and blue water naval vessels such as the 055 destroyer.


According to Fanell, the 055 launch “should be another wake-up call for the USN. This is a formidable combatant...that again out-guns/out-sticks its rivals in the USN. Watch for this to be mass produced over the next 5 years [with] numbers approaching a dozen at least.” Professor James Holmes, Professor of Strategy at the Naval War College, has made a similar argument regarding China’s coming superiority in submarine deployments.

With the Chinese Navy gaining in absolute numbers of naval combatants over the U.S., Fanell said, “a 350 ship navy that cannot engage and sink other nation’s warships is not acceptable.” The current USN of 276 ships is projected by President Trump to grow to 355. If achieved by 2035, 355 ships would cost $107 billion per year, every year, until 2047. According to Holmes, “We'll be lucky to break 300 ships by 2020, no matter what Congress does…. We have some old stuff we could recommission, but (unlike the Iowa class battleships in the 1980s) those ships already have an awful lot of mileage on the odometer.”
960x0.jpg

Type 001A, China's second aircraft carrier, is seen during a launch ceremony at Dalian shipyard in Dalian, northeast China's Liaoning Province, April 26, 2017. China has launched its first domestically designed and built aircraft carrier, state media said on April 26, as the country seeks to transform its navy into a force capable of projecting power onto the high seas. Credit: STR/AFP/Getty Images


China has plans to reach 351 ships by 2020, almost all of which will be concentrated in Asia. The U.S. will only devote about 60%of its Navy to the Pacific. That gives China the advantage in an Asian naval contest in 2020, with 351 Chinese ships against about 180 U.S. ships. Holmes points out that,

“Absolute numbers aren't everything. The Soviet Navy outnumbered us throughout the Cold War and we got by. We were better on a ship-for-ship basis than they were. Still, numbers are important. Plus, this isn't just a fleet-on-fleet competition. We're talking about a fraction of the U.S. Navy matching up against the whole of the PLA Navy backed by the PLA Air Force and the PLA Rocket Force -- i.e., the PLA Navy backed up by a large arsenal of land-based planes, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. That's a lot of firepower to supplement the PLA Navy fleet. That could be China's great equalizer even if we remain stronger on the whole.”

The next four years are a critical period of vulnerability for the U.S. Navy. China will have a bigger and more concentrated surface fleet in Asia than will the U.S., and it will be better armed. It is no surprise that China, which cares little for international law or the status quo, is risk-acceptant, and subscribes to the principle that might makes right, is taking advantage of its regional naval superiority to take territory in the South and East China seas with impunity. It is no surprise that our allies have cold feet and are hedging towards China with economic and security agreements. It is an avoidable tragedy of our own making. We have watched since the early 1990s while China made great economic and military strides, often with our stolen technology. Yet we have not sanctioned it for its failure to make progress on international common values, such as democracy and human rights, that would make it a responsible international partner in terms of peace and stability.

Now we are paying the price, starting in the South and East China seas. According to Holmes, China’s regional strength “probably does help explain their confidence in the China seas.” If the U.S. cannot convince China to back away from its militarization and territorial revanchism in Asia, we will be forced into a dangerous and costly arms race, Cold War brinkmanship, or even conventional preemptive strike, to stop China’s expansion. The only other option will be conceding more territory and relative military power that will eventually lose us any vestiges of global moral, military, and economic leadership that remain after failing and debilitating wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and our general weakness against Russia and China’s territorial expansion. That will also lose us allies. It arguably already has.

China has given the U.S. a moment of truth. Will we take a stand, or continue our slide towards irrelevance? The U.S. is not the only country that needs to wake up. China is taking catastrophic risk with its growing militarism.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/anders...-missile-failure-and-preemption/#666f5107638f

The SM-6 anti ship variant is already forward deployed, and LRASM is set to be deployed aboard B-1's next year.
In the next several years antiship Tomahawks and ATACMS will be deployed, along with extended range JSOWS and Harpoons. The US military is rapidly expanding its antiship capabilities.

The US military operates in the Western Pacific on a daily basis. Clearly they are terrified of the Chinese.
 
.
Now that we have the first 055 launched, do members here think we could also see the second 055 also launched by the end of the year.........as going by the photos we have seen, the build of the second 055 looks fairly advanced, with the hull intact, but now just needing the superstruture?
 
.
To admit I always only want to :bad: !

The USA have the most capable military force anyone had on earth so far and they are even more expanding their military :cray:... and now they rate anyone who tries to modernise or catch up in order to balance this more than one-sided dominance as a risk for peace on earth !

And it's embarrassing that they not even come to the idea who's the one who "is taking catastrophic risk with its growing militarism."

Deino






Military parity is unacceptable to US forces. The US military has operated under an "overwhelming superiority" doctrine for some time now. We have no interest in operating in a WW2 environment ever again.
 
.
Military parity is unacceptable to US forces. The US military has operated under an "overwhelming superiority" doctrine for some time now. We have no interest in operating in a WW2 environment ever again.


I understand that from the point of view of the US, but they must at least admit, that their military might is seen as a threat from other countries and in the same way the US want "overwhelming superiority" other demand - and IMO not unjustified - at least a more balanced equality.

So who then is the military risk for others !?

Deino
 
.
To admit I always only want to :bad: !

The USA have the most capable military force anyone had on earth so far and they are even more expanding their military :cray:... and now they rate anyone who tries to modernise or catch up in order to balance this more than one-sided dominance as a risk for peace on earth !

And it's embarrassing that they not even come to the idea who's the one who "is taking catastrophic risk with its growing militarism."

Deino
What can we say, they are "exceptional" o_O.... (more like delusional :rolleyes:)after all...:usflag:
I understand that from the point of view of the US, but they must at least admit, that their military might is seen as a threat from other countries and in the same way the US want "overwhelming superiority" other demand - and IMO not unjustified - at least a more balanced equality.

So who then is the military risk for others !?

Deino

Now.... now my friend, looks like you need some freedom up there.... :devil:

....

Anyway the launching of Type 55 Destroyer is really an amazing news. Congratulations to our Chinese friends.

Looking forward to the launch of second ship by end of this year (hopefully). :-) :china:
 
Last edited:
.
Now that we have the first 055 launched, do members here think we could also see the second 055 also launched by the end of the year.........as going by the photos we have seen, the build of the second 055 looks fairly advanced, with the hull intact, but now just needing the superstruture?

Since 3 055 are being constructed simultaneously right now and judging from the photos it's reasonable to assume we will be seeing a total of 4 055 completed within couple of months (whether it's by the end of this year or early next year). Look forward for more photos :D
 
. . .
Thats what i've in mind as well but you know the bashing from those naysayers is hard to take....

Some big shrimps like POP3 got really high authority, and his words are pretty like the bible for many Chinese military fans, but this time I am afraid that he is going to lose his bet against Professor Ma.

The Type 002 got delayed because of the re-designation with the EMALS and AAG.
 
. .
防空舰分级系统


通过总结 MD 海军多年来的水面战舰设计实践,大致可以认为区域防空舰吨位每减少 30%,则性能下降一级 (70% 定律?防空舰分级系统 - puffinus - 剪水鹱的博客),据此可将防空战舰按照吨位,传感器-武器系统配置,以及被动防护能力划为 5 级:

1. 满载排水量 25000 吨级 (注意量级不代表精确排水量,传感器-武器组合确定前提下,具体设计根据动力-传动系统配置的差异,实际吨位会在 “理想化” 的量级附近浮动),代表型号为 MD 曾计划建造的 CG(X) 大型防空反导巡洋舰,其 IPS (Integrated Propulsion System) 版吨位预计在 23900 吨 (常规动力) 至 26600 吨 (核动力,1 台航母级大型反应堆) 之间。该舰可在搭载大批常规尺寸垂直发射管的同时携带数十枚 KEI (Kinetic Energy Interceptor) 级别的重型武器,能够支持全尺寸 (S 波段天线孔径 6.7 米) 版 AMDR (Air and Missile Defense Radar) 双波段对空防御雷达的未来升级型号 (需要比基本型更高的电气功率和冷却容量),并且具备强韧的抗战损能力。雷达持续开机工作时,该舰电子及环境控制系统消耗的功率高达 31 兆瓦 (若留 20% 余量,则雷达系统升级后电气功率需求为 37 兆瓦),以 20 节速度巡航时消耗的推进功率则不超过 20 兆瓦。原油价格超过每桶 75 美元后,该舰核动力版的全寿命成本 (假定维持与现役 CG-47 型类似的使用强度和平均航速) 即已低于常规动力版。该级别的防空舰迄今为止仍停留在 “纸老虎” 阶段。


2. 满载排水量 17500 吨级,代表型号包括


I. CGN-9 “长滩” 号核动力导弹巡洋舰

II. Typhon CGN 核动力导弹巡洋舰 (无图)

III. CSGN “宙斯盾” 核动力打击巡洋舰

IV. 基于 DDG-1000 平台的 “护航巡洋舰” Escort Cruiser (无图)

该级别防空舰可在保证常规尺寸发射管数量的同时携带个位数的 KEI,能够支持全尺寸版 Typhon/AMDR 防空雷达 (但升级余地极其有限),搭载 256 个常规尺寸的垂直发射管 (放弃 KEI 和/或重型火炮系统),抗战损能力虽不如 1 级防空舰,仍远非更小型的平台所能比拟。围绕防空任务设计并配备 “宙斯盾” 系统时,该级舰可沿中轴线安装 3 套 Mk 26 Mod 2 导弹发射系统和 6 具导弹控制雷达 (24 个火力通道)。CGN-9 “长滩” 是唯一建成服役的 2 级防空舰。


3. 满载排水量 12000 吨级,代表型号为胎死腹中的 Typhon DLGN 和盾舰版 “弗吉尼亚” 级,可搭载降配版 Typhon,阉割版 AMDR (S 波段天线孔径 4.3 米),或完全版 “宙斯盾”,2 套 Mk 26 Mod 2 导弹发射系统 (备弹 128 枚) 或 160 个常规尺寸垂直发射管,沿轴线安装 4 具导弹控制雷达 (盾舰),携带 2 架 10 吨级直升机。CG-47 本应达到该级标准 (因采用常规动力且武器数量有所减少,满载排水量可下降至 11000 吨级),但因采用 DD-963 “斯普鲁恩斯” 级基本平台以节省设计全新舰型的开支,满载排水量被限制在 10000 吨以内,空间极度紧张,导弹控制雷达未能全部实现阶梯式纵列安装,方向覆盖不尽理想。设想中的 DDG-51 Flight III (勉强) 属于 3 级防空舰。


CGN-42 盾舰版 “弗吉尼亚” 级

由于舰体长度不足,CG-47 “提康德罗加” 级的 4 具导弹控制雷达未能全部实现阶梯式纵列安装。

CGN-38 “弗吉尼亚” 级就吨位而言属于 3 级防空舰,但受到技术,预算等多方面条件的制约,平台潜力未能得到充分挖掘


4. 满载排水量 8400 吨级,代表型号为 DDG-51 “伯克” 级,可携带驱逐舰版 “宙斯盾” 系统,3 具纵列安装的导弹控制雷达,96 个常规尺寸垂直发射管。机库属于 volume-critical 设施,体型虽胖,重量甚轻。增大燃油储备以获得 CG-47 等级的续航力 (6000 海里/20 节) 是导致 MD 海军 DDG-51 改进型号 “增肥” 至 9000+ 吨的主要因素。


5. 满载排水量 6000 吨级,可支持阉割版驱逐舰型 “宙斯盾”,2 具导弹控制雷达 (盾舰),携带 48 个常规尺寸垂直发射管,代表型号包括斗牛国 F100 型导弹护卫舰,TG 海军 052C 系列,欧洲 “地平线” 型防空护卫舰,日已落帝国 45 型防空驱逐舰,雄鸡国 DCNS 设想中的 FREMM-ER,汉斯 F124 型护卫舰,风车国 “七省” 级护卫舰等。注意 6000 吨和 48 个垂直发射管是参考基准而非确定数值,由于成本,舒适性要求,战斗力,适航性,自持力指标等方面的差异,具体设计的吨位可低至 6000 吨之下 (F124) 或高达 7000 吨以上 (45 型),垂直发射管数量变化范围则在 32-64 个之间 (TG 最新的 052C+ 配备 64 个垂直发射管,日已落帝国 45 型有升级至 64 个发射管的潜力)。


上述 5 级防空舰中,1 属于超豪华型,除非 TG 与 MD 展开全面军事对抗,否则恐怕难见天日;2 为豪华型,其存在同样有赖于 TG 与 MD 安全关系的恶化;3 为全球型海军主力防空舰的底限;4 对于全球型海军而言属于 “经济版” 防空舰;5 乃区域防空舰的入门级产品。CG-47 属于缩水版的 3 级防空舰 (3.5?防空舰分级系统 - puffinus - 剪水鹱的博客),052C+ 和 45 型则可被看作增强版的 5 级防空舰 (4.5?防空舰分级系统 - puffinus - 剪水鹱的博客)。如果悲催的 DDG-51 III 被砍,MD 或许会捣腾出来个常规动力版 2.5 级防空舰?


AMDR-S

S 波段防空反导雷达 AMDR (Air & Missile Defense Radar)/AMDR-S 是 MD 新一代防空舰远程对空探测能力的核心。迄今为止 MD 海军共考虑过 3 个版本的 AMDR-S 方案 (实际上不止,因为 AMDR 可以随意改变尺寸,但这 3 个版本分别对应 4 级防空舰,3 级防空舰/未大幅度改进的 DDG-1000,以及曾经设想过的未来巡洋舰,因此是最值得讨论的方案),即:
1) SPY + 11
2) SPY + 15
3) SPY + 30 (SPY + 40 也曾被短暂地 YY 过)

SPY + 11 使用与现役羊皮盾系统 AN/SPY-1A/B/D 雷达尺寸相当的 12 英尺/3.7 米孔径 AESA 天线,系统信噪比 (S/N ratio, signal/noise ratio) 较之于 AN/SPY-1D(V) 增加 11 分贝。SPY + 15 使用 14 英尺/4.3 米孔径天线,信噪比提升 15 分贝。SPY + 30 使用 22 英尺/6.7 米孔径天线,信噪比改善 30 分贝。SPY + 11 是 4 级防空舰支持能力的极限;SPY + 15 适用于 3 级防空舰和 DDG-1000 (2.5 级吨位,但围绕对陆火力支援而非防空任务设计),据 MD 海军宣称能塞进 DDG-51 Flight III,个人对此持保留意见。SPY + 30 需要 2 级防空舰平台 (DDG-1000 衍生版可支持 SPY + 25),如果考虑到后续升级,1 级防空舰平台更为理想。雷达系统信噪比取决于发射功率 (T/R 模块相同时与雷达天线面积/模块数量成正比),波束聚焦能力 (波长相同时波束角与天线孔径成反比,信号能量密度与波束角的平方成反比),系统内部噪声 (冷却系统越强悍,系统自噪声越小),因此要想提高全系统的信噪比,就必须尽可能增大天线尺寸及提高对天线模块的冷却能力。

AN/SPY-1D(V) 雷达在低威胁环境 (自然背景噪声,基本不遭到敌方的蓄意干扰) 中对雷达反射截面 0.0025 平方米级目标的追踪半径为 90+ 海里级。F-22/J-20 前向 X 波段雷达反射面积为 - 40 分贝/0.0001 平方米级,F-35 前向 X 波段雷达反射面积为 - 27 分贝/0.002 平方米级,按照 S 波段 RCS 比 X 波段升高半个数量级/5 分贝计算 (悲观估计 F-22/J-20,乐观估计 F-35),F-22/J-20 的前向 S 波段雷达反射面积为 -35 分贝/0.0003 平方米级,F-35 为 - 22 分贝/0.006 平方米级,遭到 AN/SPY-1D(V) 有效追踪的距离分别是 53 海里 (F-22/J-20) 和 113 海里 (F-35)。TG 的 052C 系列 5/4.5 级防空舰的核心对空雷达发射功率不及 AN/SPY-1D,但自噪声较低,天线孔径则与羊皮盾雷达相近,对低信号特征目标的探测能力当与 “宙斯盾” 系统半斤八两。从以上计算可以看出,面对盾舰时,F-22 和 J-20 能穿透至滑翔武器射程之内,F-35 则须携带专业反舰导弹方可生存,“经济版” 隐形尚未服役即已过时。

以上述计算为基础,可以得出 SPY + 11,+ 15,+ 30 三个型号对抗 F-22/J-20 和 F-35 时的性能数据
SPY + 11: 对 F-22/J-20 追踪半径为 100 海里,对 F-35 追踪半径为 213 海里 (也就是说,巡航高度的 F-35 一旦跃出水天线即无所遁形)
SPY + 15: 对 F-22/J-20 追踪半径为 126 海里,对 F-35 追踪半径为 268 海里
SPY + 30: 对 F-22/J-20 追踪半径为 298 海里,对 F-35 追踪半径为 635 海里 (超巡高度的水天线约在 250 海里之外,面对 SPY + 30 的 AMDR-S,重四水平的雷达隐形基本失效)

考虑到 F-22/J-20 隐形涂料的后续升级和实战条件下的电子对抗支持,假定 AMDR-S 雷达实战条件下信噪比恶化一个数量级 (10 分贝),则 SPY + 11: 对 F-22/J-20 追踪半径为 56 海里,对 F-35 为 120 海里
SPY + 15: 对 F-22/J-20 追踪半径为 71 海里,对 F-35 为 151 海里
SPY + 30: 对 F-22/J-20 追踪半径为 168 海里,对 F-35 为 357 海里

以上假定 F-35 的 S 波段隐形升级潜力与 F-22/J-20 相当 (乐观估计),实际上 F-35 被烧穿的距离将更高,而考虑到大气背景噪声因素后,信号水平 (- 40 分贝级) 较为接近背景噪声 (- 55 分贝级) 的 F-22/J-20 遭到防空舰有效追踪的距离将比以上计算值有所降低。如果去零取整,假定拟配备于 DDG-51 III 的 SPY + 15 版 AMDR-S 实战条件下能在 70 海里距离上建立对 J-20/F-22 的追踪轨迹,则 MD 海军认为 SPY + 15 的性能 marginally adequate (勉强合格) 便不难理解,因为此时高速突防的 F-22/J-20 已可投放高滑翔比武器 (每波攻击上百枚滑翔炸弹淹过来,就算防空舰拦截体系滴水不漏,反复交战数轮之后舰空导弹储备也将耗尽)。当然 MD 海军目前主要考虑的是 AMDR-S 对弹道导弹目标的远距追踪能力,而非对抗在西方看来 “纸老虎” 一只的 J-20。如果假定典型弹道导弹的 S 波段雷达反射截面积为 - 10 分贝/0.1 平方米,则 AN/SPY-1D(V),SPY + 11,SPY + 15,SPY + 30 对其实现追踪的距离分别是 226 海里,426 海里,537 海里,1273 海里 (未遭敌方干扰条件下)。显然,SPY + 30 级别的 AMDR-S 才能有效地支持 KEI 级别的远程反导拦截武器 (如果全力执行反导任务,追踪半径将比上述数值高出几十个百分点,但此时的防空舰完全无法对抗大气层内的目标,因此发动 “组合式” 攻击时,寥寥数枚低雷达信号特征反舰弹道导弹便能大幅度降低航母编队的海基对空防御能力)。

SPY + 30 足以击败 F-22/J-20 级别的对手,且通过增大发射功率 (换装新一代 T/R 模块),降低系统自噪声 (除了 T/R 模块技术升级外,主要依赖防空舰充足的冷却余量),增强信号处理能力,性能尚有可观的提升空间,面对重六依然毫不畏惧。而预计于 2023 年实现 IOC 的 SPY + 15 版 AMDR-S,服役之初便仅是 marginally adequate,待 2030+ 年重六服役之后处境将异常尴尬 (如果 TG 与 MD 安全关系良好,防空舰不必对抗重六等级目标,则配备 SPY + 15 雷达的 3 级平台倒也够用,杀掉 F-35 那是绰绰有余)。

在微电子技术突飞猛进的同时,高端武器平台的体型却不断增大,这一悖论令许多军迷十分困惑 (想想当年的大哥大,瞧瞧如今的水果机,这...AMDR-S - puffinus - 剪水鹱的博客)。其实道理很简单,武器系统面对的威胁从未停滞不前,而是随着技术的进步而水涨船高。假若空中目标没有实现隐形化,则羊皮盾雷达的探测性能 (- 10 分贝级 226 海里,0 分贝级约 400 海里) 已绰绰有余 (常规战术飞机挂弹状态雷达反射截面积均在 0 分贝以上,巡航高度水天线距离 200-250 海里,只要从水天线下冒出来必然遭到羊皮盾系统追踪,羊皮盾是围绕对抗信号特征显著低于常规航空器的反舰导弹设计的,足以轻易击败 F/A-18E/F 之类所谓 “准隐形” 目标,文字游戏在物理法则的面前是那么地苍白无力...)。然而现实是残酷的,拥有强大工业体系和科技实力的国家,绝不会心甘情愿地让潜在对手拥有军事技术领域的显著优势,矛与盾螺旋形上升的对抗从人类捡起第一根木棒即已开始,至今从未休止。正如红桃皇后对爱丽丝说的一样,只有全力奔跑,才能留在原地

TG防空舰发展路线图

1. 时间表
排除可看作 054A 舰空导弹系统测试平台的 2 艘 052B (相同的主对空传感器,相同的导弹控制雷达,导弹本体/airframe 不同但采用相同的毛熊制导系统),作为浮动 S-300 导弹营的 2 艘 051C,以及独苗一根的测试舰 051B 这三大干扰项之后,TG 近 20 年来国产导弹驱逐舰的发展节奏便清晰地呈现出来:

052 型首舰 DDG-112 “哈尔滨” 号于 1994 年服役。

TG防空舰发展路线图 - puffinus - 剪水鹱的博客

052C 型首舰 DDG-170 “兰州” 于 2004 年服役。

052C+/D 首舰 DDG-172 “昆明” 2012 年 8 月底下水,估计将于 2014 年服役。


显然,TG 燃气轮机动力导弹驱逐舰存在稳定的 10 年升级周期。考虑到收集消化使用数据和建造新一代平台所需的时间,这个速度已经颇为 impressive。预想中的未来大型导弹驱逐舰将采用与 052C 系列完全不同的全新平台 (可能达到 3 级防空舰标准,下面会详细论述),即便传感器-武器系统只是 052C+ 的升级版 (052C+ 的也 “只” 是 052C 的升级版),仍没有理由相信 TG 驱逐舰的技术更新周期会突然大幅度缩短。根据 TG 海军一贯的稳健作风来看,也不存在 052C+ 武器系统尚未开始海上测试之际,便急不可耐地开工建造下一代大型导弹驱逐舰之可能。TG 舰载战术航空兵刚出 “娘胎”,距离实战部署还十分遥远,而在 TG 近邻海域执行作战任务,052C 和 052C+ 已足堪重任,TG 海军没有必要心急火燎地打造为航母战斗群配套的大型防空驱逐舰。如果维持 10 年更新周期,TG 新一代驱逐舰的首舰将于 2024 年服役,只比 MD 计划中的 DDG-51 Flight III 的 IOC 晚一年而已。


2. 配置
相当于 5 级防空舰的 052C 和 4.5 级防空舰的 052C+ 已能有效压制 F-35 “闪电” II,单纯建造 052C+ 的放大版除了增加弹药基数之外意义不大,而以 TG 的技术,基于 4 级或 3.5 级平台的防空驱逐舰在可预见的时间跨度内 (未来 10-15 年) 不可能具备击败 F-22 档次对手的能力 (MD 的 DDG-51 III 大致可以看作 3.5 级防空舰,最好情况下面对 F-22/J-20 时也只是 marginally adequate),因此 TG 新一代防空舰应基于 3 级平台,并配备 SPY + 20 级别的 S 波段 AESA 雷达 (2.5 级的 DDG-1000 衍生型可支持 SPY + 25,3.5 级的 DDG-51 III 携带 SPY + 15,吨位介于二者之间的 3 级平台当可运作 SPY + 20)。鉴于 TG 的子系统技术仍将落后于 MD,要获取较 DDG-51 III 高出 5 分贝的信噪比,就必须使用比 SPY + 15 更大的 AESA 天线。若 TG 未来 3 级防空舰 S 波段雷达孔径达到 5.6 米,则子系统技术相当的条件下,其系统信噪比将有 7 分贝的优势,达到 SPY + 22,假定冷却系统效能相同,则 T/R 模块性能只需达到 MD 产品的 63%,即可实现 SPY + 20 的设计指标。SPY + 20 雷达实战条件下 (参照 AMDR-S 中的设定,S/N - 10 分贝) 可在 106 海里距离上实现对 F-22/J-20 的有效追踪,将其阻截在滑翔武器射程之外。

052C+ 的主对空传感器大致可定义为孔径 4 米的 SPY + 0 类型,TG 未来 3 级防空舰单纯依靠放大雷达孔径即可将 S/N 增加近 9 分贝,剩余的 11 分贝性能提升则来自 T/R 模块,冷却系统,信号处理等方面的进步 (如果雷达孔径不变,则 20 分贝的 S/N 收益必须完全来自各子系统性能的改善,技术风险和压力陡然增加)。延续这个思路,为对抗重六级别目标而研制的 SPY + 40 雷达应进一步将天线孔径增加到 8 米 (贡献 9+ 分贝的额外 S/N),从而需要 1 级防空舰平台。

4 英尺/1.2 米 (宽) x 6 英尺/1.8 米 (高) 的 AMDR-X 使用现役战斗机雷达 T/R 模块已能在 30 海里半径上烧穿 F-22 的前向雷达隐形屏障,足以击败任何隐形掠海反舰导弹。考虑到 TG 在 T/R 模块技术方面的差距,不妨将 AMDR-X 的三面阵列改为四面阵列,阵列尺度可基本维持不变。


3. 平台
为了保证 5.6 米孔径 TG 版 AMDR-S 所需冷却容量 (由吨位决定) 和平台稳定性 (由舰体宽度决定,从而影响平台吨位),降低生产成本,以及提供收纳无人潜航器/快艇的空间,假想中的 TG 未来 3 级防空舰满载排水量可适当高于 12000 吨的基准值 (配置一定时,平台造价由建造工时决定,较为宽松的 “低密度” 设计有利于快速施工,生产成本可低于吨位更小的 “高密度” 平台,钢材的价格对于高度复杂的战斗舰艇而言根本不算什么)。参考 MD 海军的研究,不妨将该舰水线宽度设定为 20 米,如此即可 1) 在采用全钢上层建筑并携带 5.6 米孔径 AMDR-S 的同时维持起码的横向稳定性 (要支持 4.3 米孔径的 SPY + 15 型 AMDR-S,DDG-51 III 的上层建筑须改为铝合金或复合材料构造,否则 CG-47 头重脚轻的难堪局面又将重现);2) 提供安装核动力系统 (重心较高) 所需的稳定性余量。假定水线长宽比 9:1 (兼顾高速性能和横向稳定性,且较为适合海浪波长较大的太平洋环境),则该舰水线长约 180 米,与 DDG-1000 接近,波障航速为 32.6 节,满载排水量大致是 052C/C+ 的 2 倍。考虑到核动力系统的研制周期,假定 2024 年服役的该级防空舰没有采用核动力推进的可能 (核动力战舰携带的液体较少,无法依靠调节燃油及淡水配重来修正重心位置的移动,对动力系统的重量参数异常敏感,必须在反应堆模块方案冻结后方可进行设计),仍将继续使用以燃气轮机为核心原动机的动力系统。TG 在综合电推进技术方面的积累较为有限,未来的 3 级防空舰在最初批次阶段未必能够采用全电推进方案,但存在混合电推进 (巡航速度电传动,冲刺速度机械传动) 的可能。DDG-1000 的穿浪体设计是为了最大限度提高平台稳定性,符合其对陆炮火支援平台的身份,并非专业防空舰平台设计的合理模板 (船舷内倾造成甲板宽度减小,上层建筑宽度相应下降,不利于布置大尺寸雷达阵列),TG 未来 3 级防空舰仍应采用舰舷外张的常规设计。


4. 大驱之后
如果
a) 维持 10 年技术更新周期
b) 假定核动力系统立项 - 核动力水面战舰服役时间跨度为 20 年
c) 假定 20 年内重型电磁炮实用化 (这玩意才是驱动平台设计的重要因素,充其量兆瓦级的战术激光武器对大型水面战舰的吨位和电气功率消耗基本没有影响,而假定抛射体重量为 50 千克 - 比典型 155 毫米炮弹还略轻,初速 2000 米/秒,战斗射速每 5 秒 1 枚,能量转换效率 100%,则电磁炮武器系统的电气功率消耗即高达 20 兆瓦)
d) TG 与 MD 军事技术竞争激化

则采用 1 级防空舰平台的 TG 大型核动力导弹巡洋舰 (吨位大约是前述 3 级防空舰的 2 倍,052C/C+ 的 4 倍) 将于 2034 年服役 (YY 版基本参数: 8 米孔径 SPY + 40 雷达,2 座重型电磁炮,32 枚 KEI,160 个常规尺寸垂直发射管)
 
.
The US House and Senate just proposed near $700 billion 2018 defense budgets, with around $630-640 billion as the base budget, with the rest going toward the fight against ISIS. Now, the final numbers are yet to be determined, but resources are not the problem. Those programs I listed are getting millions/billions in funding.



Yes, it's not American technology. You keep telling yourself that pal.:lol:
You did not get my point. Resources do not just equal money with invested into the programs directly.
The main factor of developing science and technology is human intelligence. The success of US based on its wonderful environment which attracts lots of foreign immigrants including most intelligent people from all over the world. It is an advantage which god gives to America.
But pls do not abuse the gift god presented.
Look back the recent years. How many dollars have been spent on the most sophisticated weapons which turned lots of towns into ashes and killed millions of people and pushed thousands of thousands of muslims into Jihads.
The president of US is busy selling killing machines, meanwhile China's present invites the Eurasian nations to rebuild the Silk Road .
US keeps producing refugees and China invests resources to rebuild these refugee's hometown.
More and more budget of US are used to send army to bomb and attack pour nations thousands miles way from American continent, while more and more budget of China are spent on developing all technique which could make the world much better and cleaner and healthier.
You could see what happened recently.
Pull out climate accord and push forward the production and export of fossil energy .
If US lose its foundations cornerstone its attraction to foreign people, how could US develop itself like what it has done since found.
By the by, there are 9 million muslins living in US.
Do you think how many of them will turn radical ,if US keeps bombing Muslim Nations ?
ISIS is the creature of US war policy. How many other radical organizations is US prepared to take care of?
 
. . . .
Back
Top Bottom