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Turning the tide of militancy
Tuesday, February 23, 2010
Dr Maleeha Lodhi
The writer is a former envoy to the US and the UK, and a former editor of The News.
Have the military operations in South Waziristan, other tribal areas and Swat helped to create a strategic moment in the countrys struggle against militants? Will 2010 be decisive in reversing the tide of militancy after a deadly year that saw a record number of terrorist attacks and killings? Has military action scattered the local Taliban or irrevocably weakened the movement?
There are no easy answers to these questions in a fluid and fraught situation gravely affected by border volatility that is being heightened by the escalating war in Afghanistan. The consolidation of gains made by military offensives will depend on overcoming a sobering number of hurdles and resolving critical governance issues. This means a greater role for political rather than military actors in the transition to the post-conflict phase.
Militancy has been dealt a lethal blow, but one that is not fatal yet. The necessary, though not sufficient, conditions have been created to turn the tide. The loss within six months of two leaders Baitullah and Hakeemullah Mehsud has left the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan in confusion and disarray. The assault on the TTPs stronghold in South Waziristan has degraded the organisations capability. But its continued ability to strike in the mainland suggests it has more than just a residual capacity and is using its connection with other groups to orchestrate the attacks.
Among the daunting tasks ahead are to dismantle the militants "syndicate" that remains intact, disrupt its supply line and flow of financial resources which are also intact and destroy its intelligence "assets." Also critical is to halt the flow of recruits into the ranks of the Pakistani Taliban, even though this has been affected by its loss of physical space. That the threat may be becoming more dispersed is indicated by the nexus the TTP has established over time with proscribed organisations or their splinters beyond FATA.
While the top leaders have been eliminated as part of a decapitation strategy the rest of the TTP leadership are still at large. Many melted away into the adjoining areas in pursuit of new hideouts, which necessitated cordon and search operations in Orakzai, Khyber and beyond. The leader of the Swat Taliban, Maulvi Fazlullah, is said to have fled to Afghanistan.
None of this minimises the significance of what has happened so far. The army today has a presence in all seven tribal agencies, including North Waziristan, where a division is deployed. It is engaged in counter-militancy missions of varying intensity in a phased way to avoid multiple engagements and minimise the danger of "overstretch." The strategy of dealing with one area at a time seems to be paying off.
The offensive launched last October in South Waziristan the largest-ever counterinsurgency operation is now in the "hold" mode, having almost completed the "clear" phase. Five brigades are in the Mehsud area while the region east and west of this is being cleared, where air power is also being used.
The operation has been effective in neutralising the TTPs centre of gravity. The Taliban have been dislodged from their sanctuaries, control of the area wrested from them and their training camps from where an estimated 80 per cent of suicide bombings were launched destroyed.
Two of "Operation Rah-e-Nijats" three objectives have been achieved: establishing the states writ, and dismantling the insurgents infrastructure. The third goal, to create space for civilian authorities to engage tribal elders in establishing a sustainable political order, is a work in progress.
This is the imposing challenge of the present phase, in which tribal maliks have to be encouraged to return and their authority revived to reestablish a functional arrangement that can take over from the military. Progress in this task will enable the estimated 200,000 locals who fled the Mehsud area to return for rehabilitation.
None of this will be quick or easy. It will need to be buttressed by significant development activity so that an environment can be created that is inhospitable to the return of the militants and alleviates the socio-economic conditions that feed the insurgency.
The projects being launched by the army in partnership with the local administration after consultation with tribal elders are a step in the right direction. As also are efforts to secure the support of the Mehsud and Waziri tribal maliks for development.
The litmus test of a military operation is when it ends a credible governance authority is fostered. Inability to deliver on this can unravel the military gains and lose critical local support.
Swats experience is instructive in this respect. Although the phase of "build" and "transfer" (of responsibilities from the military to civilian authorities) has proceeded slower than expected, due to capacity limitations, reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts are in full swing even as military action to "sanitise" and secure surrounding areas continues. There is no better testimony to the revival of public confidence and return of normalcy than the repatriation of the displaced population and last months peaceful by-election to a provincial assembly seat.
But terrorist attacks continue to shake the country. 2009 was the most violent year mainly because of the fierce backlash against the military operations. Daily bomb explosions strained the publics patience and tested the national resolve to fight militancy. Last year surpassed the previous years grim record: an estimated 2,586 terrorist, insurgent and sectarian-related incidents including 87 suicide attacks compared to 2,577 in 2008. 3,021 people were killed in terrorist violence in 2009.
Some of the violence continuing into this year may be reprisals for the intensified US drone strikes in the tribal areas. Increasing attacks on "soft" targets may represent a shift in tactics by militants aimed at shaking the national consensus. This is backfiring as the brutal assaults have only steeled the public will to fight back.
The tribal areas remain volatile. The intensification of military action in Bajaur, and to some extent Mohmand, is a response to resurgent militant activity increasingly launched from across the border. This reflects a "reverse safe haven" phenomenon, which is a potent reminder of how instability in Afghanistan continues to jeopardise Pakistans counterinsurgency efforts and also of the fact that militancy cannot be defeated in isolation to the security situation next door.
The US/Nato offensive in southern Afghanistan can also adversely affect Pakistan. Both "push" and "pull" factors "push" (militants being driven to Pakistan from Afghanistan) and "pull" (expecting the Pakistani army to act as an "anvil") -- can strain the militarys capacity and detract from its anti-militant efforts.
Especially as the campaign is at a delicate juncture. While TTP militants are on the run, having been deprived of a base to train, regroup and operate from, this has not led to a halt in their activities. The loose network has shown a capacity to regenerate even after the loss of its leaders and recover from fierce internal struggles. It may now be adapting to mounting pressure by dispersing and coordinating actions with sympathetic groups outside FATA.
A more diffuse threat with the means to cause disruption in the countrys mainland will need a different response from military assaults to secure territory. They will require effective law enforcement, improved policing, better intelligence and, of course, sustained public support.
This means replacing a fire-fighting approach with a comprehensive and multilayered strategy that employs a diverse toolkit for what most certainly will be a long haul. When army chief Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani recently described the present phase as transitional, he seemed to call for an approach in which the states civilian organs take a lead role.
The key question is whether a capacity can be generated for such a "civilian surge" even as the various law enforcement agencies take sustained steps to dismantle the syndicate of terror that still operates in the country. In the longer run the neutralisation of this network will also rest on bringing to an end the conflicts and disputes in the region that have motivated and nourished the forces of militancy.
Tuesday, February 23, 2010
Dr Maleeha Lodhi
The writer is a former envoy to the US and the UK, and a former editor of The News.
Have the military operations in South Waziristan, other tribal areas and Swat helped to create a strategic moment in the countrys struggle against militants? Will 2010 be decisive in reversing the tide of militancy after a deadly year that saw a record number of terrorist attacks and killings? Has military action scattered the local Taliban or irrevocably weakened the movement?
There are no easy answers to these questions in a fluid and fraught situation gravely affected by border volatility that is being heightened by the escalating war in Afghanistan. The consolidation of gains made by military offensives will depend on overcoming a sobering number of hurdles and resolving critical governance issues. This means a greater role for political rather than military actors in the transition to the post-conflict phase.
Militancy has been dealt a lethal blow, but one that is not fatal yet. The necessary, though not sufficient, conditions have been created to turn the tide. The loss within six months of two leaders Baitullah and Hakeemullah Mehsud has left the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan in confusion and disarray. The assault on the TTPs stronghold in South Waziristan has degraded the organisations capability. But its continued ability to strike in the mainland suggests it has more than just a residual capacity and is using its connection with other groups to orchestrate the attacks.
Among the daunting tasks ahead are to dismantle the militants "syndicate" that remains intact, disrupt its supply line and flow of financial resources which are also intact and destroy its intelligence "assets." Also critical is to halt the flow of recruits into the ranks of the Pakistani Taliban, even though this has been affected by its loss of physical space. That the threat may be becoming more dispersed is indicated by the nexus the TTP has established over time with proscribed organisations or their splinters beyond FATA.
While the top leaders have been eliminated as part of a decapitation strategy the rest of the TTP leadership are still at large. Many melted away into the adjoining areas in pursuit of new hideouts, which necessitated cordon and search operations in Orakzai, Khyber and beyond. The leader of the Swat Taliban, Maulvi Fazlullah, is said to have fled to Afghanistan.
None of this minimises the significance of what has happened so far. The army today has a presence in all seven tribal agencies, including North Waziristan, where a division is deployed. It is engaged in counter-militancy missions of varying intensity in a phased way to avoid multiple engagements and minimise the danger of "overstretch." The strategy of dealing with one area at a time seems to be paying off.
The offensive launched last October in South Waziristan the largest-ever counterinsurgency operation is now in the "hold" mode, having almost completed the "clear" phase. Five brigades are in the Mehsud area while the region east and west of this is being cleared, where air power is also being used.
The operation has been effective in neutralising the TTPs centre of gravity. The Taliban have been dislodged from their sanctuaries, control of the area wrested from them and their training camps from where an estimated 80 per cent of suicide bombings were launched destroyed.
Two of "Operation Rah-e-Nijats" three objectives have been achieved: establishing the states writ, and dismantling the insurgents infrastructure. The third goal, to create space for civilian authorities to engage tribal elders in establishing a sustainable political order, is a work in progress.
This is the imposing challenge of the present phase, in which tribal maliks have to be encouraged to return and their authority revived to reestablish a functional arrangement that can take over from the military. Progress in this task will enable the estimated 200,000 locals who fled the Mehsud area to return for rehabilitation.
None of this will be quick or easy. It will need to be buttressed by significant development activity so that an environment can be created that is inhospitable to the return of the militants and alleviates the socio-economic conditions that feed the insurgency.
The projects being launched by the army in partnership with the local administration after consultation with tribal elders are a step in the right direction. As also are efforts to secure the support of the Mehsud and Waziri tribal maliks for development.
The litmus test of a military operation is when it ends a credible governance authority is fostered. Inability to deliver on this can unravel the military gains and lose critical local support.
Swats experience is instructive in this respect. Although the phase of "build" and "transfer" (of responsibilities from the military to civilian authorities) has proceeded slower than expected, due to capacity limitations, reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts are in full swing even as military action to "sanitise" and secure surrounding areas continues. There is no better testimony to the revival of public confidence and return of normalcy than the repatriation of the displaced population and last months peaceful by-election to a provincial assembly seat.
But terrorist attacks continue to shake the country. 2009 was the most violent year mainly because of the fierce backlash against the military operations. Daily bomb explosions strained the publics patience and tested the national resolve to fight militancy. Last year surpassed the previous years grim record: an estimated 2,586 terrorist, insurgent and sectarian-related incidents including 87 suicide attacks compared to 2,577 in 2008. 3,021 people were killed in terrorist violence in 2009.
Some of the violence continuing into this year may be reprisals for the intensified US drone strikes in the tribal areas. Increasing attacks on "soft" targets may represent a shift in tactics by militants aimed at shaking the national consensus. This is backfiring as the brutal assaults have only steeled the public will to fight back.
The tribal areas remain volatile. The intensification of military action in Bajaur, and to some extent Mohmand, is a response to resurgent militant activity increasingly launched from across the border. This reflects a "reverse safe haven" phenomenon, which is a potent reminder of how instability in Afghanistan continues to jeopardise Pakistans counterinsurgency efforts and also of the fact that militancy cannot be defeated in isolation to the security situation next door.
The US/Nato offensive in southern Afghanistan can also adversely affect Pakistan. Both "push" and "pull" factors "push" (militants being driven to Pakistan from Afghanistan) and "pull" (expecting the Pakistani army to act as an "anvil") -- can strain the militarys capacity and detract from its anti-militant efforts.
Especially as the campaign is at a delicate juncture. While TTP militants are on the run, having been deprived of a base to train, regroup and operate from, this has not led to a halt in their activities. The loose network has shown a capacity to regenerate even after the loss of its leaders and recover from fierce internal struggles. It may now be adapting to mounting pressure by dispersing and coordinating actions with sympathetic groups outside FATA.
A more diffuse threat with the means to cause disruption in the countrys mainland will need a different response from military assaults to secure territory. They will require effective law enforcement, improved policing, better intelligence and, of course, sustained public support.
This means replacing a fire-fighting approach with a comprehensive and multilayered strategy that employs a diverse toolkit for what most certainly will be a long haul. When army chief Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani recently described the present phase as transitional, he seemed to call for an approach in which the states civilian organs take a lead role.
The key question is whether a capacity can be generated for such a "civilian surge" even as the various law enforcement agencies take sustained steps to dismantle the syndicate of terror that still operates in the country. In the longer run the neutralisation of this network will also rest on bringing to an end the conflicts and disputes in the region that have motivated and nourished the forces of militancy.
