Nothing but confusion
Amir Zia
Monday, June 24, 2013
From Print Edition
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The writer is editor The News, Karachi.
Many innocent minds thought that the new government would at least have a plan, some strategy to tackle the twin challenges of religious extremism and terrorism that now pose an existential threat to the state called Pakistan. Alas, Prime Minister Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif’s opening shots in the first couple of weeks in power fail to stir much confidence or give us hope.
The facts are depressing; since Sharif took oath as prime minister on June 5, there have been at least 10 major- to mid-level terror attacks and a spate of targeted killings across the country in which more than 150 people have been killed, with many more wounded. The victims of terrorism and religious, political and ethnic violence include two provincial assembly lawmakers – one each from Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, while others on this ever-expanding list are Pakistan Army officers and soldiers, policemen, Shia Muslims, an Ahmadi, members of various political parties and of course ordinary men, women and children.
Most of them had nothing whatsoever to do with any of the simmering conflicts within the country – from North Waziristan to Balochistan. They also did not invite or permit US drones to target Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants, who successfully managed to bring the Afghan war on Pakistani territory. These civilians, seen as a legitimate and fair target by militants, just happen to be at the wrong place at the wrong time.
Equally disappointing remains the new government’s response to the brutalities unleashed by the Al-Qaeda-inspired local militants and those committing barbaric acts in the name of Balochistan’s rights or under the banner of some ‘lashkar’, tehreek or the George Orwellian ‘peace’ committee in Karachi.
Our ‘lion-hearted’ prime minister, his ‘hawkish’ interior minister, the ‘talented’ brother, and even the smooth-talking information minister – all failed even to talk the right talk, let alone showing any signs that the government at least plans to take practical steps and a holistic approach to tackle the ghost of terrorism and extremism.
Yes, we all know that the new setup is still very new and in the process of settling in. The elected government has yet to come to terms with power and its various stakeholders. It is still struggling to make sense out of all the chaos around it. And most importantly, it has no magic wand to put back in the bottle the genie of extremism and terrorism – unleashed in the 1980s by Sharif’s one-time mentor and boss General Ziaul Haq – transforming Pakistan into the abnormal country the world knows today.
But the new government should have at least given a clear-cut policy statement, an outline of its strategy or even a mere expression of interest on whether it wants to confront the challenge of terrorism. If the answer is yes; then the question remains: how? However, all we got was a timid, meek, confusing and self-contradictory response at various government levels and a ‘meaningless’ silence from the prime minister himself.
His lieutenants keep giving the message that the government wants to talk with those ‘who are willing to talk’ and vow stern action against those who continue to remain on the path of violence and terrorism. At the same time, our new rulers and masters also frequently come up with one of the most fashionable policy statements of these unfortunate times – ‘dialogue is the only way to bring peace and put an end to terrorism’.
But haven’t we all heard, read and suffered such confusing statements countless times before? What remains unclear is whether the government wants to talk and fight at the same time or just talk and not fight at all. Will it impose any preconditions for talks with militants of different shades or first surrender to their demands that include freeing prisoners, pulling out troops from the conflict zones and handing over parts of Pakistan’s territory to them? All these questions merit straight answers.
The contrast between the single-mindedness of militants and the lack of direction on the part of the government is scary. While militants are on a killing spree our elected representatives overwhelmingly are of the view that the struggle against terrorism and extremism is not Pakistan’s concern. They want to believe that once Islamabad somehow manages to halt the US drone attacks and disassociates itself from what they call an ‘American war’, Pakistan will be back to normal. They also mistakenly think that the militants are organised under some broad monolith umbrella having a centralised control that can be switched on and off by pressing the right buttons. Such presumptions are flawed, dangerous and self-defeating.
It would be interesting to hear what the military leaders and their foot soldiers, who stand in the line of fire, have to say to these pearls of wisdom by elected and unelected politicians.
However, the so-called ‘talks lobby’ comprising religious and right-wing forces, many of which are sympathetic to the Taliban’s controversial version of Islam, are likely to become more assertive in their demand that the government should hold talks with the local militants following the fact that the US is now openly engaging with the Afghan Taliban as part of its exit strategy from Afghanistan. The opening up of the Afghan Taliban’s office in Doha is likely to embolden and encourage not just the pro-talk lobbies, but also the local militants as key Pakistani institutions and political players appear to be struggling for a consensus.
The only problem with this pro-talk narrative is that there is no parallel between Afghanistan and Pakistan when it comes to engaging with militants. In Afghanistan, a foreign occupation force is trying to strike a deal with a local force that dominates the majority Pakthun belt of that war-torn country. In Pakistan, the security forces are trying to establish the writ of the state in some fringe areas where local and foreign militants have taken shelter. In the Pakistani context, it is the question of whether the state is prepared to abdicate its writ from parts of its territory and allow militants to use it for terrorism within the country and across the world.
Are Sharif, Imran Khan, Maulana Fazlur Rehman and others who plead the case for talks ready to settle in for the second option? The nation demands an answer. The military, which is by far spearheading the struggle against militants amidst allegations that it patronises some favourites among them, should think twice before committing to a position in the supposed ‘end game’ in Afghanistan.
The Pakistani Taliban and other Al-Qaeda-inspired groups take a lead from their Afghan counterparts who, as proven in the past, remain more committed to their pan-Islamist political agenda than obliging Pakistan. We tried and tested this approach in the run-up to start of the US’ more than a decade long great adventure in Afghanistan and found it wanting.
History shows that policies of appeasement and deals with non-state actors at the cost of the country’s constitution, sovereignty and political order always boomerang. The moment the state and its institutions show signs of fatigue and weakness in a conflict, militants get a psychological edge in the battle of nerves.
Our civilian leaders’ desperation to negotiate with those responsible for the killings of thousands of innocent people is nothing but an open admission of weakness. Should one take this desperation to hold talks with militants as an epitaph to Jinnah’s Pakistan? Or is there hope that the military and civilian leadership will be on the same page and do the needful – take the bull by its horns and save Pakistan from these forces of darkness? The armed forces should at least have the capacity to show some light to the elected ones to counter this internal threat and destroy their own Frankenstein’s monsters – or is this too a tall order?
