Top Freedom fighter Commander Martyred in Encounter in J&K
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Your erstwhile country has been surgically bifurcation into its components. And you are barely clinging onto the remaining vestiges.
We don't seek war, you do. Eventually, when we are dragged into it, it will be one to end all others.
Sudhar jao, has been hitherto the message from us, giving you the time and chance to mend your ways.
This false bravado of your kind is well known to us, bhayyas may fall for it but we won't. We have tamed you lot over the centuries, and if it were upto us things wouldn't have been long drawn.
newb3e
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filhal toh hindu khatray may lay raha hai! hindu union khartay may hain mitrrrunnnn!
IceCold
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You have tamed us for centuries or was it the other way round? If history is a testimony to anything it is your nation who has lived under slavery and the freedom and liberty you are experiencing since 47 has gone to your heads into thinking you are some tough lot. The reality is far from it. The false bravado isnt going to make India a super power when it reality you are nothing more than a third world country. Instead of lifting your poor, all your 56" RSS terrorist has done is to alienate his own Muslim population, has given fire to an uprising in Kashmir and has tried to pick fights with Pakistan and got bitch slapped Everytime.
But yeah we all await for your kind to tame us. Have been looking forward to it because one way or the other your brutality and terrorism will have to be stopped by any means possible.
Foxtrot Delta
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Sarfaroshi ko tamana ... Jihad is the only option left for kashmiris
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Pellet-hit, bloodied, face with no name: Inside hospital after Pulwama gunfight
By
Yashraj Sharma
-
Zahid was hit by pellets in the aftermath of Pulwama gunfight on Wednesday. Photograph by Yashraj Sharma for The Kashmir Walla
Nobody knew his name. His bandaged face was soaked in blood; he couldn’t speak either—the blood had dried up and sealed his lips. A young boy, who pushed his stretcher out of the elevator on the third-floor, where surgeries are performed in Shri Maharaja Hari Singh hospital, Srinagar, had to run back quickly.
“There are more boys on the ground floor,” he said, panicking.
A team of healthcare staff, wearing Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), dragged the stretcher inside the surgery ward in a rush. And shut the door. Ghulam Qadir Wani, an elderly man wearing a pheran and a mask, sat despondently next to the gate. His son, too, was inside the ward.
Two hours earlier, he was at his home in Koil village of Pulwama district, south Kashmir, when a man came running towards him. “Your son has been hit with pellets,” he was told. His 23-year-old son, Shahid Wani, was among the hundreds of protestors who reached Beighpora village in the wee hours of Wednesday.
The phones were buzzing with rumours: Riyaz Naikoo, the operational commander-in-chief of Hizbul Mujahideen, a militant outfit, was trapped in a gunfight with government forces in his native village.
During the gunfight, the protestors threw stones at the government forces—attempting to help trapped militants escape. The forces retaliated with live ammunition and metal pellets. In the clashes, over two dozen protestors were injured. Medical Superintendent of District Hospital Pulwama, Dr. Mir Mushtaq told a news agency that sixteen injured were received at the hospital. “Four of them had bullet wounds while the rest had pellet injuries.”
Within an hour, young boys sat tucked-in in the waiting area in Srinagar’s hospital. Some had friends, others had brothers.
The gates opened and a doctor walked out. “Who is with Shahid?” he asked. Wani stood in a jerk and walked up to him, worried. “He is fine. He got pellets on his chest and abdomen,” the doctor said. Wani broke down. “His face is almost untouched.”
It was a moment of relief for Wani. He had feared worse; from July 2016 to February 2019, metal pellets—which the Ministry of Home Affairs calls “non-lethal”—have killed eighteen, blinded 139, injured 2,942, and caused eye injuries to 1,459.
Soon after, the healthcare staff dragged out two stretchers; one’s elder brother surrounded him, the other lay unattended and unmoved. Two boys stood up quickly and held onto two drips of the boy-with-no-name, as the medicine flowed into his veins through needles.
“Get his CT [Computed Tomography] scan done and move him to ward-eight on the ground floor, quickly,” a nurse ordered and wrote on an unnamed ticket. The boys nodded and rushed towards the elevator—only to be halted.
The elevator’s door opened and another boy on a stretcher, wearing a black-strip t-shirt, was pushed out; the blood on his clothes had mixed with mud, and one couldn’t differentiate anymore.
After he was taken inside the ward—his injury unknown to me—the boy-with-no-name got into the elevator. The doors slid-closed and one of the boys pushed G-button for the ground-floor of the hospital, heading towards the CT scan room.
Struggling to continue, Zahir told a phone number slowly—requesting to inform his family of his whereabouts. But it didn’t work.
His joggers were wet and his face had metal pellets. The silence inside the elevator was deafening. One of the attendants tapped on his shoulders as he lay unmoved: “You’ll be just fine. Don’t worry.” He moved one of his fingers.
I leaned and asked, “Do you have anyone with you?” He didn’t respond. “What is your age?” I asked. He ripped open his lips slowly—the blood still there—and mumbled, “Twenty.”
“Your name?” I asked, tapping his shoulder to keep him conscious. “Zahid.”
Struggling to continue, Zahir told a phone number slowly—requesting to inform his family of his whereabouts. But it didn’t work. The authorities had snapped phone lines in Kashmir in the afternoon, as the rumors of Naikoo’s killing became headlines.
One of the longest surviving militants in the Valley, a joint party of the government forces had zeroed in Naikoo’s native village on Tuesday night. He was shot dead by the forces during the gunfight on Wednesday. He was 35.
In a statement, the police held him accountable for about a dozen crimes, including attacks on government forces and the police in his 8-year long survival.
At the hospital, the boy, who was holding onto Zahid’s drips, asked him to rest and not worry.
Zahid being taken to the ward in elevator at the SMHS hospital of Srinagar on Wednesday. Photographs by Yashraj Sharma for The Kashmir Walla
The ground floor was deserted. It has been weeks since the hospital shut its Outdoor Patient Department; a global pandemic, COVID-19, didn’t spare Kashmir. On this day, thirty-four more cases were detected of the coronavirus, and the tally in Jammu and Kashmir rose to 775.
In the empty corridor, as the sun began to set, two boys, also residents of Pulwama district—unacquainted with Zahid—held on to his stretcher tight; one of the wheels won’t revolve in the rhythm. If Zahid’s foot wasn’t bumping onto a wall, then one of the boys would stumble.
Outside the CT scan room, two corridors down from the elevator, a boy in grey t-shirt, his hair dry and long, sat with a bandage on his left eye. He sat next to a wall with his face ducked. But the stretcher’s wheels were loud; he stood and ran down to help.
While Zahid lay inside for his scan, Wani came with his son on another stretcher. But he will have to wait a little longer. Before Wani’s son, two more boys with pellet injuries were in line.
However, Zahid’s reports would take an hour or so. Meanwhile, he was rushed to Ward-8 of the Department of Ophthalmology, where he would need to rest as his treatment would continue.
At the ward’s entrance, a few meters long narrow-corridor, a male nurse stopped Zahid. She checked his ticket, and asked for details. The boys replied with the first name and denied for more.
A boy frisked him for an identity card; he pulled out a bullet shell from his left pocket of the joggers. And he looked at it briefly before throwing it away in a dustbin nearby. Registering the admission, the nurse told me, “We’ve received at least fourteen cases so far from Pulwama.”
After the registration, Zahid was moved inside the ward and the nurse walked back in his room. But there was no time to relax. He quickly picked up his torch and flashed it at another boy sitting on a bench. The nurse held up two fingers in front of the face—bandaged on the left eye, asking him to nod if he can see.
The boy nodded yes as tears rolled down his right eye. A few hours later, his bandage would be removed and a doctor would check on his left eye. Only then would he know if he is half-blinded or not.
https://thekashmirwalla.com/2020/05/pellet-hit-with-no-name-inside-hospital-pulwama-gunfight/
By
Yashraj Sharma
-
Zahid was hit by pellets in the aftermath of Pulwama gunfight on Wednesday. Photograph by Yashraj Sharma for The Kashmir Walla
Nobody knew his name. His bandaged face was soaked in blood; he couldn’t speak either—the blood had dried up and sealed his lips. A young boy, who pushed his stretcher out of the elevator on the third-floor, where surgeries are performed in Shri Maharaja Hari Singh hospital, Srinagar, had to run back quickly.
“There are more boys on the ground floor,” he said, panicking.
A team of healthcare staff, wearing Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), dragged the stretcher inside the surgery ward in a rush. And shut the door. Ghulam Qadir Wani, an elderly man wearing a pheran and a mask, sat despondently next to the gate. His son, too, was inside the ward.
Two hours earlier, he was at his home in Koil village of Pulwama district, south Kashmir, when a man came running towards him. “Your son has been hit with pellets,” he was told. His 23-year-old son, Shahid Wani, was among the hundreds of protestors who reached Beighpora village in the wee hours of Wednesday.
The phones were buzzing with rumours: Riyaz Naikoo, the operational commander-in-chief of Hizbul Mujahideen, a militant outfit, was trapped in a gunfight with government forces in his native village.
During the gunfight, the protestors threw stones at the government forces—attempting to help trapped militants escape. The forces retaliated with live ammunition and metal pellets. In the clashes, over two dozen protestors were injured. Medical Superintendent of District Hospital Pulwama, Dr. Mir Mushtaq told a news agency that sixteen injured were received at the hospital. “Four of them had bullet wounds while the rest had pellet injuries.”
Within an hour, young boys sat tucked-in in the waiting area in Srinagar’s hospital. Some had friends, others had brothers.
The gates opened and a doctor walked out. “Who is with Shahid?” he asked. Wani stood in a jerk and walked up to him, worried. “He is fine. He got pellets on his chest and abdomen,” the doctor said. Wani broke down. “His face is almost untouched.”
It was a moment of relief for Wani. He had feared worse; from July 2016 to February 2019, metal pellets—which the Ministry of Home Affairs calls “non-lethal”—have killed eighteen, blinded 139, injured 2,942, and caused eye injuries to 1,459.
Soon after, the healthcare staff dragged out two stretchers; one’s elder brother surrounded him, the other lay unattended and unmoved. Two boys stood up quickly and held onto two drips of the boy-with-no-name, as the medicine flowed into his veins through needles.
“Get his CT [Computed Tomography] scan done and move him to ward-eight on the ground floor, quickly,” a nurse ordered and wrote on an unnamed ticket. The boys nodded and rushed towards the elevator—only to be halted.
The elevator’s door opened and another boy on a stretcher, wearing a black-strip t-shirt, was pushed out; the blood on his clothes had mixed with mud, and one couldn’t differentiate anymore.
After he was taken inside the ward—his injury unknown to me—the boy-with-no-name got into the elevator. The doors slid-closed and one of the boys pushed G-button for the ground-floor of the hospital, heading towards the CT scan room.
Struggling to continue, Zahir told a phone number slowly—requesting to inform his family of his whereabouts. But it didn’t work.
His joggers were wet and his face had metal pellets. The silence inside the elevator was deafening. One of the attendants tapped on his shoulders as he lay unmoved: “You’ll be just fine. Don’t worry.” He moved one of his fingers.
I leaned and asked, “Do you have anyone with you?” He didn’t respond. “What is your age?” I asked. He ripped open his lips slowly—the blood still there—and mumbled, “Twenty.”
“Your name?” I asked, tapping his shoulder to keep him conscious. “Zahid.”
Struggling to continue, Zahir told a phone number slowly—requesting to inform his family of his whereabouts. But it didn’t work. The authorities had snapped phone lines in Kashmir in the afternoon, as the rumors of Naikoo’s killing became headlines.
One of the longest surviving militants in the Valley, a joint party of the government forces had zeroed in Naikoo’s native village on Tuesday night. He was shot dead by the forces during the gunfight on Wednesday. He was 35.
In a statement, the police held him accountable for about a dozen crimes, including attacks on government forces and the police in his 8-year long survival.
At the hospital, the boy, who was holding onto Zahid’s drips, asked him to rest and not worry.
Zahid being taken to the ward in elevator at the SMHS hospital of Srinagar on Wednesday. Photographs by Yashraj Sharma for The Kashmir Walla
The ground floor was deserted. It has been weeks since the hospital shut its Outdoor Patient Department; a global pandemic, COVID-19, didn’t spare Kashmir. On this day, thirty-four more cases were detected of the coronavirus, and the tally in Jammu and Kashmir rose to 775.
In the empty corridor, as the sun began to set, two boys, also residents of Pulwama district—unacquainted with Zahid—held on to his stretcher tight; one of the wheels won’t revolve in the rhythm. If Zahid’s foot wasn’t bumping onto a wall, then one of the boys would stumble.
Outside the CT scan room, two corridors down from the elevator, a boy in grey t-shirt, his hair dry and long, sat with a bandage on his left eye. He sat next to a wall with his face ducked. But the stretcher’s wheels were loud; he stood and ran down to help.
While Zahid lay inside for his scan, Wani came with his son on another stretcher. But he will have to wait a little longer. Before Wani’s son, two more boys with pellet injuries were in line.
However, Zahid’s reports would take an hour or so. Meanwhile, he was rushed to Ward-8 of the Department of Ophthalmology, where he would need to rest as his treatment would continue.
At the ward’s entrance, a few meters long narrow-corridor, a male nurse stopped Zahid. She checked his ticket, and asked for details. The boys replied with the first name and denied for more.
A boy frisked him for an identity card; he pulled out a bullet shell from his left pocket of the joggers. And he looked at it briefly before throwing it away in a dustbin nearby. Registering the admission, the nurse told me, “We’ve received at least fourteen cases so far from Pulwama.”
After the registration, Zahid was moved inside the ward and the nurse walked back in his room. But there was no time to relax. He quickly picked up his torch and flashed it at another boy sitting on a bench. The nurse held up two fingers in front of the face—bandaged on the left eye, asking him to nod if he can see.
The boy nodded yes as tears rolled down his right eye. A few hours later, his bandage would be removed and a doctor would check on his left eye. Only then would he know if he is half-blinded or not.
https://thekashmirwalla.com/2020/05/pellet-hit-with-no-name-inside-hospital-pulwama-gunfight/
atya
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Third time??
Foxtrot Delta
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A)Timuri/mughal/afghan division of hindustan
B) British empire division of states in east and south.
C) pakistani pakistan of northern east & north west British india
So yea 3 times in past 200 years and hopefully once more in a few years.
Kashmir was never part of india ever. In 5000 years nor of tibet or china. It has been a free independent central asian kingdom since 5000 years. We want to become pakistan just because of Jinnah who said if you are muslim just join pakistan. We are majority muslim and we chose pakistan. We will be pakistan.
Last edited:
GHALIB
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who cares for pakistan ? they are enemy .
i am shia muslim rajput from uttar pradesh .
undercover JIX
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that is only possible if he was really there, feel good news for sanghi bakhts is always like thins...just a statement no proof......sanghis happy....modi is mahaan veer expert and knows how to make fools of Indians.
he will remain low cast achoot in India, no matter how much he try.
you can not be a shia, muslim or even Rajput.....you are a shameful creature low cast cheering the ones killing your own Muslims....and you are a disgrace for Rajputs....you have no traits of Rajputs..you are a coward..can not be a Rajput blood.
Amaa'n
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I would humbly request that you guys take this matter of Balochistan & FATA annexation to the appropriate thread instead of derailing the thread at hand....which is about a Freedom Fighter, born & raised in IOK got martyed at the hands of Indian Occupied forces.....feel free to discuss this matter at length here
Thanks
AfrazulMandal
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I WAS referring to the Kashmiri fighter only. Not the ones in FATA or elsewhere. Perhaps you misunderstood my position.I would humbly request that you guys take this matter of Balochistan & FATA annexation to the appropriate thread instead of derailing the thread at hand....which is about a Freedom Fighter, born & raised in IOK got martyed at the hands of Indian Occupied forces.....feel free to discuss this matter at length here
Thanks
Baghial
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Handwara Encounter –Open Source Intelligence version
@KashmirOsint Counterinsurgency Ops, Militancy, Terrorism May 12, 2020 11 Minutes
Indian security forces leaving from the gunfight site in Handwara on May 3
Late in the evening on May 2, there were sensitive and restricted reports that Indian Security forces may have suffered a major, unexpected damage in Handwara gunfight, a Colonel, a Major, 2 soldiers and a sub-inspector from J&K Police’s counterinsurgency wing (SOG) who had gone into the target-house, remained out of contact for many hours. Radio calls and calls on personal mobile phones remain unanswered. This was my reaction:
I treated the information as sensitive and maybe classified, did not share it or make it public. I struggled to understand why would a commanding officer of ~1500 soldiers venture into the target-house with just 3-4 soldiers with him and an officer from SOG. I had only two explanations at that time:
(1) The Colonel and team ventured into the target-house to check on the presumed ‘dead’ militant(s), the ‘dead’ militant(s) rose from the debris, found the Colonel and team totally off guard and took them out before they could even react, like the Pulwama gunfight last year where Indian army lost five soldiers, including a Major after a militant presumed dead came out of nowhere and sprayed-down his Kalashnikov at them. A Lt. Colonel, a Brigadier, a Captian and a DIG police were injured in the unexpected attack too. Or the Handwara gunfight in 2019 where, in a similar incident, a paramilitary officer and SOG personnel were killed.
(2) The Colonel and team ventured into the target-house to check on the presumed ‘dead’ militant(s), the militant(s) who were alive, attacked them, the Colonel and team somehow positioned themselves in or outside the house, are alive, have strategically switched their radios and mobile devices to silent mode.
At 2145 hours (approx.), the news hit Twitter; an Indian journalist working for a Hindi news channel ‘broke’ the news, and in no time an army of mainstream Indian journalists with blue ticks shared and recycled the news, and with it the details of missing officers, some claimed the soldiers were taken hostages by militants. I found it ridiculous. I knew the Colonel and Co. were either dead already, or alive, positioned strategically, in control, waiting for militants to make their move, to take them out. A militant who knows his certain death is moments away, or any militant for that matter, would never take hostages, do any talking or waste any time on negotiations in middle of a fierce gunfight. He won’t miss a chance to kill his enemy at the first sight, at the first opportunity that arises. Some Indian journalists claimed “all five soldiers were rescued and safe”. I wasn’t sure how to react to that. How exactly do you ‘rescue’ a SOG officer and a Colonel with three buddies, who have won multiple gallantry awards for their valor and achievements working in counterinsurgency ops in the valley for decades, from two militants? If they were unarmed and off duty , maybe.
I spent some time researching on the encounter. I went through different accounts, versions, some old stories, intel reports etc and came up with my version of what happened in Handwara on May 2.
The OSINT version
Indian soldiers taking positions behind a concrete barrier near the gunfight site in Handwara on May 2)
Friday, May 1 (1400 hours): India Security forces received intel that a large group of Lashkar-e-Taiba militants led by local commander Gani Khawaja is moving in the Rajwar and Marwar forest area. Gani Khawaja is big fish in the Handwara-Sopore belt, allegedly responsible for multiple attacks on Indian security forces and executions of civilians in Sopore area. Indian army’s 21-RR, 15-RR, 30-RR, SOG, 92-CRPF and Para-9 launched a search ops in the forest. A brief contact with militants was established, exchange of fire between militants and Indian security forces took place in Waddar-Bala pocket of the forest. Militants escape from the area in multiple groups, in multiple directions. Indian security forces believed that some of the militants went further deep into the forest, and some fled down into the residential area, close to the forest. The first fire was opened by militants, forcing Indian security forces to take cover and helping militants vanish from the sight. Indian security forces believe if the militants had not launched a proactive, sudden attack on them at a disadvantageous location, the militants might as well would have been neutralised in the forest itself. The proactive attack gave militants an upper hand. Indian security forces continued the siege and search ops throughout the night. The ops was called off at 1000 hours on Saturday May 2, without any success or maybe strategically. All the human-intel in the area was activated.
Saturday, May 2 (1500 hours (approx.): Indian army receive intel, a group of militants that escaped from Rajwar forests a day before have taken refuge in a two storey house in Changimulla, in the foot of the forest, 1.4 miles (approx.) from the location where first standoff with militants took place on previous day. Indian security forces launch a cordon and search ops in the village. 21-RR, 15-RR, 30-RR, 22-RR, 92-CRPF, Para-9 and J&K Police’s SOG take part in the ops. The joint-ops is led by Colonel Ashutosh Sharma, Major Anuj and sub-inspector SOG, Qazi Sagheer, two of them decorated counterinsurgency specialists with decades of experience working in counterinsurgency ops in Kashmir.
Saturday, May 2 (1530 hours (approx.): The target-house is located and contact with militants is established. A fierce gun battle rages, exchange of fire takes from both sides. Indian army used assault rifles, UBGLs, recoilless launchers against the holed up militants. The firefight ‘ends’ and there is a long enduring lull, long enough to give Indian security forces assurance and confidence that all militants were neutralised and encounter was over. Indian security forces chose not to blow up the house in usual way or burn it down to ashes like it is usually done in encounters in Kashmir. They may have tried to save the poor carpenter’s house presuming militants were dead already and no further action was required. When militants don’t resist for long, are neutralised in initial stages of the gunfight, the house is spared.
1830 hours (approx.): Indian security forces lead by Colonel Sharma, Major Anuj and sub-inspector Qazi approached the target-house to check on the presumed ‘dead’ militants, a miscalculation, an error in judgement that would cost them dearly. As soon as they came closer to the target-house, a lone militant, out of nowhere, emerged from an abutting single storey structure and fired indiscriminately at them. The spray-down from his Kalashnikov hit four men, Major Anuj, two soldiers and sub-inspector Qazi, two of them above neck, two in the wings and abdomen. Colonel Sharma ran towards an adjacent cowshed, others fled back to their original positions away from the gunfight site. It was already dark by now. The lone militant followed Colonel Sharma, caught hold of him and shot him dead inside/ or at the entrance of the cowshed. It is not clear if Colonel Sharma was armed with an assault rifle or had accidentally dropped it at the sudden and intense attack, or wasn’t carrying one in the first place. Some of the wounds on Indian soldiers appear to be inflicted by a blunt object, not bullets. It is not clear if the militant also used some sort of cutting tool in the assault or only the assault rifle. Indian security forces’ unit outside the gunfight site, made several attempts to reach Colonel Sharma and team on the radio. There was no answer. In a desperate attempt, a phone call was finally made to Colonel Sharma’s personal mobile phone later in the night. It was answered by a militant. The nature of conversation remains unknown. It was at this moment, the unit outside the gunfight site knew that Colonel Sharma and his team were KIA and final assault to neutralise the militant started. The pictures of slain Colonel Sharma and team that I saw, suggest Colonel Sharma was killed separately. His body cannot be seen near the other four bodies lying on the ground, that of Major Anuj, two soldiers and sub-inspector Qazi. Indian security forces were not sure how many militants were holed up in the target-house or the adjacent structure(s).
The lone militant then picked up arms and ammunition from the slain soldiers and went inside the target-house. He fought all night. One of the reasons he lasted longer was that he did not exhaust his limited ammo, like militants usually do. He had picked up enough ammo from the slain soldiers. However, the main reason why he lasted so long was that Indian security forces did not blow up the house, did not burn it down because bodies of five of their comrades were lying very close to the house. They were not sure if the bodies were outside the house or inside the house. Indian security forces outside the gunfight site suspected that militants may have dragged the bodies inside the house. They had to save the bodies. They used small arms to take out the militant, assault rifles and UBGLs, a hell lot of them. That is why the house is still standing on its four walls. The militant fought fiercely for 8-10 hours, a bullet from his Kalashnikov pierced through the tyre of a DySP’s armoured SUV, quite far from the gunfight site, a narrow escape for the soldier near the SUV.
One of the OSINT accounts said that Colonel Sharma and team did not approach the target-house with an intent to venture into it to check on the presumed ‘dead’ militants. They were moving around the gunfight site when they suddenly came in face to face with the militant. They were not expecting the militant to be in that location. The militant took them by surprise and sprayed down his Kalashinkov at them, some of them tried to run into the target house, but didn’t make it, Colonel Sharma ran into cowshed and others retreated to their original positions away from the gunfight site.
A damaged armoured bulldozer of Indian army leaving the gunfight site in Handwara on May 3
The Militants
The lone militant who killed Colonel Sharma, Major Anuj, sub-inspector Qazi and two army soldiers was not Lashkar-e-Taiba’s chief in Kashmir. LeT’s chief in Kashmir goes by nom de guerre Abu-Zargam, not “Haider”. He was not a Pakistani either. He was a Kashmiri, Ashiq Hussain from Warpora area of Sopore Baramulla. There is a Pakistani connection though. Keep reading. The other militant was also a local, Asif Reshi from Kralgund, Handwara, which is also Gani Khawaja’s native area. Asif Reshi was killed in the initial stages of the gun-battle, on the first storey of the target-house, hours before Colonel Sharma and team ventured into its compound. Ashiq Hussain survived the initial assault because he had taken refuge in the cow-shed or the next-door single storey house, not in the target-house. He moved back to the target-house after killing Colonel Sharma and team. He was also killed in the first storey of the building at 0500 hours (approx.) on Sunday, nearly after a 24-hour long and deadly gunfight. There was now a permanent lull and the encounter was over, officially.
No militant escaped from the encounter or was killed outside the encounter site while attempting to escape. If any of the militants had escaped from the encounter, TRF wouldn’t have missed the chance to share its version of the gunfight. They would shared an audio or video propaganda, in typical TRF way. Two militants were killed in the encounter, both on first storey of the target-house. A possible Type-56 Chinese AKM pattern assault rifle and a possible PM MD-65 was recovered from the dead militants. The recovery of basic weapons suggests the lone militant could not have managed to fight so long, which further backs the OSINT theory that he picked up the ammo from KIA Indian soldiers before going into the target-house.
Arms and ammunition recovered from the militants.
Sunday, May 3 (0700 hours): Indian security forces summoned the village-head, directed him to go to the gunfight site and check on the soldiers and militants. The scared and reluctant village-head, Mohammed Abdullah Lone with some locals went in, found bodies of all five security forces personnel in the compound of the target-house, 4 bodies were on the ground close to each other, very close to the target-house. Colonel Sharma’s body, at some distance, near the cow-shed. The village head found bodies of two militants on the first storey of the house. He informed the Indian security forces, they moved in and took over.
No Hostage Situation
There was no hostage situation, neither the residents of the target-house were taken hostages by militants, nor the Colonel Sharma and team. There were no residents in the target-house when the gunfight broke. Colonel Sharma and team never went inside the target-house. The house belonged to a carpenter who was at work along with his two sons. His wife dropped their daughter at a relative’s house earlier on that day. They probably took their kids away knowing it is not safe with militants in the house and Indian security forces on their trail. When the lone woman in the house saw Indian army cordoning off the house and taking positions, she fled well on time. When the gunfight broke, only militant(s) were in the house.
There is No Haider
Nobody called “Haider” was killed in the Handwara gunfight. No Pakistani militant was killed either. The two militants killed were: (1) Asif Reshi from Kralgund, Handwara. (2) Ashiq Hussain from Warpora, Sopore. None of them was “Haider” or a Pakistani militant. Asif Reshi had joined Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in September 2019 during the lockdown. He was locally trained, classified as “soyat” in local technical language, meaning locally or untrained militant. Ashiq Hussain had travelled to Pakistan on a valid passport and visa via Wagah-Atari in Punjab, in April 2018, received arms training and infiltrated illegally into Kashmir in September 2019 during the lockdown. He was possibly accompanied by another Kashmiri from Sopore, Kamar-ud-Din along with some Pakistanis. Kamar-ud-Din and Ashiq Hussain had probably travelled to Pakistan together, left home for Nepal, but ended up in Pakistan. Kamar-ud-Din was killed in Ganderbal on September 27 last year, days after infiltrating, possibly from an old and inactive infiltration route; Tulail Valley in Ganderbal. It was believed to be a large militant group, intercepted in Gangbal forests of Ganderbal on September 27, 2019, two were killed in the ops from September 27 to September 30, including a Pakistani, others managed to reach deep into the hinterlands of Kashmir. The ops was called off after more than two weeks. Ashiq Hussain like the militants that infiltrated through Keran in April first week and wiped-out an entire Special Forces team, would have received serious and similar training in Pakistan too. Hence, the major high-profile damage on Indian Security forces in a decade.
The Curious Case of The Resistance Front
The Resistance Front, as expected owned both militants killed in Handwara gunfight and identified them as Asif Reshi and Ashiq Hussain. I guess I don’t have to explain why did The Resistance Front own militants that were officially affiliated with Lashkar-e-Taiba once, at least one of them for sure. You can also read my previous report on The Resistance Front to understand how the militant group works. I will try to further decode TRF in coming days, if I find enough time.
Indian Army version: The official Indian army version of the gunfight is that Colonel Sharma and team went inside the target-house to recue hostages. They rescued the hostages and were KIA in the process! The official version also claims that Lashkar-e-Taiba’s chief/ commander “Haider”, a Pakistani national was killed in the gunfight. You can read more on the official version in this Greater Kashmir report. I am not going to analyse it or ask questions. I don’t want to stretch this article longer.
LeT/ TRF version: LeT/ TRF haven’t shared any details about the gunfight, except for the identities of two militants killed.
(The photos of KIA soldiers and some details are graphic. As a mark of respect to the families and friends of fallen soldiers, I did not add them here or shared them anywhere, not even the censored versions.)
The soldiers that never returned home, sleep gentle under the Himalayan heaven.
@kashmirosint
@KashmirOsint Counterinsurgency Ops, Militancy, Terrorism May 12, 2020 11 Minutes
Indian security forces leaving from the gunfight site in Handwara on May 3
Late in the evening on May 2, there were sensitive and restricted reports that Indian Security forces may have suffered a major, unexpected damage in Handwara gunfight, a Colonel, a Major, 2 soldiers and a sub-inspector from J&K Police’s counterinsurgency wing (SOG) who had gone into the target-house, remained out of contact for many hours. Radio calls and calls on personal mobile phones remain unanswered. This was my reaction:
I treated the information as sensitive and maybe classified, did not share it or make it public. I struggled to understand why would a commanding officer of ~1500 soldiers venture into the target-house with just 3-4 soldiers with him and an officer from SOG. I had only two explanations at that time:
(1) The Colonel and team ventured into the target-house to check on the presumed ‘dead’ militant(s), the ‘dead’ militant(s) rose from the debris, found the Colonel and team totally off guard and took them out before they could even react, like the Pulwama gunfight last year where Indian army lost five soldiers, including a Major after a militant presumed dead came out of nowhere and sprayed-down his Kalashnikov at them. A Lt. Colonel, a Brigadier, a Captian and a DIG police were injured in the unexpected attack too. Or the Handwara gunfight in 2019 where, in a similar incident, a paramilitary officer and SOG personnel were killed.
(2) The Colonel and team ventured into the target-house to check on the presumed ‘dead’ militant(s), the militant(s) who were alive, attacked them, the Colonel and team somehow positioned themselves in or outside the house, are alive, have strategically switched their radios and mobile devices to silent mode.
At 2145 hours (approx.), the news hit Twitter; an Indian journalist working for a Hindi news channel ‘broke’ the news, and in no time an army of mainstream Indian journalists with blue ticks shared and recycled the news, and with it the details of missing officers, some claimed the soldiers were taken hostages by militants. I found it ridiculous. I knew the Colonel and Co. were either dead already, or alive, positioned strategically, in control, waiting for militants to make their move, to take them out. A militant who knows his certain death is moments away, or any militant for that matter, would never take hostages, do any talking or waste any time on negotiations in middle of a fierce gunfight. He won’t miss a chance to kill his enemy at the first sight, at the first opportunity that arises. Some Indian journalists claimed “all five soldiers were rescued and safe”. I wasn’t sure how to react to that. How exactly do you ‘rescue’ a SOG officer and a Colonel with three buddies, who have won multiple gallantry awards for their valor and achievements working in counterinsurgency ops in the valley for decades, from two militants? If they were unarmed and off duty , maybe.
I spent some time researching on the encounter. I went through different accounts, versions, some old stories, intel reports etc and came up with my version of what happened in Handwara on May 2.
The OSINT version
Indian soldiers taking positions behind a concrete barrier near the gunfight site in Handwara on May 2)
Friday, May 1 (1400 hours): India Security forces received intel that a large group of Lashkar-e-Taiba militants led by local commander Gani Khawaja is moving in the Rajwar and Marwar forest area. Gani Khawaja is big fish in the Handwara-Sopore belt, allegedly responsible for multiple attacks on Indian security forces and executions of civilians in Sopore area. Indian army’s 21-RR, 15-RR, 30-RR, SOG, 92-CRPF and Para-9 launched a search ops in the forest. A brief contact with militants was established, exchange of fire between militants and Indian security forces took place in Waddar-Bala pocket of the forest. Militants escape from the area in multiple groups, in multiple directions. Indian security forces believed that some of the militants went further deep into the forest, and some fled down into the residential area, close to the forest. The first fire was opened by militants, forcing Indian security forces to take cover and helping militants vanish from the sight. Indian security forces believe if the militants had not launched a proactive, sudden attack on them at a disadvantageous location, the militants might as well would have been neutralised in the forest itself. The proactive attack gave militants an upper hand. Indian security forces continued the siege and search ops throughout the night. The ops was called off at 1000 hours on Saturday May 2, without any success or maybe strategically. All the human-intel in the area was activated.
Saturday, May 2 (1500 hours (approx.): Indian army receive intel, a group of militants that escaped from Rajwar forests a day before have taken refuge in a two storey house in Changimulla, in the foot of the forest, 1.4 miles (approx.) from the location where first standoff with militants took place on previous day. Indian security forces launch a cordon and search ops in the village. 21-RR, 15-RR, 30-RR, 22-RR, 92-CRPF, Para-9 and J&K Police’s SOG take part in the ops. The joint-ops is led by Colonel Ashutosh Sharma, Major Anuj and sub-inspector SOG, Qazi Sagheer, two of them decorated counterinsurgency specialists with decades of experience working in counterinsurgency ops in Kashmir.
Saturday, May 2 (1530 hours (approx.): The target-house is located and contact with militants is established. A fierce gun battle rages, exchange of fire takes from both sides. Indian army used assault rifles, UBGLs, recoilless launchers against the holed up militants. The firefight ‘ends’ and there is a long enduring lull, long enough to give Indian security forces assurance and confidence that all militants were neutralised and encounter was over. Indian security forces chose not to blow up the house in usual way or burn it down to ashes like it is usually done in encounters in Kashmir. They may have tried to save the poor carpenter’s house presuming militants were dead already and no further action was required. When militants don’t resist for long, are neutralised in initial stages of the gunfight, the house is spared.
1830 hours (approx.): Indian security forces lead by Colonel Sharma, Major Anuj and sub-inspector Qazi approached the target-house to check on the presumed ‘dead’ militants, a miscalculation, an error in judgement that would cost them dearly. As soon as they came closer to the target-house, a lone militant, out of nowhere, emerged from an abutting single storey structure and fired indiscriminately at them. The spray-down from his Kalashnikov hit four men, Major Anuj, two soldiers and sub-inspector Qazi, two of them above neck, two in the wings and abdomen. Colonel Sharma ran towards an adjacent cowshed, others fled back to their original positions away from the gunfight site. It was already dark by now. The lone militant followed Colonel Sharma, caught hold of him and shot him dead inside/ or at the entrance of the cowshed. It is not clear if Colonel Sharma was armed with an assault rifle or had accidentally dropped it at the sudden and intense attack, or wasn’t carrying one in the first place. Some of the wounds on Indian soldiers appear to be inflicted by a blunt object, not bullets. It is not clear if the militant also used some sort of cutting tool in the assault or only the assault rifle. Indian security forces’ unit outside the gunfight site, made several attempts to reach Colonel Sharma and team on the radio. There was no answer. In a desperate attempt, a phone call was finally made to Colonel Sharma’s personal mobile phone later in the night. It was answered by a militant. The nature of conversation remains unknown. It was at this moment, the unit outside the gunfight site knew that Colonel Sharma and his team were KIA and final assault to neutralise the militant started. The pictures of slain Colonel Sharma and team that I saw, suggest Colonel Sharma was killed separately. His body cannot be seen near the other four bodies lying on the ground, that of Major Anuj, two soldiers and sub-inspector Qazi. Indian security forces were not sure how many militants were holed up in the target-house or the adjacent structure(s).
The lone militant then picked up arms and ammunition from the slain soldiers and went inside the target-house. He fought all night. One of the reasons he lasted longer was that he did not exhaust his limited ammo, like militants usually do. He had picked up enough ammo from the slain soldiers. However, the main reason why he lasted so long was that Indian security forces did not blow up the house, did not burn it down because bodies of five of their comrades were lying very close to the house. They were not sure if the bodies were outside the house or inside the house. Indian security forces outside the gunfight site suspected that militants may have dragged the bodies inside the house. They had to save the bodies. They used small arms to take out the militant, assault rifles and UBGLs, a hell lot of them. That is why the house is still standing on its four walls. The militant fought fiercely for 8-10 hours, a bullet from his Kalashnikov pierced through the tyre of a DySP’s armoured SUV, quite far from the gunfight site, a narrow escape for the soldier near the SUV.
One of the OSINT accounts said that Colonel Sharma and team did not approach the target-house with an intent to venture into it to check on the presumed ‘dead’ militants. They were moving around the gunfight site when they suddenly came in face to face with the militant. They were not expecting the militant to be in that location. The militant took them by surprise and sprayed down his Kalashinkov at them, some of them tried to run into the target house, but didn’t make it, Colonel Sharma ran into cowshed and others retreated to their original positions away from the gunfight site.
A damaged armoured bulldozer of Indian army leaving the gunfight site in Handwara on May 3
The Militants
The lone militant who killed Colonel Sharma, Major Anuj, sub-inspector Qazi and two army soldiers was not Lashkar-e-Taiba’s chief in Kashmir. LeT’s chief in Kashmir goes by nom de guerre Abu-Zargam, not “Haider”. He was not a Pakistani either. He was a Kashmiri, Ashiq Hussain from Warpora area of Sopore Baramulla. There is a Pakistani connection though. Keep reading. The other militant was also a local, Asif Reshi from Kralgund, Handwara, which is also Gani Khawaja’s native area. Asif Reshi was killed in the initial stages of the gun-battle, on the first storey of the target-house, hours before Colonel Sharma and team ventured into its compound. Ashiq Hussain survived the initial assault because he had taken refuge in the cow-shed or the next-door single storey house, not in the target-house. He moved back to the target-house after killing Colonel Sharma and team. He was also killed in the first storey of the building at 0500 hours (approx.) on Sunday, nearly after a 24-hour long and deadly gunfight. There was now a permanent lull and the encounter was over, officially.
No militant escaped from the encounter or was killed outside the encounter site while attempting to escape. If any of the militants had escaped from the encounter, TRF wouldn’t have missed the chance to share its version of the gunfight. They would shared an audio or video propaganda, in typical TRF way. Two militants were killed in the encounter, both on first storey of the target-house. A possible Type-56 Chinese AKM pattern assault rifle and a possible PM MD-65 was recovered from the dead militants. The recovery of basic weapons suggests the lone militant could not have managed to fight so long, which further backs the OSINT theory that he picked up the ammo from KIA Indian soldiers before going into the target-house.
Arms and ammunition recovered from the militants.
Sunday, May 3 (0700 hours): Indian security forces summoned the village-head, directed him to go to the gunfight site and check on the soldiers and militants. The scared and reluctant village-head, Mohammed Abdullah Lone with some locals went in, found bodies of all five security forces personnel in the compound of the target-house, 4 bodies were on the ground close to each other, very close to the target-house. Colonel Sharma’s body, at some distance, near the cow-shed. The village head found bodies of two militants on the first storey of the house. He informed the Indian security forces, they moved in and took over.
No Hostage Situation
There was no hostage situation, neither the residents of the target-house were taken hostages by militants, nor the Colonel Sharma and team. There were no residents in the target-house when the gunfight broke. Colonel Sharma and team never went inside the target-house. The house belonged to a carpenter who was at work along with his two sons. His wife dropped their daughter at a relative’s house earlier on that day. They probably took their kids away knowing it is not safe with militants in the house and Indian security forces on their trail. When the lone woman in the house saw Indian army cordoning off the house and taking positions, she fled well on time. When the gunfight broke, only militant(s) were in the house.
There is No Haider
Nobody called “Haider” was killed in the Handwara gunfight. No Pakistani militant was killed either. The two militants killed were: (1) Asif Reshi from Kralgund, Handwara. (2) Ashiq Hussain from Warpora, Sopore. None of them was “Haider” or a Pakistani militant. Asif Reshi had joined Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in September 2019 during the lockdown. He was locally trained, classified as “soyat” in local technical language, meaning locally or untrained militant. Ashiq Hussain had travelled to Pakistan on a valid passport and visa via Wagah-Atari in Punjab, in April 2018, received arms training and infiltrated illegally into Kashmir in September 2019 during the lockdown. He was possibly accompanied by another Kashmiri from Sopore, Kamar-ud-Din along with some Pakistanis. Kamar-ud-Din and Ashiq Hussain had probably travelled to Pakistan together, left home for Nepal, but ended up in Pakistan. Kamar-ud-Din was killed in Ganderbal on September 27 last year, days after infiltrating, possibly from an old and inactive infiltration route; Tulail Valley in Ganderbal. It was believed to be a large militant group, intercepted in Gangbal forests of Ganderbal on September 27, 2019, two were killed in the ops from September 27 to September 30, including a Pakistani, others managed to reach deep into the hinterlands of Kashmir. The ops was called off after more than two weeks. Ashiq Hussain like the militants that infiltrated through Keran in April first week and wiped-out an entire Special Forces team, would have received serious and similar training in Pakistan too. Hence, the major high-profile damage on Indian Security forces in a decade.
The Curious Case of The Resistance Front
The Resistance Front, as expected owned both militants killed in Handwara gunfight and identified them as Asif Reshi and Ashiq Hussain. I guess I don’t have to explain why did The Resistance Front own militants that were officially affiliated with Lashkar-e-Taiba once, at least one of them for sure. You can also read my previous report on The Resistance Front to understand how the militant group works. I will try to further decode TRF in coming days, if I find enough time.
Indian Army version: The official Indian army version of the gunfight is that Colonel Sharma and team went inside the target-house to recue hostages. They rescued the hostages and were KIA in the process! The official version also claims that Lashkar-e-Taiba’s chief/ commander “Haider”, a Pakistani national was killed in the gunfight. You can read more on the official version in this Greater Kashmir report. I am not going to analyse it or ask questions. I don’t want to stretch this article longer.
LeT/ TRF version: LeT/ TRF haven’t shared any details about the gunfight, except for the identities of two militants killed.
(The photos of KIA soldiers and some details are graphic. As a mark of respect to the families and friends of fallen soldiers, I did not add them here or shared them anywhere, not even the censored versions.)
The soldiers that never returned home, sleep gentle under the Himalayan heaven.
@kashmirosint
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