A basic dictum of COIN is to separate the insurgents from the civilian population. Drones alone are incapable of facilitating population-centric goals of COIN. Their use in ‘clearing’ operations produces negative effects including collateral damage and the militarization of local populations. This not only alienates populations but can fuel further insurgency. Drones have the ability to harass and harry insurgents seeking sanctuary in the area, temporarily denying them security and freedom to operate. It does not ‘deny sanctuary’ in the long-term to the insurgents, nor eliminate their presence.
The operations in swat and FATA displaced civilians from the area and then Army went in to clear the area. Following are the lessons learnt and strategies implemented for success of COIN ops in previous ops.
-Take the heights rather than rely on traditional roads and direct approaches to towns and cities.
-Avoid collateral damage.
-Let the insurgents collect in one place and isolate and take them out.
-Use multiple thrust lines.
-Troop ratio should not be bare minimum but as much as you can afford.
-Use the local people as your front line to be able to separate “black” (bad guys) from “white”; isolate, weaken, and then take the insurgents.
- Public support is paramount.
- Avoid disconnect between the federal and provincial governments on approaching the insurgency.
- Use Quick Impact Projects to win over local population; governance issues are best tackled by good governance, not force.
- Build local social structures.
- Political follow-up is critical once the army succeeds in clearing an area.
- A national effort is needed to fight militancy, not tactical military operations.
Yet to be seen if these steps are viable in baluchistan or PA thinks COIN Ops is just LIC while major conflict is with India.
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