The relationship between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan insurgents

[Kompromat]

Every time the US has used terrorists as instruments of statecraft, it has come back to haunt the US.

Acceptable symmetry of risk given the grave situation at hand at a given time?

Whether it was supporting Saddam Hussain in the Iran-Iraq war, arming and funding the Taliban or the US's misadventures in South America, the terrorists, without fail, turned on the masters.

There is truth to this theory. But it doesn't stop intels from using them if and when they can because the only other option is to involve the military which would require an open war.

When India attempted the same thing, with the LTTE, the results were the same- they bit the hand that fed them.

But it worked out well for you guys in East Pakistan with Mukhtis. You successfully destroyed our country through proxies and never received a blow back from them. Instead Bangladesh is a defacto province of India. Is it a bad deal?

So you are right, many intelligence agencies use terrorists for strategic ends- in the long run however it rarely works out as intended. In Pakistan's case the ISI's actions have had particularly tragic consequences, for the world as a whole but mostly for the Pakistani people. This is a price that the Pakistani people might have to pay for generations.

We have paid a heavy price but not due to the simplicity of the above argument but due to the presence of superpower interests in the region. The price we have paid is huge by all means but its less than having to be invaded by the USSR from one side and India from another. The Operation Brasstacks was coordinated by India with the Soviet Union to double up the invasion of Pakistan. The timing is curious because while the Indian army was massing on our border in the east, the western border was seeing the most brutal warfare against soviets. They had both agreed to keep India on standby should the USSR be successful in cutting through D-Line. So when our own existence was at stake, we did what needed to be done. Smashed the USSR with proxies and covert SSG operatives on one side while threatened to nuke New Delhi on the other - it worked --- at least for the greatest threat.

The Americans ruthlessly used the ISI against the Soviets and left the ISI out in the cold once the Americans felt they had gotten all they could out of the ISI. This left behind a deadly legacy- ISI generals who felt betrayed, who had worked so closely with the Taliban that some of them were more Talibanised than the Taliban itself and who were now flush with cash and weapons. The most famous case in point, of course, is Hamid Gul, who is still power drunk, unable to leave behind the hangover of the power games the ISI played along with the Americans during the cold war. He said a few years ago, "The ISI are the religious conscience keepers of Pakistan". When still influential retirees from an intelligence agency consider it a religious conscience keeper, you know something has gone wrong.

General Hamid Gul certainly has his own opinions, but they are strictly of his own. In the world of intelligence there is no such thing as '''loyalty'''. You only work with those who are working with you till there are some mutual interests to be taken care of. The ISI is not a ragtag organization, its one of the most sophisticated, professional and organized intelligence outfits in the world, it knew exactly what the US was going to do and had made preps and contingencies to deal with the situation. Lastly, i don't know who told you that Taliban existed back then and the term Talibanized etc. They were purely Benazir's product
created in 1990s.

In India's case, the lesson to be learnt to stay out of situations where the consequences are unpredictable. I hope the Indian government stays out of Afghanistan except for humanitarian causes.

They are knee deep there and write it down that India will not be getting out, it would rather get bogged down, at least with the current govt which won't accept the change in power dynamics that has just taken place and has been brought about by Pakistan's decade long planning and micromanagement.

Arming and training the Afghan army, as a strategic counterweight to Pakistan, will be a huge mistake. Who knows what shape that army will be in a few years from now and how that training and weaponry will be used?

ANA can't be a 'counterweight' to PA in another 40 years. The narrative or ambition of raising an Army of that magnitude in a war stricken country where the officers corp too is illiterate let alone the grunts will require decades of multi billion dollar investment. If the NATO has failed to do so and has instead raised a counterinsurgent force, i wonder what hope there is for India which has half a billion poor people of its own to feed.

 

[Mujahid Memon]

Every time the US has used terrorists as instruments of statecraft, it has come back to haunt the US. Whether it was supporting Saddam Hussain in the Iran-Iraq war, arming and funding the Taliban or the US's misadventures in South America, the terrorists, without fail, turned on the masters.

When India attempted the same thing, with the LTTE, the results were the same- they bit the hand that fed them.

So you are right, many intelligence agencies use terrorists for strategic ends- in the long run however it rarely works out as intended. In Pakistan's case the ISI's actions have had particularly tragic consequences, for the world as a whole but mostly for the Pakistani people. This is a price that the Pakistani people might have to pay for generations.

The Americans ruthlessly used the ISI against the Soviets and left the ISI out in the cold once the Americans felt they had gotten all they could out of the ISI. This left behind a deadly legacy- ISI generals who felt betrayed, who had worked so closely with the Taliban that some of them were more Talibanised than the Taliban itself and who were now flush with cash and weapons. The most famous case in point, of course, is Hamid Gul, who is still power drunk, unable to leave behind the hangover of the power games the ISI played along with the Americans during the cold war. He said a few years ago, "The ISI are the religious conscience keepers of Pakistan". When still influential retirees from an intelligence agency consider it a religious conscience keeper, you know something has gone wrong.

In India's case, the lesson to be learnt to stay out of situations where the consequences are unpredictable. I hope the Indian government stays out of Afghanistan except for humanitarian causes. Arming and training the Afghan army, as a strategic counterweight to Pakistan, will be a huge mistake. Who knows what shape that army will be in a few years from now and how that training and weaponry will be used?

But ur saying and what indian agencies are actually doing is a bit conflictive...

I am agree with @Horus that all the agencies have relations with terrorists/militias, but it doesn't mean that they're fulfilling their purposes...

And Yes, Pakistan used and is still using Afghan Taliban, but not against America or her allies...

 

[Razia Sultana]

Every time the US has used terrorists as instruments of statecraft, it has come back to haunt the US. Whether it was supporting Saddam Hussain in the Iran-Iraq war, arming and funding the Taliban or the US's misadventures in South America, the terrorists, without fail, turned on the masters.

When India attempted the same thing, with the LTTE, the results were the same- they bit the hand that fed them.

So you are right, many intelligence agencies use terrorists for strategic ends- in the long run however it rarely works out as intended. In Pakistan's case the ISI's actions have had particularly tragic consequences, for the world as a whole but mostly for the Pakistani people. This is a price that the Pakistani people might have to pay for generations.

The Americans ruthlessly used the ISI against the Soviets and left the ISI out in the cold once the Americans felt they had gotten all they could out of the ISI. This left behind a deadly legacy- ISI generals who felt betrayed, who had worked so closely with the Taliban that some of them were more Talibanised than the Taliban itself and who were now flush with cash and weapons. The most famous case in point, of course, is Hamid Gul, who is still power drunk, unable to leave behind the hangover of the power games the ISI played along with the Americans during the cold war. He said a few years ago, "The ISI are the religious conscience keepers of Pakistan". When still influential retirees from an intelligence agency consider it a religious conscience keeper, you know something has gone wrong.

In India's case, the lesson to be learnt to stay out of situations where the consequences are unpredictable. I hope the Indian government stays out of Afghanistan except for humanitarian causes. Arming and training the Afghan army, as a strategic counterweight to Pakistan, will be a huge mistake. Who knows what shape that army will be in a few years from now and how that training and weaponry will be used?

Agree largely but there is difference between training a national army and training an insrurgent group. India and many other nations provide training resources to the armies of other friendly nations. Nations are bound by international laws and protocols but not the insurgents. Barring Talibans, Afghans always shared good relations with India.

 

[Razia Sultana]

Every time the US has used terrorists as instruments of statecraft, it has come back to haunt the US. Whether it was supporting Saddam Hussain in the Iran-Iraq war, arming and funding the Taliban or the US's misadventures in South America, the terrorists, without fail, turned on the masters.

When India attempted the same thing, with the LTTE, the results were the same- they bit the hand that fed them.

So you are right, many intelligence agencies use terrorists for strategic ends- in the long run however it rarely works out as intended. In Pakistan's case the ISI's actions have had particularly tragic consequences, for the world as a whole but mostly for the Pakistani people. This is a price that the Pakistani people might have to pay for generations.

The Americans ruthlessly used the ISI against the Soviets and left the ISI out in the cold once the Americans felt they had gotten all they could out of the ISI. This left behind a deadly legacy- ISI generals who felt betrayed, who had worked so closely with the Taliban that some of them were more Talibanised than the Taliban itself and who were now flush with cash and weapons. The most famous case in point, of course, is Hamid Gul, who is still power drunk, unable to leave behind the hangover of the power games the ISI played along with the Americans during the cold war. He said a few years ago, "The ISI are the religious conscience keepers of Pakistan". When still influential retirees from an intelligence agency consider it a religious conscience keeper, you know something has gone wrong.

In India's case, the lesson to be learnt to stay out of situations where the consequences are unpredictable. I hope the Indian government stays out of Afghanistan except for humanitarian causes. Arming and training the Afghan army, as a strategic counterweight to Pakistan, will be a huge mistake. Who knows what shape that army will be in a few years from now and how that training and weaponry will be used?

Agree largely but there is difference between training a national army and training an insrurgent group. India and many other nations provide training resources to the armies of other friendly nations. Nations are bound by international laws and protocols but not the insurgents. Barring Talibans, Afghans always shared good relations with India.

 

[asquare]

Acceptable symmetry of risk given the grave situation at hand at a given time?

There is truth to this theory. But it doesn't stop intels from using them if and when they can because the only other option is to involve the military which would require an open war.

Yes, however my argument is that intelligence agencies usually get the trade off between the present and the future wrong- weighing the present far too heavily. Imagine Wolfowitz et al (who were fed dubious intelligence by a bellicose CIA) convincing Carter that the right thing to do was to increase America's involvement in the Middle East in 1979. The perceived threat from the Russians was far greater than the actual threat. What was seen as an existential crisis requiring immediate response was, in fact, nothing of the sort. All the Americans needed to do was to have defences ready incase the KSA came under attack from Saddam (this was also the year that Saddam came to power) and leave the region well alone otherwise. Unfortunately, the incentives for intelligence agencies tend to point them towards greater overseas involvement- that, in their eyes, keeps them relevant as a major organ of statecraft.

But it worked out well for you guys in East Pakistan with Mukhtis. You successfully destroyed our country through proxies and never received a blow back from them. Instead Bangladesh is a defacto province of India. Is it a bad deal?

Of course you and I will have the usual disagreement on the nature of the Mukhtis and what justified India's involvement there.

That aside, on whether we have received no blow back- the last word on that hasn't been said as yet. Sheikh Hasina's government won't last forever. India's role in Bangladesh has bred resentment amongst many, not least the JeI. I can imagine a BNP government coming to power there and things turning against us very, very quickly. All of this is complicated by our internal politics, the current government in West Bengal pushes the BNP's line because it works well with Bangladeshi immigrants who are disgruntled with Sheikh Hasina's government. This could turn out very badly for India- millions of Bangladeshis on Indian soil egged on by a hostile BNP government to work against India's interest. I still feel India would be better off with less involvement, not more.

We have paid a heavy price but not due to the simplicity of the above argument but due to the presence of superpower interests in the region. The price we have paid is huge by all means but its less than having to be invaded by the USSR from one side and India from another. The Operation Brasstacks was coordinated by India with the Soviet Union to double up the invasion of Pakistan. The timing is curious because while the Indian army was massing on our border in the east, the western border was seeing the most brutal warfare against soviets. They had both agreed to keep India on standby should the USSR be successful in cutting through D-Line. So when our own existence was at stake, we did what needed to be done. Smashed the USSR with proxies and covert SSG operatives on one side while threatened to nuke New Delhi on the other - it worked --- at least for the greatest threat.

Can you point me to any neutral sources- particularly Soviet sources? I'm not arguing that Brasstacks was purely intended to be a peaceful test of new war tactics but I haven't come across a description of the elaborate strategy you point towards.

General Hamid Gul certainly has his own opinions, but they are strictly of his own. In the world of intelligence there is no such thing as '''loyalty'''. You only work with those who are working with you till there are some mutual interests to be taken care of. The ISI is not a ragtag organization, its one of the most sophisticated, professional and organized intelligence outfits in the world, it knew exactly what the US was going to do and had made preps and contingencies to deal with the situation. Lastly, i don't know who told you that Taliban existed back then and the term Talibanized etc. They were purely Benazir's product
created in 1990s.

I was speaking loosely- describing everything from Mullah Passanai's 'law enforcement' force onwards as the Taliban- you're right, they were more of a proto-Taliban.

Loyalty may play no role in an intelligence agency's stated objectives but intelligence agencies are run by people, often insecure zealots who are easily influenced (the unwavering professionalism of intelligence personnel is a convenient myth). Often, those involved in an operation get sucked in to the deception that they are trying to pull off- sometimes even those at the top. India had one such major incident during the Khalistan movement.

They are knee deep there and write it down that India will not be getting out, it would rather get bogged down, at least with the current govt which won't accept the change in power dynamics that has just taken place and has been brought about by Pakistan's decade long planning and micromanagement.



ANA can't be a 'counterweight' to PA in another 40 years. The narrative or ambition of raising an Army of that magnitude in a war stricken country where the officers corp too is illiterate let alone the grunts will require decades of multi billion dollar investment. If the NATO has failed to do so and has instead raised a counterinsurgent force, i wonder what hope there is for India which has half a billion poor people of its own to feed.

I agree with you on both counts here. India is unlikely to back away from involving itself in Afghanistan and our endeavours there are likely to fail.