Cossack25A1
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The reason why I created this thread is to prevent any threads related to the Philippines to be flooded with derailing comments.
The topic of this thread is about the relations of the Philippines with China - pre-hispanic era, Spanish & American era, pre-Marcos era and contemporary era, and probably future relations.
-------------------------------------------
Will Philippine Elections Bring About a New China Policy?
Richard Javad Heydarian
February 23, 2016
As the Philippines enters the elections season, analysts have been scrambling to predict potential changes in the country’s political and economic trajectory. Under President Benigno Aquino’s watch, the Southeast Asian country has managed to shake off its decades-long notoriety as the “Sick man of Asia.” Today, the Philippines is widely considered to be one of the few bright spots in an otherwise gloomy economic landscape.
Recent years, however, have also seen a dramatic uptick in bilateral tensions with China, which has gradually chipped away at the Philippines’ territorial claims in the South China Sea. It's no wonder then that, for the first time in recent memory, foreign policy issues, particularly China’s maritime assertiveness in the South China Sea, are expected to feature as a major election issue. In a curiously premature article, one observer foresaw a dramatic change in the Philippines’ foreign policy towards China once Aquino steps down from office later this year.
A closer look, however, points in the direction of greater continuity rather than rapture in Philippine foreign policy, especially if China continues to press its advantage in adjacent waters by militarizing territorial disputes. Absent a major concession on China’s part, which seems unlikely in the foreseeable future, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the next Filipino president to effectively pursue a 'reset' in bilateral relations with China.
Don’t Miss the Context
Within a decade, Philippine-China relations went from cordial to confrontational. Some critics, in both Manila and Beijing, have heaped blame on the supposed naiveté and amateurish foreign policy disposition of the Aquino administration, which, on at least two occasions, likened China to Nazi Germany.
For sure, President Aquino as well as Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario have often employed an overzealous rhetoric vis-à-vis China, which has dismissed the Philippines as a “real trouble maker” rather than a critical neighbor to engage with. And analysts, including the Chinese government, have often blamed Aquino for the dramatic deterioration in bilateral relations, pointing out the (short-lived) “golden age” of bilateral relations, under the stewardship of the Gloria Macapagal administration, in the mid-2000s.
But this line of argument overlooks two crucial points.
First, the Aquino administration, especially in its earlier years in office, sought to engage China, to the point that President Aquino, the son of two democratic icons, chose to skip the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize award ceremony for Chinese dissident Li Xiaobo out of solidarity with Beijing. In response, then-Chinese Ambassador to Manila Liu Jianchao remarked, “I appreciate the understanding shown by the Philippine government of the Chinese people and the Chinese government.” The following year, Aquino actually met Hu Jintao in Beijing as part of a bigger plan to expand bilateral trade and investment as well as explore a meaningful dialogue on the South China Sea disputes.
Second, and more importantly, the Aquino administration has had to grapple with a new China, one that has been more aggressive in pursuing its territorial claims in adjacent waters, culminating in the de facto occupation of Philippine-claimed Scarborough Shoal in mid-2012. Without the requisite military capability to wrest back the disputed feature, and in absence of meaningful American assistance, the Aquino administration was left with little choice but to resort to an unprecedented legal arbitration case against China.
Nonetheless, Aquino still tried to reach out to his Chinese counterparts during the 2013 China-ASEAN Expo, where the Philippines was the “country of honor,” before it was brusquely “disinvited” by Beijing. China didn’t only embarrass Aquino, who touted the trip as a potential diplomatic breakthrough, but it extinguished hopes for more effectively managing brewing bilateral disputes. Subsequently, the Aquino administration proceeded with filing its memorial against China at the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague and pursuing a new security pact, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), with America.
The Aquino administration has had its own shortcomings with respect to engaging China and defending its claims in the South China Sea. But its confrontational approach was largely a byproduct of China’s reciprocal intransigence as well as aggressive push into Philippine-claimed waters. So the question is: Will the next Filipino president be in a position to revive bilateral relations?
False Expectations
There are at least three reasons for skepticism. First of all, the brief “golden age” of bilateral relations has been replaced by widespread animosity and suspicion towards China. According to a 2015 survey by the Social Weather Stations (SWS), Filipino trust in China hit an all time low of -45 percent, mid last year, compared to the -36 percent rating reported shortly after it wrested control of Filipino-claimed Mischief Reef in 1994.
A significant proportion of the Filipino population and much of the security establishment views China as an opportunistic power that tried to cut unfavorable deals with the Arroyo administration (2000-2010), which was hounded by one corruption scandal after the other. For instance, Aquino’s predecessor negotiated a Joint Maritime Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) with China and Vietnam, which was later found to be inimical to Philippine constitution and national interest.
Shortly after the signing of the JMSU, the Arroyo administration proceeded with China-funded/led big-ticket infrastructure projects, which would be at the center of one of the biggest corruption scandals in Philippine history. Most believed the kickbacks were a form of Chinese bribe for the controversial JMSU deal, which was challenged at the Philippine Supreme Court.
It was very difficult for Aquino to even seriously discuss the prospect of joint development with China in disputed waters for fear they would be accused of being an Arroyo 2.0. The Aquino administration even dragged its feet, until the eleventh hour, on joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
When one presidential candidate, Jejomar Binay, openly suggested the prospect of joint development in South China Sea, he immediately provoked a firestorm of criticisms. Neither the currently-leading presidential candidate, Senator Grace Poe, nor Aquino’s anointed successor, Interior Secretary Mar Roxas, have, so far, dared to suggest a similar approach, probably out of fear of political backlash.
Secondly, unlike the Arroyo administration, the Philippines is grappling with an acute crisis in the South China Sea, with Beijing establishing a sprawling network of dual-purposes bases and airstrips across both Paracels and Spratly chain of islands. There is a genuine fear that soon China will establish a military base in the Scarborough Shoal and/or start cutting off Filipino supply lines in the disputed waters.
No wonder then, the South China Sea, which Manila has feistily renamed the “West Philippine Sea,” is today a regular topic of animated discussion, if not outright sensationalization, in the Philippine media and among ordinary citizens. Back in the Arroyo administration days, barely anyone knew much about the South China Sea disputes. With rising popular nationalism in the Philippines, Aquino’s successor will face an even more critical and sentient public opinion, which will restrict his/her room for maneuver.
Lastly, the Aquino administration has overseen a massive upgrade in bilateral security relations with its key allies, the United States and Japan. It would seem certain that both of these countries, which are among Manila’s leading trading and investment partners and have stepped up their opposition to Beijing’s maritime assertiveness, will lobby hard to ensure that the next Filipino president will not dramatically alter the Philippines’ China policy.
Looking at the rhetoric and platforms of all the leading candidates, there are, however, indications that Aquino’s successor will use more measured rhetoric, and will likely try to leverage any favorable arbitration outcome, which is expected in coming months, as a springboard to exact certain concessions from, and improve bilateral relations with, China.
The new Filipino president’s room for maneuver will expand if, for instance, China agrees to, say, a mutual disengagement from Scarborough Shoal, end the siege on the Filipino detachment in Second Thomas Shoal, and promises not to cut off Filipino supply lines the South China Sea. The two sides could also start discussing ways to revive bilateral investment relations, since China has a very limited footprint in the Philippines’ infrastructure landscape. All of these options seem a long way off, however. Don’t expect a major or swift reset any time soon.
Richard Javad Heydarian is an Assistant Professor in political science at De La Salle University, and formerly a policy adviser at the Philippine House of Representatives (2009-2015). The Manila Bulletin, a leading national daily, has described him as one of the Philippines’ “foremost foreign policy and economic analysts”. He is the author of Asia’s New Battlefield: The US, China, and the Struggle for Western Pacific (Zed, London)., and a regular to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). This article first appeared in the Interpreter.
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China envoy hopes for better Philippine ties | Headlines, News, The Philippine Star | philstar.com
-----
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Early Philippines History - Porcelain Period
Philippine -Chinese relations is richly documented by archeological discoveries of the presence of porcelains dating from the start of the Sung to the Ming Dynasties (960-1644). Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was peopled largely by the Negritos, Indonesians and Malays. The strains from these groups eventually gave rise to common cultural features which became the dominant influence in ethnic reformulation in the archipelago. Archaeological evidence indicates that small seafaring communities existed throughout the Philippine Archipelago for at least 2000 years, prior to the arrival of the Spaniards. The chief means of trading was barter. Influences from the Chinese and Indian civilizations in the third or fourth millennium BC augmented these ethnic strains. Chinese economic and socio-cultural influences came by way of Chinese porcelain, silk and traders. Indian influence found their way into the religious-cultural aspect of pre-colonial society.
The archaeological phases of relevance to complex society development in the Philippines, according to the schema of Laura Lee Junker, span the Philippine "Iron Age" or "Metal Age" (ca. 500 BC-AD 1000), the Early Porcelain Period (the Sung through Early Ming Dynasties, or late 10th century to late 14th century AD), and the Late Porcelain Period (Late Ming to Early Manchu Dynasties, or late 14th century to late 16th century AD). By the early sixteen century, the time of European contact, most of the major islands of the Philippines had a complex political landscape comprised of chiefdoms of varying scale and complexity in coastal river valleys, interacting through trade and conflict with each other and with smaller-scale tribal agriculturalist societies and mobile foragers in the island interiors.
Civilized Indian peoples visited the Malay Archipelago in the fourth or fifth century before Christ, and these regions were known to the Chinese as early as the third or fourth century of the present era, and probably earlier, for the Chinese had contacts with the Philippines as early as the third or fourth century before Christ. Probably before the beginning of the Christian era the Hindus had established settlements and introduced Brahmanism into Indo-China, Sumatra, Java, and Borneo. About the fifth or the sixth century of the Christian era Sumatra became Buddhist, and the foundations of the first great HinduMalayan empire were laid.
This Sumatran empire, known as Sri-Vishaya, or Sri-Vijaya, seems to have been the dominating power in the East Indies from the seventh to the twelfth century, and for a time, at least, embraced practically the entire Malay Archipelago except a part of Java and the island chain eastward to New Guinea. It included or controlled the Philippines, had outposts in Formosa and Hainan, and is said to have collected tribute even from Ceylon and a part of southern India. Sumatran power was gradually undermined and finally superseded by the growing Javanese state, later widely known as the Empire of Madjapahit. This empire also dominated the entire Malay Archipelago, including the Philippines, and even extended its influence to New Guinea. Its power was broken by the rapid spread of Mohammedanism during the fifteenth century.
The last Malay invasion occurred in the historic period between 1380 and 1450, the time of the introduction of Mohammedanism. This in historic sequence immediately precedes the discovery of the Archipelago by the Spaniards in 1521; Mohammedanism at that time was widespread in the Archipelago. It is evident that there has been a successive series of invasions into the Philippines, chiefly through Malaysia, and that the Archipelago has been extensively colonized for a long time. Most of these invasions were in the prehistoric period, but early in the Christian era it is clear that civilized peoples in this part of the world were in communication with the Philippines.
The general character of Chinese influence in Malaysia was and is economic, rather than social or political. While political affairs have occupied some space in the accounts quoted above, it should not be forgotten that the main object of the Chinese was always trade, and that a thousand peaceful merchant vessels sailed into the southern seas for every one sent there on a political or warlike mission.
The Chinese obtained from the Filipinos not only such raw materials as yellow wax, cotton, pearls, tortoise-shells, betel-nuts, cocoanuts, and vegetables, but also jute fabrics (probably those woven from abaka, Manila hemp, as to-day), other woven goods of cotton, and fine mats. The Filipinos took in exchange porcelain, gold, iron, needles, vases for perfumes, lance-heads, articles of lead, silk parasols, black damask, and other silks. This was nearly three centuries before Magellan.
The basic unit of government was the "barangay," a term that derived its meaning from the Malay word "balangay," meaning, a boat, which transported them to these shores. The barangay was basically a family-based community and consisted of thirty to one hundred families. Each barangay was different and ruled by a chieftain called a "dato." It was the chieftain's duty to rule and govern his subjects and promote their welfare and interests. A chieftain had wide powers for he exercised all the functions of government. He was the executive, legislator and judge and was the supreme commander in time of war.
Pre-Spanish Filipinos learned of the manufacture and use of firearms from the Chinese. Guns of this type varied in length from six inches to fifteen feet. Iron, lead, gold and silver appear to have been derived by the natives chiefly from the Chinese, while brass, bronze, copper and tin came mainly from Indian sources. The art of mining these metals, and the implements and tools used in working them, among the Malays, appear to have had the same respective origins. Metal armor and some of the older types of weapons are probably Indian, while certain later weapons and the manufacture and use of firearms are Chinese.
In clothing and ornament, an equal diversity of origin is apparent. The characteristic sarong, turban, bronze bells, anklets and armlets and a variety of smaller ornaments appear to be Indian. The skin-tight trousers of the Sulu Moros are suggestive of Indian puttees. On the other hand, the jacket with sleeves, the loose trousers worn by Moro women, glass beads, and many types of hats, rain-coats, foot-gear, etc., are almost certainly Chinese. So also is the restriction of yellow garb to royal or aristocratic usage and the prevalence of blue among the commonalty. Silks, porcelain and glazed pottery of all sorts came from China: cotton and the ramie fiber were introduced from India, though in the more recent centuries China also acquired cotton and exported cotton cloths.
Practically all the words in Malayan languages which can be traced to a Chinese source are of a purely economic or commercial character. The earlier intercourse appears to have been carried on almost wholly from ships trading along the shores, and only in later and more cultured times did merchants actually establish themselves upon the land. There appear to have been few, if any, Chinese settlements in Malay lands before the thirteenth century, but after that date they increased rapidly. Practically all the settlers, however, married native women and brought up their children as Malays rather than as Chinese.
As a final judgment it may be said that, while Indian culture penetrated to the very heart of Malay mental and social life, the Chinese merely scratched the surface. This great difference is the more worthy of note when it is remembered that, in the neighboring countries of Indo-China, Siam and Burma, wave after wave of Chinese people and culture have swept down from the north and almost completely drowned out the older native languages and customs. In later times, however, the Celestials had been penetrating more thoroughly into the island life, and while the Indian influence had long been waning, the Chinese has been slowly but ever surely increasing its hold.
There appeared on the scene in the Portuguese court a certain cavalier, named Hernando de Maghallanes (Ferdinand Magellan), who, having failed to secure the attention of the king to his scheme for a voyage of discovery, ofl'ered his services in the Spanish capital. Here, after many tedious delays, he was permitted to approach the Spanish King, Charles I, who, in the end, gave his royal assent to the discovery of a western route to the Moluccas. A fleet was fitted out, and sailed under the command of Maghallaues. It was in this voyage that he discovered the channel now known to the world as the Straits of Magellan. The Pacific Ocean was crossed, the Ladrone Islands were visited en route, and eventually Maghallanes found his way to an island which now forms one of the Philippine Archipelago, namely, Cebú.
-----
Early Philippines History
-----
The topic of this thread is about the relations of the Philippines with China - pre-hispanic era, Spanish & American era, pre-Marcos era and contemporary era, and probably future relations.
-------------------------------------------
Will Philippine Elections Bring About a New China Policy?
Richard Javad Heydarian
February 23, 2016
As the Philippines enters the elections season, analysts have been scrambling to predict potential changes in the country’s political and economic trajectory. Under President Benigno Aquino’s watch, the Southeast Asian country has managed to shake off its decades-long notoriety as the “Sick man of Asia.” Today, the Philippines is widely considered to be one of the few bright spots in an otherwise gloomy economic landscape.
Recent years, however, have also seen a dramatic uptick in bilateral tensions with China, which has gradually chipped away at the Philippines’ territorial claims in the South China Sea. It's no wonder then that, for the first time in recent memory, foreign policy issues, particularly China’s maritime assertiveness in the South China Sea, are expected to feature as a major election issue. In a curiously premature article, one observer foresaw a dramatic change in the Philippines’ foreign policy towards China once Aquino steps down from office later this year.
A closer look, however, points in the direction of greater continuity rather than rapture in Philippine foreign policy, especially if China continues to press its advantage in adjacent waters by militarizing territorial disputes. Absent a major concession on China’s part, which seems unlikely in the foreseeable future, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the next Filipino president to effectively pursue a 'reset' in bilateral relations with China.
Don’t Miss the Context
Within a decade, Philippine-China relations went from cordial to confrontational. Some critics, in both Manila and Beijing, have heaped blame on the supposed naiveté and amateurish foreign policy disposition of the Aquino administration, which, on at least two occasions, likened China to Nazi Germany.
For sure, President Aquino as well as Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario have often employed an overzealous rhetoric vis-à-vis China, which has dismissed the Philippines as a “real trouble maker” rather than a critical neighbor to engage with. And analysts, including the Chinese government, have often blamed Aquino for the dramatic deterioration in bilateral relations, pointing out the (short-lived) “golden age” of bilateral relations, under the stewardship of the Gloria Macapagal administration, in the mid-2000s.
But this line of argument overlooks two crucial points.
First, the Aquino administration, especially in its earlier years in office, sought to engage China, to the point that President Aquino, the son of two democratic icons, chose to skip the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize award ceremony for Chinese dissident Li Xiaobo out of solidarity with Beijing. In response, then-Chinese Ambassador to Manila Liu Jianchao remarked, “I appreciate the understanding shown by the Philippine government of the Chinese people and the Chinese government.” The following year, Aquino actually met Hu Jintao in Beijing as part of a bigger plan to expand bilateral trade and investment as well as explore a meaningful dialogue on the South China Sea disputes.
Second, and more importantly, the Aquino administration has had to grapple with a new China, one that has been more aggressive in pursuing its territorial claims in adjacent waters, culminating in the de facto occupation of Philippine-claimed Scarborough Shoal in mid-2012. Without the requisite military capability to wrest back the disputed feature, and in absence of meaningful American assistance, the Aquino administration was left with little choice but to resort to an unprecedented legal arbitration case against China.
Nonetheless, Aquino still tried to reach out to his Chinese counterparts during the 2013 China-ASEAN Expo, where the Philippines was the “country of honor,” before it was brusquely “disinvited” by Beijing. China didn’t only embarrass Aquino, who touted the trip as a potential diplomatic breakthrough, but it extinguished hopes for more effectively managing brewing bilateral disputes. Subsequently, the Aquino administration proceeded with filing its memorial against China at the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague and pursuing a new security pact, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), with America.
The Aquino administration has had its own shortcomings with respect to engaging China and defending its claims in the South China Sea. But its confrontational approach was largely a byproduct of China’s reciprocal intransigence as well as aggressive push into Philippine-claimed waters. So the question is: Will the next Filipino president be in a position to revive bilateral relations?
False Expectations
There are at least three reasons for skepticism. First of all, the brief “golden age” of bilateral relations has been replaced by widespread animosity and suspicion towards China. According to a 2015 survey by the Social Weather Stations (SWS), Filipino trust in China hit an all time low of -45 percent, mid last year, compared to the -36 percent rating reported shortly after it wrested control of Filipino-claimed Mischief Reef in 1994.
A significant proportion of the Filipino population and much of the security establishment views China as an opportunistic power that tried to cut unfavorable deals with the Arroyo administration (2000-2010), which was hounded by one corruption scandal after the other. For instance, Aquino’s predecessor negotiated a Joint Maritime Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) with China and Vietnam, which was later found to be inimical to Philippine constitution and national interest.
Shortly after the signing of the JMSU, the Arroyo administration proceeded with China-funded/led big-ticket infrastructure projects, which would be at the center of one of the biggest corruption scandals in Philippine history. Most believed the kickbacks were a form of Chinese bribe for the controversial JMSU deal, which was challenged at the Philippine Supreme Court.
It was very difficult for Aquino to even seriously discuss the prospect of joint development with China in disputed waters for fear they would be accused of being an Arroyo 2.0. The Aquino administration even dragged its feet, until the eleventh hour, on joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
When one presidential candidate, Jejomar Binay, openly suggested the prospect of joint development in South China Sea, he immediately provoked a firestorm of criticisms. Neither the currently-leading presidential candidate, Senator Grace Poe, nor Aquino’s anointed successor, Interior Secretary Mar Roxas, have, so far, dared to suggest a similar approach, probably out of fear of political backlash.
Secondly, unlike the Arroyo administration, the Philippines is grappling with an acute crisis in the South China Sea, with Beijing establishing a sprawling network of dual-purposes bases and airstrips across both Paracels and Spratly chain of islands. There is a genuine fear that soon China will establish a military base in the Scarborough Shoal and/or start cutting off Filipino supply lines in the disputed waters.
No wonder then, the South China Sea, which Manila has feistily renamed the “West Philippine Sea,” is today a regular topic of animated discussion, if not outright sensationalization, in the Philippine media and among ordinary citizens. Back in the Arroyo administration days, barely anyone knew much about the South China Sea disputes. With rising popular nationalism in the Philippines, Aquino’s successor will face an even more critical and sentient public opinion, which will restrict his/her room for maneuver.
Lastly, the Aquino administration has overseen a massive upgrade in bilateral security relations with its key allies, the United States and Japan. It would seem certain that both of these countries, which are among Manila’s leading trading and investment partners and have stepped up their opposition to Beijing’s maritime assertiveness, will lobby hard to ensure that the next Filipino president will not dramatically alter the Philippines’ China policy.
Looking at the rhetoric and platforms of all the leading candidates, there are, however, indications that Aquino’s successor will use more measured rhetoric, and will likely try to leverage any favorable arbitration outcome, which is expected in coming months, as a springboard to exact certain concessions from, and improve bilateral relations with, China.
The new Filipino president’s room for maneuver will expand if, for instance, China agrees to, say, a mutual disengagement from Scarborough Shoal, end the siege on the Filipino detachment in Second Thomas Shoal, and promises not to cut off Filipino supply lines the South China Sea. The two sides could also start discussing ways to revive bilateral investment relations, since China has a very limited footprint in the Philippines’ infrastructure landscape. All of these options seem a long way off, however. Don’t expect a major or swift reset any time soon.
Richard Javad Heydarian is an Assistant Professor in political science at De La Salle University, and formerly a policy adviser at the Philippine House of Representatives (2009-2015). The Manila Bulletin, a leading national daily, has described him as one of the Philippines’ “foremost foreign policy and economic analysts”. He is the author of Asia’s New Battlefield: The US, China, and the Struggle for Western Pacific (Zed, London)., and a regular to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). This article first appeared in the Interpreter.
-----
China envoy hopes for better Philippine ties | Headlines, News, The Philippine Star | philstar.com
-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Early Philippines History - Porcelain Period
Philippine -Chinese relations is richly documented by archeological discoveries of the presence of porcelains dating from the start of the Sung to the Ming Dynasties (960-1644). Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was peopled largely by the Negritos, Indonesians and Malays. The strains from these groups eventually gave rise to common cultural features which became the dominant influence in ethnic reformulation in the archipelago. Archaeological evidence indicates that small seafaring communities existed throughout the Philippine Archipelago for at least 2000 years, prior to the arrival of the Spaniards. The chief means of trading was barter. Influences from the Chinese and Indian civilizations in the third or fourth millennium BC augmented these ethnic strains. Chinese economic and socio-cultural influences came by way of Chinese porcelain, silk and traders. Indian influence found their way into the religious-cultural aspect of pre-colonial society.
The archaeological phases of relevance to complex society development in the Philippines, according to the schema of Laura Lee Junker, span the Philippine "Iron Age" or "Metal Age" (ca. 500 BC-AD 1000), the Early Porcelain Period (the Sung through Early Ming Dynasties, or late 10th century to late 14th century AD), and the Late Porcelain Period (Late Ming to Early Manchu Dynasties, or late 14th century to late 16th century AD). By the early sixteen century, the time of European contact, most of the major islands of the Philippines had a complex political landscape comprised of chiefdoms of varying scale and complexity in coastal river valleys, interacting through trade and conflict with each other and with smaller-scale tribal agriculturalist societies and mobile foragers in the island interiors.
Civilized Indian peoples visited the Malay Archipelago in the fourth or fifth century before Christ, and these regions were known to the Chinese as early as the third or fourth century of the present era, and probably earlier, for the Chinese had contacts with the Philippines as early as the third or fourth century before Christ. Probably before the beginning of the Christian era the Hindus had established settlements and introduced Brahmanism into Indo-China, Sumatra, Java, and Borneo. About the fifth or the sixth century of the Christian era Sumatra became Buddhist, and the foundations of the first great HinduMalayan empire were laid.
This Sumatran empire, known as Sri-Vishaya, or Sri-Vijaya, seems to have been the dominating power in the East Indies from the seventh to the twelfth century, and for a time, at least, embraced practically the entire Malay Archipelago except a part of Java and the island chain eastward to New Guinea. It included or controlled the Philippines, had outposts in Formosa and Hainan, and is said to have collected tribute even from Ceylon and a part of southern India. Sumatran power was gradually undermined and finally superseded by the growing Javanese state, later widely known as the Empire of Madjapahit. This empire also dominated the entire Malay Archipelago, including the Philippines, and even extended its influence to New Guinea. Its power was broken by the rapid spread of Mohammedanism during the fifteenth century.
The last Malay invasion occurred in the historic period between 1380 and 1450, the time of the introduction of Mohammedanism. This in historic sequence immediately precedes the discovery of the Archipelago by the Spaniards in 1521; Mohammedanism at that time was widespread in the Archipelago. It is evident that there has been a successive series of invasions into the Philippines, chiefly through Malaysia, and that the Archipelago has been extensively colonized for a long time. Most of these invasions were in the prehistoric period, but early in the Christian era it is clear that civilized peoples in this part of the world were in communication with the Philippines.
The general character of Chinese influence in Malaysia was and is economic, rather than social or political. While political affairs have occupied some space in the accounts quoted above, it should not be forgotten that the main object of the Chinese was always trade, and that a thousand peaceful merchant vessels sailed into the southern seas for every one sent there on a political or warlike mission.
The Chinese obtained from the Filipinos not only such raw materials as yellow wax, cotton, pearls, tortoise-shells, betel-nuts, cocoanuts, and vegetables, but also jute fabrics (probably those woven from abaka, Manila hemp, as to-day), other woven goods of cotton, and fine mats. The Filipinos took in exchange porcelain, gold, iron, needles, vases for perfumes, lance-heads, articles of lead, silk parasols, black damask, and other silks. This was nearly three centuries before Magellan.
The basic unit of government was the "barangay," a term that derived its meaning from the Malay word "balangay," meaning, a boat, which transported them to these shores. The barangay was basically a family-based community and consisted of thirty to one hundred families. Each barangay was different and ruled by a chieftain called a "dato." It was the chieftain's duty to rule and govern his subjects and promote their welfare and interests. A chieftain had wide powers for he exercised all the functions of government. He was the executive, legislator and judge and was the supreme commander in time of war.
Pre-Spanish Filipinos learned of the manufacture and use of firearms from the Chinese. Guns of this type varied in length from six inches to fifteen feet. Iron, lead, gold and silver appear to have been derived by the natives chiefly from the Chinese, while brass, bronze, copper and tin came mainly from Indian sources. The art of mining these metals, and the implements and tools used in working them, among the Malays, appear to have had the same respective origins. Metal armor and some of the older types of weapons are probably Indian, while certain later weapons and the manufacture and use of firearms are Chinese.
In clothing and ornament, an equal diversity of origin is apparent. The characteristic sarong, turban, bronze bells, anklets and armlets and a variety of smaller ornaments appear to be Indian. The skin-tight trousers of the Sulu Moros are suggestive of Indian puttees. On the other hand, the jacket with sleeves, the loose trousers worn by Moro women, glass beads, and many types of hats, rain-coats, foot-gear, etc., are almost certainly Chinese. So also is the restriction of yellow garb to royal or aristocratic usage and the prevalence of blue among the commonalty. Silks, porcelain and glazed pottery of all sorts came from China: cotton and the ramie fiber were introduced from India, though in the more recent centuries China also acquired cotton and exported cotton cloths.
Practically all the words in Malayan languages which can be traced to a Chinese source are of a purely economic or commercial character. The earlier intercourse appears to have been carried on almost wholly from ships trading along the shores, and only in later and more cultured times did merchants actually establish themselves upon the land. There appear to have been few, if any, Chinese settlements in Malay lands before the thirteenth century, but after that date they increased rapidly. Practically all the settlers, however, married native women and brought up their children as Malays rather than as Chinese.
As a final judgment it may be said that, while Indian culture penetrated to the very heart of Malay mental and social life, the Chinese merely scratched the surface. This great difference is the more worthy of note when it is remembered that, in the neighboring countries of Indo-China, Siam and Burma, wave after wave of Chinese people and culture have swept down from the north and almost completely drowned out the older native languages and customs. In later times, however, the Celestials had been penetrating more thoroughly into the island life, and while the Indian influence had long been waning, the Chinese has been slowly but ever surely increasing its hold.
There appeared on the scene in the Portuguese court a certain cavalier, named Hernando de Maghallanes (Ferdinand Magellan), who, having failed to secure the attention of the king to his scheme for a voyage of discovery, ofl'ered his services in the Spanish capital. Here, after many tedious delays, he was permitted to approach the Spanish King, Charles I, who, in the end, gave his royal assent to the discovery of a western route to the Moluccas. A fleet was fitted out, and sailed under the command of Maghallaues. It was in this voyage that he discovered the channel now known to the world as the Straits of Magellan. The Pacific Ocean was crossed, the Ladrone Islands were visited en route, and eventually Maghallanes found his way to an island which now forms one of the Philippine Archipelago, namely, Cebú.
-----
Early Philippines History
-----
I love to read history.
