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The Ramadan War: The Battle for Dignity
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Nishan
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dear brother, nomber one in the picture mentioned (comando nicosia 1978) can you explane that please
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It refers to the special task force Unit 777, which was involved in Larnaca incident in 1978, when Palestinian extremists assassinated the Egyptian minister of culture Youssef el Sebai, and took the Egyptian delegate as hostages. Sadat immediately ordered the unit to free the hostages and capture the criminals, but as they landed in Larnaca, the Cypriot army opened fire on them, killing 12 Egyptian commandos, injuring another 15, and damaging their C-130, after nearly an hour of heavy clashes between Cypriot National Guard and Egyptian commandos, who lacked any form of cover.
Egyptian raid on Larnaca International Airport - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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It refers to the special task force Unit 777, which was involved in Larnaca incident in 1978, when Palestinian extremists assassinated the Egyptian minister of culture Youssef el Sebai, and took the Egyptian delegate as hostages. Sadat immediately ordered the unit to free the hostages and capture the criminals, but as they landed in Larnaca, the Cypriot army opened fire on them, killing 12 Egyptian commandos, injuring another 15, and damaging their C-130, after nearly an hour of heavy clashes between Cypriot National Guard and Egyptian commandos, who lacked any form of cover.
Egyptian raid on Larnaca International Airport - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Thank you for the clarification . .
Menes
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Menes
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Some declassified documents..
Dayan to Golda: If we can't evacuate, we'll leave wounded behind
On 37th anniversary of Yom Kippur War, Ynet releases minutes of top secret cabinet meeting held after first day of fighting. Heated debate depicts Israel's dire situation. Defense minister says Arabs looking to 'conquer Israel, finish Jews off'; Golda Meir: They smelled blood. IDF chief presents military options
Roi Mandel, Yaron Druckman
10.04.10, 18:50
October 7, 1973. 2:50 pm. A little more than a day after the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, then-prime minister Golda Meir and her cabinet hold a dramatic meeting. Then-defense minister Moshe Dayan discusses the fall of IDF positions, one after the other, in the Sinai Peninsula. "The canal line is lost," he says, and suggests a withdrawal to the Isthmus line, some 30 kilometers (about 19 miles) from the canal, while leaving behind the injured soldiers who cannot be evacuated. "Where we can evacuate we will evacuate. In places we can't evacuate we will leave the wounded. Those who make it make it. If they decide to surrender, they'll surrender. We have to tell them, 'We can't reach you. Try to bust through or surrender.'"
The meeting's minutes, which were classified as "top secret," are being published for the first time by Ynet after being obtained from the State Archives to mark the war's 37th anniversary.
Dayan predicted that the international community would mock Israel and refer to it as a "paper tiger" after the country failed to sustain its initial attack despite having a military edge. Meir responded by saying, "I dont understand one thing I thought we would begin hitting them as soon as they cross the canal. What happened?"
Dayan said, "We lost tanks. There was artillery, our tanks were hit. The planes weren't able to approach because of the missiles. A thousand artillery barrels allowed the tanks to cross and prevented us from getting close. The planning and methodology was Russian. Three years of preparation."
Dayan spoke of hundreds of fatalities and numerous prisoners of war, and admitted he was wrong in his assessment of the enemy's objectives. "This is not the time for soul-searching. I underestimated the enemy's strength and miscalculated our forces' ability. The Arab fighters are much improved; they have many weapons. They hit our tanks with their personal rifles. The missiles serve as an umbrella, which our planes have a hard time bursting. I dont know if a preemptive strike would have changed the picture significantly," he said.
"They (Arabs) want to go for the entire Land of Israel," Dayan said. Golda responded, "This is the second round since 1948." "It is a battle for the Land of Israel," Dayan declared, "The Arabs wont stop the war, and if they agree to a ceasefire they may resume (the fighting). If we withdraw from the Golan Heights, it wont solve anything."
Golda added: "They have no reason not to continue. They smelled blood." Dayan said, "To conquer Israel, finish off the Jews."
Dayan continued with his pessimistic tone. "I'm certain that Jordan will join the fighting. We can't afford not to be prepared. A minimal level of preparation is required. We must prepare a force against a Jordanian attempt to invade the West Bank. They might allow terrorists to operate as well."
Golda suggested putting then-US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger into action, and Dayan said Israel should purchase 300 tanks form the Americans, adding, "We'll need more planes." Golda spoke of a tense meeting with IDF chief of staff at the time, David "Dado" Elazar. "Dado was sad," she said, "He said he hopes tonight will be a turning point."
Dayan concluded his briefing with a harsh statement, possibly alluding to the need to use other means to curb the threat. "The amount of weapons they have is effective. Our moral advantage is not enough in the face of such (an amount). The numbers are very crucial. Perhaps there are other ideas as to how we should operate in this situation. "
About an hour after the cabinet meeting began, IDF chief Dado entered the room. "We are facing a fateful decision. There is no room for mistakes here." He said the army had three options:
Minister Yigal Alon spoke of bombing deep in enemy territory, but Dayan estimated that bombing Damascus would not affect fighting at the front line. "We may hit oil, electricity, but nothing more. Every attack means more casualties," he said.
Dayan to Golda: If we can't evacuate, we'll leave wounded behind - Israel News, Ynetnews
Dayan to Golda: If we can't evacuate, we'll leave wounded behind
On 37th anniversary of Yom Kippur War, Ynet releases minutes of top secret cabinet meeting held after first day of fighting. Heated debate depicts Israel's dire situation. Defense minister says Arabs looking to 'conquer Israel, finish Jews off'; Golda Meir: They smelled blood. IDF chief presents military options
Roi Mandel, Yaron Druckman
10.04.10, 18:50
October 7, 1973. 2:50 pm. A little more than a day after the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, then-prime minister Golda Meir and her cabinet hold a dramatic meeting. Then-defense minister Moshe Dayan discusses the fall of IDF positions, one after the other, in the Sinai Peninsula. "The canal line is lost," he says, and suggests a withdrawal to the Isthmus line, some 30 kilometers (about 19 miles) from the canal, while leaving behind the injured soldiers who cannot be evacuated. "Where we can evacuate we will evacuate. In places we can't evacuate we will leave the wounded. Those who make it make it. If they decide to surrender, they'll surrender. We have to tell them, 'We can't reach you. Try to bust through or surrender.'"
The meeting's minutes, which were classified as "top secret," are being published for the first time by Ynet after being obtained from the State Archives to mark the war's 37th anniversary.
Dayan predicted that the international community would mock Israel and refer to it as a "paper tiger" after the country failed to sustain its initial attack despite having a military edge. Meir responded by saying, "I dont understand one thing I thought we would begin hitting them as soon as they cross the canal. What happened?"
Dayan said, "We lost tanks. There was artillery, our tanks were hit. The planes weren't able to approach because of the missiles. A thousand artillery barrels allowed the tanks to cross and prevented us from getting close. The planning and methodology was Russian. Three years of preparation."
Dayan spoke of hundreds of fatalities and numerous prisoners of war, and admitted he was wrong in his assessment of the enemy's objectives. "This is not the time for soul-searching. I underestimated the enemy's strength and miscalculated our forces' ability. The Arab fighters are much improved; they have many weapons. They hit our tanks with their personal rifles. The missiles serve as an umbrella, which our planes have a hard time bursting. I dont know if a preemptive strike would have changed the picture significantly," he said.
"They (Arabs) want to go for the entire Land of Israel," Dayan said. Golda responded, "This is the second round since 1948." "It is a battle for the Land of Israel," Dayan declared, "The Arabs wont stop the war, and if they agree to a ceasefire they may resume (the fighting). If we withdraw from the Golan Heights, it wont solve anything."
Golda added: "They have no reason not to continue. They smelled blood." Dayan said, "To conquer Israel, finish off the Jews."
Dayan continued with his pessimistic tone. "I'm certain that Jordan will join the fighting. We can't afford not to be prepared. A minimal level of preparation is required. We must prepare a force against a Jordanian attempt to invade the West Bank. They might allow terrorists to operate as well."
Golda suggested putting then-US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger into action, and Dayan said Israel should purchase 300 tanks form the Americans, adding, "We'll need more planes." Golda spoke of a tense meeting with IDF chief of staff at the time, David "Dado" Elazar. "Dado was sad," she said, "He said he hopes tonight will be a turning point."
Dayan concluded his briefing with a harsh statement, possibly alluding to the need to use other means to curb the threat. "The amount of weapons they have is effective. Our moral advantage is not enough in the face of such (an amount). The numbers are very crucial. Perhaps there are other ideas as to how we should operate in this situation. "
About an hour after the cabinet meeting began, IDF chief Dado entered the room. "We are facing a fateful decision. There is no room for mistakes here." He said the army had three options:
- Deploy two divisions along a temporary line of defense, from which the army will launch counter-attacks. "I am not certain we will be able to hold the line and then attack."
- Solidify IDF positions along the Isthmus line. "This line is exacting a heavy price."
- "This option is risky. I consulted with members of the General Staff. They suggested we attack the canal and move forward." According to the plan, Avraham Eden (Bren) and Arik Sharon's divisions would cross the Suez Canal and destroy enemy forces. "It's a gamble, because these are the only two divisions between the canal and Tel Aviv. If we the attack on the canal is unsuccessful, we are left with three broken divisions, then the Iraqis and Algerians come and in two-three days the war is inside the Land of Israel."
Minister Yigal Alon spoke of bombing deep in enemy territory, but Dayan estimated that bombing Damascus would not affect fighting at the front line. "We may hit oil, electricity, but nothing more. Every attack means more casualties," he said.
Dayan to Golda: If we can't evacuate, we'll leave wounded behind - Israel News, Ynetnews
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Newly released documents: Division and disarray on eve of Yom Kippur War
Documents attest to the existence of an intelligence source who warned of an imminent attack, enabling Israel's leadership to consider a preemptive strike.
By Jonathan Lis
Published 00:57 06.10.10
Following the release on Monday of minutes of prime minister Golda Meir's meeting with her war cabinet on the second day of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the state archives released Tuesday the minutes of eight additional meetings that the prime minister held during the war's first four days.
The documents provide a rare look at the military and diplomatic efforts made just hours before the Arab attack on Israel. They also attest to the existence of an intelligence source who provided credible information of an imminent attack, enabling Israel's political leadership to consider a preemptive strike on Egypt and Syria.
IDF chief of staff David Elazar suggested during the meetings "When there are skirmishes we tell the truth, but during wartime we must not tell the truth."
The documents show the close ties between King Hussein of Jordan and Israel's leadership on the eve of the war. They also again reveal Israel's complacency regarding the Arab armies' military might.
On the day the war broke out, Yom Kippur, the chief of military intelligence, Eli Zeira, was still expressing the belief that Egyptian president Anwar Sadat would not start another war with Israel. Despite that view, and against the recommendations of then-defense minister Moshe Dayan, Meir decided to mobilize 200,000 reserve soldiers so as to provide a substantial boost to the military in the event that war broke out.
Meir and senior defense officials also worked to procure additional military hardware, in the form of 40 fighter jet and 400 tanks, from the United States. The prime minister even considered a secret meeting with U.S. president Richard Nixon without the knowledge of the cabinet, in a effort to convince the American leader to come to Israel's assistance.
October 6, 1973, Yom Kippur, 8:05 A.M.
Meir convened an emergency meeting in Tel Aviv with senior defense officials. Six hours before the outbreak of the war, Israeli preparations for a general offensive by Arab armies finally began. The warnings of the intelligence source were being taken seriously, as was the fact that the Russians were pulling families out of Egypt and Syria, a sign of approaching war. But U.S. intelligence was not predicting war.
Minister Yisrael Galili said a source had suggested the war could be prevented by leaking information that would reach the Egyptians and Syrians, so they would knew their plans for attack had been discovered.
Jordan also preoccupied those in attendance, because it wasn't clear if the kingdom would join in the assault on Israel.
Initially, Meir deliberated between Elazar's call for a full mobilization of the reserves and Dayan's request for a limited call-up.
"If you approve a major mobilization of the reserves, I won't resign," Dayan said. But with an eye to international reaction, he added, "A full mobilization before even one shot is fired - they will say right away that we are the aggressors."
At 9:20 A.M., a full mobilization was approved.
October 7, 1973
A discussion at the Prime Minister's Office centered on how to enlist American support at the United Nations and head off a cease-fire that would hurt Israel. Meir suggested putting together a list of requests.
The forum considered presenting U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger with a partial, distorted picture exaggerating Israel's poor situation to win the Nixon administration's support. Meir rejected the suggestion out of hand.
"We should telegraph him the details; he should get the real picture," she said. "We can't play hide and seek with him."
Minister Yisrael Galili asked in response, "Do we sell him the fact that we've moved out of the populated areas?" Meir replied, "I don't object to us saying, there's also risk to populated areas ... I want to give him the real picture. I'm not under the impression the
situation is doomed ... We should tell it to him convincingly. Tonight was a bad night."
11:50 P.M.
A meeting of the ministers with senior defense officials. Yitzhak Rabin returned from a tour of the southern front and told the meeting, "The whole issue of the dead and wounded is complicated. There are 400 wounded and 80 killed. [GOC Southern Command Shmuel] Gorodish estimates there will be 150 to 200 killed before the counteroffensive." Rabin said he had no information on Egyptian losses.
October 8, 7:50 P.M.
Maj. Gen. Haim Bar-Lev and minister Yigal Allon report to the prime minister after a tour of both fronts. The Israeli forces' situation is beginning to improve, while the enemy forces are beginning to suffer serious damage.
"What they achieved today as compared to yesterday is enormous," Allon said. "The front was breached yesterday. If the Syrians had been more daring, they'd have made significant gains."
Bar-Lev explained the Egyptian and Syrian successes as being partly due to technological superiority. "Both have the new Soviet tank plus infrared," he said. "They have an advantage there. On the first night we were surprised; we only knew they had it in theory ... Today we know about it and take it into account."
9:50 A.M.
Elazar asked Meir's permission to attack four Egyptian targets along the coast. Meir agreed.
"These are good targets," Elazar said. "Make them worry. We need to press them. After all, they too are only human."
October 9
Dayan voiced confidence in the Israeli forces' ability to overcome Syria and asked permission to bomb targets in Damascus. "There's an order: No retreat on the Golan," he said. "Fighting to the death and not moving ... What I'm suggesting and asking for approval of [is] bombings inside the city."
Meir asked whether he meant within the city itself, and Dayan confirmed this. He said the IDF can't muster a column to march on Damascus even as a decoy, but bombing in and around the city could "break the Syrians" - though he conceded, "you can't say the population wouldn't be hurt."
"Why would it necessarily break them?" Meir asked. "Would a bombing here break us?
Elazar replied: "A heavy bombing here, on Reading and Ramat Aviv, would seriously disrupt things."
Meir suggested leaving on a secret, 24-hour mission to Washington, without informing the cabinet, to personally explain the gravity of the situation to Nixon. "I'd like to suggest a crazy idea: What if me and an appropriate military official go to Washington for 24 hours? ... Maybe he'll say he can offer nothing but sympathy. Maybe his personal pride will be roused by what they [the Russians] are doing to him ... I have the feeling that I'm at a point where I need to talk to him, and a feeling that he will understand."
Newly released documents: Division and disarray on eve of Yom Kippur War - Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News
Documents attest to the existence of an intelligence source who warned of an imminent attack, enabling Israel's leadership to consider a preemptive strike.
By Jonathan Lis
Published 00:57 06.10.10
Following the release on Monday of minutes of prime minister Golda Meir's meeting with her war cabinet on the second day of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the state archives released Tuesday the minutes of eight additional meetings that the prime minister held during the war's first four days.
The documents provide a rare look at the military and diplomatic efforts made just hours before the Arab attack on Israel. They also attest to the existence of an intelligence source who provided credible information of an imminent attack, enabling Israel's political leadership to consider a preemptive strike on Egypt and Syria.
IDF chief of staff David Elazar suggested during the meetings "When there are skirmishes we tell the truth, but during wartime we must not tell the truth."
The documents show the close ties between King Hussein of Jordan and Israel's leadership on the eve of the war. They also again reveal Israel's complacency regarding the Arab armies' military might.
On the day the war broke out, Yom Kippur, the chief of military intelligence, Eli Zeira, was still expressing the belief that Egyptian president Anwar Sadat would not start another war with Israel. Despite that view, and against the recommendations of then-defense minister Moshe Dayan, Meir decided to mobilize 200,000 reserve soldiers so as to provide a substantial boost to the military in the event that war broke out.
Meir and senior defense officials also worked to procure additional military hardware, in the form of 40 fighter jet and 400 tanks, from the United States. The prime minister even considered a secret meeting with U.S. president Richard Nixon without the knowledge of the cabinet, in a effort to convince the American leader to come to Israel's assistance.
October 6, 1973, Yom Kippur, 8:05 A.M.
Meir convened an emergency meeting in Tel Aviv with senior defense officials. Six hours before the outbreak of the war, Israeli preparations for a general offensive by Arab armies finally began. The warnings of the intelligence source were being taken seriously, as was the fact that the Russians were pulling families out of Egypt and Syria, a sign of approaching war. But U.S. intelligence was not predicting war.
Minister Yisrael Galili said a source had suggested the war could be prevented by leaking information that would reach the Egyptians and Syrians, so they would knew their plans for attack had been discovered.
Jordan also preoccupied those in attendance, because it wasn't clear if the kingdom would join in the assault on Israel.
Initially, Meir deliberated between Elazar's call for a full mobilization of the reserves and Dayan's request for a limited call-up.
"If you approve a major mobilization of the reserves, I won't resign," Dayan said. But with an eye to international reaction, he added, "A full mobilization before even one shot is fired - they will say right away that we are the aggressors."
At 9:20 A.M., a full mobilization was approved.
October 7, 1973
A discussion at the Prime Minister's Office centered on how to enlist American support at the United Nations and head off a cease-fire that would hurt Israel. Meir suggested putting together a list of requests.
The forum considered presenting U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger with a partial, distorted picture exaggerating Israel's poor situation to win the Nixon administration's support. Meir rejected the suggestion out of hand.
"We should telegraph him the details; he should get the real picture," she said. "We can't play hide and seek with him."
Minister Yisrael Galili asked in response, "Do we sell him the fact that we've moved out of the populated areas?" Meir replied, "I don't object to us saying, there's also risk to populated areas ... I want to give him the real picture. I'm not under the impression the
situation is doomed ... We should tell it to him convincingly. Tonight was a bad night."
11:50 P.M.
A meeting of the ministers with senior defense officials. Yitzhak Rabin returned from a tour of the southern front and told the meeting, "The whole issue of the dead and wounded is complicated. There are 400 wounded and 80 killed. [GOC Southern Command Shmuel] Gorodish estimates there will be 150 to 200 killed before the counteroffensive." Rabin said he had no information on Egyptian losses.
October 8, 7:50 P.M.
Maj. Gen. Haim Bar-Lev and minister Yigal Allon report to the prime minister after a tour of both fronts. The Israeli forces' situation is beginning to improve, while the enemy forces are beginning to suffer serious damage.
"What they achieved today as compared to yesterday is enormous," Allon said. "The front was breached yesterday. If the Syrians had been more daring, they'd have made significant gains."
Bar-Lev explained the Egyptian and Syrian successes as being partly due to technological superiority. "Both have the new Soviet tank plus infrared," he said. "They have an advantage there. On the first night we were surprised; we only knew they had it in theory ... Today we know about it and take it into account."
9:50 A.M.
Elazar asked Meir's permission to attack four Egyptian targets along the coast. Meir agreed.
"These are good targets," Elazar said. "Make them worry. We need to press them. After all, they too are only human."
October 9
Dayan voiced confidence in the Israeli forces' ability to overcome Syria and asked permission to bomb targets in Damascus. "There's an order: No retreat on the Golan," he said. "Fighting to the death and not moving ... What I'm suggesting and asking for approval of [is] bombings inside the city."
Meir asked whether he meant within the city itself, and Dayan confirmed this. He said the IDF can't muster a column to march on Damascus even as a decoy, but bombing in and around the city could "break the Syrians" - though he conceded, "you can't say the population wouldn't be hurt."
"Why would it necessarily break them?" Meir asked. "Would a bombing here break us?
Elazar replied: "A heavy bombing here, on Reading and Ramat Aviv, would seriously disrupt things."
Meir suggested leaving on a secret, 24-hour mission to Washington, without informing the cabinet, to personally explain the gravity of the situation to Nixon. "I'd like to suggest a crazy idea: What if me and an appropriate military official go to Washington for 24 hours? ... Maybe he'll say he can offer nothing but sympathy. Maybe his personal pride will be roused by what they [the Russians] are doing to him ... I have the feeling that I'm at a point where I need to talk to him, and a feeling that he will understand."
Newly released documents: Division and disarray on eve of Yom Kippur War - Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News
Menes
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Did Israel ever consider using nuclear weapons?
Newly declassified documents shine a light on the deliberations of Israel's leaders during the early days of the Yom Kippur War in 1973.
By Yossi Melman
02:12 07.10.10
Media outlets around the world have reported that state archive documents declassified this week showed that Israel's leadership considered using "drastic means" during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
On October 9, a day after Egypt repulsed Israel's counterattack on the southern front, prime minister Golda Meir convened a top-level discussion in her office.
The outlook was grim. Troop losses were high, and ammunition and weapons stores were running out. At one point, Meir blurted out that she had a "crazy idea."
That idea, however, was not a nuclear attack, but many believe a lightning visit to Washington to meet with U.S. president Richard Nixon. The visit was to be so secret that Meir advocated not even informing the cabinet. Defense minister Moshe Dayan supported her plan, but it was never implemented.
At the same meeting, officials also discussed the option of having the air force bomb strategic sites in Damascus.
Was the "crazy idea" connected to a critical strike at Syria. It seems the answer is yes.
In another meeting - according to Hanna Zemer, the one-time editor of the newspaper Davar - Dayan spoke of the possibility that "the Third Temple," meaning the state, would be destroyed. Foreign news outlets have reported that Israel readied its nuclear weapons and even considered using them as a last resort.
The Dimona nuclear facility was completed in 1960. Those same foreign reports say Israel had several dozen nuclear weapons in October 1973, as well as the means to deliver them: French-made Mirage and U.S.-made Phantom aircraft and the Jericho missile, an Israeli improvement on a French model. All of these, the reports said, were at full readiness.
Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh called his book on Israel's nuclear program "The Samson Option." The implication is that Israel would use atomic weapons if it viewed itself as facing certain, imminent destruction.
If these reports are accurate - and the documents released this week do not confirm them, but possibly only hint at them through portions blacked out by the military censor - this would be neither the first nor the last time Israel's leaders have discussed their so-called "doomsday weapons."
International researchers have posited that Israel had a nuclear device even before the 1967 Six-Day War.
In 1991, Israel again reportedly considered using atomic weapons in response to the Scud missile attacks launched by Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War. Rightist ministers, including Yuval Ne'eman (a physicist involved in Israel's nuclear program), Rafael Eitan and Rehavam Ze'evi, urged Yitzhak Shamir's government to respond forcefully, but Shamir rejected Israeli military action out of hand.
In recent years, as Iran emerged as Israel's foremost threat, experts at home and abroad have raised the nuclear option once again. In lectures in Vienna and Berlin, and later in an ill-considered op-ed in The New York Times, historian Benny Morris has urged Israel's leaders to hit Iran with a nuclear bomb.
Thankfully, government officials on both left and right have thus far shown responsibility and stuck to the ambiguity policy instituted in 1961, under which Israel promised it would not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East.
They know as well as anyone that the first country to do so will not only forfeit its seat among the community nations, but will likely cease to exist.
Did Israel ever consider using nuclear weapons? - Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News
Newly declassified documents shine a light on the deliberations of Israel's leaders during the early days of the Yom Kippur War in 1973.
By Yossi Melman
02:12 07.10.10
Media outlets around the world have reported that state archive documents declassified this week showed that Israel's leadership considered using "drastic means" during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
On October 9, a day after Egypt repulsed Israel's counterattack on the southern front, prime minister Golda Meir convened a top-level discussion in her office.
The outlook was grim. Troop losses were high, and ammunition and weapons stores were running out. At one point, Meir blurted out that she had a "crazy idea."
That idea, however, was not a nuclear attack, but many believe a lightning visit to Washington to meet with U.S. president Richard Nixon. The visit was to be so secret that Meir advocated not even informing the cabinet. Defense minister Moshe Dayan supported her plan, but it was never implemented.
At the same meeting, officials also discussed the option of having the air force bomb strategic sites in Damascus.
Was the "crazy idea" connected to a critical strike at Syria. It seems the answer is yes.
In another meeting - according to Hanna Zemer, the one-time editor of the newspaper Davar - Dayan spoke of the possibility that "the Third Temple," meaning the state, would be destroyed. Foreign news outlets have reported that Israel readied its nuclear weapons and even considered using them as a last resort.
The Dimona nuclear facility was completed in 1960. Those same foreign reports say Israel had several dozen nuclear weapons in October 1973, as well as the means to deliver them: French-made Mirage and U.S.-made Phantom aircraft and the Jericho missile, an Israeli improvement on a French model. All of these, the reports said, were at full readiness.
Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh called his book on Israel's nuclear program "The Samson Option." The implication is that Israel would use atomic weapons if it viewed itself as facing certain, imminent destruction.
If these reports are accurate - and the documents released this week do not confirm them, but possibly only hint at them through portions blacked out by the military censor - this would be neither the first nor the last time Israel's leaders have discussed their so-called "doomsday weapons."
International researchers have posited that Israel had a nuclear device even before the 1967 Six-Day War.
In 1991, Israel again reportedly considered using atomic weapons in response to the Scud missile attacks launched by Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War. Rightist ministers, including Yuval Ne'eman (a physicist involved in Israel's nuclear program), Rafael Eitan and Rehavam Ze'evi, urged Yitzhak Shamir's government to respond forcefully, but Shamir rejected Israeli military action out of hand.
In recent years, as Iran emerged as Israel's foremost threat, experts at home and abroad have raised the nuclear option once again. In lectures in Vienna and Berlin, and later in an ill-considered op-ed in The New York Times, historian Benny Morris has urged Israel's leaders to hit Iran with a nuclear bomb.
Thankfully, government officials on both left and right have thus far shown responsibility and stuck to the ambiguity policy instituted in 1961, under which Israel promised it would not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East.
They know as well as anyone that the first country to do so will not only forfeit its seat among the community nations, but will likely cease to exist.
Did Israel ever consider using nuclear weapons? - Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News
