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THE PRESSLER AMENDMENT AND PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM
[Page S11065]
Mr. PRESSLER
Testimony of Senator John Glenn--U.S./Pakistan Nuclear Issues
THE PROMISE OF THE POLICY
[Page S11066]
ORIGINS OF THE PRESSLER AMENDMENT
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESSLER AMENDMENT
OTHER LAWS INFRINGED
[Page S11067]
PAKISTAN AND IRAQ
NEXT STEPS AND REFORMS
U.S. Aid Policies and Pakistan's Bomb: What Were We Trying To Accomplish?
[Page S11068]
From Myth to Reality: Evidence of Pakistan's `Nuclear Restraint'
[Page S11069]
Are Pakistan's F-16's `Nuclear-Capable'? It Depends on Who You Ask
The Bomb vs. Butter: Pakistan's Ultimate Choice
[Page S11070]
From the Herald Tribune, June 26, 1992
On Proliferation Law, a Disgraceful Failure
[Page: S11065]
Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, yesterday the Foreign Relations Committee held an extremely enlightening hearing on interpretation of the Pressler amendment.
During the hearing, it was my great pleasure to listen to the testimony of Senator John Glenn. My first experience with the senior Senator from Ohio occurred when I was a student at the University of South Dakota. I wrote him a letter congratulating him on being the first American to orbit the Earth on the Friendship 7 mission. I received a very kind response and am pleased to count Senator Glenn as one of my very good friends today.
Few Members of the Senate, indeed of Congress, understand the issue of nuclear nonproliferation better than Senator Glenn. At the Wehrkunde Conference in Munich last winter, which I attended, Senator Glenn gave an excellent speech on nonproliferation issues. He is the leading expert on nonproliferation in the U.S. Senate today. I was pleased he was with us yesterday to share his experience and knowledge on this subject. Senator Glenn's testimony was one of the most complete and best recitations of the history surrounding Pakistan's nuclear weapons program I have ever seen or heard. I commend Senator Glenn's comments to all Senators and will ask unanimous consent that Senator Glenn's testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee on July 30, 1992 be included in the Record immediately following my remarks.
Yesterday's Foreign Relations Committee hearing explored the State Department's view that the Pressler amendment allows for the continued licensing of private sales of arms and technology to Pakistan notwithstanding what many consider very clear statutory language prohibiting such sales. To quote from the amendment, `no assistance shall be furnished to Pakistan and no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan, pursuant to the authorities contained in this Act or any other Act. * * *'
The language is quite clear. By licensing the export of arms and military technology to the government of Pakistan under the terms of the Arms Export Control Act, it seems to this Senator that the administration is in violation of both the letter and spirit of the Pressler amendment.
Mr. President, my concern is not just that the State Department is misinterpreting a statute passed by Congress. I am also very concerned that the purpose of the Pressler amendment--to stop nuclear weapons proliferation and ensure U.S. taxpayers are not asked to subsidize indirectly
the building of a nuclear weapons program in Pakistan--is not being achieved because while we have penalized Pakistan by cutting off most assistance to that country, arms continue to flow through the back door of private sales.
I recently returned from a trip to nine former Soviet republics and Latvia. Just prior to that trip the Foreign Relations Committee considered the START Treaty and the full Senate passed the Freedom Support Act. Under the terms of the Lisbon protocol to the START Treaty, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine each agreed to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as nonnuclear state parties.
I believe that such assurances would be equally valuable from the other nations emerging from the former Soviet Union that do not currently have a nuclear weapons capability. During this committee's hearings on START, I questioned administration witnesses regarding this issue and will continue to push this idea at every opportunity.
My point is that I came away from my recent trip convinced that we should apply the terms of the Pressler amendment to other developing nations which do not have a nuclear weapons capability, but which receive aid from the United States. We should use economic means to encourage nonnuclear countries to remain nonnuclear. We must make it clear that should they decide to pursue a nuclear weapons program, it will be without the help of the United States.
Mr. President, let me conclude by saying that I intend to continue working with Senator Glenn and others to ensure that at this unique time in world history--a time when the United States remains the world's sole superpower and, together with Russia, works to reduce the nuclear threat--developing nations follow that lead and resist the temptation to acquire their own nuclear weapons capability.
There being no objection, the testimony was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
Testimony of Senator John Glenn--U.S./Pakistan Nuclear Issues
(BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S. SENATE, JULY 30, 1992)
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to testify on U.S. responses to nuclear developments in Pakistan. I was tempted also to address my many concerns about India's large unsafeguarded nuclear program, but given time limitations and the focus of this hearing, I will address these concerns in another forum. Besides, your Committee has every reason to focus today on Pakistan. After all, American taxpayers shelled out billions of hard-earned tax dollars in aid that was explicitly justified as necessary to curb Pakistan's bomb program. This aid was provided only after repeated waivers of our nuclear nonproliferation laws. Congress has both the right and the duty to see what happened to these funds.
A review of this evidence will also encourage us to reexamine some old policy assumptions--like the faith some of our leaders have put in transfers of arms and high technology as tools of nuclear nonproliferation--and to appreciate the importance of some old fundamentals, like the duty of the Executive to `faithfully execute the laws,' the need for a working relationship between Congress and the Executive, and the public's right to know.
My testimony will address five questions: First, what were Congress and the American taxpayers told about the relationship between U.S. military aid and Pakistan's bomb? Second, how have these claims stood up over time? Third, why did Congress impose nuclear conditions on aid only to Pakistan? Fourth, did the Reagan and Bush administrations implement these conditions as Congress had intended? And finally, where do we go from here?
THE PROMISE OF THE POLICY
Between 1982 and 1990, America provided over $4 billion in assistance to Pakistan, about half of which was military. Some people think this aid was solely intended to get the Soviets out of Afghanistan, a goal we shared with Pakistan. My staff, however, has identified 20 official administration statements claiming since 1981 that military assistance would address Pakistan's security concerns and thereby keep Pakistan from acquiring the bomb. I will submit with my testimony some relevant excerpts. [Attachment]
Given these many claims, the answer to my first question is crystal clear: the military transfers and other assistance were explicitly justified to Congress as instruments of a nuclear nonproliferation policy. Yet since this aid was only provided following waiver upon waiver of our nuclear nonproliferation laws, the administration had a heavy burden of proof to demonstrate that the aid was producing the promised results.
Unfortunately, the much-heralded nonproliferation benefits never materialized, which simplifies the job of answering my second question about the effects of the policy. It is well known that Pakistan was acquiring a nuclear weapons capability throughout the 1980's. I will attach to my statement a table listing 50 events that show without a doubt that Pakistan was continuing and even accelerating its pursuit of the bomb despite all of our aid. [Attachment] Mr. Chairman, if you judge by the evidence and not by the promises, there was a direct--not an inverse--relationship between the level of our aid and Pakistan's progress toward the bomb.
This leads to the answer to my third question about why Congress decided to impose new conditions on aid provided only to Pakistan. In the face of sensational daily headlines from around the world attesting to the failure of the administration's arms-for-nuclear-restraint policy, Congress went to work in the mid-1980's to strengthen conditions on further aid to Pakistan. It was no more `discriminatory' for Congress to single out Pakistan for special aid conditions than it was for the Executive to issue waiver after waiver of our nonproliferation laws just on Pakistan's behalf.
ORIGINS OF THE PRESSLER AMENDMENT
On March 28, 1984, this Committee adopted an amendment offered by Sen. Cranston and myself providing that no assistance shall be furnished and `no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan' unless the President could first certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device, is not developing a nuclear device, and is not acquiring goods to make such a device. On April 3, 1984, the Committee narrowly voted to reconsider this amendment and adopted instead a substitute offered by Senator Pressler, Mathias and Percy, which tied the continuation of aid and military sales to two certification conditions: (1) that Pakistan not possess a nuclear explosive device; and (2) that new aid `will reduce significantly the risk' that Pakistan will possess such a device. This text, which was enacted on another bill in August 1985, has come to be called the `Pressler amendment.'
In summary, the amendment made binding what had been an official policy, namely that our aid would reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. It also clarified--by its broad prohibition on all arms transfers under any U.S. law--that a failure to meet these standards would lead to a cutoff of not only assistance but of military sales as well.
Let me just add at this point that neither the legislative history nor the text of the amendment itself contains any written or implied exclusion of commercial arms sales from the scope of these sanctions. Indeed, it is useful to recall that in past testimony at least one State Department witness has also dismissed this peculiar argument for allowing commercial arms sales to continue in the event of a nuclear violation. At a hearing of this Committee on November 12, 1981, I asked Undersecretary of State James Buckley to describe how a nuclear detonation by Pakistan would affect our transfers of F-16 aircraft and he replied that such an event would, in his words:
* * * dramatically affect the relationship. The cash sales are part of that relationship. I cannot see drawing lines between the impact in the case of a direct cash sale versus a guaranteed or U.S.-financed sale.
Yet as the evidence kept flowing in about new Pakistan advances toward the bomb, new rationalizations kept flowing out from Foggy Bottom for continuing our transfers of arms and aid in the service of nonproliferation--which brings me to my fourth question addressing how the Pressler amendment and other relevant laws were implemented.
[Page S11065]
Mr. PRESSLER
Testimony of Senator John Glenn--U.S./Pakistan Nuclear Issues
THE PROMISE OF THE POLICY
[Page S11066]
ORIGINS OF THE PRESSLER AMENDMENT
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESSLER AMENDMENT
OTHER LAWS INFRINGED
[Page S11067]
PAKISTAN AND IRAQ
NEXT STEPS AND REFORMS
U.S. Aid Policies and Pakistan's Bomb: What Were We Trying To Accomplish?
[Page S11068]
From Myth to Reality: Evidence of Pakistan's `Nuclear Restraint'
[Page S11069]
Are Pakistan's F-16's `Nuclear-Capable'? It Depends on Who You Ask
The Bomb vs. Butter: Pakistan's Ultimate Choice
[Page S11070]
From the Herald Tribune, June 26, 1992
On Proliferation Law, a Disgraceful Failure
[Page: S11065]
Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, yesterday the Foreign Relations Committee held an extremely enlightening hearing on interpretation of the Pressler amendment.
During the hearing, it was my great pleasure to listen to the testimony of Senator John Glenn. My first experience with the senior Senator from Ohio occurred when I was a student at the University of South Dakota. I wrote him a letter congratulating him on being the first American to orbit the Earth on the Friendship 7 mission. I received a very kind response and am pleased to count Senator Glenn as one of my very good friends today.
Few Members of the Senate, indeed of Congress, understand the issue of nuclear nonproliferation better than Senator Glenn. At the Wehrkunde Conference in Munich last winter, which I attended, Senator Glenn gave an excellent speech on nonproliferation issues. He is the leading expert on nonproliferation in the U.S. Senate today. I was pleased he was with us yesterday to share his experience and knowledge on this subject. Senator Glenn's testimony was one of the most complete and best recitations of the history surrounding Pakistan's nuclear weapons program I have ever seen or heard. I commend Senator Glenn's comments to all Senators and will ask unanimous consent that Senator Glenn's testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee on July 30, 1992 be included in the Record immediately following my remarks.
Yesterday's Foreign Relations Committee hearing explored the State Department's view that the Pressler amendment allows for the continued licensing of private sales of arms and technology to Pakistan notwithstanding what many consider very clear statutory language prohibiting such sales. To quote from the amendment, `no assistance shall be furnished to Pakistan and no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan, pursuant to the authorities contained in this Act or any other Act. * * *'
The language is quite clear. By licensing the export of arms and military technology to the government of Pakistan under the terms of the Arms Export Control Act, it seems to this Senator that the administration is in violation of both the letter and spirit of the Pressler amendment.
Mr. President, my concern is not just that the State Department is misinterpreting a statute passed by Congress. I am also very concerned that the purpose of the Pressler amendment--to stop nuclear weapons proliferation and ensure U.S. taxpayers are not asked to subsidize indirectly
the building of a nuclear weapons program in Pakistan--is not being achieved because while we have penalized Pakistan by cutting off most assistance to that country, arms continue to flow through the back door of private sales.
I recently returned from a trip to nine former Soviet republics and Latvia. Just prior to that trip the Foreign Relations Committee considered the START Treaty and the full Senate passed the Freedom Support Act. Under the terms of the Lisbon protocol to the START Treaty, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine each agreed to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as nonnuclear state parties.
I believe that such assurances would be equally valuable from the other nations emerging from the former Soviet Union that do not currently have a nuclear weapons capability. During this committee's hearings on START, I questioned administration witnesses regarding this issue and will continue to push this idea at every opportunity.
My point is that I came away from my recent trip convinced that we should apply the terms of the Pressler amendment to other developing nations which do not have a nuclear weapons capability, but which receive aid from the United States. We should use economic means to encourage nonnuclear countries to remain nonnuclear. We must make it clear that should they decide to pursue a nuclear weapons program, it will be without the help of the United States.
Mr. President, let me conclude by saying that I intend to continue working with Senator Glenn and others to ensure that at this unique time in world history--a time when the United States remains the world's sole superpower and, together with Russia, works to reduce the nuclear threat--developing nations follow that lead and resist the temptation to acquire their own nuclear weapons capability.
There being no objection, the testimony was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
Testimony of Senator John Glenn--U.S./Pakistan Nuclear Issues
(BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S. SENATE, JULY 30, 1992)
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to testify on U.S. responses to nuclear developments in Pakistan. I was tempted also to address my many concerns about India's large unsafeguarded nuclear program, but given time limitations and the focus of this hearing, I will address these concerns in another forum. Besides, your Committee has every reason to focus today on Pakistan. After all, American taxpayers shelled out billions of hard-earned tax dollars in aid that was explicitly justified as necessary to curb Pakistan's bomb program. This aid was provided only after repeated waivers of our nuclear nonproliferation laws. Congress has both the right and the duty to see what happened to these funds.
A review of this evidence will also encourage us to reexamine some old policy assumptions--like the faith some of our leaders have put in transfers of arms and high technology as tools of nuclear nonproliferation--and to appreciate the importance of some old fundamentals, like the duty of the Executive to `faithfully execute the laws,' the need for a working relationship between Congress and the Executive, and the public's right to know.
My testimony will address five questions: First, what were Congress and the American taxpayers told about the relationship between U.S. military aid and Pakistan's bomb? Second, how have these claims stood up over time? Third, why did Congress impose nuclear conditions on aid only to Pakistan? Fourth, did the Reagan and Bush administrations implement these conditions as Congress had intended? And finally, where do we go from here?
THE PROMISE OF THE POLICY
Between 1982 and 1990, America provided over $4 billion in assistance to Pakistan, about half of which was military. Some people think this aid was solely intended to get the Soviets out of Afghanistan, a goal we shared with Pakistan. My staff, however, has identified 20 official administration statements claiming since 1981 that military assistance would address Pakistan's security concerns and thereby keep Pakistan from acquiring the bomb. I will submit with my testimony some relevant excerpts. [Attachment]
Given these many claims, the answer to my first question is crystal clear: the military transfers and other assistance were explicitly justified to Congress as instruments of a nuclear nonproliferation policy. Yet since this aid was only provided following waiver upon waiver of our nuclear nonproliferation laws, the administration had a heavy burden of proof to demonstrate that the aid was producing the promised results.
Unfortunately, the much-heralded nonproliferation benefits never materialized, which simplifies the job of answering my second question about the effects of the policy. It is well known that Pakistan was acquiring a nuclear weapons capability throughout the 1980's. I will attach to my statement a table listing 50 events that show without a doubt that Pakistan was continuing and even accelerating its pursuit of the bomb despite all of our aid. [Attachment] Mr. Chairman, if you judge by the evidence and not by the promises, there was a direct--not an inverse--relationship between the level of our aid and Pakistan's progress toward the bomb.
This leads to the answer to my third question about why Congress decided to impose new conditions on aid provided only to Pakistan. In the face of sensational daily headlines from around the world attesting to the failure of the administration's arms-for-nuclear-restraint policy, Congress went to work in the mid-1980's to strengthen conditions on further aid to Pakistan. It was no more `discriminatory' for Congress to single out Pakistan for special aid conditions than it was for the Executive to issue waiver after waiver of our nonproliferation laws just on Pakistan's behalf.
ORIGINS OF THE PRESSLER AMENDMENT
On March 28, 1984, this Committee adopted an amendment offered by Sen. Cranston and myself providing that no assistance shall be furnished and `no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan' unless the President could first certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device, is not developing a nuclear device, and is not acquiring goods to make such a device. On April 3, 1984, the Committee narrowly voted to reconsider this amendment and adopted instead a substitute offered by Senator Pressler, Mathias and Percy, which tied the continuation of aid and military sales to two certification conditions: (1) that Pakistan not possess a nuclear explosive device; and (2) that new aid `will reduce significantly the risk' that Pakistan will possess such a device. This text, which was enacted on another bill in August 1985, has come to be called the `Pressler amendment.'
In summary, the amendment made binding what had been an official policy, namely that our aid would reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. It also clarified--by its broad prohibition on all arms transfers under any U.S. law--that a failure to meet these standards would lead to a cutoff of not only assistance but of military sales as well.
Let me just add at this point that neither the legislative history nor the text of the amendment itself contains any written or implied exclusion of commercial arms sales from the scope of these sanctions. Indeed, it is useful to recall that in past testimony at least one State Department witness has also dismissed this peculiar argument for allowing commercial arms sales to continue in the event of a nuclear violation. At a hearing of this Committee on November 12, 1981, I asked Undersecretary of State James Buckley to describe how a nuclear detonation by Pakistan would affect our transfers of F-16 aircraft and he replied that such an event would, in his words:
* * * dramatically affect the relationship. The cash sales are part of that relationship. I cannot see drawing lines between the impact in the case of a direct cash sale versus a guaranteed or U.S.-financed sale.
Yet as the evidence kept flowing in about new Pakistan advances toward the bomb, new rationalizations kept flowing out from Foggy Bottom for continuing our transfers of arms and aid in the service of nonproliferation--which brings me to my fourth question addressing how the Pressler amendment and other relevant laws were implemented.