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The Indian Ocean: The Strategic Situation
The Indian Ocean is the third largest ocean in the world, but has 47 countries within it.
It is estimated the Indian Ocean has 40 percent of the world’s oil production. There are fresh exploration for oil in the seas of India, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. The Indian Ocean is a vital waterway and it covers half the world’s containerized cargo. It also carries two-thirds of the oil shipments.
The article examines the growth of China and India in the Indian Ocean within a global context. While the facts are stated the major question is whether the old concept of the balance of power can be applied to this complex situation.
While the US arose as the single most powerful nation in the world the rise of India and China makes the picture complex, and a new word called co-competition has been used to describe the situation within the Indian Ocean.
The word implies that you can complete in some areas but cooperate in others. The biggest dilemma for students of strategy is in what areas do the US, India, and China cooperate with each other and also compete with each other.
The Indian Ocean: Regional Trends
The strategic importance of the Indian Ocean has come to be recognised increasingly in recent times. This recognition has been accompanied by growing militarisation throughout the area which has included naval build-ups, both by the littoral states and the great powers.
There are three aspects to great power interest in the region: the strategic location of the ocean basin, the existence of natural resources, especially oil and gas; and local rivalries. Oil is particularly concentrated around the Arabian Gulf which is separated from most industrialised states by the long shipping route round the Cape.
The concentration of oil resources and the extended sea routes make supplies from the area extremely vulnerable. This has led to a permanent great power naval deployment in the Indian Ocean.
There are numerous sources of conflict in the region and these tend to spur on local naval expansion. Disputes over boundaries and/or resources often interact with historic rivalries. The great power naval presence and frequent involvement by the great powers in local conflicts are regarded as potentially threatening by local states and can lead to requests for protection as well as self-defence measures.
India’s Military Expansion
With the expansion of the Indian economy, the Indian Strategy is to modernise its military machine. This ranges from weaponry pertaining to ships, aircraft and tanks to advanced weapons such as unmanned aerial vehicles and the latest technology in electronic warfare. The following indicates the range of its modernisation:
• Israel is supplying India with the latest electronic technology. This pertains to electronic warfare and guided missiles. The Indian Israeli trade pertaining to arms is estimated at two billion dollars.
• USA has made moves to expand their military trading with India. The significance of this trade is the removal of restrictions on trade in space and military research. India paid the United States 50 million dollars for amphibious USS Trenton.
The US firm Boeing was awarded a contract for two billion dollars for eight P-8 maritime reconnaissance aircraft and Lockheed Martin won a $1 billion contract for six C-1301J transport aircraft. Together with Obama’s recent offer to sell C-17 and F-414 aircraft, these deals have put the United States on the path to becoming one of India’s most important suppliers.
• British company BAE Systems was given the contract to sell advanced jet trainers to the Indian Airforce.
• Russia leased a nuclear submarine and the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkoe.
The biggest ongoing contract for the Indian Military is for the 126 Multirole Combat Aircraft.
The Indian Navy
The rapid development of Indian naval power is a recent phenomenon. In the first decades of independence naval development was neglected and the importance of the Indian Ocean for national security was played down.
However, over the last two decades a variety of factors, including maritime aspects of regional conflicts together with mounting great power naval competition in the Indian Ocean have encouraged India’s naval expansion.
The notion of national enclosure has also served to enhance Indian awareness of the importance of naval power. India has the longest coastline of any country in the Indian Ocean, the seventh largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of all Third World states and the largest EEZ in the Indian Ocean. The existence of extensive natural resources within the EEZ has held forth considerable promise for India provided the large offshore areas could be protected. India also has the largest merchant fleet of any country in the Indian Ocean and has therefore a vital interest in the security of sea routes.
This put the onus of a development of a nuclear powered submarine entirely on Indian resources. Its development was coordinated by the Defence Research and Development Organisation. Its main centres are in Vishakhapatnam, Hyderabad, Delhi, Bombay and Kalpakkam.
There are a number of problems found in the project: the connection between the hull and the nuclear reactor, and the steam-electrical turbine which transforms the nuclear energy to the main propulsion system. However its eventual completion would prove that India has the capability and technical understanding on how to develop a ‘blue water fleet’, with a power projection capacity.9
The Indian naval perspectives are very clear: a peninsular country like India has to give up her earlier continental attitude and traditions, and develop maritime traditions. In this regard the Indian naval planners have been quite sophisticated. Unlike the army and air force the Indian Navy has a close link with her domestic industry, thereby ensuring that all her major systems requirements are built within the country.
For instance, attempts are being made to retain the navy’s big carrier ambitions while at the same time funding an ongoing programme of nuclear propelled submarines. When Britain backed out of the submarine programme, India took steps to acquire F Class Submarines from other sources. The first Indian submarine, “Kalveri”, was commissioned in 1987. The Indians realised that the defensive potential of the submarine was great, even against a super power. India acquired a Soviet EKM Type 877 or Kilo Class Submarine. To this was added four German Class 209-15 vessels.
China is in pursuit of Great Power Status. From a naval point of view China’s perception is that India has pushed its fleet into the South China Sea which points to a potential threat to China’s trade. India’s expanding navy, and with Russia at her assistance, in this regard appears to be a disturbing fact. The fact that India has the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and therefore has the potential to stall the ingress and egress into the Straits of Malacca seems to be a worry to the Chinese naval strategists.
Hence, it is not surprising that the Chinese policy seems to be to get into the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal via Myanmar. China appears to be working on a communication project (both road and rail) in Myanmar a to facilitate better links with Rangoon and the Burmese ports. The objective seems to be to establish a route from Yunnah to Rangoon to assist transport of goods and materials. This line of approach is obviously an answer to a blockade and interruption to the sea lanes in the east or the South China Seas.
Consequential to the development of South West China it is found that the access to Vietnam ports is cut off, due to the conflicts with that country. The alternative route for the south west trade is through Myanmar: then the Burmese ports in the Bay of Bengal would open new routes into the Indian Ocean
China’s Intrusion into the Indian Ocean Region: An Important Aspect in her Global Position
The Chinese government has already adopted a “string of pearls” strategy for the Indian Ocean, which consists of setting up a series of ports in friendly countries along the ocean’s northern seaboard. It is building a large naval base and listening post in Gwadar, Pakistan, (from which it may already be monitoring ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz); a port in Pasni, Pakistan, 75 miles east of Gwadar, which is to be joined to the Gwadar facility by a new highway; a fuelling station on the southern coast of Sri Lanka; and a container facility with extensive naval and commercial access in Chittagong, Bangladesh. Beijing operates surveillance facilities on islands deep in the Bay of Bengal.
In Myanmar, whose junta gets billions of dollars in military assistance from Beijing, the Chinese are constructing (or upgrading) commercial and naval bases and building roads, waterways, and pipelines in order to link the Bay of Bengal to the southern Chinese province of Yunnan.
Some of these facilities are closer to cities in central and western China than those cities are to Beijing and Shanghai, and so building road and rail links from these facilities into China will help spur the economies of China’s landlocked provinces.
The Chinese government is also envisioning a canal across the Isthmus of Kra, in Thailand, to link the Indian ocean to China’s Pacific coast – a project on the scale of the Panama Canal and one that could further tip Asia’s balance of power in China’s favour by giving China’s burgeoning navy and commercial maritime fleet easy access to a vast oceanic continuum stretching all the way from East Africa to Japan and the Korean Peninsula.
Specific reference is made to the Chinese construction of an inner harbour at Hambantota, in southern Sri Lanka. He states as follows:
By 2023, Hambantota is projected to have a liquefied natural gas refinery, aviation fuel storage facilities, and three separate docks giving the sea port a transhipment capacity, as well as dry docks for ship respire and construction, not to mention bunkering and refuelling facilities.
The project has the capacity to evolve into a large submarine base. The Indian Ocean (unlike the Pacific and Atlantic Ocean) is said to be a better venue to hide submarines due to the geothermal qualities of its waters. Submarines within the Indian Ocean cannot be easily located by sonar or by satellites. In this context, this base will be a vital element in the Chinese presence within the Indian Ocean Region.
China’s naval strategy appears to go beyond commercial objectives to obtain great power status. Its navy is being modified, and the strategy called a ‘String of Pearls’ is being followed as seen in these naval projects:
1. Pakistan – Gwadar – 400km east of the Straits of Hormuz.
2. Sri Lanka – Hambantota – extensive bunkering facilities for Chinese Submarines and War Ships.
3. Maldives – Marao – a Chinese Submarine Base
4. Myanmar – Great Coco Islands – The Chinese are constructing two helipads and storage facilities for weapons. There is also evidence of a Chinese Electronic Intelligence Unit.
5. Bangladesh – Modernisation of the Chittagong Naval Port with Chinese Aid.
China has a large naval base at Sanya, which is in the South China Sea. It is an underground nuclear submarine base.
The Chinese White Paper on Defence published on the 20 January 2009 clearly points to its global reach and its increasing and significant presence in the Indian Ocean Region.
The Chinese plan of entering the Indian Ocean is by means of the Kra Canal. This Thai Canal proposes to connect the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea through Southern Thailand. The canal is to be 102 kilometres long and 500 metres wide. It was estimated to cost 810 billion baht (US$1 = 39.5 baht).
This proposed canal will challenge Singapore’s position as the main regional port and, will enable the Chinese to have a direct sea route into the Indian Ocean, avoiding the straits of Malacca. This has great strategic significance for naval deployment, and to a great extent challenge India’s present position of predominance in the Bay of Bengal.
It will further strengthen China’s “String of Pearls” strategy, which seeks to point to the rising of China’s power within the Indian Ocean Region. From the point of view of India the Chinese have already within this ambit of the “String of Pearls” a decisive say in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles and Pakistan.
The Indian Ocean: The Strategic Situation - Analysis
The Indian Ocean is the third largest ocean in the world, but has 47 countries within it.
It is estimated the Indian Ocean has 40 percent of the world’s oil production. There are fresh exploration for oil in the seas of India, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. The Indian Ocean is a vital waterway and it covers half the world’s containerized cargo. It also carries two-thirds of the oil shipments.
The article examines the growth of China and India in the Indian Ocean within a global context. While the facts are stated the major question is whether the old concept of the balance of power can be applied to this complex situation.
While the US arose as the single most powerful nation in the world the rise of India and China makes the picture complex, and a new word called co-competition has been used to describe the situation within the Indian Ocean.
The word implies that you can complete in some areas but cooperate in others. The biggest dilemma for students of strategy is in what areas do the US, India, and China cooperate with each other and also compete with each other.
The Indian Ocean: Regional Trends
The strategic importance of the Indian Ocean has come to be recognised increasingly in recent times. This recognition has been accompanied by growing militarisation throughout the area which has included naval build-ups, both by the littoral states and the great powers.
There are three aspects to great power interest in the region: the strategic location of the ocean basin, the existence of natural resources, especially oil and gas; and local rivalries. Oil is particularly concentrated around the Arabian Gulf which is separated from most industrialised states by the long shipping route round the Cape.
The concentration of oil resources and the extended sea routes make supplies from the area extremely vulnerable. This has led to a permanent great power naval deployment in the Indian Ocean.
There are numerous sources of conflict in the region and these tend to spur on local naval expansion. Disputes over boundaries and/or resources often interact with historic rivalries. The great power naval presence and frequent involvement by the great powers in local conflicts are regarded as potentially threatening by local states and can lead to requests for protection as well as self-defence measures.
India’s Military Expansion
With the expansion of the Indian economy, the Indian Strategy is to modernise its military machine. This ranges from weaponry pertaining to ships, aircraft and tanks to advanced weapons such as unmanned aerial vehicles and the latest technology in electronic warfare. The following indicates the range of its modernisation:
• Israel is supplying India with the latest electronic technology. This pertains to electronic warfare and guided missiles. The Indian Israeli trade pertaining to arms is estimated at two billion dollars.
• USA has made moves to expand their military trading with India. The significance of this trade is the removal of restrictions on trade in space and military research. India paid the United States 50 million dollars for amphibious USS Trenton.
The US firm Boeing was awarded a contract for two billion dollars for eight P-8 maritime reconnaissance aircraft and Lockheed Martin won a $1 billion contract for six C-1301J transport aircraft. Together with Obama’s recent offer to sell C-17 and F-414 aircraft, these deals have put the United States on the path to becoming one of India’s most important suppliers.
• British company BAE Systems was given the contract to sell advanced jet trainers to the Indian Airforce.
• Russia leased a nuclear submarine and the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkoe.
The biggest ongoing contract for the Indian Military is for the 126 Multirole Combat Aircraft.
The Indian Navy
The rapid development of Indian naval power is a recent phenomenon. In the first decades of independence naval development was neglected and the importance of the Indian Ocean for national security was played down.
However, over the last two decades a variety of factors, including maritime aspects of regional conflicts together with mounting great power naval competition in the Indian Ocean have encouraged India’s naval expansion.
The notion of national enclosure has also served to enhance Indian awareness of the importance of naval power. India has the longest coastline of any country in the Indian Ocean, the seventh largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of all Third World states and the largest EEZ in the Indian Ocean. The existence of extensive natural resources within the EEZ has held forth considerable promise for India provided the large offshore areas could be protected. India also has the largest merchant fleet of any country in the Indian Ocean and has therefore a vital interest in the security of sea routes.
This put the onus of a development of a nuclear powered submarine entirely on Indian resources. Its development was coordinated by the Defence Research and Development Organisation. Its main centres are in Vishakhapatnam, Hyderabad, Delhi, Bombay and Kalpakkam.
There are a number of problems found in the project: the connection between the hull and the nuclear reactor, and the steam-electrical turbine which transforms the nuclear energy to the main propulsion system. However its eventual completion would prove that India has the capability and technical understanding on how to develop a ‘blue water fleet’, with a power projection capacity.9
The Indian naval perspectives are very clear: a peninsular country like India has to give up her earlier continental attitude and traditions, and develop maritime traditions. In this regard the Indian naval planners have been quite sophisticated. Unlike the army and air force the Indian Navy has a close link with her domestic industry, thereby ensuring that all her major systems requirements are built within the country.
For instance, attempts are being made to retain the navy’s big carrier ambitions while at the same time funding an ongoing programme of nuclear propelled submarines. When Britain backed out of the submarine programme, India took steps to acquire F Class Submarines from other sources. The first Indian submarine, “Kalveri”, was commissioned in 1987. The Indians realised that the defensive potential of the submarine was great, even against a super power. India acquired a Soviet EKM Type 877 or Kilo Class Submarine. To this was added four German Class 209-15 vessels.
China is in pursuit of Great Power Status. From a naval point of view China’s perception is that India has pushed its fleet into the South China Sea which points to a potential threat to China’s trade. India’s expanding navy, and with Russia at her assistance, in this regard appears to be a disturbing fact. The fact that India has the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and therefore has the potential to stall the ingress and egress into the Straits of Malacca seems to be a worry to the Chinese naval strategists.
Hence, it is not surprising that the Chinese policy seems to be to get into the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal via Myanmar. China appears to be working on a communication project (both road and rail) in Myanmar a to facilitate better links with Rangoon and the Burmese ports. The objective seems to be to establish a route from Yunnah to Rangoon to assist transport of goods and materials. This line of approach is obviously an answer to a blockade and interruption to the sea lanes in the east or the South China Seas.
Consequential to the development of South West China it is found that the access to Vietnam ports is cut off, due to the conflicts with that country. The alternative route for the south west trade is through Myanmar: then the Burmese ports in the Bay of Bengal would open new routes into the Indian Ocean
China’s Intrusion into the Indian Ocean Region: An Important Aspect in her Global Position
The Chinese government has already adopted a “string of pearls” strategy for the Indian Ocean, which consists of setting up a series of ports in friendly countries along the ocean’s northern seaboard. It is building a large naval base and listening post in Gwadar, Pakistan, (from which it may already be monitoring ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz); a port in Pasni, Pakistan, 75 miles east of Gwadar, which is to be joined to the Gwadar facility by a new highway; a fuelling station on the southern coast of Sri Lanka; and a container facility with extensive naval and commercial access in Chittagong, Bangladesh. Beijing operates surveillance facilities on islands deep in the Bay of Bengal.
In Myanmar, whose junta gets billions of dollars in military assistance from Beijing, the Chinese are constructing (or upgrading) commercial and naval bases and building roads, waterways, and pipelines in order to link the Bay of Bengal to the southern Chinese province of Yunnan.
Some of these facilities are closer to cities in central and western China than those cities are to Beijing and Shanghai, and so building road and rail links from these facilities into China will help spur the economies of China’s landlocked provinces.
The Chinese government is also envisioning a canal across the Isthmus of Kra, in Thailand, to link the Indian ocean to China’s Pacific coast – a project on the scale of the Panama Canal and one that could further tip Asia’s balance of power in China’s favour by giving China’s burgeoning navy and commercial maritime fleet easy access to a vast oceanic continuum stretching all the way from East Africa to Japan and the Korean Peninsula.
Specific reference is made to the Chinese construction of an inner harbour at Hambantota, in southern Sri Lanka. He states as follows:
By 2023, Hambantota is projected to have a liquefied natural gas refinery, aviation fuel storage facilities, and three separate docks giving the sea port a transhipment capacity, as well as dry docks for ship respire and construction, not to mention bunkering and refuelling facilities.
The project has the capacity to evolve into a large submarine base. The Indian Ocean (unlike the Pacific and Atlantic Ocean) is said to be a better venue to hide submarines due to the geothermal qualities of its waters. Submarines within the Indian Ocean cannot be easily located by sonar or by satellites. In this context, this base will be a vital element in the Chinese presence within the Indian Ocean Region.
China’s naval strategy appears to go beyond commercial objectives to obtain great power status. Its navy is being modified, and the strategy called a ‘String of Pearls’ is being followed as seen in these naval projects:
1. Pakistan – Gwadar – 400km east of the Straits of Hormuz.
2. Sri Lanka – Hambantota – extensive bunkering facilities for Chinese Submarines and War Ships.
3. Maldives – Marao – a Chinese Submarine Base
4. Myanmar – Great Coco Islands – The Chinese are constructing two helipads and storage facilities for weapons. There is also evidence of a Chinese Electronic Intelligence Unit.
5. Bangladesh – Modernisation of the Chittagong Naval Port with Chinese Aid.
China has a large naval base at Sanya, which is in the South China Sea. It is an underground nuclear submarine base.
The Chinese White Paper on Defence published on the 20 January 2009 clearly points to its global reach and its increasing and significant presence in the Indian Ocean Region.
The Chinese plan of entering the Indian Ocean is by means of the Kra Canal. This Thai Canal proposes to connect the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea through Southern Thailand. The canal is to be 102 kilometres long and 500 metres wide. It was estimated to cost 810 billion baht (US$1 = 39.5 baht).
This proposed canal will challenge Singapore’s position as the main regional port and, will enable the Chinese to have a direct sea route into the Indian Ocean, avoiding the straits of Malacca. This has great strategic significance for naval deployment, and to a great extent challenge India’s present position of predominance in the Bay of Bengal.
It will further strengthen China’s “String of Pearls” strategy, which seeks to point to the rising of China’s power within the Indian Ocean Region. From the point of view of India the Chinese have already within this ambit of the “String of Pearls” a decisive say in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles and Pakistan.
The Indian Ocean: The Strategic Situation - Analysis
