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by Air Commodore Tariq Mahmud Ashraf, (Pakistan Air Force, ret.)
World Defense Review columnist
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, both China and Pakistan expressed their support for the U.S. But they did so differently and with varying motives and reasons.
While China needed time to formulate its policy afresh, Pakistan probably had no way out but to acquiesce and climb aboard the U.S. bandwagon.
Two major consequences of the U.S.-led war on terrorism have been the positioning of sizeable U.S. military forces in proximity of China and the involvement of Pakistan in the war on terrorism. These developments not only checkmated the spread of Chinese influence and precipitated a roll-back of its moves in the region, but also tilted the regional balance of power decisively in Washington's favor.
Strategically, the infusion of an American military presence into the region has seriously upset China's security calculus on which its West-bound strategy is predicated. In a countermove, China is now the major force behind the construction of a major civil/naval port at Gwadar, along the Baluchistan coast, which will be available to her Navy.
Beijing has major stakes in the war against terrorism. It has clearly stated that Pakistan is as central to its national security interests as Israel is to Washington. This is why Pakistan's support of the war of terrorism has not impinged negatively on its relationship with China. Both Pakistan and China have been co-operating on counter-terrorism in parallel. In this context, the moves of the Pakistan government to clamp down on Uighur settlements, on religious schools used as training grounds by them, and the Red Mosque incident are relevant. When tensions over Islamic extremism developed after Islamic vigilantes kidnapped several Chinese citizens, Pres. Musharraf responded quickly and strongly.
Many believe that his decision to use military force against the extremists at the Red Mosque stemmed largely from the incident with the Chinese citizens, which had greatly embarrassed his regime.
Pakistan has also helped China in controlling the separatist movement in Xinjiang. The Pakistan military killed the leader of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in October 2003. And in August 2004, Pakistani and Chinese armies conducted a joint anti-terrorism exercise in the province.
While the war on terrorism continues unabated, recent developments in Pakistan have raised fresh questions regarding Pakistan's continuing support for the war. With pro-Musharraf forces having been routed, the new government will re-examine its foreign policy, especially in the context of Pakistan/U.S. and Pakistan/China relations.
A visualization of the future brings three vital questions to the fore: Would Pakistan's new government move away from its support for the war on terror and tilt toward China? Could the Pakistan armed forces expect to get the desired military weapons and equipment from China that they can obtain from the U.S.? What role will the Pakistan Army and the ISI play during this policy review?
* Even though the newly elected government has been described as "secular" and "liberal," it is going to find it difficult to distance itself from Islam because of the underlying strength of religious feeling among the masses and the prevailing anti-American sentiment. On the other hand, its economic woes and security predicaments preclude its distancing itself from the sole super-power. As such, the new government will adopt a middle-of-the-road path designed to keep both the Americans and the masses appeased. Walking this tightrope is not going to be easy, however, and will require skillful manipulation. On the external front, Pakistan trusts China much more than the United States since the latter is perceived to have left Pakistan in the lurch once too often, whereas China has been steadfast in her commitments. Once again, however, the imperative of staying in the U.S. camp will play a major role in the formulation of the foreign policy, which will be done with the tacit approval of the Chinese.
* Chinese military weapons technology is nowhere near what the U.S. and the West are able to field. Since a budget-constrained Pakistan would be limited in what it can afford to purchase, the best option for it would be to procure limited amounts of quality equipment from the U.S. and the West with the quantity factor being made up by purchasing cheaper and less modern Chinese weaponry in greater numbers. Pakistan's defense procurement, therefore, is expected to be two-pronged without either the U.S. or China being relegated in importance.
* A lot is being said about the role of the Pakistan military in the future policies of Pakistan with some analysts conjecturing that the Pakistan Army is likely to be split into the pro-U.S. and the pro-China camps. This appears farfetched since the Pakistan Army is a well-organized and integrated institution. It could be possible, however, that the new government puts legislation in place to obviate the chances of the military assuming power again in Pakistan.
While there exists no doubt that the Pakistan-China and Pakistan-U.S. relationships are at critical junctures and any change in either is bound to impact the other, an objective analysis of the prevailing situation and the ground realities leads one to the following conclusions:
* Pakistan's new government will continue to support the United States in the war on terror. It will simultaneously strive to ensure that the Uighur separatists from Xinjiang are neither afforded any help nor safe havens on Pakistani soil.
* Pakistan will adopt a balanced middle-of-the-road foreign policy toward China and the United States.
* Pakistan will continue to rely on the U.S. for quality military equipment while depending on China for quantity.
* With democracy in Pakistan, it is expected that the military's role in affairs of state would gradually reduce. Since the ISI is a military-operated institution, one might expect its role to be reduced correspondingly with an increased element of civilian control over its activities.
— Air Commodore Tariq Mahmud Ashraf (Pakistan Air Force, ret.) writes about aerospace, defense, international terrorism, and nuclear proliferation with a focus on South Asia.
Ashraf currently holds an MA in Defence and Strategic Studies, and is pursuing an advanced degree in International Policy and Diplomacy.
As a retired senior officer in Pakistan's Air Force – rising to the rank of air commodore (equivalent to brigadier general) – Ashraf's assignments have included assistant chief of staff (air operations) during the 2001–2002 standoff with India, a faculty member at Pakistan's National Defence College, and Pakistan's Defence Attache to Indonesia, Australia, Singapore, and South Korea.
Ashraf is the author of Aerospace Power: The Emerging Strategic Dimension, co-author of The Role of Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia, and he has written more than 70 articles and papers for professional military journals in Pakistan, India, and the U.S.
The Impact of Pakistan-China defense ties on the War on Terrorism : Air Commodore Tariq Mahmud Ashraf (Pakistan Air Force, ret.) : World Defense Review
World Defense Review columnist
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, both China and Pakistan expressed their support for the U.S. But they did so differently and with varying motives and reasons.
While China needed time to formulate its policy afresh, Pakistan probably had no way out but to acquiesce and climb aboard the U.S. bandwagon.
Two major consequences of the U.S.-led war on terrorism have been the positioning of sizeable U.S. military forces in proximity of China and the involvement of Pakistan in the war on terrorism. These developments not only checkmated the spread of Chinese influence and precipitated a roll-back of its moves in the region, but also tilted the regional balance of power decisively in Washington's favor.
Strategically, the infusion of an American military presence into the region has seriously upset China's security calculus on which its West-bound strategy is predicated. In a countermove, China is now the major force behind the construction of a major civil/naval port at Gwadar, along the Baluchistan coast, which will be available to her Navy.
Beijing has major stakes in the war against terrorism. It has clearly stated that Pakistan is as central to its national security interests as Israel is to Washington. This is why Pakistan's support of the war of terrorism has not impinged negatively on its relationship with China. Both Pakistan and China have been co-operating on counter-terrorism in parallel. In this context, the moves of the Pakistan government to clamp down on Uighur settlements, on religious schools used as training grounds by them, and the Red Mosque incident are relevant. When tensions over Islamic extremism developed after Islamic vigilantes kidnapped several Chinese citizens, Pres. Musharraf responded quickly and strongly.
Many believe that his decision to use military force against the extremists at the Red Mosque stemmed largely from the incident with the Chinese citizens, which had greatly embarrassed his regime.
Pakistan has also helped China in controlling the separatist movement in Xinjiang. The Pakistan military killed the leader of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in October 2003. And in August 2004, Pakistani and Chinese armies conducted a joint anti-terrorism exercise in the province.
While the war on terrorism continues unabated, recent developments in Pakistan have raised fresh questions regarding Pakistan's continuing support for the war. With pro-Musharraf forces having been routed, the new government will re-examine its foreign policy, especially in the context of Pakistan/U.S. and Pakistan/China relations.
A visualization of the future brings three vital questions to the fore: Would Pakistan's new government move away from its support for the war on terror and tilt toward China? Could the Pakistan armed forces expect to get the desired military weapons and equipment from China that they can obtain from the U.S.? What role will the Pakistan Army and the ISI play during this policy review?
* Even though the newly elected government has been described as "secular" and "liberal," it is going to find it difficult to distance itself from Islam because of the underlying strength of religious feeling among the masses and the prevailing anti-American sentiment. On the other hand, its economic woes and security predicaments preclude its distancing itself from the sole super-power. As such, the new government will adopt a middle-of-the-road path designed to keep both the Americans and the masses appeased. Walking this tightrope is not going to be easy, however, and will require skillful manipulation. On the external front, Pakistan trusts China much more than the United States since the latter is perceived to have left Pakistan in the lurch once too often, whereas China has been steadfast in her commitments. Once again, however, the imperative of staying in the U.S. camp will play a major role in the formulation of the foreign policy, which will be done with the tacit approval of the Chinese.
* Chinese military weapons technology is nowhere near what the U.S. and the West are able to field. Since a budget-constrained Pakistan would be limited in what it can afford to purchase, the best option for it would be to procure limited amounts of quality equipment from the U.S. and the West with the quantity factor being made up by purchasing cheaper and less modern Chinese weaponry in greater numbers. Pakistan's defense procurement, therefore, is expected to be two-pronged without either the U.S. or China being relegated in importance.
* A lot is being said about the role of the Pakistan military in the future policies of Pakistan with some analysts conjecturing that the Pakistan Army is likely to be split into the pro-U.S. and the pro-China camps. This appears farfetched since the Pakistan Army is a well-organized and integrated institution. It could be possible, however, that the new government puts legislation in place to obviate the chances of the military assuming power again in Pakistan.
While there exists no doubt that the Pakistan-China and Pakistan-U.S. relationships are at critical junctures and any change in either is bound to impact the other, an objective analysis of the prevailing situation and the ground realities leads one to the following conclusions:
* Pakistan's new government will continue to support the United States in the war on terror. It will simultaneously strive to ensure that the Uighur separatists from Xinjiang are neither afforded any help nor safe havens on Pakistani soil.
* Pakistan will adopt a balanced middle-of-the-road foreign policy toward China and the United States.
* Pakistan will continue to rely on the U.S. for quality military equipment while depending on China for quantity.
* With democracy in Pakistan, it is expected that the military's role in affairs of state would gradually reduce. Since the ISI is a military-operated institution, one might expect its role to be reduced correspondingly with an increased element of civilian control over its activities.
— Air Commodore Tariq Mahmud Ashraf (Pakistan Air Force, ret.) writes about aerospace, defense, international terrorism, and nuclear proliferation with a focus on South Asia.
Ashraf currently holds an MA in Defence and Strategic Studies, and is pursuing an advanced degree in International Policy and Diplomacy.
As a retired senior officer in Pakistan's Air Force – rising to the rank of air commodore (equivalent to brigadier general) – Ashraf's assignments have included assistant chief of staff (air operations) during the 2001–2002 standoff with India, a faculty member at Pakistan's National Defence College, and Pakistan's Defence Attache to Indonesia, Australia, Singapore, and South Korea.
Ashraf is the author of Aerospace Power: The Emerging Strategic Dimension, co-author of The Role of Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia, and he has written more than 70 articles and papers for professional military journals in Pakistan, India, and the U.S.
The Impact of Pakistan-China defense ties on the War on Terrorism : Air Commodore Tariq Mahmud Ashraf (Pakistan Air Force, ret.) : World Defense Review