The High Cost of Air Power

[Zarvan]

A Sukhoi Su-30MKI Air Superiority Fighter of the Indian Air Force
by Mohan Guruswamy

Our military credibility depends upon the options we have available at every step of the escalatory ladder. The more options we have the better placed we will be to have a flexible response to situations and that will give us more options to respond to situations.

Air power is the most capital-intensive means of war. A modern fighter jet now could cost several hundred crores and the prices seem to be rising exponentially. In 2007, a budget of Rs 42,000 crore was provisioned for the 126 multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA) proposed to be acquired, about Rs 330 crore a piece. The 36 Rafale deal is now estimated to be $9 billion or over Rs 65,000 crore or about Rs 1,500 crore each.

This is almost four times the cost of the Sukhoi Su-30MKI, arguably the most capable and versatile of the world’s fourth-generation fighters. The first lot of MiG-21s in 1961 cost us less than Rs 20 lakh each. A brand new and latest MiG-21 variant will cost at least one hundred times that. An Su-30MKI costs about Rs 360 crore each.

Given an operational life of about 40-50 years, Rafale will require expenditure for periodic maintenance and modernisation. Aircraft delivered ordnance is also very expensive. Radar-guided cum heat-seeking missile today can cost up to Rs 50-100 lakh each, while an advanced long-range air-to-air missile could cost five times that. Then we have a wide array of laser-guided and TV-guided precision munitions that can be more expensive. For instance, the prices of runway busting Durandal bombs start at about Rs 15 lakh apiece. The cost of an air launched Brahmos supersonic missile will be over Rs 15 crore each.

The cost of these new smart weapons can be gleaned from the following extract from a US government study after the Second Gulf War: “While the vast majority of the expended ordnance was unguided — 92.4 per cent — the inverse was true for cost. About 84 per cent of cost was accounted for by the 7.6 per cent of ordnance that was guided. If the 332 cruise missiles are excluded — with their extremely high unit costs — unguided ordnance still represented about 92.6 per cent of the total number expended, but the percentage of cost for ordnance that was guided decreases to 75.9 per cent.”

While the accuracy of these weapons makes them devastating, air power alone does not win wars. If it were so, the US would have won in Vietnam or even be winning in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Israeli war in Lebanon in 2006, which mostly relied on its vastly superior air power, did not give it the results it expected. The Hezbollah was seen a victor for showing itself willing to stand up to the Israeli onslaught which in just a few days killed 1,200 fighters and civilians for a handful Israeli causalities. But even this very short war cost Israel $1.6 billion and shaved off about one per cent from its annual economic growth. The Hezbollah and Hamas continue to flourish and are now even bigger players in the politics of the region. So who won?

Given our geography, the Indian Army will still have to bear the primary burden of defending the borders. But as Kargil has shown, the combination of air and land power delivers results even and, especially in the mountains.

Nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent, but the conditions under which they become credible will seldom arise in the modern world. Our military credibility depends upon the options we have available at every step of the escalatory ladder. The more options we have the better placed we will be to have a flexible response to situations and that will give us more options to respond to situations.

The cost intensiveness of modern fighter aircraft requires they stay in service for decades and also be capable of maintaining air superiority and lethality in an environment where technological advancements are rapid. This means that the aircraft we buy today must be capable of taking two or more upgrades. Thus, the later the design and development, the greater are the upgrade options. Take, for example, MiG-21, still the mainstay of the Indian Air Force. The latest upgraded MiG-21-93 has all the latest avionics and the powerful Tumansky R-25-300 engine.

The next major consideration is cost. There are ways to compute these, but there are pitfalls when you compare apples and oranges. In fact, a sound equation correlating costs, age, lethality, performance, state of art, replacement and maintenance costs, political risk and other factors is well nigh impossible. But you must start with basic unit cost.

Since modern fighter aircrafts are not only extremely expensive but technologically very advanced machinery constructed out of the latest materials and electronics, it goes without saying that full indigenisation will never be possible. A good percentage of the parts will always be imported, either from the original aircraft manufacturer or from original equipment manufacturers in other countries. In times of conflict, the wear and tear is greater and munitions stores run down very rapidly. The new generation missiles and bombs, most of which at all times will be imported, also do not have very long shelf lives. This means that supply lines must always be open.

A multi-role combat aircraft is different from a strike fighter. The multi-role fighter is designed to equally perform both aerial combat and ground attack, while the strike fighter is typically a fighter aircraft that can also employ air-to-ground munitions.

The MRCAs are essentially supposed to be replacements for the older MiG-21s and the indigenous Tejas light combat aircraft (LCA) whose entry service is now about 15 years overdue. In the recent years, the IAF has also phased out all its MiG-23 fighters. All these are best described as lightweight frontal aviation aircrafts. The MiG-21 is possibly the most successful jet fighter ever with over 11,000 produced and the upgraded MiG-21bis is expected to have a service life till about 2025.

The Tejas programme commenced in 1983 and it is yet to enter full production. The reasons for this are many, but the IAF cannot shirk responsibility either as it has a track record of constantly delaying decisions and shifting goal posts. It took the IAF three long years to finalise its air staff requirement (ASR).

After the indigenous Kaveri engine failed its tests, the designers were left with little option but to seek an engine abroad. The IAF had earlier approved the GE-F404 engine, but as this engine had become outdated and since the project was delayed due to the US’ technology embargo, the designer recommended the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) manufactured Eurojet EJ200. It seems the IAF dragged its feet in giving approval, which is especially odd considering it is a more modern and efficient engine. Now the latest GE-F414 engine has been approved for the next lot of Tejas.

This persistent resistance to an indigenous fighter has given rise to much speculation about the deeper agendas of some of the IAF’s top commanders. But the Defence Research and Development Organisation too doesn’t have a particularly good track record of meeting its commitments and delivering the goods as promised. In fact, it is the DRDO’s rather pathetic track record that has made us such an import-dependent military power. And one whose politics are influenced by the machinations of Indian arms agents, financiers and other assorted shadowy flimflam men operating out of luxury hotels here and abroad, their identities are quite well known.

The writer, a policy analyst studying economic and security issues, held senior positions in government and industry. He also specialises in the Chinese economy.

The high cost of air power | The Asian Age