The Guardian view on Pakistan and the generals: holding a nation back | Editorial
Editorial: While a country of 250 million people grapples with multiple crises, the political struggle over Imran Khan’s future continues
The multiple crises facing Pakistan are not merely daunting, but immense. Six million more people have been plunged into poverty since the devastating floods inundated a third of the country last year; around two in five children in affected areas are suffering stunted growth due to malnutrition. The International Monetary Fund finally approved a $3bn bailout last month, but the economy is still reeling. Attacks by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and other militants have surged in the north-west. Amid all this, the outgoing government of Shehbaz Sharif has prioritised a new census and the redrawing of constituency boundaries.
The real reason is to delay the general election that was due later this year. The purpose was made pretty plain by the fact that it was announced on the same day that the former prime minister Imran Khan was arrested after a court sentenced him to three years in prison on corruption charges and barred him from politics for five years. The precise details of the case are less significant than the fact that it is only one of well over 100 that he faces. The media has been silenced: broadcasters are unable to mention his name. And parliament has just pushed through more than 50 bills in just two days – handing draconian powers to its feared military intelligence agency. As one seasoned Pakistani observer has noted, removing Mr Khan from electoral politics is not the same as removing him from the political scene. But the army and rival civilian politicians are doing their best to achieve the latter together.
None of this is surprising. The military has ruled Pakistan directly for around half of its existence, and otherwise has pulled the strings from backstage to varying degrees. The US and other allies gloss over that so that they can continue to do business with the army chiefs, seeing that as the unsavoury but least bad choice. Mr Khan rose by courting the generals, who saw him as a useful alternative to the longstanding political dynasties. He was ousted in a no-confidence vote last year, having overestimated his newfound power and tried to face down the army chiefs. Not one of his predecessors served a full term.
Mr Khan failed to make good on popular anti-corruption and pro-welfare promises, and the economy deteriorated on his watch. He oversaw intensified control of dissent and the media, and used conservative, misogynist and inflammatory rhetoric. But military interference is not the solution to political shortcomings. While the army wraps itself in the mantle of patriotism and discipline, in contrast to fallible civilian leadership, its dominance has served Pakistan and its 250 million people poorly. A significant part of the country’s economic woes lies in the extraordinary grip exerted by what one author called “Military Inc”. Army companies build roads, run universities, pizza restaurants and an airline, manufacture groceries, own banks and sell real estate – their path eased by generous tax breaks. Now the military is expanding into large-scale agriculture.
When he stepped down as army chief late last year, General Qamar Javed Bajwa acknowledged “constant meddling by the army in politics”, adding implausibly that the military “has decided they will not interfere in any political matter”. His remarks merely indicate that the military understands the resentment, without being willing to curtail its privilege and power. The generals cannot be the solution to the country’s permacrisis; they are a large part of the problem.
