THE GREATEST COMMANDO RAIDS & OPERATIONS EVER

[untitled]

My vote goes to either:

Operation Entebbe, certainly one of the most outlandish and successful SOF ever planned and executed:

Benjamin Netanyahu's brother was killed during this raid.... The only fatality on the Israeli forces side

 

[Chogy]

Your views on Hitler's commando order ?

I'm not sure I understand. Spying, sabotage, and commando raids are all integral and accepted aspects of war. Germany's attempt was legitimate, and the price the commandos paid part of the deal.

Those commandos from that era knew full well they'd probably be shot if captured. They were brave men.

If you are implying commandos = terrorists, no, I don't believe that. These commandos were after legitimate targets of war. The Germans wanted to blow up factories and war materiel resources, not office buildings.

 

[RAZA SAHI]

Operation Entebbe was a hostage-rescue mission carried out by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) at Entebbe Airport in Uganda on 4 July 1976.[2] A week earlier, on 27 June, an Air France plane with 248 passengers was hijacked by Palestinian terrorists and supporters and flown to Entebbe, near Kampala, the capital of Uganda. Shortly after landing, all non-Israeli passengers, except one French citizen, were released.[3]

The IDF acted on intelligence provided by the Israeli secret agency Mossad. In the wake of the hijacking by members of the militant organizations Revolutionary Cells and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, along with the hijackers' threats to kill the hostages if their prisoner release demands were not met, the rescue operation was planned.[4] These plans included preparation for armed resistance from Ugandan military troops.[5]

The operation took place at night, as Israeli transport planes carried 100 commandos over 2,500 miles (4,000 km) to Uganda for the rescue operation. The operation, which took a week of planning, lasted 90 minutes and 102 hostages were rescued. Five Israeli commandos were wounded and one, the commander, Lt. Col. Yonatan Netanyahu, was killed. All the hijackers, three hostages and 45 Ugandan soldiers were killed, and thirty Soviet-built MiG-17s and MiG-21s of Uganda's air force were destroyed.[6] A fourth hostage was murdered[7][8] by Ugandan army officers at a nearby hospital.[9]

The rescue, named Operation Thunderbolt, is sometimes referred to as Operation Jonathan in memory of the unit's leader, Netanyahu. He was the older brother of Benjamin Netanyahu, who served as the Prime Minister of Israel from 1996 to 1999 as well as since 2009.[8]



HijackingAir France Flight 139 Hijacking summary
Date 27 June 1976
Type Hijacking
Site Greek Airspace
Passengers 248
Crew 12
Injuries 10
Fatalities 4
Survivors 256
Aircraft type Airbus A300
Operator Air France
Tail number F-BVGG
Flight origin Ben Gurion International Airport
Stopover Athens (Ellinikon) International Airport
Destination Charles De Gaulle International Airport

On 27 June 1976, Air France Flight 139, an Airbus A300 (Airbus A300B4-203), registration F-BVGG (c/n 019), originating from Tel Aviv, Israel, carrying 248 passengers and a crew of 12, took off from Athens, Greece, heading for Paris.[10][note 1] Soon after the 12:30 pm takeoff, the flight was hijacked by two Palestinians from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – External Operations (PFLP-EO) and two Germans from the German Revolutionary Cells—Wilfried Böse and Brigitte Kuhlmann. The hijackers diverted the flight to Benghazi, Libya.[11] There it was held on the ground for seven hours for refuelling, during which time a female hostage was released—who pretended to be having a miscarriage.[4] The plane left Benghazi, and at 3:15 pm on the 28th, more than 24 hours after the flight's original departure, it arrived at Entebbe Airport in Uganda.[11]

At Entebbe, the four hijackers were joined by at least four others, supported by the pro-Palestinian forces of Uganda's President, Idi Amin. They demanded the release of 40 Palestinians held in Israel and 13 other detainees imprisoned in Kenya, France, Switzerland, and West Germany. They threatened that if these demands were not met, they would begin to kill hostages on 1 July 1976.[12] The hijackers deliberately sorted the hostages into two groups—Israeli nationals and others,[3] or according to other sources – Jews and Gentiles.[13] As they did so a Holocaust survivor showed Böse a camp registration number tattooed on his arm, Böse protested "I'm no Nazi! ... I am an idealist".[13]

According to Ilan Hartuv, one of the hostages, the hijackers told to the hostages explicitly that they are against Israel and not against Jews. Among the freed passengers there were many Jews that did not hold Israeli citizenship, including two yeshiva students from Brazil.[3]

The hijackers held the passengers hostage for a week in the transit hall of Entebbe Airport—now the old terminal. Some hostages were released, but 106 remained captive.[1][11] The hijackers threatened to kill them if Israel did not comply with their demands.[12]

Upon the announcement by the hijackers that the airline crew and non-Jewish passengers would be released and put on another Air France plane that had been brought to Entebbe for that purpose, the flight captain Michel Bacos told the hijackers that all passengers, including those remaining, were his responsibility and that he would not leave them behind. Bacos' entire crew followed suit. A French nun also refused to leave, insisting that one of the remaining hostages take her place, but she was forced into the waiting Air France plane by Ugandan soldiers.[5] A total of 85 Israeli and non-Israeli Jewish hostages remained, as well as 20 others, most of whom were the crew of the Air France plane.[2][14]

Operational planning
In the week prior to the raid, Israel tried a number of political avenues to obtain the release of the hostages. Many sources indicate that the Israeli cabinet was prepared to release Palestinian prisoners if a military solution seemed unlikely to succeed. A retired IDF officer, Baruch "Burka" Bar-Lev, had known Idi Amin for many years and was considered to have a strong personal relationship with him. At the request of the cabinet he spoke with Amin on the phone many times, attempting to obtain the release of the hostages, without success.[15][16] The Israeli government also approached the US government to deliver a message to Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, asking him to request Amin to release the hostages.[17]

On the 1 July deadline,[18] the Israeli government offered to negotiate with the hijackers in order to extend the deadline to 4 July. Amin also asked them to extend the deadline until 4 July. This meant he could take a diplomatic trip to Port Louis, Mauritius, in order to officially hand over the chairmanship of the Organisation of African Unity to Seewoosagur Ramgoolam.[19] This extension of the hostage deadline would prove crucial in allowing Israeli forces enough time to get to Entebbe.[10]

On 3 July, the Israeli cabinet approved the rescue mission,[20] under the command of Major General Yekutiel "Kuti" Adam with Matan Vilnai as the Deputy Commander.[21] Brigadier General Dan Shomron was appointed to command the operation on the ground.[22]

Attempts at a diplomatic solutionAs the crisis unfolded, attempts were made to solve the crisis by negotiating the release of the hostages. According to declassified diplomatic documents, the Egyptian government under Sadat tried to negotiate with both the PLO and the Ugandan government, and special envoy Hanni al Hassan was sent to negotiate in Uganda.[23][24] Negotiations, however, were made futile as the operation proceeded.

Raid preparation
Mossad built an accurate picture of the whereabouts of the hostages, the number of militants, and the involvement of Ugandan troops from the released hostages in Paris.[25] While preparing the raid the Israeli army consulted with Israeli firms involved in building projects in Africa during the 1960s and 1970s. While planning the military operation the IDF erected a partial replica of the airport terminal with the help of civilians who had helped build the original. It has been claimed by researchers[citation needed] that after arriving at the military base to begin work on the replica building (not being aware beforehand what they were to do), the civilian Israeli contractors were invited to dinner with the commander of the base. The contractors were told at the dinner that they would be held as guests of the military for a few days upon completion of the replica in the interest of national security.

According to a 5 July 2006, Associated Press interview with raid organizer "Muki" Betser, Mossad operatives extensively interviewed the hostages who had been released.[26] One, a French-Jewish passenger, had been mistakenly released with the non-Jewish hostages. Betser reports that the man had military training and "a phenomenal memory", allowing him to give information about the number and arms of the hostage-takers, among other useful details.[26] After days of collecting intelligence and planning by Netanyahu's deputy Moshe "Muki" Betser, four Israeli Air Force C-130 Hercules transport aircraft flew secretly to Entebbe Airport, by cover of night, without aid of Entebbe air traffic control.

[edit] Task forceThe Israeli ground task force numbered approximately 100 personnel, and comprised the following:[22]

The Ground Command and Control Element
This small group comprised the overall ground commander, Brig. Gen. Shomron, and the communications and support personnel.
The Assault Element
A 29-man assault unit led by Lt. Col. Netanyahu, this force was composed entirely of commandos from Sayeret Matkal, and was given the primary task of assaulting the old terminal and rescuing the hostages. Major Betser led one of the element's assault teams; Matan Vilnai led another.
The Reinforcement Element
1.Securing the area, and preventing any hostile ground forces from interfering with the C-130 Hercules aircraft and the actual rescue.
2.Destroying the squadron of MiG fighter jets on the ground, to prevent any possible interceptions by the Ugandan Air Force.
3.Providing protection for and assisting in the loading of the hostages aboard the transports.
4.Assisting in the ground refuelling of the air transports.
The raid
Aerial photo of the city of Entebbe and the Entebbe International Airport in sunset[edit] Attack routeThe task force's route flew over Sharm al-Sheikh and down the international flight path over the Red Sea, mostly flying at a height of no more than 30 m (100 ft) to avoid radar detection by Egyptian, Sudanese, and Saudi Arabian forces. Near the south outlet of the Red Sea the C-130s turned south and passed south of Djibouti. From there, they went to a point northeast of Nairobi, Kenya, likely across Somalia and the Ogaden area of Ethiopia. They turned west, passing through the African Rift Valley and over Lake Victoria.[27]

Two Boeing 707 jets followed the cargo planes. The first Boeing contained medical facilities and landed at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport in Nairobi, Kenya. The commander of the operation, General Yekutiel Adam, was on board the second Boeing, which circled over Entebbe Airport during the raid.[22]

The Israeli forces landed at Entebbe at 23:00 IST, with their cargo bay doors already open. A black Mercedes and accompanying Land Rovers were taken along to give the impression that the Israeli troops driving from the landed aircraft to the terminal building were an escort for a returning Amin, or other high-ranking official.[5][28] The Mercedes and its escort vehicles were quickly driven by the Israeli assault team members to the airport terminal in the same fashion as Amin. Along the way, two Ugandan sentries, who were aware that Idi Amin had recently purchased a white Mercedes to replace his black one, ordered this procession of vehicles to stop. The commandos shot the sentries with silenced pistols, but did not kill either of them.[5] As they pulled away, an Israeli commando in one of the Land Rovers that followed the Mercedes noticed that the sentries were still alive, and immediately killed them with a burst from his unsuppressed assault rifle.[5] Fearing premature alerting of the hijackers, the assault team was quickly sent into action.[28]

Hostage rescue
The Israelis sprang from their vehicles and burst towards the terminal. The hostages were in the main hall of the airport building, directly adjacent to the runway. Upon entering the terminal, the commandos were shouting through a megaphone, "Stay down! Stay down! We are Israeli soldiers," in both Hebrew and English. A 19-year-old Frenchman named Jean-Jacques Maimoni—who chose to identify himself as an Israeli Jew to the hijackers even though he had a French passport—stood up,[11] and was killed by the Israeli commandos, who mistook him for a hijacker. Another hostage, Pasco Cohen, 52, the manager of an Israeli medical insurance fund, was also fatally wounded by gunfire from either the hijackers or the commandos.[11] In addition, a third hostage, 56-year-old Ida Borochovitch, a Russian Jew who had emigrated to Israel, was killed in the crossfire.[29]

According to hostage Ilan Hartuv, the only hijacker that entered the hall where the hostages were assembled after the start of the operation, was Wilfried Bose. At first he pointed his Kalashnikov gun at hostages, but "immediately came to his senses" and ordered them to find shelter in the restroom. According to Hartuv, Bose fired only at Israeli soldiers and not at hostages.[3]


At one point, an Israeli commando called out in Hebrew, "Where are the rest of them?", referring to the hijackers.[citation needed] The hostages pointed to a connecting door of the airport's main hall, into which the Israeli commandos threw several hand grenades. They then entered the room and shot dead the three remaining hijackers, thus completing their assault.[10] Meanwhile, the other three C-130 Hercules had landed and unloaded armoured personnel carriers, which were to be used for defense during the anticipated hour of refuelling, for the destruction of Ugandan jet fighters at the airport so as to prevent them from pursuing the Israelis after their departure from Entebbe Airport; and for intelligence-gathering.[10]

DepartureAfter the raid,
the Israeli assault team returned to their aircraft and began loading the hostages on board. Ugandan soldiers shot at them in the process. The Israeli commandos returned fire with their assault rifles, inflicting casualties on the Ugandans. During this brief but intense firefight, Ugandan soldiers fired at them from the Airport control tower. Israeli commander Yonatan Netanyahu was killed after being shot in the chest, possibly by a Ugandan sniper.[1][30] He was the only Israeli commando killed in the operation.[10] At least five other commandos were wounded. The Israelis finished evacuating the hostages, loaded Netanyahu's body into one of the airplanes, and then left Entebbe Airport.[citation needed] The entire operation lasted 53 minutes—of which the assault lasted only 30 minutes. All seven hijackers present and around 33–45 Ugandan soldiers were killed.[10][Need quotation to verify] About 11 Ugandan Army Air Force MiG-17 fighter planes were destroyed on the ground at Entebbe Airport.[citation needed] Out of the 106 hostages, three were killed, one was left in Uganda, and approximately 10 were wounded. The 102 rescued hostages were flown to Israel via Nairobi, Kenya, shortly after the raid.[8]

Ugandan reaction
Dora Bloch murderDora Bloch, a 75-year-old British Jewish immigrant, had been taken to Mulago Hospital in Kampala, and was murdered by officers of the Ugandan army, as were some of her doctors and nurses for apparently trying to intervene.[11][Need quotation to verify] In April 1987, Henry Kyemba, Uganda's Attorney General and Minister of Justice at the time, told the Uganda Human Rights Commission that Bloch had been dragged from her hospital bed and murdered by two army officers on Idi Amin's orders.[31][Need quotation to verify] Mrs Bloch had been shot and her body dumped in the trunk of a car which had Ugandan intelligence services number plates. Bloch's remains were recovered near a sugar plantation 20 miles (32 km) east of Kampala in 1979,[9] after the Ugandan–Tanzanian War led to the end of Amin's rule.[32]

Aftermath
The government of Uganda, led by Juma Oris, the Ugandan Foreign Minister at the time, later convened a session of the United Nations Security Council to seek official condemnation of the Israeli raid,[34] as a violation of Ugandan sovereignty. The Security Council ultimately declined to pass any resolution on the matter, condemning neither Israel nor Uganda. In his address to the Council, Israeli ambassador Chaim Herzog said:

We come with a simple message to the Council: we are proud of what we have done because we have demonstrated to the world that a small country, in Israel's circumstances, with which the members of this Council are by now all too familiar, the dignity of man, human life and human freedom constitute the highest values. We are proud not only because we have saved the lives of over a hundred innocent people—men, women and children—but because of the significance of our act for the cause of human freedom.[35][36]
—Chaim Herzog.
Israel received support from the Western World for its operation. West Germany called the raid "an act of self defense". Switzerland and France also praised Israel for the operation. Significant praise was received from representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States both of whom called it "an impossible operation". Some in the United States noted that the hostages were freed on 4 July 1976 which was 200 years since the signing of the US declaration of independence.[37][38][39] In private conversation with Israeli Ambassador Dinitz, Henry Kissinger sounded criticism for Israeli use of US equipment during the operation, but that criticism was not made public.[40]

UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim described the raid as "a serious violation of the national sovereignty of a United Nations member state" (meaning Uganda). Dozens of Ugandan soldiers were killed in the raid. The Arab and Communist world condemned the operation calling it an act of aggression.

For refusing to depart (and subsequently leave some of his passengers as hostages) when given leave to do so by the hijackers, Captain Bacos was reprimanded by his superiors at Air France and suspended from duty for a period.[41]

Captain Bacos was later awarded the National Order of the Legion of Honour, the highest decoration in France, and the other crew members were awarded the French Order of Merit.[42][43]

In the ensuing years, Betser and the Netanyahu brothers—Iddo and Benjamin, all Sayeret Matkal veterans—argued in increasingly public forums about who was to blame for the unexpected early firefight which caused Yonatan Netanyahu's death and partial loss of tactical surprise.[44][45]

As a result of the operation, the United States military developed highly trained rescue teams modeled on the Entebbe rescue.[46] One notable attempt to imitate it was Operation Eagle Claw, a failed rescue of 53 American embassy personnel held hostage in Tehran during the Iran hostage crisis.[47][48]

B] Nationalities[/B]
The aircraft was carrying 248 passengers and 12 crew members[10][note 1]—of which four passengers were killed and ten injured.[citation needed] From the total of 260 people on board, 256 returned home safely.

The four passengers killed were:

1.Jean-Jacques Maimoni—a 19-year-old French Jew who stood up while the Israeli commandos were eliminating the hijackers. They may have mistaken him for a hijacker.[11]
2.Pasco Cohen—a 52-year-old manager of an Israeli medical insurance fund, who was killed by gunfire, either from the hijackers or accidentally by the Israeli commandos.[11]
3.Ida Borochovitch—a 56-year-old Russian Jew who had immigrated to Israel, was killed in the crossfire.[11]
4.Dora Bloch—a 75-year-old British immigrant to Israel, was murdered by the Ugandan government as a reprisal for the raid while she was receiving treatment at Mulago Hospital in Kampala for a condition unrelated to the raid. Her remains were recovered near a sugar plantation 20 miles (32 km) east of Kampala in 1979.[32]
According to a list by Air France, most of the passengers were Israeli, French, American, and British citizens. All of the 106 hostages taken were Jews. The complete list is as follows:

Nation Passengers Crew Total
Belgium 4 0 4
Brazil 2 0 2
Denmark 2 0 2
France 42 11 53
Greece 25 0 25
Germany 1 0 1
Israel 92 0 92
Italy 9 0 9
Japan 1 0 1
South Korea 1 0 1
Spain 5 0 5
Sweden 0 1 1
United Kingdom 30 0 30
United States 34 0 34
Total 248 12 260

Dramatisations and documentaries
The incident was the subject of several films, two of which were U.S. productions with American/British casts; a third was produced in Israel with mostly Israeli actors in the key roles. The hijacking of Air France Flight AF139 and the subsequent rescue mission is featured in the documentary Operation Thunderbolt: Entebbe.[49] Below follow a complete list of films on the subjects:

Victory at Entebbe (1976): with Anthony Hopkins, Burt Lancaster, Elizabeth Taylor and Richard Dreyfuss, Director: Marvin J. Chomsky.
Raid On Entebbe (1977): with Peter Finch, Horst Buchholz, Charles Bronson, John Saxon, Yaphet Kotto, and James Woods, Director: Irvin Kershner, Producer: Edgar J. Scherick.
Mivtsa Yonatan (English title: Operation Thunderbolt) (1977): Israeli Yehoram Gaon played Col. Netanyahu, Austrian Sybil Danning and German Klaus Kinski played the hijackers. Director: Menahem Golan.
The incident is the subject of *Cohen on the Bridge a documentary by director Andrew Wainrib, who gained unprecedented access to the surviving commandos and hostages. An animated short of the documentary won the St. Louis International Film Festival's Festival Prize,[50] was an Award Winner at the Palm Springs Short Fest[51] and played many festivals in 2010 including Big Sky, and Santa Barbara International. The feature length documentary is slated for release in 2011, the 35th anniversary of Operation Entebbe.[52]

Other depictions include:

In The Delta Force (1986) the hostage rescue operation was inspired by Operation Entebbe.
The incident was also featured in Rise and Fall of Idi Amin (1980) and The Last King of Scotland (2006).
The 1988 arcade game Operation Thunderbolt was loosely based on the events of Operation Entebbe.
"Assault on Entebbe", an episode of the National Geographic Channel documentary Situation Critical featured this incident.
To Pay the Price is a 2009 play by Peter-Adrian Cohen based in part on Yonatan Netanyahu's letters.[53] The play, produced by North Carolina's Theatre Or opened off-off Broadway in New York in June 2009 during the Festival of Jewish Theater and Ideas.[54]
In the Simpsons episode "The Greatest Story Ever D'ohed" (2010) the Israeli tourist guide (voiced by Sacha Baron Cohen) offers Marge an Uzi submachine gun saying "You can hold my gun. I used it in Entebbe, I killed three Ugandans!".

 

[ashokdeiva]

Benjamin Netanyahu's brother was killed during this raid.... The only fatality on the Israeli forces side

This was the bravest endevor that any Armed Force will aspire to learn. The operation was no ordinary effort. I had a video on how the operation was executed to achieve precession and strike ability.

 

[Nav]

Grand Mosque Seizure Grand Mosque Seizure Date November 20 – December 4, 1979 Location Mecca, Saudi Arabia

The Grand Mosque Seizure on November 20, 1979, was an armed
attack and takeover by Islamist dissidents of the Al-Masjid al-Haram in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, the holiest place in Islam. The insurgents declared that the Mahdi, or redeemer of Islam, had arrived in the form of one of the
insurgents' leaders, Abdullah Hamid Mohammed Al-Qahtani and called on Muslims to obey him.

In the early morning of November 20,
1979, the imam of the Grand Mosque,
Sheikh Mohammed al-Subayil, was
preparing to lead the prayers for the
fifty thousand worshipers who had
gathered for the first prayer of the Islamic year. He was interrupted by
insurgents who procured weapons
from under their robes, chained the
gates shut and killed two policemen
who were armed with only wooden
clubs for disciplining unruly pilgrims. [13] The number of insurgents has been given as "at least 500"[14] and "four to five hundred", which included
several women and children who had joined Otaibi's movement.[12] At the time, the Grand Mosque was
being renovated. An employee of the
organization was able to report the
seizure to outside before the
insurgents cut the telephone lines. The insurgents released most of the
hostages and locked the remainder in
the sanctuary. They took defensive
positions in the upper levels of the
mosque, and sniper positions in the
minarets, from which they commanded the grounds. No one
outside the mosque knew how many
hostages remained, how many
militants were in the mosque and what
sort of preparations they had made. Siege The surviving insurgents under custody of Saudi Authorities. c. 1980. Soon after the seizure, about a
hundred security officers of the Ministry of Interior attempted to retake the mosque, and were decisively
turned back with heavy casualties. The
survivors were quickly joined by units
of the Saudi Arabian Army and Saudi Arabian National Guard. By the evening, the entire city of Mecca
had been evacuated. Prince Sultan, then-Minister of Defense, rushed to the
city to set up a field command. Sultan
appointed his nephew Turki bin Faisal Al Saud, head of the Al Mukhabaraat Al 'Aammah (Saudi Intelligence), to take
over the forward command post
several hundred meters from the
mosque, where Turki would remain
for the next several weeks. However,
the first order of business was to seek the approval of the ulema, which was led by Abdul Aziz bin Baz . Islam forbids any violence within the Grand
Mosque, to the extent that plants
cannot be uprooted without explicit
religious sanction. Ibn Baaz found
himself in a delicate situation,
especially as he had previously taught Otaibi in Medina. Regardless, the ulema issued a fatwa allowing deadly force to be used in retaking the mosque. [15] With religious approval granted, Saudi
forces launched frontal assaults on
three of the main gates. The assaulting
force was repulsed, and never even
got close to breaking through the
insurgents' defenses. Snipers continued to pick off soldiers who
showed themselves. The mosque's
public address system was used to
broadcast the insurgents' message
throughout the streets of Mecca.
Pakistani and French security forces retook the shrine in a battle which
officially left "255 pilgrims, troops and
fanatics were killed in the battles,
another 560 injured ... although
diplomats suggested the toll was
higher." Military casualties were 127 dead and 451 injured. Pakistani and
French troops reportedly entered the
Grand Mosque and flooded it with
water; applied electricity to it; and
electrocuted most of the rebels. Other
reports said that paralyzing gas was used. Still others say only three of the
highly trained French GIGN counter-
terrorist commandos were involved in
the assault and they had received an
instant conversion to Islam by Saudi
religious leaders in a formal ceremony. The Pakistanis and French were called
in after poor results from assaults by
the Saudi Arabian National Guard
(SANG). Lawrence Wright reports that three Frenchmen were called in, members of the highly trained GIGN counter-terrorism unit. Because non-
Muslims are not allowed in the holy
city, they converted to Islam in a brief formal ceremony by Saudi religious leaders.[16] Saudi officials deny the French actually entered Mecca. In the middle of the day, Saudi troops
abseiled from helicopters directly into
the courtyard in the center of the
mosque. The soldiers were picked off
by insurgents holding superior
positions. At this point, King Khalid appointed Turki head of the operation.[17] The insurgents broadcast their
demands from the mosque
loudspeakers, calling for the cutoff of
oil exports to the United States and the expulsion of all foreign civilian and
military experts from the Arabian peninsula.[18] On November 25, the Arab Socialist Action Party - Arabian
Peninsula issued a statement from Beirut alleging to clarify the demands of the
insurgents. The party, however,
denied any involvement of its own in the seizure.[19] The battle had lasted more than two
weeks, and had officially left "255
pilgrims, troops and fanatics" killed
"another 560 injured ... although
diplomats suggested the toll was
higher." Military casualties were 127 dead and 451 injure.

 

[500]

Operation “Rooster”— Israel Captures Egyptian Radar In War of Attrition
(December 26-27, 1969)

The War of Attrition raged along the Suez canal from the end of the Six Day War in 1967 until a ceasefire agreement in 1970. The Egyptian military effort was supported by Soviet shipments of military equipment which was of great interest to Israeli intelligence. The IDF had used equipment captured during the Six Day War to better deal with enemy threats, using captured radars to learn the weaknesses of the Egyptian air defence and to develop electronic warfare methods. The aqcuired knowledge was of great value and gave the IAF the edge over enemy air defences, yet by 1969 it was becoming apparent that electronic warfare and other methods used to trick Egyptian radars were becoming less effective and that Israeli operations were being hampered by earlier detection of incoming aircraft.

Newer radars had obviously arrived in Egypt and an effort was under way to learn how to deal with this new threat. The break came after an air defence array destroyed during a september 1969 armour raid came back on line in a different configuration, much harder to penetrate. (the armour raid had actually used captured Soviet tanks and armored personnel carriers to operate an entire day inside Egyptian territory.) Reconaissance missions were quickly launched to photograph the new air defence array and soon enough a new P-12 Sovier radar was located on the beach of Ras-Arab. The immediate response was to destroy the new radar station with an aerial strike, but the attacking aircraft were stopped shortly before takeoff when an idea to capture the entire installation came up.

Nicknamed “Rooster-53,” the operation was planned in just a few days, beginning on December 24. After getting approvement from the IDF chain of command, the details and mechanics of the operation were soon ironed out and the forces involved began their training on radars captured during the Six Day War. The helicopters selected to carry the radar station to Israeli territory were the new Sikorsky CH-53 Yasur which had only arrived in Israel shortly before. These were the only helicopters deemed capable of carrying the entire radar station, estimated at 7 tons.

The operation was finally launched at 21:00 on the eve of December 26, 1969. A-4 Skyhawks and F-4 Phantoms began attacking Egyptian forces along the western bank of the Suez canal and Red Sea. Hidden by the noise of the attacking jets, three Aerospatiale Super Frelons, carrying Israeli paratroops, made their way west towards their target. Making their approach carefully in order not to be spotted beforehand, the troops surprised the light security contingent at the radar installation and quickly took control of the site. By 02:00, December 27, when the paratroops had taken apart the radar station and prepared the various parts for the CH-53s, the two Yasurs were called in from across the Red Sea. One CH-53 carried the communications caravan and the radar antenna, while the other took the heavier, four-ton radar itself. The two helicopters started making their way back across the Red Sea to Israeli controlled territory.

The four-ton radar caravan was actually heavier than the CH-53 was designed to carry and soon endangered the safe completion of the operation. The cables connecting the radar to the helicopter were streching the ribs of the aircraft which in turn caused a hydrolic pipeline to rupture. Faced with either releasing the radar or loosing control of the aircraft and crashing, the captain of the helicopter managed to cross the water line into Israel. With the last of its Hydrolic pressure, the Helicopter set down the radar and landed besides it. The second CH-53 which had already arrived with its lighter load, was sent back to retrieve the radar from the crash landing site. Once again the heavy load almost caused the helicopter to crash but the radar was finally delivered to the designated point, into the hands of awaiting intelligence specialists.

Although an attempt was made to conceal the mission and its success, the operation was made public a week after it took place following its publication in foreign press. The radar itself was studied thoroughly and provided the IAF with new countermeasures against the Egyptian air defences, removing a threat to Israeli air superiority over the Suez Canal. It was later handed over to the USA, the same as other equipment captured before.

 

[RAZA SAHI]

HERE IS A DOCUMENTRY ABOUT THE BORDEAUX RAID OR OPERATION FRANKTON IN 1942.

 

[RAZA SAHI]

HERE IS THE DOCUMENTRY ABOUT FORT EBEN-EMAEL RAID, A TRULY REMARKABLE OPERATION.

 

[Splurgenxs]

Benjamin Netanyahu's brother was killed during this raid.... The only fatality on the Israeli forces side

3 Hostages and Yoni Nitinyahoo

 

[Chogy]

Possibly posted elsewhere, but it fits this thread...

A "New Yorker" article that provides much greater detail on the Abottabad raid:

Getting Bin Laden
What happened that night in Abbottabad

Interestingly, the article claims outright that the order was given to kill bin Laden, not capture him.

 

[Chogy]

double post

 

[A1Kaid]

What about the Trojan Horse it's historical significance is well known.


Kargil operation by Pakistan Army and Kashmiri mujahideen is also another great and one of the largest armed infiltrations in military history.

 

[A1Kaid]

Al Qaeda operation, 9/11 hi-jacked 4 planes, 11 operatives, mission successful. One of the most successful agent operations in history. By passing immigration security, air port security, international security, CIA, FBI, NORAD, truly a remarkable and unprecedented operation.


Of course they may have had help from certain western Intelligence Agencies...

 

[Nav]

"Operation Grand Slam "is virtually synonymous with the 1965 Indo- Pakistani War. It refers to an audacious plan drawn up by the Pakistan Army , in May 1965, to attack the vital
Akhnoor Bridge in Jammu and Kashmir, which was not only the lifeline of an entire infantry division in Jammu and Kashmir but could also be used to threaten Jammu, an important logistical point for Indian forces. The
operation ended in a failure for
Pakistan Army as the stated military
objectives were not achieved and
subsequently were forced to retreat
following a counter attack by the Indian Army. Background Following the Rann of Kutch affair, which was seen as a military victory
for Pakistan (it resulted in territorial gains for her following a boundary
award later in 1968), the political
atmosphere in Pakistan was jubilant. Believing the Indians were badly
demoralised and the Muslims of
Jammu and Kashmir would revolt
against them with a little help, General Ayub Khan gave his approval for Operation Gibraltar, a plan to provoke uprisings in Jammu and Kashmir by infiltrating teams of military personnel
to conduct sabotage and prod the
Kashmiri people against Indian forces.
The infiltration started in the first week
of August 1965, as Pakistani infantry
infiltrated the border in teams of twos and threes, eventually swelling to
more than 6,000 in number. Identifying the insurgents as Pakistan
Army regulars, India countered them by bringing in additional troops. The Indian Army also launched attacks on the logistical bases of the insurgents in Pakistan-held Kashmir. In order to ease the pressure on the 12th Division which was defending against repeated Indian attacks and to
guard against the threat to the
important city of Muzaffarabad, which resulted from the gain by Indian
forces of strategic areas, like the Hajipir
pass, in Pakistan-held Kashmir, the Pakistani Army commenced Operation
Grand Slam at 0500 hours on 1
September 1965. Execution The Akhnoor sector was lightly defended by four Indian infantry
battalions and a squadron of tanks.
The infantry was stretched thin along
the border and the AMX-13 tanks were no match for the Pakistani Patton tanks. Against a militarily stronger and larger Pakistani thrust, the Indian
forces retreated from their defensive
positions. On the second day of the attack, the
GOC of the 12th Infantry Division Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik , commanding the overall forces in the
area, was replaced by Major General Yahya Khan, the GOC of the 7th Infantry Division, which delayed the attack by one day. Not only did this
decision show confusion among the
Pakistani officer cadre, the delay also
permitted the Indians to rush
reinforcements to the sector. When the
attack recommenced on 3 September, the Indian forces in the sector were
sufficiently reinforced to hold out for a
few more days, but they did not have
the strength to launch a counter
attack. As the attack carried on for two
more days without any significant gains in territory, the Indian Army opened up a new front, on 6
September, across the sensitive state
of Punjab in Pakistan. The advance of the Indian Army also threatened to cut across the right flank of the Pakistani
attack. Realising the gravity of the
threat, the Pakistani Army stopped its thrust into Kashmir and diverted forces to counter the Indian incursion. Conclusion Analysts on both sides of the border
believe that if the operation were to
have proceeded according to plan
without any interruption, it would
have been the unprecedented success
the Pakistani Army always dreamed of having against their arch rivals. Pakistan would have made significant territorial gains in Indian- Administered Kashmir which might have allowed her to bargain from a
position of strength in the peace talks,
sponsored by the Soviet Union at Tashkent. However, the Pakistani military leadership failed to execute
the plans effectively, and the operation
produced negative results for Pakistan
Army. The operation was marred by bad
decisions made not only by the
Pakistani Army GHQ but also by
individual commanders. In spite of
having the advantage of making
preparations to advance along this sector with superior military forces for
over 3 months and achieving strategic
surprise, the attack was slowly
bogged down due to unnecessary
change of command on the battlefield
by the Pakistani GHQ.

 

[sab sai pehlay uncle sam]

what about operation shudi karan 1984?