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by | Khawaja Khalid Farooq QPM, PSP
Some commentators have emphasized the differences between terrorists and ordinary criminals, arguing that terrorists are motivated by a higher cause than criminals and that they are better trained and better organized. In reality, criminals vary greatly in their motivation and commitment, and some say, plan their crimes just as carefully as any terrorist and are equally as determined to succeed. The differences between terrorists and criminals might be no greater than the differences between various types of criminals. Certainly there are many similarities between terrorists and organized criminals, especially those engaged in transnational crime. In addition, terrorists often commit ordinary crimes—robbery, drug dealing, fraud—not just in furtherance of an attack, but also to sustain themselves. From a policing point of view, there is much to be said for regarding terrorists as criminals with political motives, and in regard to fear generated by both terrorism and crime.
Those who are most fearful of crime—the elderly, for example—are often the least likely to be victimized. In fact, most people do not judge their risk of falling victim to crime and terrorism (or any other calamity) on the basis of statistical data; instead, they are more likely to be influenced by newspaper and television coverage of terrifying events. Thus, people are often more fearful of being killed in an airplane crash than in more commonplace ways, such as a car crash. Many also seem to be frightened of being killed in large-scale disasters, such as terrorist attacks, when this again is unlikely.
The more frightened we are, the more successful will terrorists judge their attacks. Not only does undue fear lower our quality of life but, to make radical changes in foreign policy. This might not seem relevant but the local response to the threat of terrorism is as much affected by public fear as is the national response. Although a little fear might make it easier to get things done, an unrealistically high level of fear can lead to a waste of resources and manpower.
Although this might be the rational response to the threat of terrorism, it is counterproductive: people admire brave leaders, but they value even more those who understand their fears and show appropriate caution. “There’s nothing to be afraid of,” and reducing fear should be an important part of your counterterrorism plan. Fortunately, it is easier to reduce the fear of attack than the actual risk of attack because how can you reduce further what for most jurisdictions is a truly tiny risk? Moreover, most of the actions you can take to reduce fear are costly.
Hard information about a pending terrorist attack, of course, is very difficult to obtain, and it is even more difficult to tie some threats to a specific target or region of the country. For every suspected attack, therefore, hundreds or even thousands of cities are placed on alert because there is no accepted method of grading targets according to their potential risk. This leads to wasted resources and unnecessary precautions. It also can cause large sections of the population to become needlessly frightened, which, in turn, can lead to the alert system being discredited when an attack fails to materialize. To deal with this problem, some recent alerts need to be focused on particular regions of the country or particular industrial sectors.
Sometimes it is difficult to know what to believe about terrorism. For most of us, the main source of information is the media, which bombards us with stories of terrorist atrocities, spiced with comments from experts of sometimes questionable authority. Remember that the main job of the media is not only to provide information but to hold and entertain the audience as well. Stories, therefore, are presented to make them seem relevant to the everyday experience of the audience and to engage the audience’s emotions. By making the tacit assumption that suicide bombings are to be expected here, the interviewer makes the story immediately relevant to the viewers’ lives and raises their levels of fear, whereas in truth, we are almost never adequately prepared for rare and unforeseen events. As a result, viewers are more likely to tune in again, seeking either reassurance or further titillation. “Experts” might have their own reasons for stoking fear, and you can be sure they have an axe to grind, either pro or contra the current administration, with the result that viewers end up less informed or more confused than ever.
Catching terrorists is not easy. They take even more care than regular criminals to conceal their activities and tracking them down has sometimes led to the use of questionable procedures. Even when we know their identities, we cannot always catch them. This is especially so when they operate overseas, in countries sympathetic to their cause. Those who are willing to die for their beliefs are unlikely to be deterred by the risk of death or punishment. They cannot be tried in open court because of security concerns, and even when convicted, they make difficult prisoners. In fact, perhaps the greatest cost of imprisoning terrorists is that their supporters feel justified in planning fresh outrages to force their release. However, we can certainly train law enforcement and media to manage terrorist related information so that they are capable of managing the quantum of fear generated for the public.
About the author: The author is a former head of National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) Pakistan and Inspector General of Police (IGP) Punjab.
Some commentators have emphasized the differences between terrorists and ordinary criminals, arguing that terrorists are motivated by a higher cause than criminals and that they are better trained and better organized. In reality, criminals vary greatly in their motivation and commitment, and some say, plan their crimes just as carefully as any terrorist and are equally as determined to succeed. The differences between terrorists and criminals might be no greater than the differences between various types of criminals. Certainly there are many similarities between terrorists and organized criminals, especially those engaged in transnational crime. In addition, terrorists often commit ordinary crimes—robbery, drug dealing, fraud—not just in furtherance of an attack, but also to sustain themselves. From a policing point of view, there is much to be said for regarding terrorists as criminals with political motives, and in regard to fear generated by both terrorism and crime.
Those who are most fearful of crime—the elderly, for example—are often the least likely to be victimized. In fact, most people do not judge their risk of falling victim to crime and terrorism (or any other calamity) on the basis of statistical data; instead, they are more likely to be influenced by newspaper and television coverage of terrifying events. Thus, people are often more fearful of being killed in an airplane crash than in more commonplace ways, such as a car crash. Many also seem to be frightened of being killed in large-scale disasters, such as terrorist attacks, when this again is unlikely.
The more frightened we are, the more successful will terrorists judge their attacks. Not only does undue fear lower our quality of life but, to make radical changes in foreign policy. This might not seem relevant but the local response to the threat of terrorism is as much affected by public fear as is the national response. Although a little fear might make it easier to get things done, an unrealistically high level of fear can lead to a waste of resources and manpower.
Although this might be the rational response to the threat of terrorism, it is counterproductive: people admire brave leaders, but they value even more those who understand their fears and show appropriate caution. “There’s nothing to be afraid of,” and reducing fear should be an important part of your counterterrorism plan. Fortunately, it is easier to reduce the fear of attack than the actual risk of attack because how can you reduce further what for most jurisdictions is a truly tiny risk? Moreover, most of the actions you can take to reduce fear are costly.
Hard information about a pending terrorist attack, of course, is very difficult to obtain, and it is even more difficult to tie some threats to a specific target or region of the country. For every suspected attack, therefore, hundreds or even thousands of cities are placed on alert because there is no accepted method of grading targets according to their potential risk. This leads to wasted resources and unnecessary precautions. It also can cause large sections of the population to become needlessly frightened, which, in turn, can lead to the alert system being discredited when an attack fails to materialize. To deal with this problem, some recent alerts need to be focused on particular regions of the country or particular industrial sectors.
Sometimes it is difficult to know what to believe about terrorism. For most of us, the main source of information is the media, which bombards us with stories of terrorist atrocities, spiced with comments from experts of sometimes questionable authority. Remember that the main job of the media is not only to provide information but to hold and entertain the audience as well. Stories, therefore, are presented to make them seem relevant to the everyday experience of the audience and to engage the audience’s emotions. By making the tacit assumption that suicide bombings are to be expected here, the interviewer makes the story immediately relevant to the viewers’ lives and raises their levels of fear, whereas in truth, we are almost never adequately prepared for rare and unforeseen events. As a result, viewers are more likely to tune in again, seeking either reassurance or further titillation. “Experts” might have their own reasons for stoking fear, and you can be sure they have an axe to grind, either pro or contra the current administration, with the result that viewers end up less informed or more confused than ever.
Catching terrorists is not easy. They take even more care than regular criminals to conceal their activities and tracking them down has sometimes led to the use of questionable procedures. Even when we know their identities, we cannot always catch them. This is especially so when they operate overseas, in countries sympathetic to their cause. Those who are willing to die for their beliefs are unlikely to be deterred by the risk of death or punishment. They cannot be tried in open court because of security concerns, and even when convicted, they make difficult prisoners. In fact, perhaps the greatest cost of imprisoning terrorists is that their supporters feel justified in planning fresh outrages to force their release. However, we can certainly train law enforcement and media to manage terrorist related information so that they are capable of managing the quantum of fear generated for the public.
About the author: The author is a former head of National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) Pakistan and Inspector General of Police (IGP) Punjab.
