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The end of the deal, hopes, delusions and treasons

Me thinks Iran is sticking to its guns whilst sharpening its knife.

There is only so much a knife can be sharpened before it needs to be used.

In the case of Iran, Khamenai has zero intention going nuclear. He doesn’t want that on his legacy. Likely for next Supreme Leader to decide.

Right now Iran is preparing for a post 2024 withdrawal (again) by US by getting Fordow 2.0 site up and running by then (massive enrichment hall + centrifuges production plant all underneath mountain) as well as advancing nuclear research as much as possible (IR-6, IR-8, IR-9)

The 2nd time US leaves JCPOA (assuming it happens post 2024 republicans win) then Iran will have so much leverage that they can instantly be at a zero breakout time within weeks instead of years it took since 2018 withdrawal.
 
There is only so much a knife can be sharpened before it needs to be used.

In the case of Iran, Khamenai has zero intention going nuclear. He doesn’t want that on his legacy. Likely for next Supreme Leader to decide.

Right now Iran is preparing for a post 2024 withdrawal (again) by US by getting Fordow 2.0 site up and running by then (massive enrichment hall + centrifuges production plant all underneath mountain) as well as advancing nuclear research as much as possible (IR-6, IR-8, IR-9)

The 2nd time US leaves JCPOA (assuming it happens post 2024 republicans win) then Iran will have so much leverage that they can instantly be at a zero breakout time within weeks instead of years it took since 2018 withdrawal.

By sharpening its knife I meant more that when a strike attempt is made on Irans nuclear facilities vis-à-vis Israel and co, Iran will be ready to reply and prepare for some kind of escalation which could involve a land invasion or Libya treatment to the power 100. I still think its speculation to think Iran will actually go ahead and proliferate. There isnt much Iran can do if US leaves and all roads seem to lead to something military against Iran, even with a deal!:

 
By sharpening its knife I meant more that when a strike attempt is made on Irans nuclear facilities vis-à-vis Israel and co, Iran will be ready to reply and prepare for some kind of escalation which could involve a land invasion or Libya treatment to the power 100. I still think its speculation to think Iran will actually go ahead and proliferate. There isnt much Iran can do if US leaves and all roads seem to lead to something military against Iran, even with a deal!:

Either that, or they learn to live with. They cannot force Iranian to unlearn what they know. Therefore, we will practically always be a zero breakout time nation unless we give it all away which is impossible! As @TheImmortal assessed which I think was very clear thinking, once these IR-9's are into mass production, its practically impossible to de-nuclearize Iran short of invasion!

Therefore either war, or they give up. And if Israel attempts something, Tel Aviv should look no different than Baghdad in March of 2003.
 
Either that, or they learn to live with. They cannot force Iranian to unlearn what they know. Therefore, we will practically always be a zero breakout time nation unless we give it all away which is impossible! As @TheImmortal assessed which I think was very clear thinking, once these IR-9's are into mass production, its practically impossible to de-nuclearize Iran short of invasion!

Therefore either war, or they give up. And if Israel attempts something, Tel Aviv should look no different than Baghdad in March of 2003.

Clear thinking? Let's agree to disagree on that. I think that Iran will not be given a chance to "break out" if military action is taken by US. Basically Iran's control centre's and government infrastructure will be eventually pulverised. I'd even go as far as say tactical nukes and chems will be used by the Crusaders. Zero breakout time doesnt mean blink and Iran has bombs out of thin air. Furthermore, its not something you want to be putting together while your country is being turned to glass! Either Iran should already have had, or begin making, warheads by now, secretly or otherwise, or they can forget it when the shit hits the windmill at 300mph.

I pray youre right about tel-aviv although I remember a member on here doing computer game simulations of Iran trying to overwhelm the Iron Dome system and it took more missiles than you'd think. Although, I admit simulations are far from reality, and I pray it is the case regarding this scenario especially.
 
Clear thinking? Let's agree to disagree on that. I think that Iran will not be given a chance to "break out" if military action is taken by US. Basically Iran's control centre's and government infrastructure will be eventually pulverised. I'd even go as far as say tactical nukes and chems will be used by the Crusaders. Zero breakout time doesnt mean blink and Iran has bombs out of thin air. Furthermore, its not something you want to be putting together while your country is being turned to glass! Either Iran should already have had, or begin making, warheads by now, secretly or otherwise, or they can forget it when the shit hits the windmill at 300mph.
The clear thinking I was referring to, was mostly in regards to the development and production of very advanced centrifuges. The clear thing comes from the fact that, Iran doesn't need to rush, and can be patient while it develops itself, this deal buys time to get itself prepared for higher grade centrifuges where (if it doesn't already), might be able to discreetly enrich in a small site with IR-9s, near impossible to detect, assuming Iran has the needed materials already hidden away, in an undisclosed location like Yellowcake etc..

Building in the thick of battle I agree, is worst case scenario and not the time you'd wanna be doing it. That is of course, assuming they are willing to stop Iran, and not willing to live with nuclear Iran, which I have my doubts.

I pray youre right about tel-aviv although I remember a member on here doing computer game simulations of Iran trying to overwhelm the Iron Dome system and it took more missiles than you'd think. Although, I admit simulations are far from reality, and I pray it is the case regarding this scenario especially.
I think that was me lol.

The Iron dome was practically useless, even penetrated into the Westbank using Mobin UAS traveling at 50 feet using the mountainous geography to hide from Israeli radars. The Arrow-3, Arrow-2, PAC-2 GEM+ and THAAD were the problems. Mostly Arrow-3 and THAAD. I made Israel's defenses much stronger than they are in reality, They technically do not have THAADs, US has them though in Negev Desert, They also do not have many batteries of Arrow-3 at all , but I gave them additional capacity than they do, much more ready to fire msl. just to account for 2-3 years in future if and maybe they are even at that level. I later also included US 5th Fleet Ticondrega class ships to support Israeli missile defense (SM-3).

I have a much better simulation now.

Batches of 5 missiles were fired from each portal. Their are 8 portals. Each portal has its own inventory of 25 missiles to simulate a SINGLE Iranian missile base like Haji Abad or something, I think I had one portal with 20 missiles by mistake. Anyways, main part is a total launch of 220 missiles in the Shahab-3 class (Type). Something like an Emad within 40 minutes time.

Suffice to say, interception rate was probably close to 50% overall. They did well in the initial wave, but started to degrade fast as more go through. They had to reload, during that time, anything fired would go through. It's really about overwhelming barrage, and inventory to outlast them. Performance degrades quickly the longer the fight lasts.

Its not easy, but with Iran's low cost approach, they will never be able to keep up with Iran. These launch portals must be protected at all costs. The barrage method will only work, until their inventory is gone, then the are ded.

With those expenditure rates, it won't last long. And these are in Emad class missiles, so easily trackable, and not maneuvering RVs (in this game), Doesn't include the other tools in the shed, like skip glide depressed trajectory (which I did not see an Iranian version of Kheybar shekan, but maybe I can try using a Chinese missile to simulate).


Result:

EXPENDITURES:
------------------
72x Arrow 3
48x THAAD C-2
32x RIM-161E SM-3 NTW Blk IIA
48x Arrow 2
32x RIM-174A ERAM SM-6 Dual I


EXPENDITURES:
------------------
220x Shahab-3 [Conventional 1200kg HE]
 
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The clear thinking I was referring to, was mostly in regards to the development and production of very advanced centrifuges. The clear thing comes from the fact that, Iran doesn't need to rush, and can be patient while it develops itself, this deal buys time to get itself prepared for higher grade centrifuges where (if it doesn't already), might be able to discreetly enrich in a small site with IR-9s, near impossible to detect, assuming Iran has the needed materials already hidden away, in an undisclosed location like Yellowcake etc..

Building in the thick of battle I agree, is worst case scenario and not the time you'd wanna be doing it. That is of course, assuming they are willing to stop Iran, and not willing to live with nuclear Iran, which I have my doubts.


I think that was me lol.

The Iron dome was practically useless, even penetrated into the Westbank using Mobin UAS traveling at 50 feet using the mountainous geography to hide from Israeli radars. The Arrow-3, Arrow-2, PAC-2 GEM+ and THAAD were the problems. Mostly Arrow-3 and THAAD. I made Israel's defenses much stronger than they are in reality, They technically do not have THAADs, US has them though in Negev Desert, They also do not have many batteries of Arrow-3 at all , but I gave them additional capacity than they do, much more ready to fire msl. just to account for 2-3 years in future if and maybe they are even at that level. I later also included US 5th Fleet Ticondrega class ships to support Israeli missile defense (SM-3).

I have a much better simulation now.

Batches of 5 missiles were fired from each portal. Their are 8 portals. Each portal has its own inventory of 25 missiles to simulate a SINGLE Iranian missile base like Haji Abad or something, I think I had one portal with 20 missiles by mistake. Anyways, main part is a total launch of 220 missiles in the Shahab-3 class (Type). Something like an Emad within 40 minutes time.

Suffice to say, interception rate was probably close to 50% overall. They did well in the initial wave, but started to degrade fast as more go through. They had to reload, during that time, anything fired would go through. It's really about overwhelming barrage, and inventory to outlast them. Performance degrades quickly the longer the fight lasts.

Its not easy, but with Iran's low cost approach, they will never be able to keep up with Iran. These launch portals must be protected at all costs. The barrage method will only work, until their inventory is gone, then the are ded.

With those expenditure rates, it won't last long. And these are in Emad class missiles, so easily trackable, and not maneuvering RVs (in this game), Doesn't include the other tools in the shed, like skip glide depressed trajectory (which I did not see an Iranian version of Kheybar shekan, but maybe I can try using a Chinese missile to simulate).


Result:

EXPENDITURES:
------------------
72x Arrow 3
48x THAAD C-2
32x RIM-161E SM-3 NTW Blk IIA
48x Arrow 2
32x RIM-174A ERAM SM-6 Dual I


EXPENDITURES:
------------------
220x Shahab-3 [Conventional 1200kg HE]

After I posted this I had a feeling it was you lol! Now thats some quality content and a pleasure to see on this forum! I agree, Iran's inventory has come a long way since shahab-3 because now I saw Iran testing something close to an HGV on a mock up of Dimona this year! You can shed more light on that.

Regarding the buying of time, I agree but that all depends on IF a deal is signed at all which looks highly unlikely unless Iran capitulates on all its demands. These advanced centrifuges need to be put to use now in the very likely event a deal isnt signed, because I just cant see the Ziopig lobby accepting a nuclear armed Iran. But i think at this point I'm preaching to the crowd. I take it you're pro proliferation like me? Ethically, they are an evil weapon however the law of eye for eye and necessity for survival has led us to this.
 
Remember 1,000 IR-9’s can do the work of 50,000 IR-1’s.

Once Iran masters IR-9 they can sprint to a nuclear bomb with just 200-300 centrifuges (a single cascade).
 
Remember 1,000 IR-9’s can do the work of 50,000 IR-1’s.

Once Iran masters IR-9 they can sprint to a nuclear bomb with just 200-300 centrifuges (a single cascade).

Just one nuclear bomb with 300 centifuges? Seems like a lot of effort for just one bomb...Iran will need at least 100, if not more, bombs for US to be dettered. How many IR-9s does Iran have currently and how long will it take for Iran to master this?
 
Just one nuclear bomb with 300 centifuges? Seems like a lot of effort for just one bomb...Iran will need at least 100, if not more, bombs for US to be dettered. How many IR-9s does Iran have currently and how long will it take for Iran to master this?

Pakistan built their nuclear bombs with 1000 IR-1s (I could be wrong).

300 IR-9’s is equivalent of 15,000 SWU, Iran’s current capacity is somewhere around 17-20K SWU I believe. So with 300 centrifuges you can almost match the current Iranian nuclear enrichment program—a massive advancement. Way easier to hide 300 centrifuges then hide 5,000+ centrifuges.

IR-9 began mechanical tests in April of 2021. Then next step is tests with gas fed into a centrifuge. I would imagine it’s probably 2-3 years away assuming no restriction in research. However, JCPOA may restrict research once again so actual installation date could be late 2020’s if Iran has to halt research.
 
Pakistan built their nuclear bombs with 1000 IR-1s (I could be wrong).

300 IR-9’s is equivalent of 15,000 SWU, Iran’s current capacity is somewhere around 17-20K SWU I believe. So with 300 centrifuges you can almost match the current Iranian nuclear enrichment program—a massive advancement. Way easier to hide 300 centrifuges then hide 5,000+ centrifuges.

IR-9 began mechanical tests in April of 2021. Then next step is tests with gas fed into a centrifuge. I would imagine it’s probably 2-3 years away assuming no restriction in research. However, JCPOA may restrict research once again so actual installation date could be late 2020’s if Iran has to halt research.

Yeah okay, so Pakistan has around 100-200 warheads and they have 1000 IR-9. If Iran were to begin proliferation with 300 IR-9s they could produce 30-60 warheads. Still not enough. The question is how many IR-1s does Iran have now and do we know what time frame it will take to produce these 30-60 if Iran were to have 300 IR-9s? And no doubt they need the 1000 IR-9s for it to be worth it.

From what im seeing it is promising but still some ways to go. The issue is if Iran signs the deal with the aim of buying more time to build nukes, then Iran will run the risk of being seen as untrustworthy and a war kicking off once found out, either that or total isolation more on the level of NK. Wouldnt it be better if Iran didnt sign a deal whilst developing their nukes? Because then they would have a casus belli for making nukes because the other side didnt want the deal and the threat of a nuclear attack remained.
 

Don’t Expect Any More Russian Help on the Iran Nuclear Deal


Hanna Notte
November 3, 2022
https://warontherocks.com/2022/11/dont-expect-any-more-russian-help-on-the-iran-nuclear-deal/
Russia’s position on Iran’s nuclear program has always lagged behind its confrontation with the West. Before the invasion of Ukraine, Moscow actively supported diplomatic efforts to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions. After the invasion, Russia initially disrupted these efforts, but soon reverted to a more neutral stance. Now, with Moscow becoming ever more dependent on Tehran for economic and battlefield support, Russia’s attitude will likely become increasingly unhelpful. This is bad news for U.S. efforts to restore the Iran nuclear deal and bad news for the cause of global nonproliferation more broadly.

Throughout 2021, Russia actively encouraged the restoration of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Towards that end, Russian diplomats mediated between its parties, averted a breakdown in Iran’s relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency on several occasions, and even publicly reprimanded Iran over breaches and delays in returning to the negotiating table. With the invasion of Ukraine, Russia ceased to push for meaningful and timely progress in the nuclear talks or to insulate them from broader geopolitical tensions. Amid heightened tensions with the West, Moscow’s growing ties with Tehran are reducing both the Kremlin’s ability and willingness to nudge Iran towards accepting a renewed nuclear deal or to publicly criticize Iran.

When Russia Was Helpful

The Biden administration entered office in January 2021 intent on restoring the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — some two and a half years after President Donald Trump withdrew from the deal. After six rounds of negotiations in Vienna between April and June 2021, the election of Ebrahim Raisi to the Iranian presidency in June 2021 caused a hiatus in the talks, which only ended two months prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Throughout this period, Iran took steps to reduce compliance with the nuclear accord, building on prior violations undertaken after May 2019. In February 2021, it also suspended implementation of the Additional Protocol, which granted the International Atomic Energy Agency expanded access to information and locations inside the country.

Against this backdrop, Russian officials — and in particular its permanent representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency and International Organizations in Vienna, Ambassador Mikhail Ulyanov — emerged as central advocates of a restored nuclear deal. Ulyanov played an active role in keeping the nuclear talks on track, including by frequently engaging the Iranian and U.S. negotiators bilaterally. On several occasions, Russian diplomacy was instrumental in averting a collapse of the Vienna talks — by some estimates “a half dozen times” in the second half of 2021 alone. For example, Ulyanov mediated a solution regulating access for agency inspectors to Iran’s Karaj centrifuge assembly facility in December 2021, which then allowed for the resumption of talks in Vienna later that month. Three months prior, Russia also facilitated a “last minute deal” in September on agency verification activities in Iran.

Russia also took great care to insulate the Iran nuclear talks from the broader deterioration in its relations with the West. Over the course of 2021, contacts between Moscow and Western capitals became increasingly tense. Still, U.S. officials continued to praise their interactions with Russian counterparts on the Iran nuclear deal as constructive. Ulyanov similarly applauded his dialogue with U.S. officials in the context of the nuclear talks, calling it “intensive,” “useful,” and “businesslike,” and characterizing Washington’s approach as indicative of a “unity of purpose” with Russia.

Moreover, Russia did not shy away from criticizing Iran. In February 2021, once the International Atomic Energy Agency had revealed Iran’s production of uranium metal, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov urged Tehran “to show restraint and a responsible approach.” Two months later, when the Iranian leadership announced that it had started to enrich uranium to 60 percent purity, Russian experts characterized the decision as “perhaps the most drastic step” taken by Tehran in the recent past. Amid tensions between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding agency access to nuclear facilities in the country, Ulyanov also cautiously admonished Iran to ensure preservation of video material recorded by the agency’s cameras in order “to avoid problems in the future.” In an interview conducted in July 2021, the ambassador delivered perhaps his clearest punch at the Iranians, characterizing Tehran’s recent breaches with the nuclear accord as “going too far.” Such statements appeared indicative of a growing Russian concern over Tehran edging closer to nuclear threshold status.

Russian criticism of Tehran even adopted a mocking undertone on occasion, such as when Ulyanov criticized Iran for dragging its feet over resumption of the nuclear talks in the fall of 2021. Responding to a statement from Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late October that the talks would resume “soon,” Ulyanov tweeted: “‘Soon’. Does anybody know what it can mean in practical terms?” On a separate occasion, he cautioned that the talks “can’t last forever.” The combination of active Russian mediation, telegraphing of impatience, and occasional criticism addressed at Tehran even led some in Iran to accuse Moscow of playing an unconstructive role in the Vienna talks. The Russian embassy in Tehran felt compelled to issue a statement in support of Ulyanov, who characterized allegations of Russia “dominating” the Vienna talks as “flattering but nonsense.”

A New Calculus

The invasion of Ukraine changed Russia’s calculations on the desirability of seeing the nuclear deal restored — probably not all at once, but certainly as the ripple effects of the invasion became more apparent. On March 5, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated for the first time that Western sanctions imposed against Russia over the war in Ukraine had become a stumbling block for the nuclear deal, warning that Russian national interests would have to be taken into account. Lavrov proceeded to demand written guarantees from the United States that Russia’s trade, investment, and military-technical cooperation with Iran would not be hindered in any way by such sanctions.

The United States, which was quick to respond that “new Russia-related sanctions are unrelated to the [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]” was not the only one to be dismayed. Iranian officials reportedly called Russia’s move “not constructive” for the Vienna talks. They remained careful, however, not to rebuke Moscow too openly, with the foreign minister simply stating that Iran will not allow any “external factor” to affect its “national interest in the Vienna talks.” Still, Iran’s envoy to the Vienna talks returned to Tehran for consultations. Russia then presented a non-paper on the matter to the European Union, setting out its demands for written guarantees. By March 15, however, when the Russian and Iranian foreign ministers appeared at a joint press conference in Moscow, any hints of disagreement or irritation had dissipated. Minister Lavrov walked back the earlier Russian demands by clarifying that his country already had “received written guarantees … in the text of the agreement itself on the resumption of the [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action].”

Notwithstanding the softening in Russia’s position after 10 days of uncertainty, the episode “stole the momentum” in reaching a final agreement on modalities for restoring the nuclear deal, which had been within reach by early March. It also created a perception in Western capitals that Moscow was no longer committed to insulating the nuclear talks from its tensions with the West. Such a perception might well have been fueled by Russian officials implying openly that Russia would no longer provide its “good offices to the two sides” — meaning Iran and the United States — to finalize an agreement on the deal.

In this context of decreasing trust in Russia as an impartial mediator eager to see a timely restoration of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, new intermediaries came to the fore. In the early summer of 2022, Doha hosted talks between Iran and the United States, mediated by the European Union. When those ended without tangible results, Brussels exerted efforts to mediate an agreement between Iran and the United States on a “final” text for restoring the deal. Russia, meanwhile, invested less diplomatic capital on the nuclear deal compared to the period before February 2022. Though there was no shortage of high-level Russian-Iranian engagement, and though Russia continued to participate actively in the Vienna negotiations, Russian statements after such meetings lacked the signs of impatience that Moscow had telegraphed in the fall of 2021. On Aug. 25, for instance, after Iran had requested additional time to submit its considerations on the “final” text, Ulyanov commented that “we must be patient.” And once Iran shared its response, insisting on the previously dropped demand that the International Atomic Energy Agency’s investigation into Iran’s past activities be closed, Russia’s reaction was again forgiving. A year earlier, Russian officials had subtly criticized Iran for dragging its feet over resuming negotiations. Now, they judged Iranian demands—considered by Washington as moving the talks “backwards” — to be “accommodable.”

Aside from showing infinite patience with Tehran, Russia more generally desisted from criticizing it. In June 2022, 30 International Atomic Energy Agency board members voted in favor of a resolution — which Russia rejected — that called on Iran to fully cooperate with U.N. inspectors’ investigation into three undeclared sites. Subsequently, Iran proceeded to disconnect several agency cameras installed at nuclear sites, prompting no protestations or even expressions of concern from Russia. Instead, Russian officials blamed the board resolution for undermining the “continuation of Iran’s normal engagement with the [International Atomic Energy Agency] on outstanding issues.”

New Dependencies

Russia’s apparent tendency to allow Iran to stall in the Vienna talks—rather than proactively push for progress — can be explained at least partially by its enhanced reliance on the Islamic Republic. Shunned by Western capitals since February, Russia has considerably intensified its interactions with Iran, which culminated in President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Tehran in July. The two countries have promised to expand their bilateral trade on several occasions, and Iran vowed to soon introduce the Russian Mir payment system to facilitate commercial transactions. Meeting his Iranian counterpart on the sidelines of a Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting in mid-September, Putin claimed that Russian-Iranian bilateral trade had increased by 30 percent over the first five months of 2022 alone. The two countries also announced progress on several energy projects in the Iranian upstream and downstream sector as well as swap deals and liquid natural gas production that had long been stalled. Admittedly, past plans to strengthen economic ties have often failed to live up to rhetoric, and recent increases in bilateral trade have been driven mostly by Russian exports of agricultural products. The structure of the Russian and Iranian economies, particularly their competition in hydrocarbons, fundamentally limit the prospects for growing interdependence. Still, with both countries facing strained circumstances, recent economic steps should not be dismissed.

On the military front, Moscow has recently resorted to Iranian drones to target Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, and the United States suspects it of trying to procure Iranian surface-to-surface missiles as well. Russia’s enhanced military-defense cooperation with Iran is a game changer in that it recalibrates a patron-client relationship in which Russia previously had all the leverage. Beyond Ukraine, Iran has long shown its value to Moscow by cooperating in support of the regime in Syria, respecting Russian red lines in Central Asia, helping reign in Sunni radical groups, and counterbalancing a resurgent Turkey.

Moscow has also pursued more intangible gains from its partnership with Iran. Lavrov indicated in June that Iran had shared with Russia lessons from its experience in “surviving sanctions.” While underscoring their growing economic interdependence, such rhetoric has also indicated a growing political convergence against the West. Having solidified its relations with the Islamic Republic over years, and watched the rise of Iran’s hardliners, Russia understands that — even if the nuclear deal were restored — the prospects of a general rapprochement between Tehran and Washington are negligible. Deal or no deal, Moscow will be able to count the Islamic Republic firmly on its side in the broader geopolitical confrontation with the West.

What’s Next

Russia’s enhanced dependence on Tehran is reducing its ability to nudge Iran towards accepting an agreement or publicly criticize Iran. Heightened tensions also reduce Moscow’s willingness to invest significant diplomatic capital to cooperate with Western partners in restoring the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In addition, Moscow’s calculation that Western sanctions relief would further increase Iran’s already improved bargaining position vis-à-vis Moscow might be playing into Russian thinking as well. Russia’s apparent equivocation over the fate of the deal is not the only or decisive factor preventing its restoration — but it does not help. With Tehran’s crackdown on domestic protests and direct aid to Russia, the Biden administration stated in mid-October that restoring the nuclear deal was not its “focus right now.” Since Western states allege that Russia’s acquisition of Iranian drones violates U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 — which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — the deal’s fate has now become inextricably linked to Iran’s new arms trade with Russia. Even after mid-term elections in November, these new irritants lower the chances that the nuclear accord can be revived.

There is also a risk that Russia’s attitude toward nonproliferation more broadly might be changing. Historically, Moscow always defended Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy, and routinely sought to limit U.N. sanctions on Iran. But Russian leaders never wanted Iran to weaponize its nuclear program — let alone become a nuclear-weapon state. Today, it cannot be ruled out that Russia, set on a total collision course with the West, might view Iran’s nuclear hedge as a welcome irritant to distract the West. While the current Russian leadership would still prefer Iran not get the bomb, it might see Tehran’s nuclear hedge as more useful than worrisome at this time, particularly as Iran has moved down the Kremlin’s list of perceived threats in recent years.

The Kremlin prefers protracted uncertainty over the fate of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to either a successful deal or its formal collapse. But should it prove impossible to continue diplomacy after the U.S. midterm elections, and should Western states declare the deal dead, Russia will likely try to protect Iran against any consequences. It will probably shield Tehran at the U.N. Security Council, attempt to complicate Western efforts to “snap back” U.N. sanctions, and provide Iran with more advanced air defense systems and other weapons. Such steps will undoubtedly put Moscow further at odds not only with Western capitals, but also Israel and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. But from Moscow’s perspective, Russia cannot afford to leave Iran out in the cold as it continues its struggle with the West.
 
Iran is seeking Russia’s help to bolster its nuclear program, US intelligence officials believe, as Tehran looks for a backup plan should a lasting nuclear deal with world powers fail to materialize.

The intelligence suggests that Iran has been asking Russia for help acquiring additional nuclear materials and with nuclear fuel fabrication, sources briefed on the matter said. The fuel could help Iran power its nuclear reactors and could potentially further shorten Iran’s so-called “breakout time” to create a nuclear weapon.

 
Iran is seeking Russia’s help to bolster its nuclear program, US intelligence officials believe, as Tehran looks for a backup plan should a lasting nuclear deal with world powers fail to materialize.

The intelligence suggests that Iran has been asking Russia for help acquiring additional nuclear materials and with nuclear fuel fabrication, sources briefed on the matter said. The fuel could help Iran power its nuclear reactors and could potentially further shorten Iran’s so-called “breakout time” to create a nuclear weapon.

hmm, my guess is that Russia will not "support" Iran's nuclear program AT THIS STAGE. -Russia rightly will see it as authorizing the creation of an Iranian nuclear bomb, which i'm unsure Russia wants at this time.
 
Three nuclear domains that Iran can ask Russia for help:
1- design of small reactors for ships and submarines as Iran has nuclear propulsion sub defined as a future plans.

2- Design of "tactical" nuclear devices.

3- plutonium fuel..and laser enrichment of Uranium
Iran has already mastered the centrifuge Unranium enrichment and does not need help on that issue.
 
Three nuclear domains that Iran can ask Russia for help:
1- design of small reactors for ships and submarines as Iran has nuclear propulsion sub defined as a future plans.

2- Design of "tactical" nuclear devices.

3- plutonium fuel..and laser enrichment of Uranium
Iran has already mastered the centrifuge Unranium enrichment and does not need help on that issue.
#2 and # 3 are very likely no go areas for Russia with Iran now, but #1 is possible.
 

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