The Deployment of the JSDF Overseas: paradigm shift of national interest and strategic imperatives

[Aepsilons]

Presentation at Temple University,

Your opinion and input, Sirs @LeveragedBuyout , @SvenSvensonov , @Aegis DDG , @gambit , @Red Mahura , @sEoulman556 , @F-22Raptor , @TruthSeeker et al.

 

[LeveragedBuyout]

Presentation at Temple University,

Your opinion and input, Sirs et al.

It's a long video, so I will let you know when I've watched it. On a side note, I never got your tag, and I seem to get alerts less and less frequently these days. Just letting you know in case it appears I'm ignoring a tag--more likely than not, I was just never alerted.

 

[Aepsilons]

It's a long video, so I will let you know when I've watched it. On a side note, I never got your tag, and I seem to get alerts less and less frequently these days. Just letting you know in case it appears I'm ignoring a tag--more likely than not, I was just never alerted.

Thanks Sir. I look forward to your analysis.

 

[Hyperion]

I think @WebMaster can sort this out for you!

It's a long video, so I will let you know when I've watched it. On a side note, I never got your tag, and I seem to get alerts less and less frequently these days. Just letting you know in case it appears I'm ignoring a tag--more likely than not, I was just never alerted.

 

[LeveragedBuyout]

@Nihonjin1051

Good presentation. I wish I had a copy of the slide deck he used, do you know if it's available anywhere?

The video reminds me of this article I read about Japan's experience in Iraq, and lack of lessons learned (War is Boring, sorry for the low quality source, but still interesting):

Ten Years Ago, Japan Went to Iraq … And Learned Nothing — War Is Boring — Medium

As far as the video itself, the problems experienced by Japan seems to be a microcosm of the problems of peacekeeping in general (logistical bottlenecks and lack of airlift capacity, poor intelligence, lack of coordination, constraints on the size and quality of the force, risk averse and risk negligent, etc.) These issues make me fear a bit for Japan if it is faced with a real war, because it doesn't seem to have ironed out these issues, yet. Perhaps that's why Abe is pushing for allowing the JSDF to join American combat operations overseas (i.e. as combatants), to get some experience and shake off the cobwebs.

This is a surprisingly complicated issue. Remilitarization seems necessary in order to be a more effective peacekeeping force, which on the surface seems ironic, but then, Si vis pacem, para bellum.

I liked the discussion about the Cambodia operation, and it was interesting to hear that the Japanese were effective and high-quality, but inefficient. But it was also interesting to hear the speaker praise the Chinese engineering contribution as well. The speaker had mentioned earlier that China is very effective in using peacekeeping operations strategically, whereas Japan is not. That would be another interesting topic to read about, if you know of any materials.

On a side note, the conflict between the English version and Japanese version of Article 9 (and "the code" that the speaker describes) is a fascinating topic, and I wonder if these differences will play a role in Japan's future "reinterpretation" of Article 9. I also wonder if such disparities exist elsewhere in the Japanese constitution that would enable unexpected changes by a charismatic leader.

 

[Aepsilons]

@Nihonjin1051

Good presentation. I wish I had a copy of the slide deck he used, do you know if it's available anywhere?

The video reminds me of this article I read about Japan's experience in Iraq, and lack of lessons learned (War is Boring, sorry for the low quality source, but still interesting):

Ten Years Ago, Japan Went to Iraq … And Learned Nothing — War Is Boring — Medium

As far as the video itself, the problems experienced by Japan seems to be a microcosm of the problems of peacekeeping in general (logistical bottlenecks and lack of airlift capacity, poor intelligence, lack of coordination, constraints on the size and quality of the force, risk averse and risk negligent, etc.) These issues make me fear a bit for Japan if it is faced with a real war, because it doesn't seem to have ironed out these issues, yet. Perhaps that's why Abe is pushing for allowing the JSDF to join American combat operations overseas (i.e. as combatants), to get some experience and shake off the cobwebs.

This is a surprisingly complicated issue. Remilitarization seems necessary in order to be a more effective peacekeeping force, which on the surface seems ironic, but then, Si vis pacem, para bellum.

I liked the discussion about the Cambodia operation, and it was interesting to hear that the Japanese were effective and high-quality, but inefficient. But it was also interesting to hear the speaker praise the Chinese engineering contribution as well. The speaker had mentioned earlier that China is very effective in using peacekeeping operations strategically, whereas Japan is not. That would be another interesting topic to read about, if you know of any materials.

On a side note, the conflict between the English version and Japanese version of Article 9 (and "the code" that the speaker describes) is a fascinating topic, and I wonder if these differences will play a role in Japan's future "reinterpretation" of Article 9. I also wonder if such disparities exist elsewhere in the Japanese constitution that would enable unexpected changes by a charismatic leader.

What an excellent analysis! I agree with your point that remilitarization is , indeed, a complicated issue for countries with an unfavorable military history such as those of Japan , Germany and to an extent, Italy. The state that is trying to remilitarize , Japan, has to be wary of not appearing to be a military threat to those whom they had military qualms in the past, in light of the geostrategic relations. And yet at the same time nations like Japan have to balance threat perception from immediate neighbors whilst ensuring national interests and preserved and secured abroad.


One paper that I’ve been reviewing was that written by Sakai (2007)who noted that the dispatch of Japanese Self Dfense Forces to Iraq following the US-led invasion was a watershed in the transformation of Japan’s defense and security policy, from its traditional pacifist policy toward deeper involvement in international security issues. Sakai (2007) notes that the Japanese media covered the situation in Iraq mainly in the context of Japan’s policy regarding the SDF. An analysis of major editorials in Japanese newspapers shows that media concern regarding the SDF reached a peak during the proceedings on legislation to allow the dispatch of the SDF , but decreases dramatically following dispatch. This change seen in Japanese policy from Koizumi has been precedent to newer administrations that have called for greater dispatch of Japanese defense forces abroad to protect strategically sensitive areas such as the Strait of Hormuz, security in the Andaman Sea, in the Malacca Straits, et al.


I want to point out how there has been a gradual development , shift, from supportive responsibilities to active military roles in recent years. First, back in 2003-2004, Japan would not send its forces into battle in Iraq, but was expected to offer full support for post-war reconstruction. Even before President Bush’s official declaration of the end of major combat operations in Iraq, the Japanese government sent civilian officials first to Kuwait, and later to Baghdad and Basra, in order to cooperate in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance as well as administrative assistance in Iraq provided through the coopeation with the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) (MOFA, 2003).


Due to the security of the situation in Iraq, it became increasingly difficult for civilians to be involved in reconstruction work inside the country. Especially after the killing of two Japanese diplomats in November 2003 and the abduction of five Japanese NGO activists and journalists in April 2004. Due to this paradigm shift, Japanese Self Defense Force had to send the Ground Self Defense Force with defensive role to protect Japanese assets in Iraq, protect areas in Iraq that were under Japanese administration (Hokkaido Shumbun, 2004). It was this experience that had given the JGSDF the necessary battle experience in the middle east, and this would eventually reflect in policy changes.


The recent 2014 Re-interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution takes this into consideration, and provides the JSDF with the ability to defend itself, even in the case of offensive campaign to protect strategic interests, as well as to protect allied interests. It is interesting that the experiences in Iraq had been the catalyst for the gradual changes in JSDF roles, it was not a result of Abe’s recent reinterpretation, but had been a result of Koizumi’s decision to send JSDF to Iraq in 2003.

I also want to show some pictures of the JSDF in Iraq:

JGSDF in Basra, Iraq

JGSDF securing strategic zone in Basra, Iraq





References:


Hokkaido Shimbun(2004), ‘Yuujihou to Beigun: Zenmen Ittaika wo Kigu Suru

[Contingency Bill and the US Military Forces: Worrying SDF’s integration into

the US Army]’, 11 March, Morning edition.




Mainichi Shimbun(2004), ‘Iraku Fukkou Shien: Houdou Kikan to Boueichou,

Genchi Shuzai Ruuru de Goui [Assistance for the Reconstruction in Iraq:

Newspapers and News Agencies agreed with Japan Defense Agency on the

Guideline for Media Activities in Iraq]’, 12 March, Morning edition.


Sakai, K. (2007). 'Stories of our boys', but for whom? The Japanese media's coverage of the SDF in Iraq.
International Journal Of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, 1(3), 349-366. doi:10.1386/ijcis.1.3.349/1