No, it is going to be much more difficult. See this...
China’s Xi Jinping is forecasting he will invade Taiwan, the US better listen: Robert O’Brien Former national security advisor tells 'Kudlow' China 'badly' wants Taiwan Former National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien warned the Biden administration Thursday to not underestimate Xi Jinping’s...
defence.pk
Because you have never served, you do not know what you are talking about.
When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Iraqi casualties were about 650 rounded figures. When Desert Storm ended, Allied casualties were about 1200 rounded figures.
Why do war planners desire the element of surprise so much?
On the surface, it seems intuitive that if you catch the enemy by surprise, defeat should be swift. That is true. But there is more to a swift defeat to the enemy. A major reason why the element of surprise is so desirable is that it reduces your casualties even if you grossly outnumber the enemy. Up until Desert Storm, PLA doctrine have been to overwhelm enemy defense by sheer numerical superiority, aka the 'human wave' tactic. But Desert Storm proved that flexibility and maneuverability are able to focus force to weak points faster than the enemy could react, in other words, exploit the element of surprise where least expected. The start of the air war was when Iraqi air defense radars were destroyed to create a just wide enough radar gap for the coalition's air forces to fly thru relatively undetected.
With an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, the PLA have no available avenue to exploit the element of surprise. The sea restrict to only one method of troop delivery: by ships. The favorable landing sites are known. The weather openings are predictable. In other words, Taiwanese defense can practically mirror PLA invasion plans.
Absent the element of surprise, the PLA attacking force needs at least a 2-1 numerical superiority
ON LAND just to even the odds, let alone sway the odds over to victory. But now the PLA amphibious fleet would be vulnerable for at least 180 km in transit in the strait. Assuming a reasonable surface speed of 20 kts, the fleet would be 4 hrs in open water, and each vessel location would be known to Taiwanese defense
IN REAL TIME.
The problem for the PLAN is that Taiwanese artillery can reach out to 40 km and they do not need to destroy the entire fleet. Taiwanese defense, which includes artillery, manned fighter-bombers, and missiles, just have to do enough damage to reduce PLA numerical superiority enough to induce doubt that the invasion will succeed, and if the doubt is there due to enough losses in transit, PLA generals will have no choice but to turn back, else losing the rest on Taiwanese beaches.
When I was active duty, the USAF standard formation was a four-ship flight.
Cesar “Rico” Rodriguez gives a remarkable account of how he brought down three enemy fighters, two during Desert Storm and one during Allied Force.
www.thedrive.com
This is the process junior pilots must work through on an operational unit to progress from being a wingman, through two-ship lead, four-ship lead,...
If we lose one, for any reason, the flight's effectiveness over the target is commensurately reduced, meaning our burden to do damage to the target is now even greater. If we lose two, most likely the target will survive to retaliate.
This calculus is
NOT restricted to air forces.
It means for every four-ship PLA flight, Taiwanese defense just have to destroy one fighter-bomber in order to reduce the flight's effectiveness, and to increase the target's survival odds. The approximate could be applied to missile defense, tank defense, or against the PLA amphibious fleet. To survive as a viable armed force, Taiwanese defense just have to kill one element out of four, whatever it maybe. But more likely, Taiwanese defense will take two out of four.
This is why the element of surprise is so critical but the PLA will not have it over Taiwan.