atlssa
FULL MEMBER
- Joined
- Mar 5, 2014
- Messages
- 220
- Reaction score
- 0
- Country
- Location
IHS Jane’s World Navies
Executive Overview (extract) – The challenges facing India’s Navy
It has been a challenging nine months for the Indian Navy (IN). A fatal explosion on board the INS Sindhurakshak, a 2,300-tonne Type 877EKM Sindhughosh (Kilo)-class variant, in August 2013 that resulted in the sinking of the vessel off the coast of Mumbai and the deaths of 18 crewmen, was the first of a series of accidents to hit the IN over the past year. The IN chief at the time, Admiral D K Joshi, resigned in February 2014 following a fire on board the INS Sindhuratna, another of the IN’s Kilo-class submarines, that killed two officers and was the tenth incident involving IN assets and the third submarine accident in the preceding seven months. Prior to the sinking of the Sindhurakshak, the IN had in service 14 diesel-electric submarines – ten Kilo-class and four Shishumar (Type 209/1500)-class – with only seven to eight operational at any time; at least four are currently understood to be undergoing extended refits. In comparison, China has more than 60 submarines in service, including nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), with several more on order. The Pakistan Navy (PN) has long stated an interest in acquiring additional submarines to bring the force more in line with the submarine strength of the IN; the PN is in discussions with China for a purchase of up to six submarines with a deal expected to be signed before the end of 2014.
Much of the intense public scrutiny that has followed the accidents over the past year has focused on an ageing IN fleet being the cause of mishaps. The Sindhurakshak had been in service only 16 years at the time of the accident in 2013, and had been handed back to the IN in January 2013 after a mid-life update (MLU) in Russia, extending its service life by at least another decade. However, the Sindhurakshak was one of the last submarines to be inducted into the IN. India’s Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) pointed out in 2008 that 75 per cent of the IN’s submarine fleet had already completed three fourths of their estimated operational life by 2010, and that the fleet was only 67 per cent of the force levels envisaged in a 1985 maritime expansion plan. Although the Sindhuratna had also recently been refitted and was undergoing acceptance trials at sea when the accident took place, it was originally due to be phased out in 2013.
In order to meet desired operational standards, the IN will need to address several challenges that go beyond its submarine arm. Aside from the relative success of the indigenous construction of the aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, and the SSBN, INS Arihant, the IN has hardly seen timely construction and delivery schedules or the regular induction of new platforms. Consequently, ageing platforms have undergone repeated upgrades to extend their operational life beyond their normal lifespan. In addition, efforts to modernise the IN’s fleet have been weakened by less than optimal refit management, procurement procedures, infrastructure constraints, and personnel and training issues.
Refit management
In a February 2014 report tabled in parliament, the CAG revealed considerable time and cost overruns to mid-life refit and other upgrade programmes of IN platforms at state-owned dockyards under Ministry of Defence (MoD) control, resulting in unavailability of platforms for operations. It stated that between 2005 and 2010, 113 (or 74 per cent) of a total of 152 IN refits were only completed after an accumulated delay of 8,629 days, or 23.6 years. It attributed the delay to "growth of work attributable to the ageing of ships", and "the inability to ensure timely induction of new ships". It added that delays of 5-67 months in commencing mid-life upgrades of naval platforms had prompted "cascading delays" in refitting other ships, which had resulted in the operational unavailability of warships. Further, the report pointed out that though these issues had been raised in previous reports as early as 1999, “… even after a decade, the same concerns continued to exist.”
A programme to upgrade all Kilo-class submarines to Type 877EKM standard is still underway, with INS Sindhudhvaj and INS Sindhushastra currently undergoing modernisation. The programme has focused on the installation of new sonar systems, along with weapons upgrades that enable the class to equip 3M-54E1 Klub-S (SS-N-27) land attack cruise missiles. It was originally intended that the majority of these refits would take place in India, but this has not proven possible, leading to some work being undertaken in Russia, resulting in significant delays. An additional concern that the CAG has highlighted in multiple audits has been that refit of platforms was often carried out at the end of the service life, rendering them “maintenance intensive”, and as a result impacting on availability, readiness, and operational effectiveness.
Infrastructure, spares, and procurement delays
The CAG report referred to above also cited infrastructure constraints at dockyards and the lack of timely availability of spares as primary reasons for less than optimal MLU programmes. The report cited the Mumbai Naval Dockyard as admitting to “geo-physical constraints such as space, depth of water, tide, etc., affect[ing] berthing and docking operations of large sized ships”. A spate of the IN’s accidents has taken place in the Western Naval Command. Sanctioned construction of dry docks at the Mumbai Naval Dockyard has remained incomplete for more than 26 years, in addition to significant cost overruns. Although decongestion had been achieved to some extent by developing a new dockyard at Karwar in Karnataka state, manpower planning had posed additional challenges here.
The report also highlights “extensive” unavailability of critical spares for refit of IN vessels that “resulted in postponement of essential routines and use of refurbished components, resulting in adverse impact on quality, reliability and longevity of equipment on board. In the absence of supply, the demands were met either by refurbishing old spares or by resorting to local purchases. In certain cases, the items were also cannibalised from other ships.”
Procurement and indigenous production of platforms for the IN, particularly the submarine fleet, have also faced significant delays. In 1999, India’s Cabinet Committee on Security approved a 30-year submarine construction plan for the construction of 24 conventional submarines in India. Only six Scorpene submarines are expected to be inducted into service by 2021-22, more than twenty years after the plan was finalised. The Scorpenes were expected to begin replacing the ageing Kilo-class vessels by 2012. Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL) is building the six DCNS Scorpene submarines in Mumbai under Project 75, but these have been severely delayed. MDL started building the boats in December 2006 but by June 2013, delivery of the first Scorpene had slipped by around four years to late 2016. Under Project 75I (India), state-owned public sector undertakings (PSUs) were selected in December 2013 to build four diesel-electric submarines IN. Project 75I had been delayed due to bureaucratic wrangling over which companies would locally construct four of the six boats. Fearful of delays, the IN had wanted the private sector to play the prominent role in the build programme, while the MoD wanted the submarines constructed by PSUs, despite earlier indicating that it would offer the programme to private shipyards. The procurement process for six next-generation air-independent propulsion (AIP) -equipped submarines has remained in initial stages since the request for information was issued in 2010. The IN is unlikely to field these submarines until after 2020, if not later.
A production line that was commissioned for the Shishumar class in anticipation of the retirement of the IN’s Kilo-class submarines was closed down in 1994 following the construction of INS Shankul after allegations of corruption emerged.
A previous CAG report had also made specific reference to inordinate delays in the procurement of Battery Monitoring System that were urgently needed for upkeep of IN submarines.
The aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya was commissioned in November 2013 following a five-year delay and an almost three-fold escalation in its refurbishment costs. The first in the navy’s Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC) programme, INS Vikrant, was launched in August 2013 after a four-year delay and is not anticipated to enter service until 2018.
In a 2010 report, the CAG also highlighted significant challenges to the development of the IN’s aviation wing. It stated that the navy's air power aspirations remained handicapped by "weaknesses in planning, asset management, operations, and repair and maintenance activities", adding that an ad hoc approach had triggered "significant shortcomings and procurement delays". It noted that between 2003 and 2009, overall aircraft availability was just 26% because of the large number of assets undergoing repair and overhaul, and due to delays in procurement. Further, no combat, long- or medium-range maritime reconnaissance or anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft were introduced between 1990 and 2005, forcing the IN to extend the operational life of in-service aircraft.
Personnel and training
Understaffing and undertrained personnel may also have contributed to some of the more serious incidents involving IN assets. In an indication of this, soon after taking over as chief of naval staff on 17 April 2014, Admiral RK Dhowan said that the navy would take steps to ensure that personnel followed rules and procedures without resorting to shortcuts that could result in mishaps. Local media reports citing findings from a preliminary inquiry into the fire aboard INS Sindhuratna indicated that some deviation from standard operating procedures may have taken place; conclusions from a board of inquiry are awaited. Several previous accidents involving IN vessels have however been attributed to human error, including flawed manoeuvres and safety drills not being followed. IN officials have long stated that although it had received new platforms in the past decade, the MoD and union finance ministry had declined to provide additional funds to pay for the consequent increase in staffing levels, leading to meagre resources being stretched and to officers with limited experience assuming charge of technically advanced vessels, many of which experienced mishaps.
As of June 2013, the IN faced a shortfall of 1999 officers and 13373 sailors. Though the navy has announced plans to increase personnel strength by nearly a quarter by 2018-20, it appears that opportunities in civilian employment are proving difficult to counter. Other reasons identified by the MoD for overall manpower shortages in the country’s armed forces include “accretion in force level from time to time, availability of multiple and lucrative alternative career avenues with the growth of nation’s economy, stringent selection criteria and difficult service conditions coupled with perceived high degree of risk”.
Strengthening capabilities
The IN’s aspirations for blue water capabilities require focus on several areas including resolving delays to its platform replacement programmes, defining capability requirements more precisely, and addressing reforms to defence procurement procedures. In its latest audit, the CAG also recommended “a more efficient management of planning and execution of refit, speedy completion of infrastructure projects, better inventory management, and timely supply of machinery and spares.” Against the background of highly publicised incidents involving strategic assets, and in the absence of clarity on the cause of recent accidents, morale of personnel might also be an important aspect to address for the IN. Former senior IN officials pointed to morale being affected adversely as a result of a seven-week delay in appointing a chief of naval staff; the delay led to the postponement of the IN's bi-annual commanders conference in early April 2014 in New Delhi. The IN also had to send relatively junior representatives to the four-day Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) in March 2014.
A gradually ageing fleet with replacement programmes running many years behind schedule take on added significance given the IN’s desire for sea control and sea denial capabilities in the northern Indian Ocean. Former IN chief Nirmal Verma speaking to IHS Jane’s in July 2011 highlighted the IN’s evolution as a credible and operationally capable force that is looked upon as a regional "net security provider". Adequately fulfilling this role and meeting its goal of operating 162 imported and locally designed platforms, including two aircraft carriers and conventional and nuclear-powered submarines, by 2025, will require sustained efforts by the IN and the Indian government to address the challenges ailing the service.
Copyright © IHS Global Limited, 2014
Note: this is exactly a copy and paste from the original which can be downloaded here:
Defence & Security Intelligence & Analysis - IHS Jane's 360
or
http://info.ihs.com/forms/IHSJanesDefense?retURL=http%3A%2F
%2Fwww.janes360.com%2Fimages%2Fassets%2F210%2F37210%2FJWNA_India_EO.pdf&a=1
or
https://www.dropbox.com/s/wqb9ik0d9...view - Challenging times for India's Navy.pdf
Dropbox - IHS Jane's World Navies Executive Overview - Challenging times for India's Navy.pdf
but at least the Arihant will enter service in 2015-16 plus we will have the first Scorpene in 2015 too. Now we need to get a move on and build 6 next gen subs with AIP! let's hope the BJP will be better in this regard and not waste time.
